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Showing content with the highest reputation on 04/30/2017 in all areas
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Yeah, I'm with VFMA-187 on this. Big difference between combat ready and capable. Can't speak to heavy units, but from a fighter perspective, I think you're off base. Before I retired from the guard, with the exception of three guard babies, low time guy in my squadron had 2000+ hours. I don't know if every guy "cracked 3-1 or 3-3" buy they could all fly the shit out of the jet. Unless I chose to go light in a month, I usually flew as much if not more as a traditional than I did on AD. But, the thing to remember is the guard isn't supposed to provide a combat ready pilot tomorrow. It's a pool of mostly high time guys who have the experience base to be away from the jet for a few weeks or fly limited sorties. It's never been expected that an ANG unit would be the equivalent of a AD unit for day to day ops. If they're needed for combat ops, they're going to spin up quickly and be both combat ready and capable.7 points
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We need to go back to the 90 day deployments. 6 months is still way too long. So it costs more money. What costs more replacing O-4s who are burnt out or breaking those BS deployments between 2 people? Sent from my iPhone using Baseops Network Forums4 points
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For my last 3 or so years on active duty, I adopted the practice of calling authority figures in my chain of command "management" rather than "leadership". Fortunately, I had Squadron leadership that rocked and were flying top cover for me, otherwise I'm sure I'd have added another LOR or something to my already-impressive record of administrative slaps on the wrist. SQ/CC: "Hacker, have you briefed Group leadership on the ADVON plan?" Me: "Sir, I did brief management, and they did not have any questions." SQ/CC: "Why do you keep using the term 'management'?" Me: "I'll call them "leadership" when they re-earn that title. In the mean time, I'll call them what they actually are in practice." SQ/CC: "I guess I won't be putting you up for Wing Staff anytime soon....you're dismissed."4 points
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I told leadership that I'm off this sinking ship next October and magically, 4 months later, here's your 6-monther to the Deid. If you are reading this Chang...this is one of the 69 reasons people have had it. You want more fighter SP throughput, deploy an experienced IP from T-38s, while ramping up class sizes. That'll help the burden on others. 23 Oct 18 can't come soon enough.2 points
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The fact that stone age AFGSC is ahead of another MAJCOM in something is unbelievable.2 points
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Agreed, with one exception and the guy that comes to mind was phenomenal in the plane after he came to tankers and now is one his way up; most tanker guys that came to 130s were skilled careerists who could not fly the plane to save their lives. Likewise, my tanker bros want to punch me in the face after some of the "HPOs" we sent to tankers. Want a prime example of Phoenix debaucherry? Little Rock AFB under Rhat, tanker guy leading THE c-130 hub of the world. Good lord the toxicity that came under him was unprecedented. Now this is not to say it was because he was a tanker guy, it provides evidence of what kind of "guy" Phoenix types usually are. Yes, eliminate Phoenix. And stop making our weapons officers Wing execs. I don't think ACC does this at all?: making viper guys eagle guys or vice versa for career reasons? Seems the CAF values depth while AMC values breadth = not being proficient in your airplane..1 point
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In AMC (which is probably the most toxic community) get rid of the PHOENIX programs. You get career Airlifters in Tanker squadrons that: 1. Don't give a shit about the mission or community. 2. Are only there to check the box and get command. 3. Never grew up in the community, so of course they don't know how it's ran. Same could be said for the Tanker "management" that goes to command Airlift squadrons. Also the majority of folks who PHOENIX programs are the ones that sucked in their original MWS and never flew. But they're the ones who were the Exec/CAG/Guy who shouldn't be flying, so of course they'll get a great strat. Then they'll cross flow into the other side of AMC where they'll be Exec/ADO guy who doesn't fly a lot, doesn't know the new jet at all, and is just hanging on to go to school. Other communities don't do this type of program, don't know why the MAF feels why they have too.1 point
