Alaska F-22 crash: RIP, "Bong" Haney

[ThreeHoler]

Investigations like this make me sad. Especially when things like this

A pilot assigned to the accident investigation tried to pull the EOS activation ring in a ground simulation, and also moved the stick and the rudder pedals by mistake trying to reach the device.

occur during the investigation. As the pilot board member, I could never stand for labeling pilot (in)action as causal when there is a potential serious design flaw. I would have had serious closed-door words with the board president, my career be damned.

[Karl Hungus]

Just wow.

Are you really that surprised? The frauds that pass for "leadership" in this joke of an organization will throw you under the bus for pretty much anything these days.

Take note, folks, when it's time to make important career decisions.

Edited December 15, 2011 by Karl Hungus

[Shortbus]

Are you really that surprised? The frauds that pass for "leadership" in this joke of an organization will throw you under the bus for pretty much anything these days.

Take note, folks, when it's time to make important career decisions.

Yup, unfortunately this is nothing new. On a few occasions during my career I've had friends met at the jet by lawyers after combat sorties - nothing ever came of it except fostering second-guessing on future missions. I guess someone has to cover their ass.

[brabus]

A quote from the report: "Had Haney not been distracted by trying to breathe, he would have recognized the unusual attitude..." + a pilot proving in the sim the difficulty of using the EOS/inadvertently putting control inputs in = Fuck you to the AIB!

I wish I wasn't surprised by the absolute pieces of shit the AF lets "lead" these days...nonetheless this just makes my blood boil. I wish I could even just put the board president in a sim, wrap my hands around his neck and choke the fuck out of him and then tell him to perform all the CAPs flawlessly while flying under NVGs...fucking asshole. Rant over. to Bong.

Edited December 15, 2011 by brabus

[Cap-10]

This makes me sick!

As a guy who has been in safety positions at the squadron and Wing level, at home and deployed, including CoS at a Fighter Wing, this reeks of infulence from above...senior officers that "gently persuaded" the board to blame the pilot over the POS aircraft and the manufacturer.

I hope the family sues all parties involved and I hope they win a metric shit-ton of money!!

Cap-10

[Guest]

I'm glad this became public. People need to see it. It is fucked up.

If you've never strapped into the jet in Alaska with all the cold wx gear and a set of goggles on your face and then had an emergency over an area where the ground is as pitch black as North Korea at night you can't really appreciate how easy it is to get fucked up in a scenario like this. I don't care if it is a faulty attitude indicator, non-NVIS cockpit lighting or a bleed air leak/OBOGS issue, putting 100% on the pilot because he should've been able to hack it is bullshit.

I mentioned this before and a few guys shit in my mess kit because they said I wasn't sensitive to the families but I'm glad this has gone public so people can see they're blaming a pilot for something 99.69% would also do in the same situation.

I know lots of people are immediately jumping on "Leadership" as part of the problem. I'm not defending the CSAF and I'm sure this won't make anyone feel any better but I'm seeing lots of traffic from the O-6 and above level and guys are saying (privately) this is total bullshit and they're only getting away with this because dead men cannot challenge the board findings.

[Rifleman96]

WTF is up with AF leadership. My blood is boiling from the AIB results. Again, trying to use the pilot as the scapegoat for equipment failure of the AF's prized possession. Words just cannot describe how pissed off and disappointed I am with this AIB.

[ExBoneOSO]

Another quote from the AIB report that borders on the insane..

Had Haney not been distracted by trying to breathe, he would have recognized the problem, the report reads.

I'm no expert, but I think not being able to breathe is pretty distracting in of itself. I need to stop reading the report; every time I look at it I get more and more pissed. They may have just well said "the cause of the crash was the aircraft's sudden deceleration upon impacting the ground." That makes more sense than blaming the MP.

[Steve Davies]

If I may be permitted to ask a question or two:

Based on my very limited experience as a 'breather', I've been told countless times that if the mask stops supplying air, you should either pull the green ring or drop the mask. In this case, is it unreasonable to expect that the pilot would have done the latter when he realised he was unable to reach/activate the emergency system? Or, would hypoxia have set in so quickly that he really only had one shot at pulling the ring?

