Clark Griswold

Lighten up Francis Just fantasizing spending hundreds of millions of taxpayer dollars reinventing the wheel Sent from my iPhone using Tapatalk

Excellent post - discussing the points you made: Terrorism - possibly a primary reason for staying in Afghanistan but I think a minor one. I have no doubt the Taliban if they returned to power would allow some VEOs to operate there (besides themselves) but I think they would likely only allow VEOs that were regional actors. Last time they allowed International VEOs to operate there they got invaded by the US & NATO, occupied for 10+ years and generally had a bad time. My opinion they would be massive a-holes yet again when in power as they were and are now but would likely keep themselves from becoming targets of direct military action again. Strategic reasons you listed - concur but I would ask us to question the cost to benefit of direct military and expensive financial support to the NUG. China and Iran will get to the rare earth metals that are mineable in Afghanistan before we will be able to as they can merely walk there if they wanted to. Their geographic presence alone makes a supported friendly proxy that is a puppet that we will use in opposition or as foil to their regional plans unrealistic IMO. If Afghanistan were intrinsically stronger and by custom unified, then maybe but as they are weak by nation-state standards, they will be sucesptible to regional influence more easily than our support that we are willing to commit to can overcome. They will make deals with regional powers regardless if we disapprove of them or not, we are half-way around the world and don't want to be there any longer, they're neighbors are right there, they are not going away and they will be who they trade and work with on a broader scale than us. We made a mistake, spend an a$$ load of money and don't want to admit we were wrong - concur. That said, it doesn't mean we want just say to hell with it. There are only so many more billions Congress is willing to appropriate, no one wants to see that final Saigon moment when the end happens and the helicopters with the last of our folks are getting the hell out of there so let's acknowledge that is not what we want but some return of the Taliban is inevitable as we are not willing to pour another 500+ billion over 10-15 years to keep the inevitable from happening. 500+ billion can do shit load of good here, can it really do a shit load of good in Afghanistan? If CG were running for office and my opponent were a stay the course politician, I would pummel them with that sophistry mercilessly, surprised it has not been made in national elections as of yet. We have to acknowledge we are spending a shit ton of money to not support and defend the people of Afghanistan but the elites of Afghanistan we find less offensive than the Taliban, is it really worth it to keep them in power? Funding can keep the NUG in power / functioning for some period of time after we withdraw all or most of our forces - concur. So let's act on that fact and start to move towards the door of this party we want to leave while still chatting with the attendees. Relocate the mission slowly to Mazar e Sharif as the north is less Pashtun and hence less Taliban, fund as required the NUG, bribe as required local warlords / criminals to keep the Taliban busy, directly fund provincial governments to keep the shit to shoe level in there provinces and keep the NUG from stealing all the money and then at an appropriate time, probably in the winter as the fighting will be less then, pull the plug, cross the Friendship Bridge like the Red Army did in 89 and call it good. There will inevitably be some loss of national prestige (temporarily) and political clout/influence in Central Asia for a time but if you carefully and smoothly step back, you will not be or look like you got chased out with your tail between your legs rather you did your part, the NUG just could not pull it together and they failed. Charlie Wilson was right, we did amazing things and then we fucked up the end game, was true in the 80s and true now, the task is how to minimize the long term negative consequences of poor previous choices not continue making them.

Indeed... ;-) On a related subject to light attack aircraft, an article on an developing attack aircraft at multiple levels with actual strategy for delivering & sustaining capability not merely a successor to a platform currently performing a mission. Worth the time. https://warontherocks.com/2017/05/reclaiming-the-air-attack-mission-a-radical-return-to-a-proven-success/

Always liked the F7F - two motors would be good If we're going down (sts) the rabbit hole get a modernized F-82 Pilot and CSO get their own cockpits

Copy so probably not any US pilots of late. Brits did take a few home after the Falklands and fly them for a bit even thinking about them for COIN just curious if we had gotten first hand knowledge Sent from my iPhone using Tapatalk

So I read this the other day: The U.S. was supposed to leave Afghanistan by 2017. Now it might take decades. and since the forum has been active on Afghanistan related subjects, namely AFPAK Hands, and the basically universal consensus that it is a waste of time, I wanted to start a discussion on whether or not it is time to leave and if so how? Leaving gets misinterpreted with defeat in battle, not so. Leaving means the completion of our military training mission, determination that our rebuilding & stabilization mission has run its course and that it is time to redeploy our forces & people to the northern part of the country, former Northern Alliance territory, stabilize and monitor the situation there on a short term mission to withdraw completely in a maximum of 3 years. So collapse of the Afghan National / Central government is expected on withdrawal but what about an agreement with Provincial governments as Afghanistan and its culture are much more tribally / regionally focused? They're support and use as an intermediary to deal with regional Taliban commanders could allow for a withdrawal without a chaotic collapse of the nation as it is now, basically assist it in reverting to what it usually was, mostly autonomous agrarian based tribally divided regions, at varying degrees of conflict with each other via local warlords feuding. Buy them off individually as provinces with a medium term promise of aid for stability (probably 5 years) and slowly / smoothly leave. Get Pakistan on board with carrots to assist, sanctions partially lifted, financial aid, etc... keep the money flowing to them for a few years. I would rather see a clear cut victory but there is not likely one, they have no assailable COG as we think of it, like a hydra there leadership cadre regrows eventually with every surgical strike, no conventional enemy military to destroy, no critical supporting infrastructure to destroy and they cede territory for the most part to return as we can not occupy large swaths of the country (rural) or LOCs for indefinite periods. In lieu of victory as we usually envision it, I see leaving in a planned manner, publicly stated and executed in clear steps as the least bad COA. I spent a fair bit of time over there a few years ago, it pains me to say it but it is time to call it complete knowing what is likely to happen and let the chips fall where they may. So how do we do this?

