Clark Griswold

Not too quibble with you but I didn't say bankrupt but it is my opinion that it is has a disproportionate place in our acquisition strategy. Its growth in budget and slip in schedule has been tolerated too much, just my two cents. No argument that growth in new missions and the bow wave of recap which is really the chickens of coming home to roost for years of poor acquisition strategy and execution. I am an advocate for shedding certain missions/core functions as they detract from what should be our focus on air & space power projection, cyber is awesome but beyond a certain level of organic capability it probably should be in a separate institution, that's not just for the AF but all branches of the military. I do. As Carl Sagan would say billions and billions and I would say that Space Superiority and all the missions from that core function rate higher or should on our acquisitions strategy. How that displaces the air acquisition is messy but probably necessary. Would not count that as a face palm moment for SECDEF Gates' comment. It was not out of touch but an observation on our force structure and a public question to ask the leadership and military strategy community to think if that truly still what is needed. If this were the late 30's and a Secretary of War publicly questioned the penchant of the USN for battleships versus aircraft carriers, prevailing opinion would have chided him but he would have been prescient. If a concept, doctrine or strategy is correct or wise it should be defensible enough to withstand public comment. If we don't challenge our assumptions we are susceptible to delude ourselves or ignore changing operational/strategic conditions. Agreed but I would also caution not to get distracted by what we should focus on being high end, the platform or the weapons they deliver? Would our finite resources be better spent on more advanced weapons or platforms? Honest question. As pilots we are naturally inclined to think the airplane but as military officers we have to step back and question our biases. Also, perhaps High Low Mix isn't the right term with the 4+ fighters Low doesn't seem right to describe them. Yes, but how do you do that? Pardon my inference but I think you are implying that we have to have the ability from an aircraft to deliver ordinance to any target no matter the environment. That may be a bridge too far in some cases now but that same mission might be more appropriately performed with new technology, like a hypersonic missile. No disagreement that we need the capability but I think we need to recognize how we deliver the capability is changing.

Excellent WOR article on Hi-Lo strategy: Rethinking the High-Low Mix, Part II: Complexity’s Death Spiral

I said take a page not copy and follow the whole thing. Like it or not we may have hit "peak fighter" with our 5th Gens not only being deadly to the enemy but to their own forces by their relentless consumption of resources to the detriment of everything else that might need sustainment, upgrade or replacement. Some people like to crow that we spent the Soviets into oblivion with SDI and the 80's build up but in a way we're doing that to ourselves by a non-stop obsession with the absolute best or nothing. There is a point when you say that is just too much to do it that way. We've been here before with other airplanes from way back in the day, ref. the XB-70 Valkyrie and the XF-108 Rapier, both the pinnacles of design for their times in their mission types but the AF realized (wisely) that it can't spend the lion's share of the team's salary on one player. We cancelled the programs and thought about how to accomplish those missions better not just focusing on what will fly/fight in them. I'm not saying that in the USAF, USN, USMC, etc... pilots flying a multi-role strike aircraft have to be in some barely relevant old POS, what am saying is that the core aircraft(s) of Tactical Aviation by the sheer number of aircraft to be bought can not be so expensive to procure, operate and maintain that they degrade the Total Joint Team.

Word. Circling back to the original subject of this thread, substantially improved existing designs in lieu of an all 5th Gen fleet, seem to be popular to our two realistic peer AFs, China & Russia. Perhaps it is time to take a page from their playbook as our budget doesn't seem to be able cover that and all the other missions / systems we have or need to do.

No argument that its a problem just my option that the software will be the largest gripe and an on-going gripe to fix/update for stability & security. Baby definitely has back... comparison to a. Harrier: 2

Not me, saw it after business hours. And now for something completely different... HAL Tejas

Copy that. If someone can speak to this (OPSEC allowing) has there been any planning / discussion on if a LAAR is to be purchased, how they will be integrated into the AF? Most of the discussion that I have seen in open sources has not really addressed that and if the green light is given, a plan in place to stand up units, change MWS of existing units, etc... The logistics and manpower could be a stumbling block even if an aircraft purchase is approved.

