New thread to discuss results, applicable lessons and armchair general’s opinions on the conflict. Politics for the other thread.

My first salvo:

• UCAVs are needed now, up to full autonomous operations, less expensive persistent surface and air area denial, integrated with manned platforms.

• Suicide drones, more of them, conventional ones like LUCAS against fixed and large moving targets (ships) and new systems bringing direct anti personnel drones/loitering munitions linked to airborne C2 aircraft or linked to operators thru high altitude network enablers. Morale destruction and surgical targeting of the most odious members of the regime.

• More surface fleet combatants for naval control, greater presence over large/multiple areas

• Base defense and expedient shelter hardening capes growth, new decoy systems.

Not today ISIS.

36 minutes ago, Standby said:

Not today ISIS.

Yeah I get it but the unresolvable loop in the original Iran thread has reached a point where nothing more can really get done, besides there’s enough in the open source world to have discussions worth what it costs to access BO…

The articles are starting to ask what this can teach us about a Taiwan scenario, what is China learning, etc….

We should discuss the big elephants in the room.

Edited 15 hours ago15 hr by Clark Griswold

I think air defense really shined. Now the question is how do you get a good mix of capabilities and cost. Patriot/THAAD are nice, but you can't afford to smack every shahed with one.

Hardening critical infrastructure and capabilities to prevent easy kills by cheap systems is looking wise, as well.

4 minutes ago, raimius said:

I think air defense really shined. Now the question is how do you get a good mix of capabilities and cost. Patriot/THAAD are nice, but you can't afford to smack every shahed with one.

Hardening critical infrastructure and capabilities to prevent easy kills by cheap systems is looking wise, as well.

Concur

The offense defense tango continues, offense is throwing mass cheap systems and the challenge to defense is how to answer that.

Probably an all of the above is the best feasible option

Defensive systems, decoys, mobile low footprint systems, etc…

It seems you need a force that is composed of opposite ends of a value spectrum, some high end exquisite systems to kick things off, medium systems level and a shit ton of cheap attrition tolerant mass to constantly throw at your opponent

Edited 3 hours ago3 hr by Clark Griswold

We still kick ass when it comes to CSAR! 👍👍
For a laugh, I asked Copilot (the AI, not the guy in the right seat!) which is about as deep as we want to get on here...

U.S. MILITARY LESSONS LEARNED – OPERATION EPIC FURY

1. BLUF

Operation EPIC FURY validated U.S. dominance in joint high‑intensity warfare but highlighted critical vulnerabilities in missile defense capacity, force protection, logistics endurance, and partner integration under sustained saturation attacks.

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2. OPERATIONAL OVERVIEW

• Start: 28 Feb 2026

• Lead: U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM)

• Mission: Destroy Iranian missile capability, naval forces, and defense industrial base to prevent power projection and nuclear breakout.

• Scope: Large‑scale joint, combined air–maritime–cyber campaign against a peer‑capable regional adversary.

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3. KEY LESSONS LEARNED

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A. JOINT INTEGRATION WORKS—BUT REQUIRES SCALE

Observation

U.S. forces achieved rapid air superiority, effective SEAD, and joint fires synchronization across domains.

Lesson

• Joint integration is a decisive advantage, but only when properly resourced for sustained operations, not short campaigns.

• F‑35, long‑range bombers, submarines, and ISR platforms dominated early phases.

Implication

Future conflicts with peer adversaries will require:

• Larger munitions stockpiles

• Faster reconstitution

• Broader distributed basing

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B. MISSILE AND DRONE SATURATION IS THE PRIMARY THREAT

Observation

Iran employed mass volleys of missiles and drones, overwhelming regional defenses despite high intercept rates.

Lesson

• Interceptor inventories are finite

• Missile defense success is measured in resilience, not perfection

• Saturation attacks still produced casualties and infrastructure disruption

Implication

The U.S. must:

• Expand interceptor production

• Integrate regional air/missile defense (IBCS‑like systems)

• Harden bases and civilian infrastructure

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C. CYBER AND SPACE ARE NOW FIRST-MOVE DOMAINS

Observation

Cyber and space effects were employed before kinetic strikes, degrading enemy C2, sensors, and communications.

Lesson

• Cyber is no longer a supporting arm—it is a primary maneuver element

• Pre-positioned access is decisive

Implication

• Cyber operations must be planned at campaign level

• Requires persistent access, legal frameworks, and resilient U.S. cyber defenses

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D. LOGISTICS AND SUSTAINMENT LIMIT CAMPAIGN LENGTH

Observation

The operation consumed massive quantities of:

• Precision munitions

• Fuel

• ISR flight hours

• Human endurance resources

Lesson

The U.S. can strike faster than it can sustain at current industrial capacity.

Implication

• Industrial surge capacity is now a combat enabler

• Future wars will be won by logistics endurance, not opening salvos

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E. FORCE PROTECTION REMAINS A VULNERABILITY

Observation

U.S. personnel suffered hundreds of wounded and multiple fatalities, primarily from missile attacks on regional bases.

Lesson

Even with air superiority, fixed bases are vulnerable.

Implication

• Expand dispersal, deception, and hardened infrastructure

• Improve warning and sheltering procedures across AORs

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F. PARTNER NATIONS ARE BOTH STRENGTH AND LIABILITY

Observation

Gulf partners enabled access but suffered direct retaliation and infrastructure damage.

Lesson

Allies require integrated—not parallel—defense architectures.

Implication

• Defense cooperation must include shared command-and-control, not just basing agreements

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4. STRATEGIC TAKEAWAYS

1. U.S. dominance is real—but not inexhaustible

2. Mass matters again (munitions, interceptors, logistics)

3. Cyber-first warfare is now normal

4. Missile defense determines societal resilience

5. Campaign durability—not shock—is the decisive variable

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5. WAY AHEAD (RECOMMENDED ACTIONS)

• Expand munitions and interceptor production lines

• Integrate cyber deeply into joint campaign planning

• Invest in regional missile-defense integration

• Harden and disperse critical basing

• Reform industrial mobilization planning