Clark Griswold

Agreed They want to treat the symptoms not the disease

Not saying that or implying that military pilot training is the only way to become a great pilot What I am saying is that it is PATHETIC that a military institution historically based on airpower with a 132 billion dollar budget, 12,600 pilots, 5 bases dedicated to pilot training and over 1,000 training aircraft and access to enormous amounts of data that was foretelling this problem can not figure a way out.

Just the sad final end of years of mismanagement or a cynical strategy to "disaster signal" to get Congressional approval of policy / manpower changes to allow Big Blue to kick the can down the road...

Another article on OA-X: https://warontherocks.com/2017/11/oa-x-strikes-back-eight-myths-light-attack/ Don't agree with Myth 5 but more grist for the mill...

Yup - everybody needs to be 5th gen / LO in the truly contested environment if you want to have sustained ISR, precision strike, etc... to implement complex ROEs. Inherently impractical for a host of reasons and not necessary. If it is that kind of fight, there's not time for the 2 hour mud hut watch while it is debated on whether to strike or not. The Saudis maybe the first one to take it to a non-permissive environment and test it's ability to operate their: https://www.thedrive.com/the-war-zone/15757/saudi-arabia-puts-textrons-scorpion-light-attack-jet-through-the-paces Article says they could possibly be looking at the Yak-130, an apples to oranges comparison IMO. The endurance and design (integrated sensor stations, open architecture, mission bay, etc..) of Scorpion just make it unique among ISR / Light Strike, as cheesy as it is, game changing is true to say. Another article from The Drive, USMC wants some light strike aircraft partnered with its F-5 aggressor program: https://www.thedrive.com/the-war-zone/8837/marines-want-more-second-hand-f-5-aggressors-and-a-light-attack-aircraft

What? It was awesome...

B-1 at Oshkosh

I wish Partially Out of Phase II (which IMO should be a tad longer sts) studs would track one of three ways with the guys/gals tracked for fighters going to T-X at Bases X,Y and Z. Dudes going to track ACC heavies, AFGSC bombers, RPAs, etc... based on the economic realities we face need not be trained in an expensive to buy, fly and maintained AB jet. If this were the mid-80s where the JP was cheap, the DoD budget was fat and the mission(s) more clear then sure T-X for all the studs but it is not. We face high ops tempo, flat budgets, aging equipment and a genuine need to have people with a breadth of experience in several missions (or at least a basic exposure to them) so that a greater portion of our pilot force is more flexibly assignable during their career

Yup

Exactly and what I should have put in is we still need SUPT but SUPT with three advanced trainer options: Scorpion, T-X and Helos. Consolidated T-X (fighter) at 2 to 3 bases and have their syllabus in two parts: Phase 3 and earning wings then roll straight to IFF. The majority of studs go to Scorps and do a new Phase III syllabus to develop Mobility, SOF, ISR, RPA, OSA, etc... pilots. True the majority of dudes will not be maneuvering tactically but the new Phase III will be to grow a cadre of non fighter but tactically minded aviators who will more naturally flow between Mobility, ISR, SOF, etc... assignments in their careers.

Alright, off the cuff data / public math then... They want 350 on the initial buy of T-X but only 25% of T-X are truly needed for fighter pilot production and let's add 10% to that for a better ADAIR program, 10% for TPS and Chase Ship Programs and another 5% for attrition so in reality you need 50% or 350 that comes to 175 airframes on the initial buy. At 30 million a tail that comes to 5.25 billion for purchase and figure sustainment for those tails at $6,000 per flight hour (WAG) and the 88 training tails fly 500 hours per FY and the other 87 tails 200 per FY so that is $264 million for 44,000 training hours + 104.4 million for 17,400 other hours = 368.4 million per FY for T-X in O&M cost, rough number but seems reasonable. So as the AF only bought the T-Xs actually required for the missions where called for it effectively saved in the purchase 175 x $30 million = 5.25 billion in purchase costs and instead of flying students not going to fighters in 175 T-Xs x 500 x $6,000 per flight hour at 525 million per FY and instead bought 400 Scorpion jets (divesting the T-1 and using the Scorpion) it spent 8 billion up front but per FY it replaced aging iron (T-1) and assuming the Scorpion is selected somehow from LAE it synchronizes logistics with that program also and has new, easily sustainable iron on the ramp for Stanley to abuse learning the ropes. Per FY it saves by flying 175 Scorps vs T-X at 3K per hour versus 6K per hour about 262.5 million per FY that the training Scorps are on the flight line. So after all that by going with a less expensive option for the dudes who are not actually going to fly fighters you save over a quarter of a billion dollars per FY, that pays for 12 Scorps per FY in savings plus some other large number I can't figure out right from retiring the T-1 fleet before it becomes a MX hog and is old, expensive iron to fly and the savings from hopefully synching up logistics with an operational Scorp fleet. All that is probably north of 500 million bucks, serious money for the AF to save every FY. You are probably right but I rage (pointlessly) never the less. I am a Scorpion cultist but y'all are probably right on the T-50 / T-100, Boeing's offering seems less viable as it is not as established. Only saw the vendor booths for those two systems in 2015 at the AFA convention, both impressive, but I would probably go with T-50 for a better lead in to the F-35A.