The B model is only part of the problem(s), the software and updates/fixes needed are also BIG rocks to deal with. Giving the USMC a smaller carrier capable of STOBAR / ski jump operations and supporting amphibious operations and consolidating all USN acquisition on the C model, in hindsight, might have kept the JSF close to a historically successful multi-service, multi nation fighter program, the F-4. Deleting the B which is going to be only 14% of the US purchase of F-35s would have reduced risk/cost/complexity - water under the bridge.

Valid.

Maybe but SCAR may not go far enough in empowering the mission crew and FAC(A) is probably too much for what I think we are discussing, release authority for a LAAR acting independently of a C2 node when there is no real risk of fratricide. From the Lemay center, AF doctrine annex on Counterland missions (derivative missions) https://doctrine.af.mil/download.jsp?filename=3-03-D08-LAND-Derivative-msns.pdf ...Forward Air Controller (Airborne) (FAC[A]). FAC(A) missions provide terminal attack control (TAC) for CAS aircraft operating in close proximity to friendly ground forces. Because of the risk of fratricide, FAC(A)s are specially trained aviation officers qualified to provide delivery clearance to CAS aircraft. The FAC(A) is the only person cleared to perform such control from the air, and can be especially useful in controlling CAS against targets that are beyond the visual range of friendly ground forces... FAC(A) doesn't really fit as the training requirements are very high and again this is not release with friendlies close. SCAR missions use aircraft to detect targets for dedicated AI missions in a specified geographic zone. The area may be defined by a box or grid where worthwhile potential targets are known or suspected to exist, or where mobile enemy surface units have relocated because of ground fighting. ...Even though some SCAR responsibilities are similar to that of a FAC(A), SCAR aircrew do not have the authority to conduct terminal control of CAS. FAC(A)s undergo specialized training to effectively coordinate and integrate air-ground forces to conduct TAC safely during CAS—a SCAR aircrew does not have release authority, nor do they clear other aircraft for employment of munitions... SCAR doesn't seem to give a LAAR enough independence of control. A new mission that emphasizes independence of control from a rear echelon C2 or ISR cell but using the ground element as required and having independent release authority if there are no friendly ground forces in the immediate vicinity of a kinetic action seems in order. What we have works but could be improved, just rantings from the internet.

No argument that the blame is on both sides and the 5th Gen only crowd didn't set the stage we have now by themselves but absent an even larger increase to the AF budget than the current admin is proposing what we have in the plans for the AF is just not affordable and maintaining the force structure we have / missions allocated to us We know we need more to do everything on the books and we would have to if the ballon goes up but that kind of extra funding and the control over the money vice the MIC and parochial Congressional interests is not coming So what to do? Load shed. Propose fewer missions and more affordable mission systems vice an all silver bullet fleet but emphasizing we NEED some silver bullets. There has been an exponential growth in mission sets that are not warheads on foreheads, mobility, nuclear deterrence, etc... New missions and responsibilities that are being disproportionate being saddled on the AF need to culled, reassigned or cost shared to keep us focused and resourced effectively Sent from my iPhone using Tapatalk

Dambusters reenactment http://worldwarwings.com/wwii-era-bouncing Sent from my iPhone using Tapatalk

On the subject of who's in charge... I can understand (somewhat) the hesitation to not let go of control of the mission if the target has been surveilled and developed prior to arrival of the asset on station and that asset is continuing the persistent stare with VDL back to a GCC or other ISR element but when a target is developed in the mission either by the air asset or by cue from another ground or air asset, the authority should / needs to remain with the mission crew. For a LAAR, this should be it's primary modus operandi (IMO) and lends itself more to the proposed Observation mission than ISR as doctrine defines that mission now. Observation mission as proposed by a previous reference in this thread article from a War on the Rocks: https://warontherocks.com/2016/08/oa-x-more-than-just-light-attack/ How to get leadership on board with this? Not sure, but the arguments I see supporting it are: - Shortened kill chain, fewer levels of approval. Possible risk in that understood. - Lower footprint due to lower amount of FMV requiring PED from ground element in rear echelon, PED is to be usually organically supplied by supported element or mission crew if customer is not VDL capable. - Can be allocated to customers / targets that are lower priority for high persistence assets thereby allowing greater focus of high persistence, ISR focused assets against higher value targets. Allows longer surveillance of targets that should be under constant stare. - Concept of Employment and primary mission of Observation / Light Strike in direct support / coordination with GFC or JTAC not aligned with longer decision cycle involving rear echelon ground elements.

