B-1 (Bone) questions

[Slander]

You'll never convince me that CAS by committee works. Ever.

[SurelySerious]

[backseatdriver]

You'll never convince me that CAS by committee works. Ever.

Agree to disagree.....

Edited October 17, 2014 by backseatdriver

[dvlax40]

All good points, i understand in a crewed aircraft that no one person is just focusing on themselves, i also know that the pilots are not simply just handing everything over to the other guys.

i think i may have worded it wrong so let me try this: because of the separate but overlapping jobs in the cockpit, in combat does this lead to a better SA then a singular person with information overload? how does this affect mission success rate? reduction of collateral damage or friendly fire incidents?

i was wondering if there were any actual studies on this,

also not slamming single cockpit guys, because i understand they have a similar dynamic in that they are usually in a multi-ship formation.

The bone is unique in that is is very far away from what is was originally designed for and seems to be doing a very good job

[hispeed7721]

words

As stated before...send a .mil to someone, this isn't the place for OPSEC problems

Sent from my iPhone using Tapatalk

[dvlax40]

Agreed. If you guys want specifics, you should have access to everything you want in the vault. Go talk to intel and get them to point you in the right direction.

will do, thanks guys

i only brought this up because of incidents with CAS on the A-10 and B-1 platforms i was interested if anyone has done any studies on platform efficacy

[Sim]

Go talk to intel and get them to point you in the right direction.

LOL.

[BonedRiver]

i think i may have worded it wrong so let me try this: because of the separate but overlapping jobs in the cockpit, in combat does this lead to a better SA then a singular person with information overload? how does this affect mission success rate? reduction of collateral damage or friendly fire incidents?

i was wondering if there were any actual studies on this,

Doubtful, although there's probably been poor attempts leading to a dynamic "it depends".

I think we all just focus on studying mission success w/in our own community and how to constantly improve (in the Bone, yes, CRM's a big part of it), granted, with a healthy respect and willingness to learn from how other communities do business. But I don't think it's possible to cross streams and compare mission success v. various platforms; apples & oranges & grapes & pears//with pros & cons everywhere.

[EDDIE]

Doubtful, although there's probably been poor attempts leading to a dynamic "it depends".

I think we all just focus on studying mission success w/in our own community and how to constantly improve (in the Bone, yes, CRM's a big part of it), granted, with a healthy respect and willingness to learn from how other communities do business. But I don't think it's possible to cross streams and compare mission success v. various platforms; apples & oranges & grapes & pears//with pros & cons everywhere.

This

[Disco_Nav963]

Coming from the other multi-specialty crewed bomber, but having watched a BONE AC prep for a single-ship Mission Lead upgrade sim at Pawnman's former squadron, the B-1 guys are doing it right. In the BUFF we don't have a single ship ML qualification, so on single ship training sorties (mind you, we train primarily to employ in formation) the AC nearly always fills that role by default (barring the occasional uber-passive AC losing the Darwinian charisma contest to a more experienced Radar Nav) relying on training of widely varying quality.

I've seen it go both ways: sometimes you see ACs with the "the squadron is a flying club" mentality (vs. "we're here to get better at employing the jet as a weapon system") lead mission planning as basically a set of meetings ultimately driving toward accomplishing the required motherhood and having a basic plan to go up and run some checklists, configure the right switches, and simulate the right weapon releases to log the right RAP bean... the offense team and the EWO plan in a vacuum between these meetings, and on execution day the Pilot Flying honors the calls of the compartment (offense or defense) that yells the loudest, rather than honor the ALR/threat plan/commit criteria. It isn't 5 people working toward 1 plan; at best it's 5 people with partial SA on 1 plan, and at worst it's 3-5 different plans. I've also seen ACs who set out to learn something, plan target back, and actively "push the noodle" toward everybody doing their part in the common plan. And actually, I'd say our FAIPs usually fall moreso into the latter group (because they show up ready to learn, with something to prove), while those that started as co-pilots are more of a mixed bunch. But the bottom line is we don't do them any favors by not consistently training them up in a ML role until FLUG...

And even after that, we usually don't qualify people on the LOX as MLs (multi-ship ML that is) until they are in WIC spinup, which has a number of perverse effects including (1) we ask our CSOs, the EWOs especially, to start talking and leading way too late in their first ops assignment, and (2) it reinforces a perception that tactically-focused continuation training is for patch wannabes, not the squadron as a whole (mind you, this perception probably wouldn't exist if we hadn't been out of combat and mainly nuke exercise/inspection focused for the last 8 years).

Bottom line: In a crew aircraft, someone has to push the noodle and know the *entire* plan, not just their crew position-specific piece of it... Whether that's the prior FAIP AC or FL dual-hatting as ML or it's someone with CSO wings doesn't matter. They just need to step up and do it (and have the requisite training to not muck it up).

