Leaderboard

The monetary and personnel costs associated with the PCS grind are massive. DoD spent $4.3B reshuffling its people in FY14, which is up 13% since 2001 even though the number of moves is down 12% over the same span, meaning that total costs are up 28% on a per-move basis. The AF sees a disproportionate amount of that cost too, since airmen, and AF officers especially, are the costliest segment of the DoD to move. Per AFPC's own statistics, we're also PCSing our officers every 37 months on average, despite the assignments reg stipulating 48 months as the standard. If you crunch the numbers, you'll find out that Big Blue could save close to $100M per year if it did nothing but follow its own damn AFI WRT TOS before PCS's. That doesn't even begin to account for the added value in QoL, the likely increase in retention, etc. Here's the GAO report if anyone's interested. Assignments AFI is 36-2110.

Dude, that has not been a player in any previous closing decisions. In fact, as pointed out in previous threads (too lazy to search) signed MILCON projects proceed even AFTER closing decisions. Reference the brand new commissary and hospital that were opened on Chanute right before they shuttered the place.

Approved for the 2nd time. What a clown show.

fify

It would be an amazing concept for the services to actually offer a hardship location pay to some of the spectacular locations stateside like Polk or Minot. I get prioritizing cost of living adjustments but BAH is designed to handle that, what isn't handled is money to make being 7 hours away from anything and any family in the middle of the desert. Another factor I would say all the service branches need to see is what there actual needle is at with the constant game of "that's where you're PCS'ing enjoy the sandwich I gave you." I can count on one hand the number of people told to go to crap location that threatened to drop their papers and leave that didn't, but I can count at least 15 guys that are out for the same reason. How many times does HRC have to lose that fight while still calling themselves successful before somebody tries to make a change. Maybe treating people eligible for retirement/guard/etc like they have no option but to take the hand dealt isn't a good policy to stick to when you're simultaneously facing a manpower shortage. Sent from my iPhone using Tapatalk

Not sure if this has been posted on BO.net before, but I agree with this: https://philipgmorrison.wordpress.com/2017/01/15/its-your-move-the-dilemma-of-incurred-commitment-in-the-modern-job-market/ BLUF: frequent PCSing leads to unnecessary separations, even for "free agents" who could otherwise punch more or less immediately Completely true in my sample size of 1. My departure from AD was driven by a PCS, yet I likely would have stayed on at least a little while beyond my ADSC had I remained in place.

There is the $25k deal and $15k deal. If you only fullfill the obligation for the $15k deal, but you signed for the $25k deal you must pay back the cummulative difference between the $25k deal and the $15k deal. Could end up being $20,000 and you have to pay that back pre-tax (and file corrected w2's). Royal PITA, but hey... if you want out, you do what you have to do. At the end of the day when you have the potential to make $300+ per hour in the last 5 years of your airline career working 10 days per month, $20k now is chump change. Sent from my SM-G930T using Tapatalk

You're joking, right?! You did caveat your comment so I'll give you that. Which community are you referring to, because in my limited experience the ARC bubbas are full-up and have 2-3 times more experience as well.

I've been told the same thing for the Reserves, which is a good thing since I had my AFRC board package and my FC1 request both sent in yesterday.

Mypers updated for the O-4 board. Estimated release mid-late June. Sent from my iPhone using Baseops Network Forums

Supposedly FC1 does not have to be completed prior to submittal up to NGB. Had 2 guys at WPAFB with me getting FC1, who already had approved package from NGB, and were weeks away from TFOT commencing.

It's supposed to be sent after FC1 and MFS results are approved, but I've heard of instances where units submit the officer accession package to NGB before the medical to speed things up.

I have heard it can go before FC1. It seems like most go after though which would make more sense.

Just learned from my recruiter that NGB had the package sitting on their desk for the past 2 months and nobody even knew. So today they now know and said I should have my letter within 2 weeks.

I take issue with any argument that says the AF can't afford something. Bullshit. The Air Force will prioritize bleeding edge technology fighters over everything else. If solving personnel issues means one less F-35, they'll take the jet every time.

