Why Not the B-1 Instead of the A-10?

[xcraftllc]

It's funny reading some of these posts that mention the Army's "requests" as far as CAS is concerned. Most people know that the Army actually tried to acquire the A-10 the last two times the Air Force seriously considered getting rid of it. The only reason it's not now is that it already lost that fight twice and there's no way the Army can afford it in the sequester. It is already having to get rid of the entire Kiowa fleet. If you wanna know what the Army is thinking about regarding loss of the A-10, let's just say there's a reason why dispite the sequester, the entire fleet of 690 Apaches is being moved to active duty and upgraded to the E model standard. Well, there are actually many reasons but among them is the realization that without a good replacement for the A-10 in the immediate future, the Army is currently in the process of ensuring that it will not to have to depend on the Air Force for CAS.

With that said I do believe, like some people are saying on this thread, that despite its shortcomings, we are better off learning to love the F-35 than we are fighting. That's it man, it's all we got. The only thing I disagree with is having to remove airframes to get it. It's going to arrive either way. If the AF is going to retain it's fighting ability in the mean time, it's is going to be by doing what porkchop said with airframe life extension and upgrades.

[busdriver]

The Army would have upgraded the Apache fleet regardless. They've never been happy to rely on another service for air support, regardless of the quality of that support. That said, of the legacy fighters the A-10 is the only one that would provide unique capability once the F-35 shows up in full force, assuming it lives up to the promises. Makes me wonder what that unique capability could truly be if we invested in a modern RF jamming system.

Having said all that, the long endurance CAS stack right on top of the friendlies isn't survivable in a modern battlefield. Regardless of the fighter dropping the ordnance, we need to invest in the JTAC side of the equation both training and technology.

The other big A-10 mission area (I'm biased, I know) is CSAR, while just about any fighter can do the Sandy 1/2 mission given the training; the Sandy 3/4 mission is a different story. We either need to arm the helos to self escort, which adds weight (always a problem with helos) or shift to another platform that can overfly the low altitude threat. Problem right now is the Osprey can't pressurize, and has no real weapons and is a crappy hover platform. The FVL is 15 years away at the earliest, and the Army is leading it up, so who knows what they'll pick.

We've leveraged the farm on the F-22/F-35 combo, but I think we've sold other missions down the river in the process; at least for the next 15ish years. But I've been known to be wrong on more than one occasion.

[Alpharatz]

My total knowledge of this is knowing one helo pilot and one crew chief. My impression is that any helicopter is considerably more fragile than an A-10. Considerably more maintenance intensive. In addition, it may be a pain in the ass but you can actually deploy an A-10 in a relative hurry. Does that apply to any helicopter? It would have to be mega-bucks less to do an expensive upgrade on the A-10 fleet than to screw with all of these helicopters and their rotors and collectives and shipping containers and days at sea getting somewhere. Admitted they can land "anywhere", but isn't an A-10 pretty good that way too? i.e. a stretch of road or a psp runway?

.........I'll bet you could find some babes with a stolen 777 a LOT quicker in an A-10. And there are lots of places to land an A-10 in Burma too...........

[JarheadBoom]

...it may be a pain in the ass but you can actually deploy an A-10 in a relative hurry. Does that apply to any helicopter?

Helicopters can be deployed (relatively) quickly if the situation warrants it.

C-5 can carry 3-4 H-60s, half a dozen skids (H-1s), or two H-47s/H-53s, plus the tools, supplies, and crews to maintain & fly them. C-17 can carry them too, just smaller numbers.

There is prep work required for all helicopters to be airlifted -the bigger the helo, the more prep required at either end of the trip.

[FallingOsh]

C-5 can carry 3-4 H-60s, half a dozen skids (H-1s), or two H-47s/h-53s, plus the tools, supplies, and crews to maintain & fly them.

And leave them at the first stopover location for 2-3 weeks while waiting on a replacement aircraft.

[xcraftllc]

Or if you're really an unlucky Army Aviator, they'll get some external aux tanks for your Apaches and fat cow a bunch of chinooks with internal aux tanks in to a remote field site to set up tents and pull your own security.... Bottom line is there are ways to do it but having long range and relatively quick FW assets to help cover down is a much better way to go.

https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/9/94/Flickr_-_Israel_Defense_Forces_-_Apache_Helicopters_Overlooking_Greece.jpg

https://rdl.train.army.mil/catalog/view/100.ATSC/BE9C0DC8-3EB5-4582-9729-8AFD1876340C-1331137175881/image017.jpg

[Majestik Møøse]

Well I guess that would work if your country is the size of Israel.

