Clark Griswold

More BDA info on the strike and performance of the Tomahawks used: http://warisboring.com/u-s-cruise-missiles-struck-syrian-base-with-impressive-precision/ TLDR version: 7 Syrian KIA, 18 Syrian WIA, airfield heavily damaged, 4 Syrian Su-22s destroyed and no Russian helos or personnel hit. On the policy executed by POTUS, good commentary on it from Bolton: http://www.theblaze.com/news/2017/04/07/last-night-the-obama-era-in-american-foreign-policy-ended-says-john-bolton/ He mentions around the 6:30 mark in the video embedded in the article what I believe is inevitable and should be encouraged, the partition of Syria/Iraq. FP article on the idea: http://foreignpolicy.com/2016/03/09/its-time-to-seriously-consider-partitioning-syria/ I'm not for imposing on others without a lot of thought and caution but is this inevitable and really what the situation is now and likely to remain so without a major intervention? I include West Iraq in the question as the Sunni population there would and is drawn to union or alliance with the Sunni population of Syria vice being ruled or in a nation dominated now by Shia.

Russian RPA post-strike footage of the Al Shayrat airfield:

Can't argue with the likelihood that we would take blame for things going wrong before, during and after the fact that no military could legitimately be held responsible for and that physically and mentally capable military age males running to Europe for asylum does not help the cause of major sustained intervention as LBJ said... but... in life there very few absolutes and every instance is different, probably similar to past events but still different. It is right to be wary given the history and result of the OIF and OEF missions but I see 3 reasons for intervention: - that allowing the Syrian Civil War to continue provides an opportunity for hegemony for Iran and Russia in an area of vital national interest, the stability of oil exports and increased threat to Israel will in the future only increase the probability and cost of a required US led intervention, nip it in the bud. A riff on the Domino Theory but analogous to challenging Axis powers in the 30s versus waiting and having a devastating war in the 40s. Not every aggression will lead to WW 3 I know but in this case, allowing a Persian Crescent to form with the Russians assisting is not in our interests. - continuous war is setting up the nation of Syria or what will become new nations possibly for long term failure by the loss of youth, educated populations and a physically/psychologically/culturally damaged populace. on the doorstep to Europe a West Afghanistan could be forming. not in our interest, Europe's or the ME's to allow. and - the west or IC needs a win in order to keep the team together. this may seem shallow but allowing our military, economic and security alliances and organizations to wither and then further question the basic value of a world where democracies for the most part stick together, promote basic decency and for the most part don't let the authoritarian regimes run riot over their neighbors has a value we take for granted. this is a theatre where if the team comes together, a whole government(s) and organizations (govs, intl, and ngos) effort first led by a military mission then followed by a humanitarian mission then followed by a diplomatic mission then finally followed by a long term economic mission can work. from a military perspective a Syrian theater has several advantages over what is probably dissuading us, the false analogy that is the recent experience in Iraq / Afghanistan: - the area to be secured (primarily) is smaller. Syria is 1/3 the size of Afghanistan and 1/2 the size of Iraq. we can concentrate forces, patrol and monitor more frequently and react faster. - there is an existing infrastructure (for now) we can use. civilian roads, airports, seaports, military bases, etc. with direct and secure road access from two potential allies, Turkey and Jordan. - the potential AOR is much closer to existing logistical support bases / major commercial ports. compared to Afghanistan, resupply will be easier. - we have an enormous amount of equipment designed for this operation (occupation and likely some level of COIN / LIC following the initial deployment. MRAPs, RPAs and the large amount of recent operational experience will likely mean this operation would be run better. optimistic but I don't think naïve. just my ranting and opinion worth what you paid for it but I think we could pull this off if we decide it is in our collective interest, will allocate the resources and then some if required, act decisively and call the bluff of malevolent actors in the situation and if we chose to act, be patient and not expect this to last less than 10 years.