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If AF leadership is so concerned about pilot retention, why don't they do two things: (1) fix the real problems and (2) make the new congressionally approved flight pay/ACP bonus limits a reality? Both need to happen right now! That being said, money is only 1 of 69,000 problems the AF has. Furthermore, there should be zero talk about stop loss from AF leadership until they, at a minimum, implement dollar values congress has authorized. That being said, the extra money won't do anything for retention unles the other 69,000 problems are fixed too. The AF has one choice. They must pay pilots more, bring basic functions back to the squadrons, reduce queep 100% (if it's queep, it's not required), and change the mentality of the AF at large from shoe clerk geekery back to what it should be---violently murdering our enemies and/or aiding those who do. Leadership has failed, as evidenced by the lack of trust in the O-5 through O-10 levels across our AF. It's very sad...and I do hope that among the new breed of FNGs, there are warrior-minded future leaders that turn this thing around for the better. It will take at least one generation of "leadership cleansing" in order to get rid of the spineless, yes man "leadership" currently embedded at all levels of our AF. As a data point, I planned to stay in the AF until they dragged me out. I had this mindset for a long time. Around 2012, I started to question my plans. By 2016, my decision was clear---move on to greener pastures as soon as I hit 20 years versus staying to 28, 30 or more. It really kills me because I know what the AF is capable of being, but it's not going to get there any time soon. For those of you stayinglong-term, fight the good fight and make this place better. As for me, I will do what can to improve my very small piece of the AF for the next 1 year, 6 months and 5 days.1 point
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They're just lead-turning the pendulum swing. Right after we stop loss, they'll have to do another RIF; probably want to take three years of cuts all at once. I'm just hoping the horse bucks before 31 Dec 2018 so TERA will still be legally authorized by the NDAA.1 point
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But let's have two O-4 boards in a year. Wonder if the 09 guys will have to wait around a year and a half before pinning on.1 point
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When I checked earlier in April they hadn't listed the 150 reduction in June. Thanks for posting that. I guess the timeline has slowed drastically. Good thing since they haven't even posted an update for the '08 board timeline. Sent from my iPhone using Baseops Network Forums1 point
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Not sure 90-day trips meet the need for non-flying positions. Better is to make sure all billets are required, as discussed in myriad other posts. Deploying to an ISAF job a few years ago, the Finns split staff billets up between 3 guys: something like 12 weeks on, 6 weeks off for a year. Two guys in theater at all times, with overlap for continuity.1 point
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I did 3 6-month deployments on that schedule, and it really wasn't too bad. But the 179s I'm talking about are the random ones where you're deployed away from your unit, in a non-flying job, for 6 months. I wouldn't want to deploy for a whole year every three years, that's for damned sure. At least with the 6-month deployments, I either got to enjoy summer vacation with the kid or I was home for Christmas. A 365 pretty much ensures you miss both. I think a lot fewer people would bail due to the prospect of a 6 month deployment late in the career. Plenty already have bailed over the prospect of a 365.1 point
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It's not masked, but was deemphasized for the last several boards by way of the SECAF's memo of instruction to the board. For the most recent board, she also provided the same instructions to the MLRs. It's available on mypers if you want to read, I think.1 point
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Sometimes I feel like you guys are okay without the Wing having a Christmas party. Are you also okay without the LGBT fun run, or the African-Asian-Pacific Islander-Martian heritage events? I don't know...I wouldn't lose any sleep if any of those things didn't happen, but if people like those things...if it impacts their morale, and they want to plan those things...I have little issue with that. (And yes I know this was from a previous post and not the one that was quoted, so don't get sand up in the vaj; you seem like you need to be told that.). When someone turns down additional responsibility to remain flying the line...no big deal, man. Right on...we should promote you based on you experience and also your instructional abilities. But when all you do is fly the line and you fly 3-5 times a week...even if I try, I can keep my eyebrow from going all fvcking Vulcan. Damn near gives me the Whittaker eye... How long does it take to work on your airline apps? Damn...for the Lts out there, sure does pay to keep that logbook up to date from the start! Bendy Sent from my iPhone using Baseops Network Forums1 point
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This sounds like BS and you haven't read through the threads on this forum enough. So you think the AF is going to promote you ABZ without having planned a single X-mas party? #1 rule to AF Club is to plan the best X-mas parties. And you have to serve up pigs in a blanket. The top guys love those. I remember in 2004 or 2005 the promotion board didn't promote a lot of FAIPs. I know you aren't a FAIP.... Anyone know why the board went on a FAIP rampage?1 point
