Clark Griswold

Don't know of a program to do that but I do know a former male nurse who became a pilot. He became an O in the Guard and went to UPT via that route. My guess is that there is no program.

Just getting older and more opinionated...or rotting...

Not a bad article but after reading this (and other articles like it) on the "problem" of the present day AF, I feel like every well intentioned reformer or reform advocate needs to realize that there are somethings that have happened not just in the AF but in society in general that are to be acknowledged and accepted to go forward productively. There are some fights that are not worth it, not winnable, not even a fight where something can be won and a distraction from that which is attainable and worth time, resources and effort. The "problem" of the present day AF is not a problem per se but a state of being that was arrived at after a particular (and on going) set of operations / conflicts, changes in society (some good - effort to include non-historically represented groups, some bad - egregious PC culture and emphasis on identity at the expense meritocracy and logic) and the corporatization of some aspects of the day to day administration of the AF. That said, there is plenty that could be reformed, changed and made to make an AF that is more mission focused, more challenging for its members and one that inspires an esprit de corps. I think it would be a harder AF to be in than it is now (I'm ok with that) and I think that is probably where to start because that is something we can do now, no money needed, no new laws to be passed. Just the will to do it and accept some of the potentially unpopular and uncomfortable results of dialing up the standards. On the article... 1. Dear Boss... My two cents, some of the "Dear Boss" sentiment is valid, there has been a growing gulf between the Line and Leadership of the AF, loss of confidence in AF leadership when from an operator's perspective we (the USAF) do not seem particularly responsive to a changed operational environment and an apathetic approach to retention. My other two cents, some of the "Dear Boss" sentiment is grandstanding and sanctimonious, only the author of whichever iteration of the "Dear Boss" letter can see the mediocrity & corruption and because said individual is so principled, so dedicated, so pure that they just can't take it anymore and they have to leave. Give me a break, at anytime in the existence of any established, conventional military force there have been cronies, REMFs, butt kissers, busy work and snipe hunts, etc... this is not to say those things are to be tolerated but they're like mosquitoes, you swat one and another arrives to meet the same fate, repeat the process or get eaten alive. Deal with it, annoying things and people are part of life, try to fix them, get rid of them or avoid them but don't expect them to ever go away completely. 2. PC Culture Partially accept some it. Fighting all of it is unwise, not winnable and not even a good idea. Most of it comes from above the DoD, Federal Government Policy for all Departments, Agencies and Bureaus and has to be implemented, unless it is specifically stated how X policy will be implemented, the AF (IMO) has prerogative to deliver X policy in a military applicable manner. The AF can take the best parts of the efforts to build an inclusive society that offers equal opportunity for all, encouragement (not exceptions) for those not historically represented and adherence to universally applied standards without denigrating those in the majority and assuming original prejudice in their attitudes. I saw this in a briefing from a GO on the day the transgender policy was changed for the DoD, he had one slide that clearly stated the policy, said we will treat all members in accordance with professional military standards and that was it. I am not really that on board with the policy but when it was delivered in a non-condescending, short, professional manner it did not generate excessive resentment, I left the All-Call with no more or less cynicism than before. Given the topic, that was probably as good as it was going to get. An example of how to do Social Actions Policy. 3. Warrior / Mission Culture If we want a warrior culture, a mission culture then look at the tools we have available and use them. That will be tougher standards, more rigor and fewer opportunities to leave the cockpit / ops station you are in (if part of the LAF). Be careful what you wish for, you may get it. I am ok with dialing up the heat, not that I am an Air Rambo, but I know that if we want to rid the AF of shoe clerks and meaningless schools, programs and fluff, that is in reality the only way to do it. Thinking that some Bro General is just going to come in, tell the Shoe Clerks to pound sand and that's it is naive thinking at its worst. Swords are forged in extreme heat then beat into shape, afterwards repeatedly scraped with a stone to make sharp, not a gentle process. If we want this type of AF (we do), we need only more strongly discipline and train ourselves. Not the most pleasant rant I've ever given on BO but my honest opinion. Any military or military unit you want to be part of should be tough to be part of, that is where the pride comes from, doing something that is hard to do and not everyone can do. If the AF changes the vector to this, the rest will take care of itself.

