I don’t even think it’s important. The GWOT invalidated those schools and the officers they produced. None of their advanced education brought anything worthwhile to the GWOT. Our successes were tactical, and produced by guys & gals in the trenches flying the daily line figuring out a new way to expedite authorities, move stuff, pass gas, engage high speed cars, track squirters, etc. Guys like you. Making the only thing close to a win by pure grit & attrition.
Whereas our numerous GWOT failures were produced (militarily at least, I’ll sidestep political finger-pointing) by inexperienced commanders overthinking relatively simple problems.
Attendance at these prestigious schools and their prerequisite Exec/ADC jobs is a time demand incompatible with double digit line flying deployments. When these graduates finally showed up down range, it was always in a leadership position however their lack of operational experience and credibility resulted in leading without confidence or operational context; their knowledge of war was theoretical.
They didn’t trust their captains to provide that experience, were crippled by a lack of confidence, did not understand how to intelligently take calculated risk, were fixated on irrelevancies while mischaracterizing captains who prioritize mission and ignored irrelevancies as undisciplined, and stuck to poor command decisions out of pride. You couldn’t talk to these people. They just wanted to make it to the end of their tour without anything happening. They despised initiative.
The elite IDE/SDE schools and fellowships are no longer prestigious. They produced graduates who simply cannot win, and stifled those who could.