CNN is confirming Russians at the base when the strike occurred, no mention of Russian causalities. By attacking the regime do you help ISIS or do you strike a ruthless dictatorship or both? Assad is evil but so is ISIS, AQ, Al-Nusra, etc... and the Kurds / FSA are not realistically strong enough to take the West Syria and hold it. A punitive strike is fine but ultimately we (the world that purportedly wants to stop the Syrian Civil War) have to have a strategy, a plan and commitment of the resources (forces, money, casualty acceptance, robust ROE, commitment, patience, etc.) to end this if we believe it is worth enough to our interests to act and pay the cost of action. If the world wants to end it, put together an overwhelming force for occupation, give the regime an ultimatum with an escape vector, asylum in Russia for the highest echelons of the regime with no ICC warrants if they cede power, sanctuary for the lower levels of the regime/military in ethnically/religiously homogenous zones with the coalition occupation force providing security. ISIS, AQ and Al-Nusra get no quarter and could pincer them between a very large conventional occupation force arriving from Turkey, Jordon & Mediterranean ports and Kurds/FSA in Eastern Syria; if they run to Iraq, we continue the drive from both sides and they lose. This would have to be a coalition in the 350k+ range to sweep them out and sit on Syria for years to come so I put about 0.69% that this will get assembled but that is what it would take, if no one gives an f that place will just continue to burn. The International Community should either admit it doesn't give a damn and just stop bemoaning the plight of the Syrian people or man up and do something, if we (the usual contributors) all agree go all in and not try to min run it, this could be done. The regime, the Russians, the Iranians could put up a fight as this coalition assembled and D day approached but methinks when the Mediterranean ports are blocked, there are is an Air armada circling waiting for the call and a 1000+ tanks, APCs and 350k soldiers in columns ready to fight a conventional war of annihilation, they will realize it is time to get with the program.

Maybe but I think the idea for a joint program for a new strike jet was a hedge against cancellation or curtailment given the track record of the first stealth and 5th Gen programs. Just conjecture but given the cost overruns of the 117, 2 and 22; the cancellation of the A-12 & RAH-66 with nothing to show (publicly) for the money spent, I think the idea of a joint program was to prove to Congress that DoD and learned its lessons and that this stealth / 5th Gen program would be different. History, different requirements, operational philosophy and costs be damned... Not trying to be too negative, the service I believe did not and doesn't truly want to just waste money but they will propose technically ambitious / risky programs, collude in some ways with contractors, think tanks, congress, etc. and build programs TBTF by distribution of sub-contracts and leap first look second ideas like concurrency. There is just no established mechanism in government acquisitions to "price in" risk in large, technically ambitious projects as there is in the private market with higher borrowing costs for institutions embarking on something analogous. My suggestion would be to make the branches spell out a Plan B if Plan A goes to shit, what will they offset or discuss openly and honestly if there plan is to just ask for more money if the project goes over X %. There are laws like Nunn-McCurdy but they are after the fact, we the taxpayers should basically expect that they won't stay on budget and force them to plan on what they will load shed. That's not perfect by any means but might keep the Bigger, Faster, Farther, Higher crowd in check when coming up with requirements that will drive costs. Develop ambitious but realistic requirements, there's just not enough money for boondoggles anymore.

Yeah - it was a laundry list and while it has plenty of faults it also has a lot of good points just not the price tag. I am very skeptical of the purported decreases in price and think that is the most important and legitimate criticism of the JSF - the effect that it likely has had on other modernization/replacement programs. My suspicion is as the program grew in cost money was reprogrammed ahead of required public disclosures or decisions were made not to even propose other acquisitions as there was no money left as the JSF got further over budget - that is probably its biggest fault. Sent from my iPhone using Tapatalk

Long article on the F-35, basically a huge airing of grievances... Read with a dash of salt but worth the time http://warisboring.com/the-f-35-is-a-terrible-fighter-bomber-and-attacker-and-unfit-for-aircraft-carriers/ Sent from my iPhone using Tapatalk

On the subject of Light Attack... Article on the ARES concept from Rutan back in the 90s http://nationalinterest.org/blog/the-buzz/ares-the-light-attack-aircraft-america-needed-never-happened-19939 and a video:

