I get that's a common sentiment in order to show gratitude to the departed, but that's not at all how it went down in reality. It's also not the first time I've buried a co-worker where the folk tale gets pressed that there was a heroic suicide for the sake of the people on the ground, later to reveal a more simple and less flamboyant answer (spatial D and mental unwillingness to get out, as was the case with my UPT SRO and his Hornet crash). You don't have to rub it in the surviving's faces at the funeral. But for us who still remain and do the job tomorrow, damn right we owe the departed some roasting, if we are to honor the legacy of his sacrifice, and learn a god damn thing or two instead of repeating it.
The conversation about collateral damage in the jet was to me, simply ancillary to a suspension of disbelief that stemmed from the fact they (and I am also not above reproach in that fallibility) did not immediately internalize the absolute nature of loss of control once dual hydraulic failure ensues. The common urban legend is that you can steer with windmilling hydro when the engine fails but windmills. First of all, not true enough to warrant consideration. BUT, this is worse than merely windmilling hydraulics, because the gearboxes were severed and thus there would have been actual zero input to the pumps. That means no shit, other than the engines effecting pitching moments of little consequence as they throttle jockeyed, the aircraft was immediately ballistic.
The decision to delay ejection was neither the correct one nor one that saved lives on the ground. It may have actually killed the deceased, if one is to conjecture that he would have had extra time to gather enough presence of mind to get his sh*t together, un-f*ck his own seat from the way he left it on takeoff, and punch. But this is conjecture since we will never know if he failed to punch himself out due to incapacitation (due to the incorrect sequence selected, and the FCP seat blasting him with the rocket) or inappropriate reaction to stress (aka frozen by panicking).
As to the latter, the SIB had some insights into that question which now the AIB sort of refutes, and paints the survivor in a not so positive light. I'm a little bit disappointed by this reversal in findings, but that's for the survivor to live with. Never miss an opportunity to STFU when it comes to USAF interviews is all I got to say about that one. I also don't trust the safety process enough to open my trap, but that's my bias.
Exactly. And you're being kinder than I.
Generally the checklist now allows for anywhere before takeoff. Most people either stow them in the hammerhead, or all the way back before pulling chocks. I do the latter, but sometimes I break order and do it in the hammerhead. And I'll challenge anybody here who flies these things come and assert they've never forgotten to arm their seat until they get to the MOA and go "..oooh shit...*muffled cllllllick* ". I only say that so people don't misinterpret my criticism for the complacent CRM in the conduct of a requal sortie that was conducted with a CT atmosphere (they all are) as some sort of gratuitous aspersion, when in reality we have all been guilty of it at one point or another.
The lesson learned for me is exactly that: treat CT rides with respect. And treat requal guys like idiot UPT students. Sure, don't verbalize that to them, but treat them with the same skepticism. The fact is, we don't as a collective. I also don't agree with the shortened "feed the fight" figther-centric thing we got going on at the schoolhouse, with shortening the callouts. Not so much because it's somehow blasphemy, but rather because the UPT bases, Red Bulls in particular, are actually going the opposite direction, precisely because of this accident. But I'm preaching to the choir here. Stay safe out there.