[xcraftllc]

Lol, and that pic is of Israeli Apaches. U.S. Apaches also support the use of aux tanks although they haven't been used in a while, I just came across that pic first. It's not a very practical system when used like that. The old ones are also not ballistic, the new ones are but they hold less fuel. Single Aux tanks were used in desert storm before the internal "Robby" tank was created. They were dangerous though and had to be jettisoned at the first sign of enemy. I think everyone would agree that it's better to use A-10s for long range stuff if available.

Edited May 25, 2014 by xcraftllc

[SurelySerious]

The range of an Apache isn't the first line of discussion here, it should be the way the Army allocates them: it would have to radically change, or else the range doesn't matter. They're organic assets, and the ground commanders aren't keen on sharing.

[xcraftllc]

They're organic assets, and the ground commanders aren't keen on sharing.

Yep, as well as a host of other problems that arise from having aircraft assigned to a ground commander who really doesn't understand them, similar to the issues that caused the creation of the Air Force in the first place.

[guineapigfury]

Yep, as well as a host of other problems that arise from having aircraft assigned to a ground commander who really doesn't understand them, similar to the issues that caused the creation of the Air Force in the first place.

Every RPA dude recommends the above quote.

[JarheadBoom]

And leave them at the first stopover location for 2-3 weeks while waiting on a replacement aircraft.

Yep. BTDT, in the other service.

I wasn't implying that airlifting helos closer to the fight was the best option, or a viable replacement for a contingency deployment of A-10s, just that it is possible, and it is an option.

[MD]

The Administration response

https://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/omb/legislative/sap/113/saphr4435r_20140519.pdf

[MD]

Congress Saves the A-10 Warthog... for Now

by Rich Smith

The U.S. Air Force wants to kill the A-10 Thunderbolt II.

But the Air Force's paymaster does not. And when all's said and done, that's what the debate over the fate of America's best tank-destroying warplane may come down to -- whether the folks who control the Air Force's purse strings want to keep the A-10 flying.

A few weeks ago, we went over a few trial balloons that the Air Force has floated, in case Congress won't let it retire its fleet of 326 A-10 "Warthogs." To save the estimated $700 million a year it costs to keep the A-10s fueled, maintained, and flying, USAF has suggested it could retire its entire fleet of 66 B-1B long-range bombers instead -- or put about a third of its 1,018 F-16 fighter jets into mothballs.

That makes sense because, as Georgia Senators Saxby Chambliss and Johnny Isakson have pointed out, the A-10 is cheaper to fly, per flying hour, than either the F-16 or the B-1. This suggests that cutting the more expensive planes from the Air Force's arsenal, and sticking with the older -- but cheaper and more effective -- A-10 is the right move to make.

And speaking of no brains -- Congress!

Regardless, Congress is busily brainstorming other ways to save the A-10. Earlier this month, for example, legislators in the House Armed Services Committee, or HASC, passed an amendment, voting two to one to forbid the USAF from even thinking of retiring the plane unless it can assure legislators it has other ways of providing "adequate" close-air support to troops on the ground.

This requirement edged out a separate proposal (which was rejected) that would have had the Air Force mothball its A-10s -- so that rather than being disassembled and sold for scrap, they'd be kept in stasis, shrink-wrapped in latex, and could be brought back from retirement if need be. (The main problem with that plan: "Spinning up" a latex wrapped A-10 can take as long as four months to accomplish. By that time, the war may already be lost).

Meanwhile in the Senate, the HASC's doppelganger, the Senate Armed Services Committee, confirmed this week that it's working on a plan to shift funding from other programs to cover the cost of the A-10. (The catch here? Optimistic senators think they only need to cobble together $400 million to keep the A-10 flying for another year. That's barely half what USAF says it needs -- and less than half of what the Obama Administration says the A-10 will cost).

What it means to investors
It's that last point that may turn out to be of most importance to defense investors. The White House went on record this week saying it has "serious concerns" with Congressional efforts to keep the A-10 alive, and "objects," in particular to Congress's plan to shift funding from the Littoral Combat Program, among others, to fund programs such as the A-10. The Administration even went so far as to utter the "V" word -- threatening to veto the bill if its demands are not met.