No doubt an aggressor program would have that effect. My original sidebar on this was that an expanded aggressor program could be like a LAAR could be, a Golden Apple good deal program to serve a valid training / operational need and encourage retention by affording interesting / appealing opportunities that could keep X number of aircrew for the career vs. the separation inducing non-vol RPA / staff tour. As to your comment on seasoning, switchology, airmanship development, completely agree. I would not call it regressing to a lower level of aircraft/avionics/sensors/comm/etc.. but flying something that requires more attention, effort and care definitely builds the airmanship muscles that can atrophy. A few years ago I was flying one aircraft for my civilian employer and one for the Guard, one was significantly more advanced than the other and just in flying the less advanced aircraft point A to point B a few times was a bit of airmanship workout that made me better at not being lulled by the fancy jet doing a lot for me. Thinking outside the lines, if the resources could be found for it, a reasonable purchase of some of the inexpensive light fighters like JF-17, Tejas or Kfirs could fill this role. A light fighter version T-X I am sure would be fine but it would be interesting / worthwhile to have some different horses in the stable to ride.

Not sure about either question but from my tanker days fighters would rejoin as required but usually on the right but if the tanker was in a turn, on the outside of the turn, make it work. ATP 56 for light reading... http://www.japcc.org/wp-content/uploads/ATP-3.3.4.2_Ed_C_Ver_1_Air-to-Air_Refuelling.pdf Sent from my iPhone using Tapatalk

Maybe but I wonder how far you can emulate the threat(s) using the same jet - there has to be a limit, having a completely different opponent using a different airframe, engine(s), radar, etc. has to have a direct training value and another I think for the opportunity to the community in developing their tacticians. Giving them an opportunity to plan and use a totally different system to challenge our TTPs, systems, etc. Sent from my iPhone using Tapatalk

Valid point but methinks the money that Big Blue would be willing to allocate for an aggressor aircraft would probably not support a modified 35 for this role. An aggressor 35? I'm not sure the design of the system (airframe, engines, avionics, etc..) could support a non-mission / ALIS based version. It seems basically all completely integrated but I wonder if you could build this basic aggressor 35 on the test X-35 configuration vice the F-35. Take the test article design and see if you could get an LO'ish airframe, good performance and add capabilities you need to train or test against all while keeping the price in check, not easily done I'm sure but probably worth some research.

Don't disagree that training cost could be higher and you're right LAAR would not be a good sparring partner for 5th gens - my sidebar comment on Golden Apples was for an expanded or established good deal program really one of several that could encourage retention and serve a valid operational or training requirement An aggressor aircraft IMO could be a light fighter or LIFT jet - no turboprop or jet LAAR even could meet that requirement well Sent from my iPhone using Tapatalk

Private MiG-21 flight...

Good article from The National Interest on OA-X: http://nationalinterest.org/blog/the-buzz/oa-x-the-us-air-force-ready-purchace-new-light-attack-19927?page=show From the article: “I think the latter point is too quickly dismissed by some critics of this initiative. The Air Force has a pilot shortfall that is projected to grow to over 700 in the next couple of years. Moreover, while the Air Force’s Combat Air Force has shrunk to 55 fighter squadrons and a handful of bomber squadrons, there are other critical positions that require pilots such as joint staffs, operational planning staffs, etc. The Air Force is going to produce more pilots, but they will need cockpits for them – and a light attack aircraft with a two-pilot cockpit and a cost per flying hour of $4-5,000 could be a cost-effective alternative. Add to that the availability of several off-the-shelf (or nearly so) aircraft; this becomes an option the Congress could fund that would have a near-immediate impact on the Air Force’s readiness. There is also the potential for foreign military sales to allies and partners. So, this said, I think the initiative has a good chance of succeeding.” The reiteration of the benefit of a lower cost per flight hour aircraft for more flying, more/better operationally focused training and frankly a return of a "golden apple" to entice aircrew to stay for a career has got to pierce the institutional inertia. Good deal programs are not that expensive in the total scheme of the AF. LAARs as an alpha tour for 11Fs and some cross flow opportunities for 11M/R/U/S/G More/different models of aggressor aircraft for fighter wings would likely keep some 11Fs for the career, thinking MiG-21s or an aggressor model T-X Companion trainer for RPA units, require only a very basic cert/qual for the customers at the supported units with a cadre of 11's as IPs Just bar napkin math but those programs would like cost 1.5 billion in acquisition and around 200 million a year using likely high end per flight hour cost estimates. Assuming that a fighter pilot at the end of their ADSC cost about 8 million in training to get to their level of qualification, proficiency and operational knowledge and assume about 4 million for a heavy pilot, if these programs retain only 15 fighter guys and 20 heavy, they pay for themselves every year just retaining that few pilots, you'll likely retain at least that many CSOs, yet another savings. This is not even factoring in the cost savings by using something cheaper in ops/tng... Just buy one LAAR AF... we'll worry about the other golden apples later