Knew Andy also. Dedicated officer, great pilot and good dude. Godspeed

Or a longer legged FB-22... if this is going to be twin engines and lower range go ahead and make an LO KC-21 with probe and drogue or an MQ-25 Stingray AR wingman

Article from WOR on how the AF got slow and below glide slope: https://warontherocks.com/2018/03/air-force-in-crisis-part-ii-how-did-we-get-here/ Worth a read but a cliff notes of his (Benitez) points: 1. The Air Force Got Too Small (People) Concur. Shoot to eliminate redundancy at the top first to save resources to build the base. More Indians, less Chiefs. Cut GO billets in half, Cut O-6 billets in half, etc... look for possible deferments in promotion with targeted retention bonus in critical career fields. Career Fields not just critically manned but critical to the military mission(s) of the AF. 2. The Air Force Got Too Small (Airplanes) Concur. While not addressed in this section of his article, it touches on morale which appears in several sections as it affects everything, an RPA companion aircraft, discussed ad nauseam and requirement is self-evident for airmanship and morale. He addresses 4th gen recapitilization, makes the argument for new 4th gen versus refurbished aircraft, better aircraft, better industrial base strategic utilization, better aircraft at about the same cost, agreed. Investigate a resurgence of a few good deal / golden apple programs to strategically retain key personnel, provide a solution to a requirement and ideally retain selected individuals for the full career. LAAR acquisition in respectable fleet size, ADAIR in desirable locales, flying graduate enrichment programs open to crew/single seat aviators as instructors, etc... I would also not forget about the support folks also, instead of emphasizing in-residence PME, I would look at expanded civilian career education opportunities for them with self-selection of schools/programs to be considered. 3. The Air Force Got Too Small (Lethality) Semi-concur. Argues for shorter rotations to AORs, 4 months preferred to 6 months, for a several valid reasons (experience distribution, QoL, etc..) and I concur but not concurring with looking to Navy / USMC for assistance in the Aerospace Control Alert Mission. They're tapped out anyway and don't like the idea of ceding mission. Internal redistribution of resources to expand capability in core missions seems better, resources from where in the AF is the sticky part (sts)...

Unconstrained by laws, lawyers, a sometimes duplicitous bureaucracy and an investigating and adversarial media... one man in control of a technologically capable and paranoid nation can do amazing / terrifying things...

I keep finding uses for this...

Shit could get real, doubt they would try to use this against a manned asset but unmanned? Maybe

Well damn it...

Legit point but I go with an ours and theirs policy, our LAAR and their LAAR policy. We buy a higher end aircraft that we can afford and gives us the higher end capabilities we want and that our ROE and in general our way of doing business demands (lots of ISR pre-strike, CDE considerations, PGMs almost exclusively, etc...) and their LAAR that is modern and relevant but cheaper (to operate and train) and is more in line with how X partner nation will likely do business (direct fire weapons, unguided munitions, some ISR pre-strike, etc...). Ditto on the AT-6, never flew the Texan but following that thread and the myriad problems (OBOGS, cockpit instrument problems, E-seat problems, etc...) I think that design has "issues". A-29 with open architecture sounds good, an "adaptive pod" (some smaller version of Agile Pod) is what I am imagining. Current 15" FMV ball could stay and this would be the dual sensor capability to up its game... If anybody flying the Super T can speak to this, is the architecture capable of becoming open?

The great Russians weapons demo continues

No gouge but wiki says 2023 and the ref for that was from 2013 (AF Times). Sounds about right for today's FUBAR acquisition process.

