Falling Stars

[General Chang]

https://www.foxnews.com/politics/hegseth-orders-historic-reduction-general-officers-military
 

Thoughts on the dismal future for my fellow GO/FOs?

- General C.

[Vetter]

YAS QUEEN!!!!

[Lord Ratner]

I think Eisenhower would have thrown up in his mouth if he knew how bloated the command structure had become. Bravo. 

[ClearedHot]

6 hours ago, General Chang said:

https://www.foxnews.com/politics/hegseth-orders-historic-reduction-general-officers-military
 

Thoughts on the dismal future for my fellow GO/FOs?

- General C.

AMF's - We will be just fine without them.

There are approximately 900 active-duty GFOs.  The current number is low for the post-Cold War era and substantially lower than the number of GFOs in the 1960s-1980s, when the Armed Forces were much larger in size than they are today. However, while always very small in comparison to the total force, the GFO corps has increased as a percentage of the total force over the past five decades. GFOs made up about one-twentieth of one percent (0.048%) of the total force in 1965, while they made up about one-sixteenth of one percent (0.063%) of the total force in 2023, indicating that the share of the total force made up of GFOs is now increased by 31%. This historical trend is more pronounced with respect to four-star officers (which grew from 0.0014% of the total force to 0.0029%, a 107% increase) and three-star officers (which grew from 0.0045% of the total force to 0.0103%, a 129% increase). One- and two-star officers increased less rapidly (from 0.0425% of the total force to 0.0500%, a 17.6% increase). 

Sorry Chang - better start looking for a board to hire you to do nothing but bloviate on the outside.  RSU's are a real thing, check them out.

[Stoker]

Calling someone a general is really cheap if it keeps them in the service instead of bailing for a legacy CJO, for the Air Force's perspective. We certainly aren't paying GOs commensurate with the workload and job market competition. Which is fine when we are fighting an existential war with defined end goals, not so much if you want quality people to serve long-term during peacetime. It's easy to say people should sacrifice personal gain, family quality of life, and job satisfaction in exchange for the pride in serving their country, but realistically that has never been the case in the US during peacetime.

Edited yesterday at 02:16 PM by Stoker

[ClearedHot]

45 minutes ago, Stoker said:

Calling someone a general is really cheap if it keeps them in the service instead of bailing for a legacy CJO, for the Air Force's perspective. We certainly aren't paying GOs commensurate with the workload and job market competition. Which is fine when we are fighting an existential war with defined end goals, not so much if you want quality people to serve long-term during peacetime. It's easy to say people should sacrifice personal gain, family quality of life, and job satisfaction in exchange for the pride in serving their country, but realistically that has never been the case in the US during peacetime.

Yeah they have it tough with drivers, cooks at their houses, personalized GO only healthcare and an accelerated retirement payscale.  99% of them will make up and pay deficit within 30 days of walking out the door.

[Banzai]

21 minutes ago, ClearedHot said:

Yeah they have it tough with drivers, cooks at their houses, personalized GO only healthcare and an accelerated retirement payscale.  99% of them will make up and pay deficit within 30 days of walking out the door.

What is an accelerated retirement pay scale?

[ClearedHot]

2 hours ago, Banzai said:

What is an accelerated retirement pay scale?

I think they changed it recently but in years past GO pay had a scale that increased over time like everyone else.  However, actual basic pay for O-7 to O-10 was (and still is), limited to level II of the Executive Schedule.  That limit number was lower than the pay amount for their rank and years of service on the chart.  While on active duty take home pay was limited but for retirement their pay was calculated off the higher number in the chart.

 

[grasshopper]

18 hours ago, ClearedHot said:

Yeah they have it tough with drivers, cooks at their houses, personalized GO only healthcare and an accelerated retirement payscale.  99% of them will make up and pay deficit within 30 days of walking out the door.

Just to color in some balance:

They get sedans, and sometimes drivers for official business only. Home-to-work use and vice versa is very rare, and usually not allowed; and personal use and stops are prohibited. They don’t get a round-the-clock chauffeur.

GOs that occupy Flag Quarters get aides who assist with official entertaining required by their position. Think folks that set the table and make the food when discussing international agreements with world leaders and senior partners. At the end of the night they go home. Personal services are prohibited.

There is no special healthcare plan. In some busy locations (Walter Reed, etc) there are separate areas or appointment processes that help them get seen to take care of issues (or avoid getting seen by the masses for privacy concerns), but they use the same docs and TRICARE plans.

You’re right about the pay - the FY2015 capped their pay and retirement.

I agree that we need less GOs, and propose less officers overall, but in a more streamlined organization. Here’s what our new friend has to say:

Trim the Brass, Sharpen the Spear

A wartime-ready blueprint to realign America’s officer corps

 

The U.S. military’s command structure is misaligned with the demands of modern war. The senior officer corps has grown too large relative to the force it leads, distorting spans of control, inflating headquarters, and diluting accountability. We propose a deliberate reduction of general and flag officers from 525 to approximately 350 by FY33, accompanied by a targeted drawdown and restructuring of the broader officer corps. This reform restores wartime focus, reduces decision latency, and enables a more credible, combat-aligned military architecture.