Here's my question and the response from the VA using their website's "Ask a Question" function: QuestionMy wife plans on utilizing my transferred Post-9/11 GI Bill benefits to start attending grad school. I'm currently a part-time Air National Guard member (with full eligibility from my time on active duty). I work anywhere between 5-10 days of Title 10 per month and some additional Title 32 days as well.I'm wondering how those days of Title 10 will affect the MHA payment we would expect to receive. Is it prorated? Does even one day of Title 10 in a month make you ineligible for MHA payments? If I went on Title 10 orders long-term I'm assuming that we'd be ineligible for MHA just like if I were on active duty, but the intermittent orders is really what's driving my question.I've tried to search for answers but can't find any articles or FAQs that cover this specifically. Thanks in advance for your help! Answer Hello, Your housing would only be affected if you were on continuous active duty (you would not receive housing at all). All other intermittent days will be added to your service time and should not affect housing payments (unless you generate enough days to warrant a percentage increase) if you have not already reached 100%. Thank you for contacting the Department of Veterans Affairs. St. Louis RPO/TL

How's this whole thing goin?? Morale improving or shall it continue?!

TERA is authorized by Congress until 31 December 2018, at the discretion of the service chiefs. Our service chief isn't currently offering it.

I think we're at 2 now?

Excellent that the article's main point wasn't just to slow the roll on PCSing, but that the incurred service commitment for a mandatory PCS was the issue. 100% agree...when faced with A) accept PCS and add to my overall ADSC or B) punch, I took the red pill. To solve the problem of massing folks in desirable locations, you do what every other large organization on earth does: leverage incentives. Pay more for less favorable locations. Offer career benefits for accepting tours in less favorable locations. Also you probably just accept that quality at those less favorable locations is going to inevitably be lower due to the trend of people with their heads screwed on straight will choose more favorable life conditions for their families.

Another special pay for shitholes for 0 to 3 years, bonus for staying beyond three years. Bottom 1/3rd requested bases get a base pay bonus of 10%. Sign up for a 5 year hitch at Turdshit AFB and get years 4 & 5 with a bonus + 10% base pay. Make the bonus appreciable, at least 6 o 12k per year, with increasing pay for tenure at Base X. Coming at it from a perspective of someone with rug rats, steer money to these bases for great housing-facilities-schools (On base DODS or contract schools if the local schools are abortions or grants for local school improvements if it could be done legally). Not saying this from hate but there could be other incentives to encourage movement at appropriate times rather than stagnation at garden spots. You could require the desirable spots to fill X % of 365s first with some caveats to ensure they get sometime in the sun or beach before a 365 to somewhere not so nice. Less desirable bases would then have at least one attractive amenity (or several if you implement that plus a bonus pay).

Stopping the PCS madness is a great idea. 5 years should be the standard. All a typical pilot needs till he goes to ACSC are jobs at/below the Wing level anyway. All that can be done in one place. If you want to move after 5 years but before 10 look for a job in a squadron somewhere else and get hired there. Let Sq/CCs hire their squadrons. I'm sure there are tons of problems with this idea.

Yeah, imported leadership has been the thing for a while. Now we're moving captains and majors between platforms.

Ever had a plate of lightly toasted crayons dipped in ranch dressing? Don't knock it until you try it.

I don't think CCs get a specific report on bonus takers, but it's pretty obvious in the ADSC date and reason coding on your SURF if you have/haven't....assuming anyone is inclined to check.

My CC asked me if I took the bonus after a PCS to his squadron. I hadn't been offered the bonus yet. Does AFPC tell the CC when you don't take the money? I turned the bonus down based on what my airline buddies told me. If I had 5 years remaining to 20 years, I might have taken the money. Just stupid not to take the money in that case. Anyway, I am glad I listened to my friends because one friend told me he regretted his decision. I feel like a free man by turning the money down. The guy at AFPC told me the window was extended after I had told him no and the deadline had elapsed for the bonus. In my mind this extension was due to the fact that not enough people are biting on the bonus. I felt like the ARP at AFPC is under some pressure right now. He kept emailing me and would cc a GS-11 on our emails. Even after telling me the bonus may decrease or I might not be eligible this year, I didn't care.