What might this mean for investors, in dollars and cents? Here's a quick rundown of the highlights.

Northrop Grumman

America hasn't built a brand-new A-10 Warthog in decades. But as the debate before Congress shows, it still spends hundreds of millions annually keeping the ones it's already built flying. Since 1987, Northrop Grumman has served as prime contractor for A-10 work. Its most important recent contract was awarded in 2010 -- a $486 million contract to equip U.S. Air Force and Navy aircraft -- including A-10s -- with up to 99 LITENING targeting pods.

Other tasks assigned to Northrop: $1.7 million to "sustain and modernize all A-10 weapon system configurations," and $11.3 million to perform "evaluations, analysis, repair designs, and/or testing" of A-10 structural integrity.

Boeing

Another contractor with arguably as big a stake in the A-10's survival as Northrop Grumman's, is Boeing. Last year, Boeing was the single biggest recipient of A-10-related funding, winning $218 million in maintenance contracts for the A-10, "the most of any defense prime," according to Bloomberg. These included $212 million awarded in just one single contract to deliver 56 replacement "thick-skinned" wings for the A-10.

Going forward, and working from the estimated $4 million cost per wing, Boeing's contract to build as many as 242 replacement wings for the A-10, of which 173 have already been ordered, could yield as much as $276 million in additional revenue for Boeing in years to come -- and help to keep the A-10s flying well into the 2040s. (That is, if Congress can convince USAF to keep the plane flying, at all).

Lockheed Martin

Lockheed Martin, in contrast, has almost no ties to the A-10 program whatsoever. Yet, it's arguably the single company most interested in the aircraft's fate.

A review of business segment data from S&P Capital IQ on the revenues of each of the major A-10 players reveals that, even the multi-hundred-million-dollar contracts that Boeing and Northrop have won for A-10 work amount to mere fractions of 1% of each company's annual revenue stream. In contrast, Lockheed Martin gets 20% of its revenues from production of its new F-35 Lightning II fighter jet -- the plane that the Obama administration and the U.S. Air Force agree can do an "adequate" job of replacing the A-10 on, for close-air-support missions.

Over time, and based on the F-35's projected program cost, the F-35 could ultimately grow to constitute 50% of Lockheed's business, if the company is able to sell as many F-35s as originally expected. But here's the key: Every dollar diverted from F-35 production to fund the A-10 means fewer F-35s built today. And the fewer F-35s that get built, the slower Lockheed Martin is able to scale production of the F-35.

Less economies of scale mean less efficiency of production for Lockheed, raising the cost of building F-35s, and making the plane less price-competitive with alternative fighter jets for sale on world markets. And this effect tends to snowball -- the more expensive the plane, the fewer the foreign buyers, and the fewer the foreign buyers, the less efficient the production -- raising the F-35's cost even further, and leading to even fewer buyers.

In short, Lockheed Martin needs to scale production of the F-35 fast. But the more funds get diverted from F-35 production to save the A-10, the harder this job gets for Lockheed Martin. If you were wondering before why the F-35's backers in Congress hate the A-10 so much, well, now you know.

Edited May 27, 2014 by MD

[xcraftllc]

Congress Saves the A-10 Warthog... for Now

by Rich Smith

In short, Lockheed Martin needs to scale production of the F-35 fast. But the more funds get diverted from F-35 production to save the A-10, the harder this job gets for Lockheed Martin. If you were wondering before why the F-35's backers in Congress hate the A-10 so much, well, now you know.

A long read but an interesting one. I can't believe how I overlooked the desire and therefore political influence that Lockheed has on the elimination of the A-10. Oddly enough that also most likely means that Vipers are safe. Lockheed would only like to see the Hawg go since they have no investment in it, whereas they now run the Viper program.

The "Snowball" or "Spiral" effect of economies of scale is the scariest part of the F-35 program and is why I say we just have to suck it up and learn to love that thing. The program is reaching the lower end of its critical mass in that if we can't commit to the 2443 we said we would buy, then other buyers won't be able to afford it and so on and next thing we know we have even less of an Air Force than we already do.