[dvlax40]

Coming from the other multi-specialty crewed bomber, but having watched a BONE AC prep for a single-ship Mission Lead upgrade sim at Pawnman's former squadron, the B-1 guys are doing it right. In the BUFF we don't have a single ship ML qualification, so on single ship training sorties (mind you, we train primarily to employ in formation) the AC nearly always fills that role by default (barring the occasional uber-passive AC losing the Darwinian charisma contest to a more experienced Radar Nav) relying on training of widely varying quality.

I've seen it go both ways: sometimes you see ACs with the "the squadron is a flying club" mentality (vs. "we're here to get better at employing the jet as a weapon system") lead mission planning as basically a set of meetings ultimately driving toward accomplishing the required motherhood and having a basic plan to go up and run some checklists, configure the right switches, and simulate the right weapon releases to log the right RAP bean... the offense team and the EWO plan in a vacuum between these meetings, and on execution day the Pilot Flying honors the calls of the compartment (offense or defense) that yells the loudest, rather than honor the ALR/threat plan/commit criteria. It isn't 5 people working toward 1 plan; at best it's 5 people with partial SA on 1 plan, and at worst it's 3-5 different plans. I've also seen ACs who set out to learn something, plan target back, and actively "push the noodle" toward everybody doing their part in the common plan. And actually, I'd say our FAIPs usually fall moreso into the latter group (because they show up ready to learn, with something to prove), while those that started as co-pilots are more of a mixed bunch. But the bottom line is we don't do them any favors by not consistently training them up in a ML role until FLUG...

And even after that, we usually don't qualify people on the LOX as MLs (multi-ship ML that is) until they are in WIC spinup, which has a number of perverse effects including (1) we ask our CSOs, the EWOs especially, to start talking and leading way too late in their first ops assignment, and (2) it reinforces a perception that tactically-focused continuation training is for patch wannabes, not the squadron as a whole (mind you, this perception probably wouldn't exist if we hadn't been out of combat and mainly nuke exercise/inspection focused for the last 8 years).

Bottom line: In a crew aircraft, someone has to push the noodle and know the *entire* plan, not just their crew position-specific piece of it... Whether that's the prior FAIP AC or FL dual-hatting as ML or it's someone with CSO wings doesn't matter. They just need to step up and do it (and have the requisite training to not muck it up).

this is exactly the stuff i was looking for, thanks for the insight!

its very interesting that in the Bone these issues are not as apparent

[pawnman]

On 10/17/2014 at 1:36 AM, Slander said:

You'll never convince me that CAS by committee works. Ever.

I'll put our safety record up against any other platform in the CAF.

[di1630]

I'll put our safety record up against any other platform in the CAF.

Huh?

[magnetfreezer]

Are there opportunities cross train from the B-1 to other OSA platforms like C-20, C-21, C-37 or C-40? 

Never seen anyone do it.. and the B-1 isn't a DV airlift platform

[ClearedHot]

On 10/17/2014 at 1:36 AM, Slander said:

You'll never convince me that CAS by committee works. Ever.

 Non-Concur.

I've seen good and bad.  On the bad side I worked with a Buff crew very early in the war that was absolutely determined to drop even though no one could see the ground.  I won't go into all the details but at one point he told me "We are going to mark the target for you"...ahhh no pal, you are going to mark GPS coordinates.  I dropped under the weather and as I sorted out the mess I determined he was going to drop a of stick GBU-31s on a freaking village.  #fail  I will say this was not typical of other work I did with the Buff dudes.

On the good side I worked with B-1s and these bros were absolutely dialed in...they knew the battlespace and had great SA of both the friendlies and the bad guys, they threw some serious hate with bombs that were right on target at the right time.

Some of the best work I've ever done was while tag-teaming the bad guys with a flight of A-10's.  It was a thing of beauty and one of the best missions I ever flew, although I am sure we pissed off a lot of virgins.

[B52gator]

5 minutes ago, ClearedHot said:

worked with a Buff crew very early in the war that was absolutely determined to drop even though no one could see the ground. 

key phrase right there, not excusing their actions, but way back then BUFF CAS was something shiny and new and everyone wanted to implement.  Took us awhile to get our minds wrapped around it and learn how to do it correctly.  

 

[SurelySerious]

30 minutes ago, b52gator said:

key phrase right there, not excusing their actions, but way back then BUFF CAS was something shiny and new and everyone wanted to implement.  Took us awhile to get our minds wrapped around it and learn how to do it correctly.  

 

Great idea: have them take a ten year sabbatical and have to relearn all of those lessons again. 

42 minutes ago, ClearedHot said:

 Non-Concur.