How dare you question how real Airpower is delivered now! Didn't you learn anything at re-education camp? This is how devastating TMT strikes and lethal takers are delivered to the enemy... Not this oppressive heterosexual dominant privileged cockpit that can only bring weapons and sensors to bear on the enemy, how passé... On a more serious note, has anyone in the SOF or Attack community flown or assessed the IA-58 Pucará?

Farewell video for the HAF RF-4E

Not a bad article, similar to points made in other articles but cracking the edifice of stagnation, stubbornness, delusion and intransigence will take multiple hammer blows of common sense arguments, data and public humiliation of AF HR management of late. Would have added to his Root Causes: The AF went expensive on the planes, cheap on Airmen; pitting human capitol for machine capitol. An apples for oranges trade that made multiple problems (cultural, force structure, loss of institutional respect/trust, etc...).

Just buy one already AF.

Understood, I was at a Northern Tier base years ago and money would not be enough to go back there, a shit load of money maybe. Ultimately it is time, you're never going to get more of that and I understand the low to negative desire to spend it at a base in the middle of BFE. Concur - push back on the COCOMs on staff requirements and give credit where credit is due. On a related note to, an idea to reward 365s, a volunteer could be rewarded with a follow on already decided, ex: 365 to A-Stan with follow on to Hickam, 365 to the Died with follow on to Peterson, etc... There would have to be a data driven argument to convince the AF of the upside for them versus the current method of 365 requirement matching, this should be a survey project for an AU student...

Another special pay for shitholes for 0 to 3 years, bonus for staying beyond three years. Bottom 1/3rd requested bases get a base pay bonus of 10%. Sign up for a 5 year hitch at Turdshit AFB and get years 4 & 5 with a bonus + 10% base pay. Make the bonus appreciable, at least 6 o 12k per year, with increasing pay for tenure at Base X. Coming at it from a perspective of someone with rug rats, steer money to these bases for great housing-facilities-schools (On base DODS or contract schools if the local schools are abortions or grants for local school improvements if it could be done legally). Not saying this from hate but there could be other incentives to encourage movement at appropriate times rather than stagnation at garden spots. You could require the desirable spots to fill X % of 365s first with some caveats to ensure they get sometime in the sun or beach before a 365 to somewhere not so nice. Less desirable bases would then have at least one attractive amenity (or several if you implement that plus a bonus pay).

Yup - it's still a less than 50% chance IMO that Big Blue will acquire a LAAR but argue in whatever venue you can in the hope (maybe in vain) that the powers that be are listening. Looking back, I think it is legitimate that in the 2003 to 2005 time frame, the USAF should have realized that OEF and then OIF were marathons not sprints and that a new way of delivering Strike / ISR was necessary, a compliment to the existing but limited capability in the Predator and soon in 2007 to be introduced Reaper. So with that, does acquiring a LAAR still make sense? Yes. But why when we have the Reaper FOC and years of successful use with it now doing Persistent ISR w/ Strike Capability? Because the LAAR is going to be doing a different mission than Persistent ISR w/ Strike Capability. This manned asset should not as a rule be tasked with Persistent ISR w/ Strike but primarily light BAI, CAS and the derivative mission(s) of FAC-A & SCAR at appropriate effects required / threat appropriate AORs. The drive / requirement of tactical affordability is driven by the strategic implication of economic exchange in warfare. LAAR will support ground maneuver elements more effectively than tasking a UAV for overwatch, react to pop up TICs thus keeping persistent stare on TOIs to complete their long total missions/efforts and provide a cheaper per hour mission and total cost of ownership than if we expand the RPA fleet to use for these types of missions. As W aptly put it "President George W. Bush famously told four senators that he wasn’t “going to fire a $2 million missile at a $10 empty tent and hit a camel in the butt.” Each CAP costs about $20 million per year and Reapers when you factor in the total system cost about $120 million per tail with at least 170 personnel executing the mission and/or supporting it. It is an asset for a certain type of mission with an expensive but necessary capability, extreme endurance, use it for what it is best for not for what it could possibly but inefficiently do. Use a LAAR for what it was built for and can do inexpensively, on demand light strike, ISR and battlefield coordination. Articles on the subject: http://foreignpolicy.com/2014/10/08/destroying-a-30000-islamic-state-pickup-truck-can-cost-half-a-million-dollars/ http://nation.time.com/2012/02/27/1-the-reaper-revolution-revisited/ http://nation.time.com/2012/02/28/2-the-mq-9s-cost-and-performance/

Really? That's a good sign but as you said it's been 3 years and nada. I wonder if one of the other branches proposed to take over this set of COIN / LIC missions if that would get the AF to shit or get off the pot.