2 With perfect hindsight, the introduction of 5th Gen had and has an apparent flaw that with the technology, materials and designs we have now they don't work with the Hi - Lo concept that was successful with the 15 & 16, that is you really can't make a "cheap" 5th Gen fighter. The barn is wide open and it doesn't matter but if we had committed to a full run of 22's (in the 500+ range) to replace the 15Cs and Es, developing an FB-22 and kept our requirements in check for the 16 and 18 replacement (forgoing the VSTOL altogether) to not be go full 5th Gen but 4++ with unique capabilities or design to be relevant but not in the first wave on night 1, things might have worked out better. The lesson learned for the 35 acquisition and development is strive for good improvement not unrealistic improvement over the previous jet. The price soars, the schedule goes late, you reduce your goals to keep it alive and undermine your service reputation, important because you'll want to get another toy in the future and politicians trust you less or not at all anymore.

Textron gets a demo event this summer for the USAF... http://www.defensenews.com/articles/textron-sets-its-sights-on-air-forces-light-aircraft-experiment

You got right some of what I was thinking after I read the article, my posts were / are skeptical of the concept, I was just imagining and putting up a visual of what I thought this modern LWF F-45 if brought to life would be or likely to be.. I can describe in words what a hot girl looks like but if I put up a picture, that's about 69% more effective...

Nice.

Copy that. There's something that happens to people when they stare at video feeds, BFT maps, etc... at an AOC, the illusion of control is slow, subtle and inevitable maybe. History doesn't repeat but it rhymes, trite but true. This micro control is reminiscent of LBJ, McNamara, et al in the Vietnam War directing what targets, when, what weapons from the White House... guess they didn't cover that at Maxwell...

Copy that Circling back to the article and proposing another jet that will likely never get funded, unless there is a champion or group of insurgents in the AF to fight for another LWF then I would suggest taking a design the article's author referenced positively and that IMO is unappreciated, the JAS-39 NG, and seeing if an "F-45" could be had from it. Just vaporware from the Internet but a good approximation of what could be a modern LWF from an existing design that is true to what the author and Boyd would likely advocate for. The KF-X concept I referenced above is years from flying, the Japanese Stealth Fighter is a twin engine design and likely way higher in intended capabilities than a hypothetical F-45, taking a good multi-role light fighter that focuses on reliability, interoperability, limited support and affordability seems a viable COA.

Sacrifices must be made. Given the habits formed from the last 15+ years of ops in permissive environments and the generous growth in links back to C2 and ITCs (not all bad, having access to ground based resources is nice), it might do some good to wargame VDL degraded / denied scenarios to flesh out TTPs for LAARs in Observation / ISR / Strike. Ask any of the perspective vendors, they would fall all over themselves to make this happen FOC. Not sure if it would be exactly FAC-A but seems pretty close to it.

2 I like his general concept but the limitations or firm targets he sets on the dimensions of the aircraft seem a bit optimistic. I don't see Big Blue going to Congress for another fighter but in lieu of that I think asking Congress for a companion trainer/aggressor for Fighter Wings is in the realm of possibility, on the edges of it but possible... to prevent the problem you are unfortunately dealing with, too few flight hours. Rolling the T-38s that have enough life in them to Fighter Wings as the T-X comes online would give them some less expensive iron to fly for their own Red Air / Companion aircraft program. His idea is not without merit, it is just not in the cards (probably) given the MASSIVE investment into the F-35, for better or worse, probably more the better I think though. One thing about his concept for a passive detection focused LWF that I don't see him address is how he will handle opponents practicing their own EMCON discipline and/or being distracted by decoys (ground or air launched). Cross cueing might solve that but without your own robust radar, seems kinda limited.