I've seen good and bad.  On the bad side I worked with a Buff crew very early in the war that was absolutely determined to drop even though no one could see the ground.  I won't go into all the details but at one point he told me "We are going to mark the target for you"...ahhh no pal, you are going to mark GPS coordinates.  I dropped under the weather and as I sorted out the mess I determined he was going to drop a stick GBU-31s on a freaking village.  #fail  I will say this was not typical of other work I did with the Buff dudes.

On the good side I worked with B-1s and these bros were absolutely dialed in...they knew the battlespace and had great SA of both the friendlies and the bad guys, they threw some serious hate with bombs that were right on target at the right time.

Some of the best work I've ever done was while tag-teaming the bad guys with a flight of A-10's.  It was a thing of beauty and one of the best missions I ever flew, although I am sure we pissed off a lot of virgins.

The biggest shortcoming is CRM difficultly; in an airplane not built with any human factors considerations, for a complex situation at any one time one of my dudes is probably tumbleweed.  I have to expend the time/comm to bring them back because due to the system limitations I can’t continue without them. It can work well, but it can also end up costing time the ground party doesn’t have. 

 

/Derail and can’t grammar

Edited January 9, 2018 by SurelySerious

[ClearedHot]

2 hours ago, SurelySerious said:

Great idea: have them take a ten year sabbatical and have to relearn all of those lessons again. 

The biggest shortcoming is CRM difficultly; in an airplane not built with any human factors considerations, for a complex situation at any one time one of my dudes is probably tumbleweed.  I have to expend the time/comm to bring them back because due to the system limitations I can’t continue without them. It can work well, but it can also end up costing time the ground party doesn’t have.

The answer is training....lots and lots of training.  The gunpig is not exactly a human factors ergonomic masterpiece.  The AC-130H had the FCO and Nav on the flight deck but isolated form the pilots by a blackout curtain, the sensor operators and EWO were down stairs in a booth.  The AC-130U has the NAV, FCO, EWO and sensors operators all downstairs in the BMC...yet somehow both platforms trained their way to excellence.  I am not bashing the Buff...just one data point early in the war, I have a second data point but no need to dogpile.  These are great Americans and they have since professionalized their contribution.

In the end the thing that typically makes the U.S. military stand out from the rest is not the platform but the people and the training.  Train like you fight and fight like you train...joint CAS can be a beautiful thing.

[pawnman]

11 hours ago, di1630 said:

Huh?

I'm saying that the B-1's method of CAS doesn't approach the effectiveness of an A-10 with a good pilot, but the safety record is pretty damned good, despite what 60 Minutes would like you to believe.

[Mark1]

On 1/9/2018 at 6:08 PM, pawnman said:

I'm saying that the B-1's method of CAS doesn't approach the effectiveness of an A-10 with a good pilot, but the safety record is pretty damned good, despite what 60 Minutes would like you to believe.

One thing that nobody ever factors into "safety record" is bad shit that could have been avoided had a proficient crew, flying a purpose built aircraft, been onstation.  People only consider it a black mark on your record if you frag the friendlies or strike an invalid target.  What about the FKIA resulting from enemy contact that nobody saw coming, but should have?  They're less tangible because you can never really be sure if any given situation was the result of substandard support or just the unavoidable cost of war, but it's a huge factor in my preference for the assets I want overhead if I'm the GFC.  Two of my most memorable missions didn't involve any air-to-ground employment and yet I'm sure we prevented loss of life where no other asset in the inventory would have.  Had we not been there the friendlies would have been in a world of hurt, but there wouldn't have been any congressional inquiries into the performance of the other aircraft onstation for those missions.  People only pay attention when missions are actively bungled (e.g. fratricide), not when things go south as a result of something that wasn't done.

As for 60 Minutes, portions of the story were cringeworthy, but I wanted to strangle the GO who tried to minimize the significance of a crew not knowing the basic capabilities of their aircraft.  The fact that they were in combat without that knowledge indicates a systemic failure.  Insufficient training or failure of the system to enforce standards, or both.  Either way it's a system wide problem and the primary causal factor despite the military's insistence on laying overall responsibility at the feet of the GFC for anything/everything that happens in their general vicinity.  There's blame to go around, but the aircrew was in the best position to break the chain by a massive margin.

A simple "Copy, you're marked by IR strobe.  Understand we're unable to see that visual mark with our equipment, request [XYZ]." in response to the JTACs first mention of strobes would have absolutely changed enough moving forward to prevent the whole incident.

[Breckey]

It was significant enough for them to release a Flash Bulletin about it.

[magnetfreezer]

It was significant enough for them to release a Flash Bulletin about it.