 

The goal is not austerity. It is clarity. The reduction preserves surge capacity, strengthens the operational core, and ensures that uniformed officers serve only where their presence is essential—to command forces, make lethal decisions, or operate under military law. Responsibilities misaligned with those functions—acquisition oversight, installation management, enterprise support—shift to civilians or warrant officers, freeing uniformed talent for operational and combat roles.

 

Rebuilding the Structure for What Comes Next

This is not the first time the military has confronted institutional overgrowth. But the nature of this moment is unique: dispersed operations, data-saturated environments, hypersonic timelines, and adversaries that prize speed over scale. It is no longer just inefficient to carry excess headquarters—it is operationally dangerous.

 

To correct course, five principles guide the proposed change:

1. Combat first. Uniformed officers remain where lethal authority, command in battle, or military justice are inherent to the role.
2. Surge capacity preserved. A ready bench of one- and two-star Reserve general officers ensures rapid reinforcement without sustaining unnecessary peacetime overhead.
3. No ornamental billets. Positions that exist for convenience, tradition, or administrative overreach—whether in program offices, family services, or base-level operations—are subject to reassignment or elimination.
4. Every cut validated. Billets are reviewed against theater contingency plans and operational requirements. If it’s needed in war, it stays. If not, it goes.
5. Span of control restored. The target is 1 general or admiral for every 4,000 active-duty service members, supported by a flexible, civilian-heavy institutional base.

 

A Three-Phase Reduction

Phase I (FY25–FY27): A freeze on new general and flag officer billets. Retirements and unfilled vacancies begin reducing staff layering across major headquarters. Redundant deputy directorates, overlapping support roles, and administrative excess are trimmed. Estimated reduction: ~10%.

 

Phase II (FY28–FY30): Major consolidation follows. NORTHCOM and NORAD merge into a unified Homeland Defense Command. Navy and Marine Corps departmental headquarters unify under a Maritime Service Secretariat, while operational independence remains intact. Base and installation commanders shift to senior civilian leadership. The Defense Health Agency is streamlined. Spans of control increase meaningfully. Cumulative reduction: ~25%.

 

Phase III (FY31–FY33): Key defense support agencies (DIA, NGA, DTRA, NRO, DISA) transition to civilian SES leadership with uniformed deputies. A new statutory cap of ~350 general and flag officers is established in Title 10, with annual oversight mechanisms to enforce compliance. The Reserve flag pool is formalized and resourced. Final span of control: ~4,000:1.

 

A Promotion System Built for Relevance

A smaller senior corps must be matched by a promotion system that recognizes functional need over structural inertia. The following reforms address that reality:

 

• Parallel career tracks. Officers will declare either a command track—focused on leading units—or a technical track, optimized for fields like cyber operations, AI, logistics, or advanced sensing. Technical officers may culminate in O-6 “Senior Specialist” billets with appropriate incentives.
• Up-or-stay. Officers who are not selected for promotion may continue serving if they fill high-need roles. Career progression is no longer tied solely to upward movement.
• Demand-informed boards. Promotion and continuation boards will use real-time Talent Marketplace data to gauge where officer demand exists, ensuring advancement reflects operational value.
• Lateral entry and reentry. Officers with critical skills from outside government, or those returning from academic or industry sabbaticals, can enter or reenter service without being penalized by traditional career timing.

This modernized system ensures that officers are advanced, retained, or reassigned based on what they contribute—not simply how long they’ve served or how many boxes they’ve checked.

 

Where Uniforms Are No Longer Required

Reform is not just about removing billets. It’s about putting the right people in the right roles. Uniformed officers belong where warfighting, military authority, and combat decision-making are required. Elsewhere, stability and expertise often matter more.

 

• Installation and community support. Garrison and base leadership transitions to civilian SES or GS-15 professionals, supported by uniformed deputies where appropriate.
• Enterprise logistics and acquisition. Approximately 1,400 officer billets—especially in procurement, lifecycle management, and depot oversight—shift to civilians or warrant officers. Deployable contracting and sustainment teams remain uniformed.
• Medical and training institutions. Around 200 field-grade billets at military hospitals, schools, and non-operational centers are transitioned to civilian or warrant roles.
• Policy and analysis roles. Legislative affairs, public affairs, and long-term policy planning roles that are often filled by staff officers will instead be civilianized to preserve institutional knowledge and reduce rotational disruption.

The result is not less capacity—it is more relevant capacity, matched to the function it serves.

