Here are three lessons from AFG we should be smart enough to apply in UKR:
1. We should not attempt fighting a battle for those who don’t care enough to fight it themselves. The idea Prozac expressed, that we must stop tyranny here before it spreads everywhere, is undercut by the unwillingness of Europe to defend itself. If Germany isn’t worried about Russia threatening them, why are we? We aren’t isolationists; if Europe is banding together against an aggressive Russia I’m in. But the situation looks like we’re overly aggressive defending a continent who is apathetic about our noble notions. We should be smarter. Do not fight a war for Europe that Europe won’t fight itself.
2. This one is tough to articulate: There are boundaries that if adversaries cross we should fight. But we should not artificially move those boundaries, then fight over artificially made boundaries. In AFG we said “AQ attacked us, we have to crush them & their ability to do it again.” Yup, 100% right. I spent my adult life doing it. But then we foolishly transitioned into “we must spread democracy here, as a strategic hedge against AQ ever growing again . Now we’ll stay for decades forcing democracy.” Fighting to prop up GIRoA was dumb, even GIRoA didn’t believe in itself. We should have left after smashing the enemy, let grow whatever political system worked for the Afghans, and come back to smash them again if required. With Ukraine, the line we cannot allow to be crossed is a NATO member being attacked. “If they attack UKR they’ll attack Poland!” Maybe, we don’t know. But if that’s the case, we should fight when they attack Poland (Article 5), not at an artificially made assumption before the one we actually care about. It is hubris to assume you know what the future holds.
3. We should not commit troops to war unless our nation actually wants it and we authorize it correctly through Congress. This thing we’ve all done for the last 20 years was stupid, unpopular, devastating to our national credibility, national debt, and the lives of service members. And ultimately we gained nothing from it. Now the same people are telling us we have to do something similar in Ukraine, and we should trust them. But our countrymen don’t want it, so it will fail.
In light of these three items, we should be clear eyed about our prospects for success on this misadventure in Ukraine. And although this final item might seem political, it is relevant: given the obvious and massive corrupt political connections between our presidents family and Ukrainian oligarchs, can any of us trust that the information we are receiving about the situation is correct?