One thing that nobody ever factors into "safety record" is bad shit that could have been avoided had a proficient crew, flying a purpose built aircraft, been onstation.  People only consider it a black mark on your record if you frag the friendlies or strike an invalid target.  What about the FKIA resulting from enemy contact that nobody saw coming, but should have?  They're less tangible because you can never really be sure if any given situation was the result of substandard support or just the unavoidable cost of war, but it's a huge factor in my preference for the assets I want overhead if I'm the GFC.  Two of my most memorable missions didn't involve any air-to-ground employment and yet I'm sure we prevented loss of life where no other asset in the inventory would have.  Had we not been there the friendlies would have been in a world of hurt, but there wouldn't have been any congressional inquiries into the performance of the other aircraft onstation for those missions.  People only pay attention when missions are actively bungled (e.g. fratricide), not when things go south as a result of something that wasn't done.
As for 60 Minutes, portions of the story were cringeworthy, but I wanted to strangle the GO who tried to minimize the significance of a crew not knowing the basic capabilities of their aircraft.  The fact that they were in combat without that knowledge indicates a systemic failure.  Insufficient training or failure of the system to enforce standards, or both.  Either way it's a system wide problem and the primary causal factor despite the military's insistence on laying overall responsibility at the feet of the GFC for anything/everything that happens in their general vicinity.  There's blame to go around, but the aircrew was in the best position to break the chain by a massive margin.
A simple "Copy, you're marked by IR strobe.  Understand we're unable to see that visual mark with our equipment, request [XYZ]." in response to the JTACs first mention of strobes would have absolutely changed enough moving forward to prevent the whole incident.

Read the report. Not saying the aircrew were faultless by any means, but based on the chain of events the same outcome could very easily have happened in daytime. Adherence to JPUB by all members of the CAS team is the best way to prevent this.

[Mark1]

13 minutes ago, magnetfreezer said:

Read the report. Not saying the aircrew were faultless by any means, but based on the chain of events the same outcome could very easily have happened in daytime. Adherence to JPUB by all members of the CAS team is the best way to prevent this.

 

The most egregious active mistakes came from the controller, for sure, but they were just the start of the error chain and the aircrew was still in the best position to put things back in order after the mission began to jump the tracks.  I know we put ultimate responsibility with the JTAC/GFC by doctrine, but I can't recall an employment scenario where I didn't have more SA than the controller (not a dig; given the tools at my disposal there's a big problem if that's not the case).  By doctrine the JTAC is at fault, but the reality is that the aircrew has, or should have, more SA (4 brains vs. 1, and a bunch of equipment) than the controller and is better equipped to put a stop to it.  If the JTAC passes info that is vague, contradictory, or incomplete then the aircrew needs to pull the proper info out of him.  And if he passes information that insinuates he believes something to be true that is not, then the aircrew needs to address it immediately.

Given the circumstances there should have been, at an absolute minimum, some concern over the level and validity of information the aircrew had been provided.  In a pinch, the aircrew could have suggested that they mark their intended impact point to confirm the target with the JTAC.  That, also, would have immediately clarified things.  And that's the kind of the suggestion that is usually going to have to come from the crew.  If they fail to suggest such a thing the AAR will never mention it as a failure, because it's something that wasn't done.  In my experience the reports focus 99% on the things that were done, just improperly.  But that doesn't make it any less of a failure.

I hate to Monday morning quarterback, I really do.  I fully understand that things are different in the heat of the moment, with the fog of war, with the urgency in the JTACs voice, etc.  But sometimes a pig is a pig.

[di1630]

So not to knock the bone, it’s done some great work but it’s got some HUGE drawbacks in anything other than a simple bombs required on coords scenario and this is why 5 dudes are dead.

Every jet has strength/ weakness but a strength of the hog other than having all the nice technology designed for CAS is you have diverse weapons. So when there is a question of “is this the right target” you can send a marking rocket or do 2-ship “hit my IR mark” tactics.

These type of options provide steps to break the chain of errors if a JTAC is overtasked/wrong.

So if you have a JTAC who needs a pod and maybe a BOC, bone is fine. If you need complex deconfliction (read the CAS definition...it’s not 99% of Afghanistan) then you want a aircraft with the tools, weapons and training to do it.

Again, not knocking the bone, it has done some fine work but every jet has its limitations. The A-10C has terrific avionics designed for the mission...some features were a result of lessons learned where feat happened in the past.

F-16 block 30 is a CAS machine compared to other blocks.

Strengths and limits.

[waveshaper]

B-1 Bomber Crews Defend Sniper Pod After Friendly Fire Incident (11 Jan 2018);

https://www.military.com/daily-news/2018/01/11/b-1-bomber-crews-defend-sniper-pod-after-friendly-fire-incident.html