There's a logic to geographic distribution beyond the AvFID focused bases. AFSOC might not be the only place to put them, ACC could get a contingent of the buy. They have a common baseline configuration but each MAJCOM could add their pods & mods as they see fit. ACC could focus on light strike, tactical ISR, FAC-A in conventional operations once the threat is suppressed and AFSOC has the advise and train mission along with SOF support.

A typo Sent from my iPhone using Tapatalk

They want contract A-29 IPs in SA, TX... http://www.jobs.net/jobs/dyncorp/en-us/job/United-States/Instructor-Pilot-A-29-Super-Tuscano-Fighter/J3F2DH652PRCT05GG12/

Yup, completely caught with their pants down, attacking as their diplomatic delegation was enroute and anticipated in NYC. Further on a Korean War / Crisis, the refugee factor: http://foxtrotalpha.jalopnik.com/war-with-north-korea-could-mean-a-refugee-crisis-no-one-1794498603 and another good series of articles from Stratfor, the 3rd & 4th, on how the US/ROK would preemptively strike and how NK would respond: https://www.stratfor.com/analysis/what-us-would-use-strike-north-korea https://www.stratfor.com/article/how-north-korea-would-retaliate

Agree that this (leadership purge will not happen) just my opinion that it likely must.

The answer is one that leadership will likely never accept, they (almost all) must go. At this point the only thing that will save the AF from itself is over a 2 to 3 year process, retiring almost all the GOs, eliminating their enablers in the O5 & O6 ranks and retiring a lot E8 to E9s with a whole sale elimination of many of the civilian deputies in these organizations there for continuity but they just continue the same reign of madness, one shinny penny to the next. Take a page from the corporate world, when a dying once great company makes a turnaround, there is a 99.69% chance it will NOT be with the same management that made a once great company a dying formerly great company.

Saw this one on the early bird today: https://mwi.usma.edu/thunder-run-seoul-assessing-north-koreas-war-plan/ So North Korea is getting frisky again and I doubt it will happen but if NK ever did attack (not just the small provocative attacks from time to time) but a major to the death attack, what would it be? I had read some other hypothetical scenarios if NK ever decided to go for broke and this assessment is similar to those but most assume no Chinese intervention (for the purpose of theorizing) of any kind as all bets are off if they directly intervene, ostensibly for NK. I doubt they would intervene directly (on the ground) but what about in the air, only over NK and in a "defensive" way? From a think tank (Journal of Political Risk): They could assert a no fly zone pretty easily over NK, declaring a buffer zone for their national security and giving NK sanctuary from most air attack (cruise missile and artillery still an option to strike into NK) while not directly getting into the fight but supporting their sometimes useful proxy. NK uses its AF in the opening hours / days to maximize damage and disregarding its attrition by knowing that they won't need it as the PLAAF will keep their skies for them after their AF is gone. NK still loses ultimately (probably) but the regime could remain intact with this kind of assistance. Just thinking outside the lines. So you have a conflict where the enemy has a safe haven from air strike or reprisal (Pakistan, Cambodia, Laos, North Vietnam for a while, etc...) so how do you as a JFACC fight and support when you can only engage the enemy in your territory? Rhetorical and loaded with OPSEC problems question I know but can you just focus on AS / BAI / CAS locally and allow the enemy to attrit himself by relentless attack into your well defended and ready AOR? That does not work from our historical experience usually if our objective is to win (defeating fielded military forces/toppling the enemy political regime) and fighting not to lose is not sustainable ultimately.

Concur.

Agree that Duke Field is a good location but faces problems with range saturation. Even with that factor, being at the hub of all things AFSOC is a must for LAAR. As to Moody, if there is no space there then I would propose Maxwell or an Active Associate unit across town with the AL ANG at KMGM. Could go either way (sts) for Moody ranges to the east or south for Eglin ranges and as the AL ANG is likely to get the F-35, a unique opportunity to train with a 5th gen asset on a regular basis. If LAAR can get out of the chute, a good geographical distribution for valid and political/parochial reasons could help the program fend off efforts to kill it when other programs inevitably go over budget and turn cannibal. I think we mostly consider LAAR in support of SOF ground forces but there has to be role/mission for training with conventional Army/USMC units, what would be an ideal base(s) for training with "Big Army" or USMC?