If he had dropped his mask, would there have been sufficient oxygen in the cabin air (I note that there was cabin pressure failure) to have warded off the effects of hypoxia?

Not trying to second guess anyone, but keen to know what the alternatives might have been.

One final one: are USAF AIBs expected to designate a *single* cause as the main reason for the mishap, or is there latitude for them to cite two or more main reasons?

[ClearedHot]

If I may be permitted to ask a question or two:

Based on my very limited experience as a 'breather', I've been told countless times that if the mask stops supplying air, you should either pull the green ring or drop the mask. In this case, is it unreasonable to expect that the pilot would have done the latter when he realised he was unable to reach/activate the emergency system? Or, would hypoxia have set in so quickly that he really only had one shot at pulling the ring?

If he had dropped his mask, would there have been sufficient oxygen in the cabin air (I note that there was cabin pressure failure) to have warded off the effects of hypoxia?

Not trying to second guess anyone, but keen to know what the alternatives might have been.

One final one: are USAF AIBs expected to designate a *single* cause as the main reason for the mishap, or is there latitude for them to cite two or more main reasons?

Steve,

This opinion coming from a non-fighter guy, but a guy who has worn the mask almost my entire career (3800 hours), because the gunpig is unpressurized.

I think the answer as always is "it depends"...

First, was he hypoxic because of lack of oxygen or because of other contaminants in his bloodstream. As I recall carbon monoxide bonds with hemoglobin 230 times stronger than oxygen so simply dropping the mask may not be a simple recovery solution. There are too many unknowns to kn ow the actual situation.

Second, A lot depends on his altitude at the time of the incident. As you know the higher you are the less time you have to react, and in the high 30's you may have less than 5 seconds of useful consciousness.

Hypoxia is nothing to fuck around with. I can tell you I had an IFE in OEF where multiple members of my crew began to experience hypoxia symptoms as we climbed unpressurized to our combat altitude. The aircraft had just returned from heavy fuel cell maintenance. We just crossed the fence and were climbing to altitude when folks started complaining about an extreme fuel smell. Our bold face tells us to have everyone get on the hose and go 100% oxygen...we were already on the hose and within a few minutes several of my guys started experiencing hypoxia symptoms. It took us a few minutes but we determined the oxygen hoses were mistakenly soaked in J-8...I was faced with a dilemma but I order the crew to drop masks (against the Dash 1), and started an emergency descent to 10K. I got lucky and judgement carried the day.

[Steve Davies]

Thanks, CH

That answers my hypoxia questions. According to the report, he was at 50k when the OBOGS FAIL caption came on. That doesn't leave much time to do very much of anything.

[Toro]

Based on my very limited experience as a 'breather', I've been told countless times that if the mask stops supplying air, you should either pull the green ring or drop the mask. In this case, is it unreasonable to expect that the pilot would have done the latter when he realised he was unable to reach/activate the emergency system? Or, would hypoxia have set in so quickly that he really only had one shot at pulling the ring?

IMO, the answer would be to drop the mask, but this may not have been immediately intuitive. I've been in BFM/ACM engagements when - due to twisting my body and helmet around - I've unintentionally disconnected the oxygen hose (which should cause a similar effect as what happened to Bong). The few times I've done it, it takes a few seconds for it to sink in that you can't breath because of everything that's going in. What contributes to the problem is the fact that the exhale vales still function, so you can breath out normally, you just can't breath in. I could easily see getting into a "WTF is going on?" situation - especially if the symptoms of hypoxia were present.

If he had dropped his mask, would there have been sufficient oxygen in the cabin air (I note that there was cabin pressure failure) to have warded off the effects of hypoxia?

Above 10K is were we're required to have oxygen, so below that he should have been fine. Even above that he should have been fine for a while (how long would depend on how high he was), and under normal circumstances, he would be expected to descend below 10K.

One final one: are USAF AIBs expected to designate a *single* cause as the main reason for the mishap, or is there latitude for them to cite two or more main reasons?

They can site more than one casual factor for a mishap. That is what makes the AIB president's determination even more sickening.

Edit: I wasn't aware he was at 50K - that definitely complicates the situation with hypoxia potential as CH described.