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Since we are discussing year groups, does anyone know the health status of the 2005 year group? My year group has gone through 2 rifs. All of my buddies are gone except one. People were like you are a shoe in to make Lt Col. I'm like that would be great and all but I now see why people in the 2004 year group bailed prior to pinning on major. Do you want happiness or to be told what to do for 8 more years. Feeling like you have no control over your life and can't tell a person to respectfully f#$@ off. I am not going to say out right I will not do ACSC to leaderships face. Definitely buy you a 365 in my opinion. Just going to keep kicking the can so if people ask, I will have a legitimate response. I'm tired of school and the AF forcing me to learn things I really don't care about.1 point
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Win a Champ! $50/ticket or $125 for three tickets. Only 4,000 tickets total, so odds are good. It's a 1946 LSA 7AC Champ that I haven't flown much in recent years due to military moves. I finally found a better purpose for it. Get raffle tickets here. Some friends and I created a non-profit, Vets to Jets, to fund flight training grants for veterans and enlisted folks. The idea is that vets/enlisted have to either make life-changing decisions or pay some high hurdle costs to get into flight training (Post 9/11 GI Bill does not fund private pilot unless at an institute for higher learning). Vets to Jets is a 501(c)3 organization. Please pass this on to folks you think would be interested.1 point
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I signalled I was leaning toward punching next year when ADSC is up...I too get a six month vacation to the sandbox. We have identified a trend.1 point
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Too bad, as you mentioned STOP LOSS is a viable retention tool and we obvious need tools like you.1 point
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The most difficult time I have had in my career over the last decade as a Fighter Pilot and Marine was when I was an airframes OIC with 35 Marines and 10 airframes while simultaneously going through my 4-ship flight lead upgrade. Two points: 1) While that approach would certainly result in better leader development at every level, it is incredibly taxing on those put into those positions. 2) Due to having to balance both duties, much like a multi-role fighter, it is nearly impossible to truly excel at either without jeopardizing the other. What happens is you become average at both, detailed many times by my experience operating with Air Force F-15 and F-16 units where their capacity in the air was developed to a higher degree than ours was. Though I suppose some of that may be attributed to our 6-7 flight hours a month...1 point
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As a Korea RAS and a dude with a Korean wife, I can say this statement is categorically false.1 point
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Well the wife and I have talked and when my commitment is up I'm going to become a homemaker and support her career. My wife's job is super important and she works long hours with others so I'm going to start a club for the other husbands to have get togethers and build up the spouses network. Granted she teleworks so all of our meetings (and kids play dates) will have to be over Skype but with all the things going on in the world I think there should be a better support network for her coworkers dependents. Her job keeps her so busy and now that we have kids someone has to sacrifice their career, she may be going overseas next year for six months or so as well to manage stocking toilet paper in the Doha office even though she works in the medical field. Maybe if we're lucky while she's gone, I can volunteer to help set her up for success and get her more face time with her boss and maybe help her get her next promotion. I think she's going to volunteer to coordinate the company gift exchange this year so my plate is going to be FULL over the coming months in preparation. I also heard there is a program to be a prime spouse (it requires a week of mandatory training and being on call one week a month), I may try that as well. What do you all think? Now imagine if I were being serious you would think I was crazy. Why do we do this to ourselves?1 point