 

Risk Is Not Assumed—It’s Managed

• Forward capability is retained. Military contracting, legal, and finance personnel remain embedded in operational formations.
• The surge bench is real. Twenty Reserve general and flag officers are maintained, trained, and aligned to COCOMs for rapid activation.
• Reform is incremental. No mass firings. Reductions are phased in through retirements, billet realignment, and voluntary civilian transition.
• Every change is rehearsed. Reforms are tested in wargames and planning scenarios. If the billet supports combat power under pressure, it survives.

 

The Force in FY33

• General/Flag Officers: 525 → ~350 (−33%)
• Total Commissioned Officers: 234,000 → ~196,000 (−16%)
• Span of Control (Flag Officers): 1:1,600 → 1:4,000
• Annual Overhead Reduction: ≈ $1 billion; 30,000 fewer PCS moves
• Decision Latency: Cut by half; command chains shortened from six to three echelons
• Retention: Technical and tactical experts retained; command-track officers promoted on merit
• Surge Resilience: Maintained through Reserve flag pool and SES institutional continuity

 

Structure is Strategy

The current officer corps was not built for speed. It was built for routine—career patterns, headquarters comfort, and institutional self-preservation. But adversaries do not calibrate to our bureaucracy. They calibrate to our weakest link. If the structure that governs our people, decisions, and actions is bloated or misaligned, the rest of the force cannot compensate for it.

 

This proposal is not about doing more with less. It is about doing better with purpose. It realigns billets to functions. It reduces friction where decisions matter. It builds incentives that reflect today’s needs, not yesterday’s promotions. And it preserves both readiness and resilience.

 

A smaller, faster, more operationally aligned officer corps is not a luxury. It’s the bare minimum for a military preparing to fight at speed and scale against modern threats.

 

By FY33, the United States can—and should—field an officer corps in which every rank, every billet, and every staff function supports the central purpose of the profession: winning in war. That requires sharper tools, not more of them.

Edited 6 hours ago by grasshopper

[ClearedHot]

1 hour ago, grasshopper said:

Just to color in some balance:

They get sedans, and sometimes drivers for official business only. Home-to-work use and vice versa is very rare, and usually not allowed; and personal use and stops are prohibited. They don’t get a round-the-clock chauffeur.

GOs that occupy Flag Quarters get aides who assist with official entertaining required by their position. Think folks that set the table and make the food when discussing international agreements with world leaders and senior partners. At the end of the night they go home. Personal services are prohibited.

There is no special healthcare plan. In some busy locations (Walter Reed, etc) there are separate areas or appointment processes that help them get seen to take care of issues (or avoid getting seen by the masses for privacy concerns), but they use the same docs and TRICARE plans.

You’re right about the pay - the FY2015 capped their pay and retirement.

I agree that we need less GOs, and propose less officers overall, but in a more streamlined organization. Here’s what our new friend has to say:

A bit more color from someone who spent a LOT of time around that environment...including as an exec for the Deputy Chief of Staff.

Not suggesting it is a personal chauffeur but home to work was the norm when I was there and especially in places like DC it is a HUGE deal, especially with the parking and special security lanes.  Also, moving around DC while the rest of us use the METRO.  Ironically, I once Slugged with a dude and when we got to the Pentagon drop off area he asked if I worked in the building...I replied yes and showed him my badge.  He said stay with me I have decent parking.  We went through security, zipped past south parking and down pat the memorial and corridor five where all the 3-4 starts had their cars parked.  I got real nervous when we turned the corner and he drove up the ramp and parked in the second spot by the Mall Entrance...unbeknownst to me I just rode to work with the DEPSECDEF who insisted on driving himself.  I was trying to replay the conversation in my head because he was asking me questions all the way down 395.

The "assist" with entertaining is the most abused part of the program.  "International agreements with world leaders and senior partners" is absolutely comical.  At least half the time they are hosting old friends who happen to work in industry.  I never once saw a"world leader" but I saw a lot of old bros coming over for dinner and drinks.  You forgot to add the USAF is sending these assistants to culinary schools...usually private ones.  When I was an exec the boss' were swapping out and the new guy decided the interview of his new in-home assistant was a test case hosting a party for other senior leaders.  That prep included mowing the Senior GO's lawn...by the way, the interviewee was pregnant.  That was a defining moment when I knew I didn't want to be a GO.

You forgot the execs and enlisted assistants that DO personal stuff like dry cleaning, uniform setup, going to get breakfast and lunch...I used to fill out birthday cards (I know because I got yelled at for one misspelled word in a stack of 53 cards).

Same docs or not as you note they have a special place and process that they get to use even when RETIRED.  They don't wait for appointments and why do they need more privacy than HIPAA provides the rest of us.  My first boss had some medical issues, I could call the GO office at Walter Reed or the In-Pentagon Flight Doc and get him in within the hour.

C-21s and other aircraft for the 1-3 starts...white caps for the 4 stars.

Being a GO is hard work with long hours but I don;t feel sorry for them one bit.