Day Man

Jesus. to Luc

sweet...thanks. turns out I am a ra-tard.

This is what I see...the "reputation" is visible because I was hovering over it.

anyway we can get the names displayed again of who up/downvoted something? it saved the bandwidth of adding just a "2" reply, and gave some SA on other guys opinions/positions...

Atheist here...a bro had something come up so I took over Chrismahanukwanzaka party planning. Took it as an opportunity to make the party as fun as possible and ignore any religious overtones. I'm pretty sure it was a good time...

Good work man... appreciate the effort.

read my SIB/FEB thread...

Low risk/low reward

Still pisses me off they put a picture of Sitka 43 ~2 seconds from impact on the cover. And 2 on everything said about lawyering-up/not saying anything to anyone.

Not privileged, used in the CDI & FEB. Agree with the bolded part...one of their super important CDI questions was "why we weren't wearing our deployed sq patch"...their intent was obvious.

False.

Perfect! Out of curiosity, what configuration does the Erroneous ALS/Stall Warnings (Nose Damage) checklist recommend? (Hint: it's not 8 degrees of flaps) No way man...like I said before I'm lucky to be here. In fact, I'm glad the AF showed me what they really think relatively early in my career. When I needed guidance, my leadership was nowhere to be found. Both my WG/CC and SQ/CC told me they were hopeful for the final outcome and I was instructed to be "ready to fly" when the decision came down. 2 years later they both signed off on my referral OPR.

No thrust from 1 & 4. There ended up being some damage to the cores from over-temping. We initially thought they were back online when all engine tapes looked good, but that was apparently just from windmilling. No idea about the same treatment. They said we landed in the wrong configuration, but no one still has told me the right configuration.

I know what I did wasn't procedurally correct. Have you read the whole thread? I didn't want to inhibit relight by denying the engines fuel. Was there a point (time/altitude) where I would resume checklist items? Probably. Do I know what it was? No, but it's probably something that should be discussed (I don't know if it's in the current -1). The point of this thread is to discuss the incident, an SIB, and an FEB...kinda like the title says. I knew nothing of how an SIB or FEB was conducted, and would like to help out guys who might have to go through it as well. If that bothers you, don't view it.

My point was if I was guaranteed a safe landing again, I wouldn't do anything different. If I had turned the fuel switches off, would the engines had relit in time? If we had gone into holding to sort shit out, would 1 & 4 eventually catch fire? No one knows. We were lucky...if you want to test your theories (not in a sim), have at it. Do I recommend this COA for the next guy? Probably not.

Valid points. Obviously nothing happened to any leadership. There's a whole section in the CDI regarding the "culture within the OG"... - Dec 09 to Dec 10, 62 OG approved 270% more waivers than 437 OG (KCHS) - A DO said "We had a guy during post-mission crew rest go to Altus without having any of the sims, flights, etc. That was fairly routine." - 62 OG pilots had the highest rate of CAP at KLTS

There were 2 pilots. For the record, we didn't have any issues at Skardu And yes the pallets were essentially the same; food, water, blankets, etc.

Appreciate the Monday morning QB'ing, but I've had plenty in the past 3 years. If we knew the storm was that severe, do you honestly think we would have flown through it? If you have something constructive to add, please do. Otherwise, go add more nonsense to the IRA thread. This was one of my points of this thread; decisions at 0/0 are different than when you are considering the implications of not going home. Post-flameout, I would do nothing different; I get to kiss my wife every day, and any changes that day could ultimately affect that.

Copy Our planned alternate was OAIX...can you imagine the inbound call to ops with a jet full of Pakistani refugess?

Never did an AIB.

Ah...I have no desire to watch that video again. If you want to try, have at it!

When I get what?

Can't speak to findings, however, Wx radar training was a focus item after our SIB, so draw your own conclusions. We weren't allowed to go, but that is funny. I'm guessing the hail. Edit: according to the CDI "The presence of extreme precipitation is validated by damage to the aircraft radome." And I've never had the pleasure of meeting AMC/CC. He didn't have the balls to tell me in person, even though he was at my base less than a week before I got his disqualifying memo. Green, yellow, magenta Yes it was in auto mode. Magenta is moderate turbulence, and can cover-up more severe precip. We saw the same magenta that we saw before with no real precip or notable turbulence. Yes, I'm an idiot...what was the question? Bingo. Correct. They found it for the FEBs... green, yellow, magenta in that order. 17 Sept 2010. No idea on the range...

Thanks Counsel did their job for the FEB. One (of many) of my issues was that AMC/CC was briefed (several times) on the incident, which obviously included privileged interviews. He also had access to our testimonies for each other's FEBs which was under a grant of immunity. Shady... The day was planned UAFM-OPRN-OPSD-OPRN-UAFM for relief supply/emergency evac after huge floods in Pakistan. OPSD is a RIDICULOUS (for -17s) airfield (google Skardu). Picked up relief supplies at OPRN, found a hole in the layer over the field, and landed. Combat offload the pallets and park. OPRN was running out of pallets, so we had extended ground time to build pallets of pallets. We ended up floor-loading a bunch of pax (~170), and departed. There was some wispy clouds along the route of flight, but nothing that we felt was "true IFR." Approaching OPRN, we had bad comms. There were some cells on the wx radar that we maneuvered around, but nothing extreme. We asked to maneuver north of the field, but denied D2 Indian airspace. They sent us south, and we flew through one of the wx cells (it wasn't bad...light chop)where we lost comms with OPRN, until we eventually just turned around (the radios sucked anyways, plus the wx). We were instructed to proceed to the navaid at the field and descend, so we did. There was a cell over the field, but it looked similar to the one we had flown through previously and thought nothing of it. With a low power setting for the descent, we got into some HEAVY precip. I looked at the AC and said "we gotta get the outta here." He began a left turn, and everything went black. I thought it was a power surge from a lightning strike, but he immediately did the boldface. I then realized what had happened. I double checked his boldface steps were correct, and retrieved my checklist for clean-up. Like I said before, one of the next steps was to turn fuel off, but I wanted to give the engine a chance to light off (there was no time or altitude in the checklist when to proceed after the boldface was completed). I tried to back him up with airspeed (pitch for 250), but our stby indicators were 60+ knots off (turbulent airflow from the imploded nose), so I shut up. I even tried starting the APU which won't start in flight, but I figured if the electrical system was jacked, it might work (it didn't) 2&3 came online after a couple minutes giving us normal cockpit power through the split parallel system. We had no desire to run any other checklist since the AC could control the plane sufficiently and proceeded to final. Didn't bother with inputting told (bad airflow, 2 engine, winds out of limits), and I made sure important shit was completed (spoilers/gear). We were initially going to land 1/2 flap, but the AC called for 3/4 (standard 3 degree config) after the runway was made to make it smoother for the floor-loaded pax). The crap after roll-out is already posted above.

Good to hear. Did they show the video? What were the takeaways?