The latest from Maj Gen Wills:
MAF Heroes,
Below is a slightly edited version of a post I added to a CAF forum that I’m also part of. It followed a thread that commented on the release of one of the recent AIBs. Quite a bit of it is specific to the CAF, but I think the main points I’m trying to make apply to all of us, especially the shameless plug for our instructors. If you haven’t read the safety reports from the past few accidents in full, I highly recommend it. There’s something there for all of us, and it isn’t all what you think.
Offered for your consideration and in the intent of this forum.
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Previous Post:
Warriors, I’d like to add a couple of points to the recent thread regarding the recent mishap (s). First, if you haven’t had the chance to read the actual safety reports, I highly recommend it - there’s a lot there for us to collectively consider in a lot of areas.
Some have asked “does the leadership know?” The answer is yes - declining experience levels and training cuts are at the forefront of our discussions, and specifically on the agenda going in to aircrew summit. I won’t speak for my ACC teammates, but they’re working on plans to address the experience levels in ACC. COMAETC and COMACC met today and this was at the top of the list. COMACC emphasized that this is an enterprise wide problem and it will require an enterprise wide solution.
We’ve had some great discussions here about risk. If you’re wondering if the leadership knows we’ve accepted increased risk, the answer is yes. We also know that the Generals are the ones who accept it and you’re the ones who have to live with it. This is the usual arrangement, as unsatisfying as it is to all of us.
Overall, the entire system is fundamentally out of balance, and fixes in one area tend to exacerbate problems in another. It’s an enterprise problem and it’s a little like squeezing a balloon. The previous COMACC described it as a ‘wicked problem’ - meaning you can’t work discrete elements of the problem, you have to work all of it at once.
There’s no magic solution. We’re trying to make pilot training better, but we can’t make it longer. There’s a lot more to this story and I’m happy to field questions on this front. Keep in mind that there is virtually zero CAF experience at UPT and it’s been this way for a long time. The MAF has single-handedly propped up pilot training for at least 10 years and we owe them a lot.
It’s also true that ACC + AETC deliberately adjusted FTU length and fighter tour lengths to restore a healthy flow from UPT to FTU to Ops units and back to white jets and institutional requirements. That change (and the syllabus) was coordinated, but it apparently wasn’t communicated across the MAJCOMs in an enduring way. As the syllabus owner for a lot of these programs, I’ll take the spear for that, and it won’t happen again. We have syllabus conferences coming up in for the F-16 and F-35; my pledge is that you’ll get a coordinated worldwide message going into and coming out of each AETC FTU syllabus conference that lays out what we’re collectively building and what it looks like. You’ll also get a front page of the syllabus that clearly lays out the aim of the syllabus and the kind of wingman it will produce. You don’t have to like it, but you’ll at least have the intent in black and white. Sneak preview - COMACC intent remains “The “B” in B-Course stands for Basic. We need to focus on the basics and ensure we’re teaching folks to do the ordinary things extraordinarily well.” B courses will remain ~6-7 months long.
Regarding AAR at FTU, we’ve made changes at the AETC FTUs to ensure we don’t graduate anyone without at least Day AAR complete. Our tanker teams are outstanding but we all know that scheduling is a challenge. It would be unrealistic to say that no B courser will ever graduate FTU without AAR again, though both ACC and AETC are working hard to prevent it. FYSA, our team at Altus is sending a business effort tanker once a month to where it’s needed - we’ve had 3 thus far to Eglin to support the F-22 and F-35 FTUs. We’re also trying to get more out and backs from Altus to HMN to support.
Shameless plug: Hats off to the FTU IPs out there. Our FTU heroes are working overtime to provide you with the wingmen you need. They’re being pulled in both directions - adjust to a less experienced input and provide a more capable output — it’s a tough task and I’m proud of those of you who are making it happen. All of this is made more difficult by generally low FTU manning and will get harder with some of the fleet challenges we’re going to be seeing. Bottom line: FTU is tough duty and our teams are doing great work with a mighty challenge.
We’re going to be in a period of declining experience levels for some time. We can argue about how we got here, but we’re here.
That said, what are WE going to do about this?
One thing we should all agree on right away: let’s stop saying our new pilots “suck.” It’s probably closer to true to say that in most cases they’ve just had less training than you did. Put yourself in their shoes. Through no fault of their own, they went through the programs at a time of tremendous turbulence and change. The syllabus is one piece of the puzzle. Constant wash backs, fleet challenges, breaks in training and finally COVID means that their continuity in training was generally awful. Now is the time to think about what’s required to get them to the level they need to be. Most of us weren’t born on Mount Olympus...somebody helped you get where you’re at today. It’s our turn to pay it forward, and at the end of the day, they’re wearing our patch...how are we going to make them better?
The second recommendation is a little closer to home. We say we’re fighter pilots...fighter pilots are supposed to be able to ask hard questions of themselves, not just of other people. Are we asking truly hard questions? Do we have a culture problem in addition to an experience problem? Are we paying lip service to ORM or are we really making the tough calls? Are we disciplined in execution, or have we let our own standards drop? Are we so empowered that nobody feels the need to know the rules or follow the rules? Another way of saying ‘declining experience’ is ‘fewer adults in the room.’ We’re in a period of the Air Force where if you’re asking if there’s an adult in the room, you’re the adult. We’re all going to need to step up.
It’s easy to blame the machine, and the machine deserves some blame. The machine consumed me some time ago, so I’ll take all your spears on that front. The MAJCOMs are working together to try and build a good way ahead with the pipeline. All the easy answers are gone, so it’s going to be tough sledding for a while. One thing I do know is that we’re failing if we don’t look in the mirror a little bit too. It’s our Air Force and it’s going to take all of us working together. This is a defining challenge and it’s not going away anytime soon.
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Bottom line: We can argue all day long about how we got here, but we’re here. What are WE going to do?