Not an airline guy but once a commercial pilot and member of a union, putting on my working pilot cap... what the shit would this "season" working thing look like? would these guy just come in the "busy" season, work up to the legal limit a few months at a time? how the hell does that fit into the PBS with their line numbers? was a pilot rep at this "great" meeting? i swear the af is hell bent on doing everything but admit they actually have a institutional problem and will look for any gd thing that looks like it can keep the shoe clerk machine lurching just a few more miles down the line...

How did this shoe clerk expect this new crop of "leaders" to lead if they have no technical knowledge, operational experience or shared professional experience with the people they are supposedly going to lead? What was this traveling kool aid salesman's idea of when an aviator is supposed to recuse themselves from actual ops because that's just technical and leadership is really enterprise management or as they used to call it administration... last i checked Admin was not one of the core functions All rhetorical but sometimes the anecdotes of encounters with shoe clerks are infuriating My suspicion is this guy could not lead himself let alone anyone else out of paper bag

Agreed but as busdriver said it is a notional requirements list and the AF is scared to put a ring on it, instead of a no-shit fly off, we're having: "Invitation to Patriciate (ITP) for the Capability Assessment of the Non-Developmental Light Attack Platforms in support of the Office of Strategic Development Planning and Experimentation (SDPE)... blah blah blah" WTF? Grow some balls and make a choice, do you want a LAAR or not? If so, then have a RFP / fly off and make a damn choice. Agreed, but all of them are a bargain IMO. How much more do we need to experiment? 15+ years of COIN / LIC is not enough for us to believe putting a 2 ship of15E/16/18s... at probably 40k+ an hour (factoring in tanker support) is nuts?

Yes. This type of mission, Direct Support, is what's needed. Like the C-27Js in their short life being directly tied to the customer rather than going thru the filter of AMD, it is what is needed. Giving the AF though an escape clause if they are truly tasked with the impossible/stupid could make this a reality.

Agreed. But some kind of improved FOD protection, deep RSC fording, etc. or the capability to have that if called for might be wise. Just how much is the rub. Follow on, AT-6 & A-29 operating on dirt, no luck with the Oracle of Google finding anything on the Scorpion operating on anything less than prepared. Understood.

I wish I had a an excellent counter argument to that but methinks you are probably right but one can hope even in vain. If they pick one, the question now is will they follow thru with the original 100'ish plane purchase? McCain wanted 300 and even LAAR fanatic me thinks that is a bit of a tall order. 100-150 seems like the right number but last I checked the AF was short on pilots and even shorter on CSOs, just buying or even selecting one is only step 1 to acquiring a LAAR capability. Now if they really wanna go outside the container, program the MILPERS for about 5000 man-years of MPA with the purchase and start offering 3 year tours to ARC aircrew, MX & support to stand up the squadrons and detachments that will need to be ready to absorb and host this new MDS.