Name change. HPO is now HIPO or HiPO or even Hipo will work. The imagery in my mind as you all mention one was too corollary. You're welcome. Out.

It's funny because the last few we've sent to Phoenix from the Herk were the sewn-in kneepad types that we wanted out of the community. You're welcome.

2

If AF leadership is so concerned about pilot retention, why don't they do two things: (1) fix the real problems and (2) make the new congressionally approved flight pay/ACP bonus limits a reality? Both need to happen right now! That being said, money is only 1 of 69,000 problems the AF has. Furthermore, there should be zero talk about stop loss from AF leadership until they, at a minimum, implement dollar values congress has authorized. That being said, the extra money won't do anything for retention unles the other 69,000 problems are fixed too. The AF has one choice. They must pay pilots more, bring basic functions back to the squadrons, reduce queep 100% (if it's queep, it's not required), and change the mentality of the AF at large from shoe clerk geekery back to what it should be---violently murdering our enemies and/or aiding those who do. Leadership has failed, as evidenced by the lack of trust in the O-5 through O-10 levels across our AF. It's very sad...and I do hope that among the new breed of FNGs, there are warrior-minded future leaders that turn this thing around for the better. It will take at least one generation of "leadership cleansing" in order to get rid of the spineless, yes man "leadership" currently embedded at all levels of our AF. As a data point, I planned to stay in the AF until they dragged me out. I had this mindset for a long time. Around 2012, I started to question my plans. By 2016, my decision was clear---move on to greener pastures as soon as I hit 20 years versus staying to 28, 30 or more. It really kills me because I know what the AF is capable of being, but it's not going to get there any time soon. For those of you stayinglong-term, fight the good fight and make this place better. As for me, I will do what can to improve my very small piece of the AF for the next 1 year, 6 months and 5 days.

Yeah, I'm with VFMA-187 on this. Big difference between combat ready and capable. Can't speak to heavy units, but from a fighter perspective, I think you're off base. Before I retired from the guard, with the exception of three guard babies, low time guy in my squadron had 2000+ hours. I don't know if every guy "cracked 3-1 or 3-3" buy they could all fly the shit out of the jet. Unless I chose to go light in a month, I usually flew as much if not more as a traditional than I did on AD. But, the thing to remember is the guard isn't supposed to provide a combat ready pilot tomorrow. It's a pool of mostly high time guys who have the experience base to be away from the jet for a few weeks or fly limited sorties. It's never been expected that an ANG unit would be the equivalent of a AD unit for day to day ops. If they're needed for combat ops, they're going to spin up quickly and be both combat ready and capable.

Ha, what do you mean by mindsets are changing for the better? Making the Guard more like AD? That's working out well for AD... Wrt 3-3/3-1... Maybe in your community.

We need to go back to the 90 day deployments. 6 months is still way too long. So it costs more money. What costs more replacing O-4s who are burnt out or breaking those BS deployments between 2 people? Sent from my iPhone using Baseops Network Forums

The really good ones were Art 15s.

They just slow the increment down.

From that ilk I've heard "you are a lightbulb. When you burn out I replace you with another one." Fantastic advice for resource management. It takes little time to create a toxic culture. It takes YEARS to fix it. Sent from my iPhone using Baseops Network Forums

You're spot on....the guy who groomed him wasn't much better 30 commander directed q-3's?! Wow. That alone speaks volumes.

Will not happen. Hopefully, because few things could be worse for our nation. There is only one scenario that shakes up the culture of leadership: 1. A legitimate existential threat to the average American way of life that can only be solved by military means. 2. A failure of existing leadership to counter the threat. 3. A failure of their second and third tier like-minded replacements to counter the threat. 4. Great tactical minds emerging as strategic geniuses, who defeat the undefeatable threat and overthrow the previous culture. 5. They become the leaders of a revised military culture that is built around the problems of a new yesterday. 6. The cycle starts again.