Legit points but the LAAR is not a direct competitor or substitute for an RPA, but I believe a system to be used in combination with one, like an LOS Tier I RPA or maybe a Tier II. The LAAR does bring a lower cost operation and lower risk in some ways when operating in conjunction with other manned players but it's strongest point is its autonomous operational capability. No LOS, satellite footprint, no comms with the IMC, no problem - brief the crew and cut 'em loose. Start point, call sign and frequency - get the details at check-in. I'm not for just winging it but sometimes we need a capability to just operate on little planning or support, a LAAR seems to be able to meet that need.

Thread bump. Article from National Review for a modern LWF ala Boyd and the Fighter Mafia vice the F-35: http://www.nationalreview.com/article/445708/f-35-replacement-f-45-mustang-ii-fighter-simple-lightweight Interesting article, very similar to a concept advocated by Robert Dorr a few years ago. Not sure about all of his ideas / principles for this modern successor to the F-16 / LWF but his requirement of demonstrated high reliability (multiple operational sorties per day) is prescient for what might be an Achilles' heel in peer / near peer fight. Reading it reminded me of one concept model for the KF-X project: This would probably fit the bill for this next generation LWF. Semi stealth F-16 kinda.

True - it is an institutional character flaw in the AF. Pride, stubbornness and a lack imagination have infected it at the deepest levels. Agree that they were disruptive both short term and long term, the TAMI-21 sh*t sandwich though I think was way more damaging. There was a requirement, the AF stepped up to meet it but to reference Gates again "with the fine motor skills of a dinosaur" it manned it in a 1950's style that treats highly skilled valuable difficult to produce aircrew as interchangeable cogs to be used until failure then replaced with another. Unfortunately for the AF as a bureaucracy, it has not gotten the message that people have options, the ones your want to keep are hard to recruit, train and retain so it continues to stumble... if it were Gen Clark Griswold designing these programs, they would have heavily recruited from the ARC, not tried to nickel & dime the orders so that I could get a high degree of participation, looked for volunteers in the RegAF with the carrot of special programs following successful completion of their MC-12 / UAV tour rather than some pixel pusher who will need disability for repetitive knees stress (in residence PME if desired, base of choice, etc...) We have resources, we can retain key airmen, we just need to stop acting like an AF or military for that matter from a different era. What drives us into the dirt is that the world has changed, the wars / operations we are in are different than we are institutionally structured to meet yet we really don't change. The AF should be running head long into getting a LAAR not just as a cheaper way to deliver Airpower but as a strategic retention tool. I can only speak for myself but I worked my ass off to get a Pilot Slot to be a... Military Pilot. If you got 100 to 150 of these aircraft located at a few different, varied bases to give options for personal/family choices and QOL... instead of Capt X quitting after his second assignment UAV tour, he might stay for a career because he had a follow on in an aircraft, doing the mission and rebluing an officer in the process. Same thing for CSO. This will pay for itself for being about 95% cheaper when operationally employed and also when it retains hundreds of qualified aviators in the AF over the course of its operational life:

Depressing but likely a reason that could get them to the party (around 14 years late depending on your opinion of when we should have realized we were running a marathon and not a sprint). It's going to take a public brow beating ala the SECDEF Gates chiding the services and specifically the AF that spurred Project Liberty and got an FMV surge. Not judging the efficacy of that project but I cite it as an example of an event that shocked the AF into action. If a SECDEF, Senator or other serious politician publicly humiliated the AF or threatened to send the mission to the Army, that might spur action. Just buy one AF... if we can not figure out how to buy a light turboprop or jet, crew it appropriately and not crash the AF then we might as well hang it up and head to the house.