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I'll add my two cents (and some more). Soooooo not everyone on this board agrees with Tony Carr's perspective on the USAF - see his editorial on the Thunderbird mishap from last June and (if you know ANYTHING), you'll know that that piece was designed to elicit an emotional response, did nothing to satisfy public curiosity about the event, shed no new light on the event, and was literally the journalistic equivalent of throwing $hit at a wall - in the name of smearing the AF (cause he thinks it's fun, IMO). After that post I was honestly not sure whether or not to take him seriously any more - and I don't. He was a previous safety guy who "had F-16 experience" but yet he wrote it as someone would who lacked a military flying background. His response to my analysis (https://disq.us/p/1ejpsoe) of his editorial was dismissive, and when presented with facts, he avoided the issue. I don't consider him value-added at this point - as I do this message board. I think he's a semi-talented, own-press-reading, bitter, (ret) Lt Col who has nothing better to do with his time than sport bitch on the internet. I think lots of people agree with that sentiment, and while he can sometimes come close the mark, I don't think (in general) he is that interesting any more. On that note, and to your question, I don't think the root cause of the USAF's current crisis has much to do with leadership in a traditional sense, but then again, I was never one who drank the AF koolaid that would have all its officers believe that leadership is the panacea to every and all problems. No, sometimes, people make poor decisions and it's not because they are poor leaders. And sometimes, it doesn't matter who's at the seat, there can be (and are) systemic issues in an organization which have far greater effects. Pinning it all on "toxic leadership" is what someone who is still pissed at a lot of previous superiors does when he is no longer subject to their rule. That said, if you choose to orient yourself in such a way, then I suppose that everything can be boiled down to poor leadership (not toxic), but I think there are more systemic issues as to why the USAF is in its current state, and when viewed in that light, will lead to more fruitful changes. 1. 179s: Look a troop in the eye, and tell them that the reason they're going down range for 179 days (vs 180 or more) has nothing to do with the USAF's policy of granting short-tour credit for deployments of longer length (sts). https://www.af.mil/News/Article-Display/Article/112915/air-force-normalizes-short-tour-credit-policy/. IMO, there is only one reason such a policy could exist, and it is to screw airmen out of a medal, deployment credit, make it easier for the personnel machine to send them downrange again sooner, or whatever. Justifications along the lines of "well, we will need to be able to deploy them again" do not hold water. All airmen who were getting short-tour credit for 180+ day deployments were playing by the same rules, and were all on the same "list". What shifting a policy did while we were in the middle of a war, was create two groups of people - those who had deployed for >181 and <365 who got credit, and those who did not - that is a ripple in the system, and though it may not have an immediately visible consequence, it certainly has an effect and was unfair to lots of people. So, that's one example of something wrong, which has nothing to do with anyone wearing < 4 stars on their shoulders. But toxic leadership? Maybe, but by only one person - not a culture of it. 2. RIFs/Force-shaping: During my time in the USAF, I "survived" two RRFs (I think, maybe, I can't remember at this point). One occurred shortly after I finished the B-Course. The U-S-A-F sent me, a fighter pilot, paperwork that suggested I may not be retained, literally immediately after I finished soaking up the better part of $5M in training costs/taxpayer money and with nearly 10 years of commitment remaining. IMO, this was done in the name of "social justice" - an example of a policy enacted to make everyone feel like they're on the same page and are all of equal value. Was I actually concerned I was going to be force-shaped? Nope. But this is an example of something that is wrong with the AF at a cultural level. Fixing this would go a long way toward re-orienting the AF in the correct direction, but (I get it) it would cause A LOT of teeth-gnashing with the REMFs, and that is a merge I highly doubt the AF wants to buy - because we MUST be socially just, we absolutely must be (sarcasm). 2a. In 2011, the USAF got rid of 157 Majors who should have been allowed to retire: https://dailycaller.com/2011/11/25/military-advocates-decry-illegal-early-terminations-of-157-air-force-majors/ https://nation.time.com/2012/01/03/air-force-firing-for-effect/ This occurred, and then (almost immediately), the USAF sought to be granted TERA (and was given it) in order to "slim down": https://www.af.mil/News/Article-Display/Article/467816/eligible-officers-enlisted-members-offered-early-retirement/ https://www.af.mil/News/Article-Display/Article/483997/af-opens-additional-tera-vsp-windows/ https://www.af.mil/News/Article-Display/Article/467713/af-announces-additional-force-management-programs-to-reduce-force-size/ https://federalnewsradio.com/retirement/2016/01/greg-rinckey-air-force-officers-demand-reinstatement/ Does that not cause one to scratch their head (who said head)? Look a troop in the eye and tell them this is not the apex of hypocrisy and short-sighted decision making. If you ask me, this is an instance of breaking faith with people. And before we cry uncle and say "well we're subject to civilian leadership decisions", I don't remember any stars falling on their swords over that one. GOs should have been resigning up and down the chain over that one. Again, like it or not, when people witness decisions like this, it affects