Dude, Unless you are Goldfein himself, NOTHING is going to change. We've heard the call to cleanse the system of toxic leaders before and nothing came of it, the primary reason I ran for the airlines and a guard unit at my first opportunity almost three years ago. If you want a toxic community look no further than AFSOC. Two of the worst most caustic humans that have ever lived have risen to become General Officers in AFSOC. One gave 30+ commander directed Q-3s while commanding the 15th SOS. As a Group/CC and deployed JSOAC/CC he hammered a dude in my community for losing his weapon down range, only to lose his gun a short time later and have it covered up by his command chief. He openly hates anything outside of his realm like the Weapons School and actively fought to end the program, going as far as shaming people who wore their graduate patch, then surrounded himself with patches downrange. As the Group/CC he flew a CV-22 into a tree, almost rolling the aircraft into the dirt. That little escapade got him a commander directed Q-3 of his own from the Wing/CC which would have ended any other officer's career, his punishment was to be there Wing/CC at Cannon where I hear he salted the earth and left a trail of destruction. Through all of this and multiple IG complaints from people I respect, NOTHING happened and he is now a two star select. Until you fix assholes like him, NOTHING will change. When I dropped my separation papers there was some doubt, the brothers and sisters I fought with were incredible people who shaped my life, now I look at the decision as the best of my life because I don't have to watch toxic leaders destroy the Air Force I love.

In lieu of making that previous post even longer, I decided to not go into the 'how' of our fight in Afghanistan. In short, I think we've eff'd it up wholesale by going in as heavily-handed as we did. Putting 100,000+ troops on the ground was not the answer - I think history and the present proves that. 15 years ago, it was Army leadership's job to tell their bosses that going into a 3rd world shit-hole like that was not a winning gameplan. Going in with SOF/surgical airpower/Jason Bourne/etc was the right answer. But, of course, we were reeling from 9/11, and IMO, we acted emotionally instead of rationally. Now, we designed a fight without realistic conditions for victory, and we're left with a quagmire that I literally think no one has any realistic idea on how to get out of victoriously. I'm sure there's lots of pretty slides and strategy papers on the who, what, where, when, and how, but I just don't buy it at this point - in fairness, I didn't buy it 15 years ago either - call me cynical. I too, am happy when our bros on the ground make it back, but the sad fact is that many of them have been killed without our nation having achieved its strategic objectives. So, with that as context, and arguably the only legitimate reason to be able to justify asking soldiers to give their lives, what is the solution? Burn up our Air Force and Navy? The two arms of the DOD that give us truly global power and asymmetric advantage? Right now Navy and Marine Hornets have <50% MC rates in some cases. That is what fighting a ground/guerilla war with air power gets you: not much. To your second paragraph, that's basically my point. We never should have invaded in '03, and we never should have fought Afghanistan with the tactics and strategy we chose. I chalk it up to our national leaders having access to the 'easy button', i.e. air power - low political cost, high-impact, immediate effect. Pretty much.

He's not against helping the US on the ground. If the Army is in an unsustainable position, though, grinding air resources at the problem without clear, achievable, measurable objectives merely keeps those soldiers in the same position longer vs realigning objectives (we are generally better at surgical excision of terrorist structures vs whole scale nation building)