15% - that’s the total of SUPT that go to fighters? If so, then it makes zero financial sense to synch Phase 3 with IFF by aircraft type - just make IFF longer and harder (sts) and get a more economical Phase 3 trainer which IMO should be a Scorpion

Cool I could see adding another 20-25 hours but keeping the T-1 syllabus in the 50-60 hour range. Mission fam could be still be done in the jet but after a bunch of IAPs in the T-6 and the student graduating that Phase, I would lower the instrument requirements and use the jet for the skills I really wanted to develop. Also, if the fighter dudes get a gold plated new trainer, we get one too (dream on) but I want the PC-24 That is if we don’t go back to a UPT model if that then go with a Scorpion in a training configuration

Sidebar: Do you think that more time in the T-6 (a bit cheaper to fly) would be better for studs tracking heavies then a shorter but more focused T-1 syllabus on crew management, multi-eng ops, etc..? Looking back on SUPT, I have always thought (especially for studs tracking heavies) that more extensive x-country work with RONs at OST locations would have enhanced training. Dispatching yourself and then having the experience of leading a formation on the road with little to no support is where the mind of a capable, adaptable aircraft commander is made.

Amen brother I am struggling to understand the institutional resistance to a variety of solutions to the missions we face. Not every problem is a nail. Some of the problems he laid out (range, speed for survivability, adaptability / updateability, etc.) are all addressed by the Scorpion (shameless plug) and way exceed its competitors. It amazes me the obliviousness of the AF for how many of its problems with modernization, support, etc... are caused by the gold plated white elephants we keep buying and asking for but this is a service that will rationalize anything...

Gotcha and will defer to your opinion (not an 11F) on Red Air. My main point is that the Phase III syllabus (if we return to UPT vs SUPT) should be changed to be less fighter lead in focused and more broad in scope.

Not sure about if the Scorpion that was at LAE was the final configuration but given it's open architecture design and use of COTS for the basics (and just the standard configuration as it exists now) configuring it to a SUPT Phase III configuration should not be a big deal. That's just from me with no formal connection to Textron Air-Land or the AF offices testing / evaluating it but I don't think that guess is too far from the mark. Unfortunately I receive no internet Scorpion fan boy money I just do it for free (sts). No argument that it will not be a BFM monster but I will focus on one part of what you said, "if we are going to train the next gen of fighter pilots", and I would argue that Phase III is not the place to do that specifically. Phase III, IMO, is for teaching how to generically accomplish and manage a variety of military missions. From that syllabus and the order of merit for the studs, dudes could select fighters and the training to get there. A better IFF program with a rock solid modern LIFT jet like the T-50, T-00 or Boeing T-X is what is called for. If moi were king for a day, IFF and ADAIR would be one program and before dudes showed up to fly Vipers, Eagles, Raptors, Lightings they would complete IFF and get more seasoning in a less expensive jet fighting the planes they are going to fly. They show up with more air and more tactical training time.

True but I don't think the Scorpion would have a problem matching them in logistical costs as part of the overall system design it was designed to leverage Cessna's proven parts and MX supply chain. Break - Break... But what is it exactly we want to be produced and sorted based on merit from Phase III and then assigned best to meet the needs of the AF? I would posit that we need a shift back to UPT with the goal of the overall process (selection, screening, training and evaluation) to produce a Military Pilot. Differentiating that from a pilot (private or commercial) as one that is well trained in basic airmanship and skills but a sizable portion of his/her training is focused on developing traits, habits and experience in maintaining Situational Awareness, Prioritization, Effective Communication and Team Leadership (leading the formation, crew, supporting the GFC, etc...). For me, to do this we would extend IFS to build the very basics of airmanship and aviation GK economically, Phase II would be longer with more instrument / cross country (retaining aero and form) to build experience in aviation operations generally and then to Phase III with only instrument work coincidental with military mission concept introduction. This would probably stretch UPT out a bit further than a year but the product supplied to the AF will advance faster in training (my theory) in their assigned MDS and ultimately cost less to reach the required proficiency prior to reporting to the actual line squadron. I am probably preaching to the choir as I think everyone sees that UPT needs to produce but for the given current realities of the AF (high ops tempo, flat budgets, aging equipment) we need to actually not reduce training / standards in SUPT but modestly increase it and focus training in Phase III not on doing a fix to fix (Hitler video was funny) or instrument approaches ad nauseum but on the skill sets (SA; ability to manage chaos, recover and prioritize; cool nerves developed from some stress induced in training) as IPs / ACs / Flight Leads / etc... we value in our co-pilots and wingmen. This new Phase III would look somewhat similar to the Navy's T-45 program just as a reference. More rides, hours and training scenarios calling on multiple skills I believe is more economically and realistically achievable in a system like the Scorpion and ultimately better for the AF. Just my two cents.