You know I appreciate the input from all the people who commented on this thread. There were definitely some very valid points made about how valuable the Bone is. I think we can all agree that the real problem and question isn't which airframe should we cut, but rather that the political and bureaucratic forces at work can only offer that as a solution.

Having said that if it comes down to it, I still believe the B-1 would be a better cut, especially if the next gen bomber program can be kept alive. Then there would be a true replacement for the B-1 that would be easier to justify with the Bone already gone, along with the other factors I mentioned earlier.

Edited May 28, 2014 by xcraftllc

[Hydrostream]

_{That's the same reason they cited in getting rid of the OH-58. It was Boeing and Sikorsky vs. Bell.}

Edited May 28, 2014 by Hydrostream

[Lawman]

_{That's the same reason they cited in getting rid of the OH-58. It was Boeing and Sikorsky vs. Bell.}

Or it could have been the fact that we have ignored upgrading that helicopter for so long to bring it up to a useful standard fleet wide would cost as much as a full acquisition (that isn't run into the ground by Bell like the ARH).

[xcraftllc]

Or it could have been the fact that we have ignored upgrading that helicopter for so long to bring it up to a useful standard fleet wide would cost as much as a full acquisition (that isn't run into the ground by Bell like the ARH).

It's interesting that you mention the ARH, yet another example of how broken the R&D/Acquisition system is. Almost as ugly as the Comanche program. It seems to be a problem that has spanned all services too.

[Lawman]

It's interesting that you mention the ARH, yet another example of how broken the R&D/Acquisition system is. Almost as ugly as the Comanche program. It seems to be a problem that has spanned all services too.

We do a lot of it to ourselves. Some new wiggit or capability or radio comes out, "hey PM _____ can we put that on the ______." And then we go back three steps to redo software, add weight, redo testing of the actual component and before we get back to where we should have been we do it again for another good idea. That was what killed Comanche and ARH. What's truly sad is the ARH is flying and working cheaply in form with the original requirement but we faked it away trying to squeeze every bit of mo'betta out of it instead of building what we had originally asked for.

That's why the E model Apache has the same old 50 point database. PM said "knock his shit off we will add it after we actually have an aircraft to show for it." Hopefully after seeing how much better that works we can unfuck some of the self inflicted pain in acquisitions.

[HU&W]

We do a lot of it to ourselves. Some new wiggit or capability or radio comes out, "hey PM _____ can we put that on the ______." And then we go back three steps to redo software, add weight, redo testing of the actual component and before we get back to where we should have been we do it again for another good idea. That was what killed Comanche and ARH. What's truly sad is the ARH is flying and working cheaply in form with the original requirement but we faked it away trying to squeeze every bit of mo'betta out of it instead of building what we had originally asked for.

That's why the E model Apache has the same old 50 point database. PM said "knock his shit off we will add it after we actually have an aircraft to show for it." Hopefully after seeing how much better that works we can unfuck some of the self inflicted pain in acquisitions.

This is exactly the problem with both the F-35 and the littoral combat ship. You start with a great plan/design and by the time you've added all the "nice to have's", it's morphed into something completely different.

[Prosuper]

I say we come to a compromise and sit down both the A-10 and B-1 and pull out some old F-4 D's,

[FallingOsh]

This is exactly the problem with both the F-35 and the littoral combat ship. You start with a great plan/design and by the time you've added all the "nice to have's", it's morphed into something completely different.

This is exactly the problem with both the F-35 and the littoral combat ship. You start with a great plan/design and by the time you've added all the "nice to have's", it's morphed into something completely different.

Exactly. It's the same way we ended up with CSEL. I always think of Homer Simpson's car design when people discuss programs like LCS, CSEL, JSF, etc.

Edited May 31, 2014 by FallingOsh

[SurelySerious]

Requirements creep: the longer a program is in development, the more extreme it becomes.

[xcraftllc]

Ok so now I guess nobody knows what's going on:

https://www.stripes.com/news/us/a-10-supporters-rebuffed-in-defense-spending-legislation-1.286650

[busdriver]

https://www.airforcetimes.com/article/20140609/NEWS04/306090036/Opinion-10-needs-go

Article by an Army Infantry officer, just re-enforces the fact that the Army guys view CAS as flying artillery. Also a an example of not understanding the air piece which is pretty common amongst Army Infantry from what I've experienced.