I'll add my two cents (and some more). Soooooo not everyone on this board agrees with Tony Carr's perspective on the USAF - see his editorial on the Thunderbird mishap from last June and (if you know ANYTHING), you'll know that that piece was designed to elicit an emotional response, did nothing to satisfy public curiosity about the event, shed no new light on the event, and was literally the journalistic equivalent of throwing $hit at a wall - in the name of smearing the AF (cause he thinks it's fun, IMO). After that post I was honestly not sure whether or not to take him seriously any more - and I don't. He was a previous safety guy who "had F-16 experience" but yet he wrote it as someone would who lacked a military flying background. His response to my analysis (http://disq.us/p/1ejpsoe) of his editorial was dismissive, and when presented with facts, he avoided the issue. I don't consider him value-added at this point - as I do this message board. I think he's a semi-talented, own-press-reading, bitter, (ret) Lt Col who has nothing better to do with his time than sport bitch on the internet. I think lots of people agree with that sentiment, and while he can sometimes come close the mark, I don't think (in general) he is that interesting any more. On that note, and to your question, I don't think the root cause of the USAF's current crisis has much to do with leadership in a traditional sense, but then again, I was never one who drank the AF koolaid that would have all its officers believe that leadership is the panacea to every and all problems. No, sometimes, people make poor decisions and it's not because they are poor leaders. And sometimes, it doesn't matter who's at the seat, there can be (and are) systemic issues in an organization which have far greater effects. Pinning it all on "toxic leadership" is what someone who is still pissed at a lot of previous superiors does when he is no longer subject to their rule. That said, if you choose to orient yourself in such a way, then I suppose that everything can be boiled down to poor leadership (not toxic), but I think there are more systemic issues as to why the USAF is in its current state, and when viewed in that light, will lead to more fruitful changes. 1. 179s: Look a troop in the eye, and tell them that the reason they're going down range for 179 days (vs 180 or more) has nothing to do with the USAF's policy of granting short-tour credit for deployments of longer length (sts). http://www.af.mil/News/Article-Display/Article/112915/air-force-normalizes-short-tour-credit-policy/. IMO, there is only one reason such a policy could exist, and it is to screw airmen out of a medal, deployment credit, make it easier for the personnel machine to send them downrange again sooner, or whatever. Justifications along the lines of "well, we will need to be able to deploy them again" do not hold water. All airmen who were getting short-tour credit for 180+ day deployments were playing by the same rules, and were all on the same "list". What shifting a policy did while we were in the middle of a war, was create two groups of people - those who had deployed for >181 and <365 who got credit, and those who did not - that is a ripple in the system, and though it may not have an immediately visible consequence, it certainly has an effect and was unfair to lots of people. So, that's one example of something wrong, which has nothing to do with anyone wearing < 4 stars on their shoulders. But toxic leadership? Maybe, but by only one person - not a culture of it. 2. RIFs/Force-shaping: During my time in the USAF, I "survived" two RRFs (I think, maybe, I can't remember at this point). One occurred shortly after I finished the B-Course. The U-S-A-F sent me, a fighter pilot, paperwork that suggested I may not be retained, literally immediately after I finished soaking up the better part of $5M in training costs/taxpayer money and with nearly 10 years of commitment remaining. IMO, this was done in the name of "social justice" - an example of a policy enacted to make everyone feel like they're on the same page and are all of equal value. Was I actually concerned I was going to be force-shaped? Nope. But this is an example of something that is wrong with the AF at a cultural level. Fixing this would go a long way toward re-orienting the AF in the correct direction, but (I get it) it would cause A LOT of teeth-gnashing with the REMFs, and that is a merge I highly doubt the AF wants to buy - because we MUST be socially just, we absolutely must be (sarcasm). 2a. In 2011, the USAF got rid of 157 Majors who should have been allowed to retire: http://dailycaller.com/2011/11/25/military-advocates-decry-illegal-early-terminations-of-157-air-force-majors/ http://nation.time.com/2012/01/03/air-force-firing-for-effect/ This occurred, and then (almost immediately), the USAF sought to be granted TERA (and was given it) in order to "slim down": http://www.af.mil/News/Article-Display/Article/467816/eligible-officers-enlisted-members-offered-early-retirement/ http://www.af.mil/News/Article-Display/Article/483997/af-opens-additional-tera-vsp-windows/ http://www.af.mil/News/Article-Display/Article/467713/af-announces-additional-force-management-programs-to-reduce-force-size/ https://federalnewsradio.com/retirement/2016/01/greg-rinckey-air-force-officers-demand-reinstatement/ Does that not cause one to scratch their head (who said head)? Look a troop in the eye and tell them this is not the apex of hypocrisy and short-sighted decision making. If you ask me, this is an instance of breaking faith with people. And before we cry uncle and say "well we're subject to civilian leadership decisions", I don't remember any stars falling on their swords over that one. GOs should have been resigning up and down the chain over that one. Again, like it or not, when people witness decisions like this, it affects their "matrix" and they then re-evaluate their criteria for staying in the AF for the long haul. What this sequence of decisions made clear was that a member's continued service was arbitrary, and subject to the flavor of the month. That is not going to be good enough for most people who are investing the most valuable years of their working lives towards a successful career, and I think this has had a direct and lasting affect on morale and retention. Again, this is an example of a policy decision that created two classes of people: those who served > 15 years and were not given a retirement, and those who were. 3. Shortly on the pilot bonus: the fact that it hasn't change in what, 20+ years, communicates a lot - if not directly, then indirectly. All the hand-wringing about increased amounts being just around the corner is a little pathetic, and is obviously being done from a reactionary perspective. This should have been addressed YEARS ago, because the Airline hiring wave is NOT a surprise. 