Edited December 15, 2011 by Toro

[ThreeHoler]

One thing I saw that really was an unanswered question was the cabin altitude and rate of depressurization. I don't recall seeing it anywhere in the investigation report, yet the AIB somehow concluded that he was conscious the whole time.

[Guest]

In this case, is it unreasonable to expect that the pilot would have done the latter when he realised he was unable to reach/activate the emergency system?

Dropping your mask with NVGs strapped opnto the front of you helmet is also not the first thing you think of since your helmet will fall forward to some degree and makes looking around inside the cockpit under the goggles a bigger pain in the ass.

[Breckey]

One thing I saw that really was an unanswered question was the cabin altitude and rate of depressurization. I don't recall seeing it anywhere in the investigation report, yet the AIB somehow concluded that he was conscious the whole time.

The CABIN ALT light didn't come on until 14 seconds before impact, passing ~20k ft. I'd assume he was conscious the whole time because he initiated a recovery only 11 seconds later.

[Buenos Diaz]

Doesn't look like they used "the reasonable person" concept to me. I'm not sure what an AIB uses to determine this but I have been involved with safety for quite awhile and it looks like an average pilot would have gotten himself into a similar situation under similar circumstances. We have lost pilots to spatial d alone without compounding the problem with hypoxia or trouble breathing. If I remeber correctly, one of the scenarios in the centrifuge was to look back and to the left and then look forward. This demonstration was used to show the debilating effects of that type of spatial disorientation. Imagine doing that at night withot being able to breathe. Sounds a lot like what Jeff went through.

I flew with Jeff several times in tweets. He was an excellent pilot. Jeff was better than a "reasonable" pilot and without evidence that he performed his recovery incorrectly or put himself into an unrecoverable situation, I will continue to believe that he died because of a system malfunction.

Buenos

[NEflyer]

I flew with Jeff several times in tweets. He was an excellent pilot. Jeff was better than a "reasonable" pilot and without evidence that he performed his recovery incorrectly or put himself into an unrecoverable situation, I will continue to believe that he died because of a system malfunction.

I'd say....

The MP was recognized throughout his career for exceptional performance. He received numerous accolades and awards including: Distinguished Graduate, AETC Commanders Trophy winner, and Flying Excellence Award winner from Undergraduate Pilot Training; Top Overall Graduate and Distinguished Graduate from F-15C Fighter Training; and most recently, 525FS Flight Lead of the Year, Warrior of the Year, Turkey Shoot Top Flight Lead, Instructor Pilot of the Quarter, and selection as an alternate to the F-22A Weapons Instructor Course. He was regarded as one of the top pilots in the squadron among his peers and supervision.

If this could happen to a pilot of his caliber, I can only imagine the chances a mere mortal would have.

[DEVIL]

This bums me out.

[BB Stacker]

I'm sure most of y'all have already seen it, but the actual AIB report has been posted on the JAG website, if you want to get it straight from the horse's mouth instead of reading a news story about it. Here's the summary, and here's the full report.

Edited December 16, 2011 by BB Stacker

[M2]

Tell ya what, let's push the craniums of the AIB members under water for a minute or two, and we'll see how "distracted" they become while trying to breathe...

Un-fucking-believable!

[Guest]

If this could happen to a pilot of his caliber, I can only imagine the chances a mere mortal would have.

Shack.

[Steve Davies]

Thanks Toro/Rainman for the additional answers to my questions.

The CABIN ALT light didn't come on until 14 seconds before impact, passing ~20k ft. I'd assume he was conscious the whole time because he initiated a recovery only 11 seconds later.

One thing that the report does not address is whether there would have been any mist/condensation associated with the decompression. I assume that the lack of information about it means that the board believed it was not a factor, but it is odd that they do not explicitly address it.

If the cabin did fog up, or his visor misted over - even for a short while - how could he have been expected to 'fly the aircraft'?

Edited December 16, 2011 by Steve Davies

[Guest]

If the cabin did fog up, or his visor misted over - even for a short while - how could he have been expected to 'fly the aircraft'?

Instruments.

[Breckey]

That and you don't wear a visor when using NVG's

[Guest]

That and you don't wear a visor when using NVG's

It depends.