their "matrix" and they then re-evaluate their criteria for staying in the AF for the long haul. What this sequence of decisions made clear was that a member's continued service was arbitrary, and subject to the flavor of the month. That is not going to be good enough for most people who are investing the most valuable years of their working lives towards a successful career, and I think this has had a direct and lasting affect on morale and retention. Again, this is an example of a policy decision that created two classes of people: those who served > 15 years and were not given a retirement, and those who were. 3. Shortly on the pilot bonus: the fact that it hasn't change in what, 20+ years, communicates a lot - if not directly, then indirectly. All the hand-wringing about increased amounts being just around the corner is a little pathetic, and is obviously being done from a reactionary perspective. This should have been addressed YEARS ago, because the Airline hiring wave is NOT a surprise. 4. Focus: This, to me, boils down to what the USAF should be focused on. IMO, it is high-time that "space" and "cyber" became their own separate service (or perhaps services). Much like the USAF growth out of the Army benefited both branches, I think another, modern version of that evolution needs to take place with those two realms so they can get the focus they need, and we can get ours. No, space is NOT a continuation of the "air domain", and neither is cyber. There, I said it. Sure, they abut, but so does the surface of the sea/Earth, with the sky, yet we have different branches dedicated to those domains. IMO the AF is in love with the idea of being a one-sized fits all solution to all problems (or maybe they're addicted to the money, IDK). That last point will lead me to #5. 4a. It was suggested on other message boards that more 11X presence is needed throughout the AF - from staffs, to the FSS. I fully agree with this sentiment, and would happily displace an FSS Maj or Lt Col (while remaining on flying status) and run that shop/unit. Would I be there everyday? Nope, but I wouldn't need to be. See, it's all about policy and setting an expectation. The USAF for far too long has been ceding ever more control to those who don't have to cross a wire. Why is this? Do we really need a finance-trained, specialized Maj/Lt Col to run the finance shop? Really? Does that person even know how to operate DTS or whatever else? And even if they do know how, do they? I highly suspect they fill more of figure-head roll; a leader of those units could easily come from an 11X background and provide actual, bonafied leadership. I would go so far as to say that in order to command anything, you should have to be a rated officer. Yes, this caps non-rated officers - tough shit. Go get wings. 5. This is likely an unpopular opinion on this board, but the biggest mistakes we have recently made (as a nation) have been the strategic errors of invading Iraq in 2003, the "how" of invading Afghanistan in 2001, and then the subsequent withdrawal from Iraq in whenever we actually did it. Bottom line on this one, is that the USAF leadership (at the time) should have thrown down a firm "no" when the Army demanded we play in the conflict for as long as we have, as should have the Navy. Drones and snake eaters? You bet. Multi-million dollar fighter jets, the full capes of the world's greatest AF burning holes in the sky, US Navy billion-dollar aircraft carriers? No way. We have WAY over-extended ourselves in these conflicts and have NOTHING to show for it. Well, except a military full of equipment that is falling apart at a time when we least need it. I fully grasp that we were sent to war by our civilian leadership, but not calling a goat by its name isn't solving the problem. No, AFPAK Hands will not succeed. Not because of lack of awesome people and their concerted and earnest efforts, but because the strategic context of its goal is illogical and nonsensical. No amount of Air University PHD-research-papering will make it so. The point of the military is to kill people and break their shit; not to nation-build before a war is won. Advising people who don't want what we want isn't the answer - if there's one thing I learned from my experiences, combined with the 'cross cultural competency' assigned by ACSC, it's that. The sooner our "leadership" - of whatever flavor and level - wake up and recognize this, the better. We have poured (and continue to pour) far too much in time, resources, blood, and money into an unwinnable situation. We need to get back to defining realistic, measurable goals, by which we can actually measure a 1 or 0, we can start counting those. I would much prefer to hear from our leadership that the new, stated goal in Afghanistan is to never allow a Taliban, or al Qaeda sponsored/sympathetic government to take root - and leave it at that. We're not interested in standing up a government there; we're not interested in building girls' schools there; we're not interested in teaching air advisers how to read the JP 3.09-3. We are interested in shooting Hellfires off of drones at anyone associated with the Taliban or al Qaeda for the next 1000 years - that's it. This section has run on way too long, but to sum up: our current strategy only exists because we misunderstand who and what type of people we are fighting. 