Gotcha The War Zone summed up what is likely the truth but again one can hope / rant on BO net Let's Face It, The USAF Isn't Serious About Buying a Light Attack Aircraft Again, AF look at the long term, Scorpion already has the best performance, capabilities and a design specifically to easily upgrade or accept new capabilities with low cost & risk. This is the type of aircraft we used to pursue, the best rather than looking for what is minimally satisfactory. Not sure if this has been posted yet but an article and assessment from The Aviationist after a fam ride: https://theaviationist.com/2017/11/16/we-have-flown-in-textrons-scorpion-jet-heres-what-we-have-learned/

True but all of them seem like a major leap in capability if even only 75% true of their advertised capability

It is impressive and they probably have the inside lane but to balance things out here's Leonardo's T-100 integrated training system page: https://www.leonardodrs.com/products-and-services/t-100-integrated-training-system/t-100-embedded-training-program/ and Boeing's https://www.boeing.com/defense/t-x/index.page?gclid=Cj0KCQiA2snUBRDfARIsAIGfpqHQLQAOEossg9gCAIfC9o6Tg40ukrUC1CBZjiXD5aahfqXskHHzJ7MaAhVjEALw_wcB#/video-player/boeing-t-x-real-as-it-gets-training

True but that is a fact not a reason that AFSOC could/should acquire a jet for this requirement. Interesting, is this requirement and a subsequent requests for proposals separate from these previous RFI/RFPs? https://www.fbo.gov/index?s=opportunity&mode=form&id=b1732e28ed804b5d1cc5c2c7315a92f2&tab=core&_cview=1 https://www.fbo.gov/index?print_preview=1&s=opportunity&mode=form&id=b30065477e7b9159bb2687f2cc2a3667&tab=core&tabmode=list

Why is a prop a requirement?

Just posting links to sing the praises of the Scorpion Jet: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=LLWlh5aZ8ks https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=fdv_hqmemEs Brett Pierson explaining the concept and design of the jet, at the 1:15 mark (first video) he explains how the basic avionics and mission systems are completely separate allowing very easy modification, customization or update without affecting the basic systems that certify the aircraft as airworthy, genius... Again, I can't believe the AF is not selecting this aircraft for LAAR or at least further evaluation in LAE...

T-50A video If you have ADHD, go to 1:00 and the BVR A2A virtual engagement training scenario and 1:50 A2G scenario.

Relight on thread... For armchair generals and strategists... https://russiamil.wordpress.com/2018/01/24/russian-air-force-procurement-plans-2/ From the article: Overall, Russian aircraft procurement has followed the path of buying more of what Russian defense industry is good at producing, rather than basing procurement on a programmatic assessment of Russian defense needs. In addition, the MOD has to some extent succumbed to pressure to support defense industry and will be procuring aircraft such as the MiG-35 that it is not particularly excited about. As a result, the air force will be faced with a proliferation of combat aircraft types, with the attendant higher maintenance and training costs. In the meantime, the long-term weakness in transport aviation will persist, limiting the improvements in military mobility that have been one of the core aspects of military reform efforts over the last decade. Thought that statement was interesting and seems political/industry concerns trump their services own determined requirements, same as it is here to some degree.. One more for discussion... https://warisboring.com/russias-stealth-fighter-deployment-in-syria-is-a-dangerous-farce/ Deploying the not-ready for prime time Su-57? For potential customers or valid operational reasons? Methinks the former

Just to grasp at straws but is there anyway that AFSOC could define it's own requirement (separate and different than ACC's) to have a process not so biased? Any appetite for that?

Too smart not complicated enough

Light a candle but why only the AT-6B and A-29 in the second round of LAE? To plagiarize @ClearedHot "Scorpion crushes the other offerings" and that is not to say the others are not without merit but the difference in capability is too great to pretend they are similar aircraft. But if it is to be between the AT-6B or A-29 let's just cut to the chase and get the AT-6B. Not resignation as the AT-6B is a good buy but just impatience at wanting to see LAAR finally get here.

Quite a large head of pressure with moisture following the repeated gusts