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Sheppard, Laughlin, Columbus, and Vance! Fingers crossed this year board. I finished my PPL in just enough time!

Getting the medical done is a big deal. My stuff is all submitted, I’m going to try and forget about it now so I can go about in peace. It all varies. Who knows what slots look like. Looks like the few I have seen go to Vance start quickly. My buddy showed up there and started IPT quickly. I am okay with a little wait time, gives me more time to study and prepare my family for training. I have 3 kids, so would be nice to get a little established somewhere before the grind starts. I put ENJJPT first, but I’m happy to go to the other bases too. And UHT.

Got the medical done today! Thankfully all went well, just hoping it’s a quick turn to get it stamped by AFPC. Similar picks except ENJJPT, I hear the wait times could be 9-12 months which would kill me. Curious to see how many slots are available this year.

This sounds right, IIRC 26-13AU and 26-15AB dropped together at Vance. Unfortunately could not go to that drop

And this guy https://www.pallasadvisors.com/mike-minihan Hard pass

KEND 26-13AF T-38 FAIP F-35 x3 (2 AD, 1 Guard) F-16

KDLF 26-13AF T-38 FAIP T-38 ADAIR F-35 x2 F-16 x 2 (1 international)

Commute worthy read Our Generals Are Not Even Good at Tactics: A Hard-Hitting...Until we do, our generals will continue to fail us — not because they lack technology or tactical drills, but because the system that produces them was designed for a different war and century.Not 100% on board with the author’s assertions on the current state of the GO ranks / Officer selection and career path planning, he’s probably 2/3rds right but worthy points.

Elon built a Gen X Chatbot and called it M2. As if Grok were a grumpy old military vet. Perfection.

https://www.pallasadvisors.com/our-team/jim-slife

Gouge is Vance didnt have a sister class and Columbus was behind so almost half the class was gonna wash back so no swaps.

Standing by for commentary from "c"aptain Steeeeeeeeve.........

Well it's got to be less embarrassing than having the Ukrainians eventually blow the thing up, right? 😂

Hey man, I've only got 20 minutes to catch my commute flight home.

Is anybody else going to be completely unsurprised if we find out that M2's old ass died a year ago and a rogue AI agent trained on his content and took over his account without anyone noticing? 😂🤣

It’s probably not a credible threat or you could probably be shot down! What a binary choice to make at the end of your last leg for the day!

Apparently, Russian air defenses took out an Su-57. https://www.reddit.com/r/ukraine/s/Es3lAU68gW

I'd take any excuse to go missed and land anywhere but NYC.

"There's a guy on short final with a bazooka but otherwise winds are 210 at 10, cleared to land" 🤦🏼‍♂️

this is hilarious LOL.

You can't leave us hanging like that

I'm pretty tied into the community and this is not accurate.

And “a loss of confidence and trust in their ability to effectively lead and command” is a bureaucratic formula that hides whether the commander actually failed to lead effectively or merely fell out of favor with their superiors! If a commander is relieved for poor judgment, toxic leadership, mission failure, or misconduct, a generic statement can make it difficult to determine whether the action was justified. Specific reasons help demonstrate that standards are being applied fairly. Military organizations improve when leaders understand what went wrong. A vague explanation like "loss of confidence" provides little guidance for subordinate commanders trying to avoid similar mistakes. Also, when people see leaders removed without explanation, they may suspect politics, favoritism or scapegoating. Transparent reasoning can increase confidence that decisions are based on performance and standards. Future leaders, historians, and researchers need more than a boilerplate phrase to understand why a command decision was made and what lessons should be learned. Some will argue that the public does not necessarily have a right to know every detail; but a better balance is needed between transparency and institutional learning, and privacy, fairness, and command discretion!

Required reading for my CGSC class, very insightful! Ricks argues that the U.S. Army's success in World War II was partly due to its willingness to relieve ineffective generals, while the postwar Army became increasingly reluctant to hold senior commanders accountable for poor performance. According to Ricks, this decline in accountability contributed to military shortcomings in Vietnam, Iraq, and Afghanistan. Marshall routinely evaluated commanders and removed those who could not perform under combat conditions. During WWII, dozens (not 600) to include 16 division commanders of generals were relieved, reassigned, or retired when they failed to meet standards. Marshall prioritized mission success over protecting careers, but it wasn't always due to leadership failures. One famous example was Maj. Gen. Terry Allen, commander of the 1st Infantry Division, who was relieved despite being an aggressive and popular combat leader because Army leadership felt a different type of commander was needed for future operations. Leaders such as Matthew Ridgway, George Patton and Maxwell Taylor are highlighted as officers who adapted to changing conditions and inspired subordinates. Ricks contends that many senior leaders in Vietnam remained in command despite poor results. The Army became focused on preserving institutional reputation rather than candidly assessing failures, and that promotion systems increasingly rewarded conformity and career management. Officers learned to avoid mistakes rather than take calculated risks, and advancement often depended more on navigating bureaucracy than demonstrating battlefield excellence. Early phases of the Iraq War exposed deficiencies in strategic planning and senior leadership. (Petraeus is presented as a notable exception, helping to develop and execute the 2007 Surge strategy) and again Ricks argues many senior commanders were not adequately held accountable for flawed assumptions and operational setbacks. Ricks also highlights that being successful at lower levels of command does not automatically prepare an officer to be a successful general officer, that senior leaders must understand politics, policy, coalition management and strategy, not just battlefield tactics.