Not to be negative but they have to pick one, we've been on the cusp before and then the AF backed off and the LAAR languished, just getting enough oxygen to stay alive but not enough to get on its feet. They're all good and let's face it, the mission is not super demanding from an airplane performance perspective and they all meet the original requirements for a USAF LAAR: The selected LAAR aircraft will have to meet several key requirements, including: Rough field operations. The RFI requires that the aircraft be capable of operating from semi-prepared runways such as grass or dirt surfaces. Defensive package. The aircraft will have to include several defensive measures, including a Missile Approach Warning System (MAWS), a Radar warning receiver (RWR), and chaff and flare dispensers. Armored cockpit and engine. Long loiter time. The aircraft must be able to fly 5 hour sorties (with 30 minute fuel reserves). Range. The aircraft must have a 900 nautical mile (1600 km) ferry range. Data link capability. The aircraft is required to have a line-of-sight data link (with beyond line-of-sight desired) capability of transmitting and receiving still and video images. Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance (ISR) capabilities. The aircraft will have to laser track and designate targets, as well as track targets using electro-optical and infrared video/still images. Weaponry. The LAAR aircraft will need at least 4 weapons stores capable of carrying a variety of weapons, including 500 lb bombs, 2.75-inch rockets, rail-launched missiles, and illumination flares. The aircraft will also be capable of aerial gunnery, either with an integrated or pylon mounted gun. Desired traits (but not requirements) include: Infrared signature suppression for the engine(s). 30,000 ft (9000 m) operational ceiling. 6,000 ft (1800 m) takeoff and landing distance. Aerobatic capabilities capable of maneuvers such as the Immelmann turn, Cuban eight, and Split S. https://www.fbo.gov/index?print_preview=1&s=opportunity&mode=form&id=b30065477e7b9159bb2687f2cc2a3667&tab=core&tabmode=list My two cents, the Scorpion is worth the extra money both in acquisition and operations costs.

Don't count out the AT-6, it has a lot of strong points and the Scorpion is ready for prime time now with its production configuration set. The A-29 is still the front runner (IMO) but just pick one AF... This has probably been posted on this thread or the other ones that are on the subject of the LAAR: https://warisboring.com/the-pentagon-has-two-choices-for-light-attack-planes-2e4306197b1e#.utts1rvlb The concept OV-10X would have been sweet (particularly if they incorporated a turret mounted belly 20 or 25mm) but Boeing had nothing more than a proposal and some cool photoshopped graphics, the line was not ready to crank out one new airframe and there are not enough existing OV-10s in serviceable condition to be a viable option. I quoted CH from the beginning of this thread as he has actually flown both and can speak best to this... CH - have you had anymore participation on the LAAR project since this 2009 post? AT-8, A-29 or Scorpion Jet?

No argument, it has to be more than 4th gen 4+ / 4.5 / whatever with very high end weapon(s) / sensors to relevant along with kinematic performance par excellence Just open source on how the other side is trying to play to their strengths and illustrative of this for the discussion The Russians never boast or exaggerate (/s) but decrementing these figures by 20-30% they still have capability in the modern high end fight matched up with an advanced R-77M or K-100. No argument again but it is ever changing ratio that takes common sense, data and professionals not easily influenced unduly by the MIC or ill informed politicians. Spend a lot for today and little for tomorrow? Sure when the barbarians are at the gates. Spend some for today and some for tomorrow? Sure when we've got them pushed back and have some breathing room. The problem is we don't have strategy, we have knee jerk reactions to the crisis du jour and we end up wasting our resources. Here's a strategy: Accquire an appropriate amount of low end inexpensive to operate systems in low threat long term operations so I still accomplish my mission and greatly lower my costs of executing them. Take my savings and build a modern force with a mix of systems, High-Medium-Lower, but all relevant and modern to fight against peer and near-peer foes. Here's our strategy apparently: Buy only high end systems, act like we need to use only high end systems in low intensity conflicts. Set the requirements so high that the high end systems get more expensive and are years behind schedule and never get bought in the amounts we set our long term force structure plans for then keep the legacy systems going even as they get more expensive and less relevant. After all that go ask for more money and promise you'll have it all fixed next year.

More resources are fine but in reality it is the control over the appropriation is really what is needed. How many useless installations, pet projects, make believe jobs, redundancies, "fall out money" spending orgies in the 4th quarter could add up to needed resources? Congress can appropriate more money but it they tell us it can only be spent in Turdshit AFB, USA on a non-relevant money sucking system or mission, then it does not matter. And they have no track record of doing that... On the subject of replacing the Eagle with the Viper... you save money short term but you might be eating your Vipers up faster than you originally planned on thus incurring a risk until the F-35A is FOC and the squadron(s) are supplied. The training bill to convert X number of Eagle drivers into Viper drivers will have a few zeroes on the end of it also, doubt the F-16 FTU has a bunch of open spots also, another problem to solve. It's a damn Rubik's cube... If the Eagle is too expensive to continue flying for Homeland Defense, from the T-X competition develop a light fighter / aggressor and call it good. That squarely favors the T-50 or T-100 but Boeing could figure it out quickly if they won the competition.