4. Focus: This, to me, boils down to what the USAF should be focused on. IMO, it is high-time that "space" and "cyber" became their own separate service (or perhaps services). Much like the USAF growth out of the Army benefited both branches, I think another, modern version of that evolution needs to take place with those two realms so they can get the focus they need, and we can get ours. No, space is NOT a continuation of the "air domain", and neither is cyber. There, I said it. Sure, they abut, but so does the surface of the sea/Earth, with the sky, yet we have different branches dedicated to those domains. IMO the AF is in love with the idea of being a one-sized fits all solution to all problems (or maybe they're addicted to the money, IDK). That last point will lead me to #5. 4a. It was suggested on other message boards that more 11X presence is needed throughout the AF - from staffs, to the FSS. I fully agree with this sentiment, and would happily displace an FSS Maj or Lt Col (while remaining on flying status) and run that shop/unit. Would I be there everyday? Nope, but I wouldn't need to be. See, it's all about policy and setting an expectation. The USAF for far too long has been ceding ever more control to those who don't have to cross a wire. Why is this? Do we really need a finance-trained, specialized Maj/Lt Col to run the finance shop? Really? Does that person even know how to operate DTS or whatever else? And even if they do know how, do they? I highly suspect they fill more of figure-head roll; a leader of those units could easily come from an 11X background and provide actual, bonafied leadership. I would go so far as to say that in order to command anything, you should have to be a rated officer. Yes, this caps non-rated officers - tough shit. Go get wings. 5. This is likely an unpopular opinion on this board, but the biggest mistakes we have recently made (as a nation) have been the strategic errors of invading Iraq in 2003, the "how" of invading Afghanistan in 2001, and then the subsequent withdrawal from Iraq in whenever we actually did it. Bottom line on this one, is that the USAF leadership (at the time) should have thrown down a firm "no" when the Army demanded we play in the conflict for as long as we have, as should have the Navy. Drones and snake eaters? You bet. Multi-million dollar fighter jets, the full capes of the world's greatest AF burning holes in the sky, US Navy billion-dollar aircraft carriers? No way. We have WAY over-extended ourselves in these conflicts and have NOTHING to show for it. Well, except a military full of equipment that is falling apart at a time when we least need it. I fully grasp that we were sent to war by our civilian leadership, but not calling a goat by its name isn't solving the problem. No, AFPAK Hands will not succeed. Not because of lack of awesome people and their concerted and earnest efforts, but because the strategic context of its goal is illogical and nonsensical. No amount of Air University PHD-research-papering will make it so. The point of the military is to kill people and break their shit; not to nation-build before a war is won. Advising people who don't want what we want isn't the answer - if there's one thing I learned from my experiences, combined with the 'cross cultural competency' assigned by ACSC, it's that. The sooner our "leadership" - of whatever flavor and level - wake up and recognize this, the better. We have poured (and continue to pour) far too much in time, resources, blood, and money into an unwinnable situation. We need to get back to defining realistic, measurable goals, by which we can actually measure a 1 or 0, we can start counting those. I would much prefer to hear from our leadership that the new, stated goal in Afghanistan is to never allow a Taliban, or al Qaeda sponsored/sympathetic government to take root - and leave it at that. We're not interested in standing up a government there; we're not interested in building girls' schools there; we're not interested in teaching air advisers how to read the JP 3.09-3. We are interested in shooting Hellfires off of drones at anyone associated with the Taliban or al Qaeda for the next 1000 years - that's it. This section has run on way too long, but to sum up: our current strategy only exists because we misunderstand who and what type of people we are fighting. 6. HPO lists, etc. This category is all about creating "classes" of people. The military has always been a good 'ol boys club, and it always will be. Formalizing it in Excel spread sheets, and choosing people while they are Captains is what has created and perpetuated a perception that it literally doesn't matter what you do if you're not on that list. It is nothing more than playing favorites, and creates an environment that leads people to separate - now there's some "leadership". I ultimately believe that more transparency in the assignment and promotion system will go a long way to correcting a lot of the AF's current problems as well. I could, and might, write more, but until next time, if you haven't read this article, the author hits on some extremely relevant points: https://philipgmorrison.wordpress.com/2017/01/15/its-your-move-the-dilemma-of-incurred-commitment-in-the-modern-job-market/. - ViperMan