Relight on cold thread: Alright, I've been following the "F-16 students skip Phase III" thread and there have been several good sidebars on going back to UPT vs. SUPT with a single advanced trainer, are the requirements set for T-X really necessary for training in SUPT, etc... Thinking on those a bit and stepping back a few feet, ultimately what is the purpose of phase III? To introduce advanced military flying training/concepts to reduce training in the first MDS of the studs? Or primarily a final evaluation exercise to see how quickly they grasp a new aircraft, new concepts, etc... while integrating the base of knowledge acquired in IFS, Phase I and II of SUPT and then rank the class accordingly? Probably both so what tasks of advanced military airmanship are we looking to emphasize? Mission / Spatial / Temporal SA, Comm Management & Prioritization, System Management & Maximization, etc.. @ClearedHot brought up the Scorpion as a trainer (in the other thread) and I am thinking now that is the better choice for its open architecture, low cost of operation, reliability, etc... with those traits you could probably emulate all aspects of challenging, dynamic modern military missions but you would probably not get the high aspect BFM performance you get with an afterburner jet, but is that necessary in SUPT? Thoughts?

https://warontherocks.com/2017/11/false-promise-oa-x/ Don't agree with the author's premise but valid critiques are raised, worth a read.

Gonking further on this, WTH would be come of the T-1 Phase III if this dumpster fire of a COA becomes policy? I don't see AMC, AFSOC, AFMC, etc... ok with deleting half of the training for some of their future pilots and accepting that likely very large and expensive training bill to get them to the experience and proficiency level required to complete their MDS qual. ACC for that matter is likely to get shafted with a sizable bill also, again who the f actually thinks this is a good idea?

Doug would totally rock this problem out... If retention is impossible/improbable and you can't grow fast enough then you have to load shed / tap reserve capacity. In all of this I have not heard the idea floated for Involuntary Mobilization, I don't think they should but T10 - 12304 is fairly broad in scope and doesn't take that much if you get the right people to say yes. IM under that authority limits you to 200k for only up to 365 days but if you needed dudes that bad you could pull that T-handle but accept the consequences (long term). Rather than that, offer 3 year ADOS tours with a 50K bonus, no 365 TDYs, no staff work with an offer to continue to 20 years of service at end of orders, ARC folks might be worried about going back to their unit, give them the option of another home if they want (assuming they don't have a civ job to return to). 3,000 man years with bonuses is not cheap but it is not unaffordable either. Load shedding is the third rail, not sure where a modern AF leader would say we can't give you X and still provide Y and Z, there's just not enough Shlitz. If it were me, I would probably ask for the Army/Navy/USMC to pick up 15 RPA CAPs (could be exchange personnel at AFBs and using AF RPAs); I would probably ask for relief from the growing non-traditional mission sets (Cyber, ISR PED, etc...) and then I would load shed the big one and ask to drop the air delivered strategic nuclear deterrence mission, switching the strategy of the AF to a tactical nuke air delivered strategy only. Reprogram those resources to tap ARC resources in a way to encourage voluntary take ($$$ and specific duties/responsibilities contractually spelled out) and keep the AETC pipeline turned up to 11 for years on end.

Looks like they are testing the waters for Stop Loss: https://www.airforcetimes.com/news/your-air-force/2017/11/21/break-this-force-air-force-warns-cuts-manning-woes-could-hurt-war-zone-fight/ “I don’t think there’s much the Air Force can do right now ... except invoke stop-loss in order to stop this gross departure of pilots,” Venable said. “I had the chief of staff here at the Heritage Foundation [at the beginning of the year] and he said stop-loss is not on the table. But, at one point or another, you’ve got to maintain your combat capability. And if they can’t ... I think he’s going to have to [consider] stop-loss. It would be draconian, everybody would hate it. But I’m not sure what their alternatives are going to be.”

I just figured out where the good idea fairy got this awful idea from:

So if this abortion of an idea comes to pass, what does or would the FAA have to say about this? While the military is a self-certifying agency there are some basic assumptions between the DoD and the FAA on aircrew training for qualification and certification, that we won't do anything reckless, risky, dumb or that would endanger the public or property unduly. Like marginally training people and then putting them in the control of a jet they by any other standard would not be qualified to operate at their given level of experience and training. I doubt they would be cool with us certifying someone good to fly a multi-engine jet if they had no turbine or multi engine experience, so extend that idea to someone only having 100 or so hours in a high performance turboprop, some sims (not even Class D) and then put in the seat of a supersonic jet. Methinks they would not be ok with that person at the controls in the NAS. How can the Air Staff or AETC Staff seriously bounce this idea around without considering the first incident and then the subsequent investigation, reports, headlines, etc... and not see the AF losing all confidence in its ability to operate? I mean really, look at the Navy right now, they took shiphandling and turned it from a formal course into a stack of CDs for dudes to review prior to reporting to their first assignment, how's that working for them now? https://www.npr.org/2017/09/07/549117911/navy-officials-examine-training-procedures-after-ship-accidents