6. HPO lists, etc. This category is all about creating "classes" of people. The military has always been a good 'ol boys club, and it always will be. Formalizing it in Excel spread sheets, and choosing people while they are Captains is what has created and perpetuated a perception that it literally doesn't matter what you do if you're not on that list. It is nothing more than playing favorites, and creates an environment that leads people to separate - now there's some "leadership". I ultimately believe that more transparency in the assignment and promotion system will go a long way to correcting a lot of the AF's current problems as well. I could, and might, write more, but until next time, if you haven't read this article, the author hits on some extremely relevant points: https://philipgmorrison.wordpress.com/2017/01/15/its-your-move-the-dilemma-of-incurred-commitment-in-the-modern-job-market/. - ViperMan1 point
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Don't waste your time on Chang...now, for something more entertaining. FLBP Sent from my iPhone using Baseops Network Forums1 point
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Quote for posterity. My younger self would have never believed that to be possible.1 point
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Meh, I disagree nsplayer. I enjoyed the show while it lasted. More importantly, I will tell anyone who listens with what is wrong with the Air Force. Some I have solutions for and for others I am at a loss on how to fix. Actually Chang, the persona that you portrayed here, although completely overdone, are the sum total of the sentiments that are causing people to head for the door. What causes disappointment? Unrealized expectations. I think you have to start there. The last 10 or so years have been really tough on the CGOs. We came into the AF after 9-11 being told that the #1 priority of the AF is lethality, yet we are held to a completely different standard of measurement. I was an '08 commissionee from ROTC and worked my butt off to get to UPT, 38s and hopefully to a fighter, just to be told that there was no where for us to go except RPAs and AMC. Big disappointment, but whatever, I press on. Get to my AMC unit and less than a year later I am writing a RRF for my 1st of 2 RIF boards. Meanwhile my fighter brethren (the 30 or so they created in my whole year group) were now considered undermanned. On my 4th deployment, my CC calls me to tell me that he has to get me on the next VML otherwise an RPA may be non-vold must-fill from AFPC. I end up going to T-6 UPT, my dream job at the time. While I am in PIT I face the #2 RIF/VSP of my career, while my 11F brothers (whoever is left) are now critically manned. I get sat down by my T-6 SQ/CC and told that although my record is outstanding, my career field (11M) is 175% manned and I haven't even completed PIT yet, so prepare for the worst/hope for the best. Also, we are cutting for the next 5 years. I go out and get my dream job, and apply for Palace Chase only to be denied because now even though my career field is still overmanned, the AF as a whole is short on pilots. Me, I still keep kicking @ss, pulling down #1 Sq/OG strats and moving my way up in the Sq. Get tasked with a 6 month non-flying deployment to some $hithole to be underemployed and a job that would have actually been better to have been CONUS doing (timezone differences). Somewhere in there my family (wife+kids) made up their mind that we were done getting jerked around, so I have been making my way to the door ever since. After 10 years of stellar service, 5 deployments, missing years of my kids lives, I get called a quitter and told that I have no future in my Sq. I could write a lot more, but I just don't care to relive it anymore. I hate the fact that the AF made me fall out of love with something that I fought so hard to be apart of. I have seen this organization change in just the 10 years I've been in and it is unrecognizable. I sincerely want the AF to get better and be better, so let me know if you have any questions. Sent from my iPhone using Baseops Network Forums1 point
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Copy, I was expanding on how far behind the times AETC is.1 point
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I'm aware, purely commentary on AFGSC's general inability to adapt to anything.1 point
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10+ years ago I was assigned to get a never-had-flown T-38 former C-130 with 2000+ hours, ready for IFF as he was transitioning to a new guard unit. He made it...barely thru IFF, struggled in the B-course and I personally spent a shit-ton of spare time helping with extra sims, instruction etc and that's because the guy had a great attitude. A lot of time is spent breaking habits, teaching quick, solo thinking. It's just a different flying mindset. It can be done, he proved it, but it wasn't easy or efficient and nothing comparable to taking a 23 year old and pushing them thru with the right skills and mindset from day 1. Sent from my iPhone using Baseops Network Forums1 point