Meh, I disagree nsplayer. I enjoyed the show while it lasted. More importantly, I will tell anyone who listens with what is wrong with the Air Force. Some I have solutions for and for others I am at a loss on how to fix. Actually Chang, the persona that you portrayed here, although completely overdone, are the sum total of the sentiments that are causing people to head for the door. What causes disappointment? Unrealized expectations. I think you have to start there. The last 10 or so years have been really tough on the CGOs. We came into the AF after 9-11 being told that the #1 priority of the AF is lethality, yet we are held to a completely different standard of measurement. I was an '08 commissionee from ROTC and worked my butt off to get to UPT, 38s and hopefully to a fighter, just to be told that there was no where for us to go except RPAs and AMC. Big disappointment, but whatever, I press on. Get to my AMC unit and less than a year later I am writing a RRF for my 1st of 2 RIF boards. Meanwhile my fighter brethren (the 30 or so they created in my whole year group) were now considered undermanned. On my 4th deployment, my CC calls me to tell me that he has to get me on the next VML otherwise an RPA may be non-vold must-fill from AFPC. I end up going to T-6 UPT, my dream job at the time. While I am in PIT I face the #2 RIF/VSP of my career, while my 11F brothers (whoever is left) are now critically manned. I get sat down by my T-6 SQ/CC and told that although my record is outstanding, my career field (11M) is 175% manned and I haven't even completed PIT yet, so prepare for the worst/hope for the best. Also, we are cutting for the next 5 years. I go out and get my dream job, and apply for Palace Chase only to be denied because now even though my career field is still overmanned, the AF as a whole is short on pilots. Me, I still keep kicking @ss, pulling down #1 Sq/OG strats and moving my way up in the Sq. Get tasked with a 6 month non-flying deployment to some $hithole to be underemployed and a job that would have actually been better to have been CONUS doing (timezone differences). Somewhere in there my family (wife+kids) made up their mind that we were done getting jerked around, so I have been making my way to the door ever since. After 10 years of stellar service, 5 deployments, missing years of my kids lives, I get called a quitter and told that I have no future in my Sq. I could write a lot more, but I just don't care to relive it anymore. I hate the fact that the AF made me fall out of love with something that I fought so hard to be apart of. I have seen this organization change in just the 10 years I've been in and it is unrecognizable. I sincerely want the AF to get better and be better, so let me know if you have any questions. Sent from my iPhone using Baseops Network Forums

When you guys lose your shit over a troll, it makes me think you are retards. Sent from my iPhone using Tapatalk

I've been telling young guys wanting to join to go guard/reserves. They can still serve their country, fly the mission, for the most part without having to deal with careerists like yourself. The guard/reserves provide the same product to national security as their active duty counterparts (some part time and some full time.) In fact, some are better at it because many of them prioritize mission excellence over careerist queep. By the way you have 328 dislikes, that should tell you something.

If you do that, you're almost guaranteed to be promoted.

A psychiatrist