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[Last post from me in this derail, I really do appreciate the contrasting view and recognize that it’s an unpalatable and unpopular view]: We don’t have to actively threaten now with a massive buildup; a long term presence is the threat. Well aware that the current posture doesn’t provide options in a peer threat war. But! When we leave, Beijing will be there ($50 says Xi or his successor shows up for a high profile visit within 24 months after the last US troops are out) and they’ll have zero concerns about immediate instability. They will be looking 50 years down the [belt and] road and won’t harbor any illusions of helping the people or government of Afghanistan. (Except as required to manipulate the people and government of Afghanistan). Not leaving means we tell China that we recognize their game and aren’t going to let them walk East and west simultaneously. Here’s a picture of the Shanghai Cooperation organization. Members in Green, Observers in Blue (Afghanistan included). It isn’t getting any smaller. It contains most of the people on earth and by 2040, potentially most of the GDP on earth.

Over, not in.

(Funny you should say that; lots of folks saying the Chinese play go while we play chess). The Chinese know we’re all more familiar with chess than go. They’re playing a very different game. I’d say that if it forces the adversary to consider a wholly different axis than the one they’ve been absolutely dominating (the Western Pacific) that it isn’t a waste. They are clearly facing East WRT the US, currently and aspirationally. No (though we’ve likely all already played that game before). I’m saying that ceding influence and control in the ‘Stans forces us to look at China from the direction they’d like us to see them from. I’m not saying that we need to continue combat operations in Afghanistan at all. I’m saying that the pressing problem of our time is a rising China. We should make decisions based on what we need in 2040, not what would have been prudent in 2003. No disagreement with the first point here. Losing people senselessly is a horrible thing. Again, not advocating for continued combat operations or any aspiration of fixing Afghanistan. Fock ‘em... I just need to be able to plop aircraft, weapons, tanks, tankers, and Americans with Rifles in a place that lets me get to China’s western frontier quickly. If we’re doing distributed basing in your country from MOLs in Afghanistan, your pacific A2AD becomes a neat prize at the end of the war. Unpopular, I know, but being in Afghanistan doesn’t have to be about Afghanistan.

I think anybody who grew up playing Go would disagree.

I understand the sentiment, but is having an enduring presence in an “unconquerable” land that borders China in the West worth (some) blood and treasure? Maybe even some embarrassment in negotiations?

Had a contrasting experience. Learned a lot about the folks I work with. Never thought about a lot of what was discussed. A number of people brought to tears with a significantly poignant story. Overheard one of the staunch “the best way to end this problem is not to discuss it” people tell the person who organized the training “thanks, I’m glad we had this talk; I think I need to listen more.” We didn’t have a 100% talking rule and attendance/tracking was intentionally obfuscated... and by that I mean we definitely had 100% attendance to meet the mandate.

Totally agree with you. I’m skeptical of the rationale that’s being repeated in this thread re: the justification behind an “America Class.” No offense intended to student pilots, but has anybody in a position to speak to the decisionmakers’ rationale provided insight? “Checking washout rates” seems like a massive misunderstanding of social science and statistics or something coercive with subversively racist intent. (I have faith the latter isn’t the case and hope the former isn’t either... though “no class As for X years!... don’t notice all the Bs and Cs” doesn’t build confidence.) In any case, @brabus’s comment is a perfect reason that we shouldn’t let anybody (to include the young guns at work) see us roll our eyes at the seemingly clumsy and overtly progressive “first all XYZ ABC” stories. Those are exactly the reactions that give people confidence in saying “it’s going to be harder for you; don’t bother.” The only ones with actual SA are us.

@12xu2a3x3 Data is ~6 years old; take it for what it’s worth. Wichita Falls has no shortage of old, kind of shitty, but super cheap apartments in the old downtown area (12 minutes to base). You could pick one up for less than $700 a month back in 2014. Some for less. It’s also the closest piece of civilization to some extraction operations (though not as booming as Midland/Odessa can be when the price of oil goes up), so long-term rentals at campgrounds are fairly common. (Good luck buying a camper at the moment though; COVID has made that market go crazy.) If you want to commute, having a place in WF is doable on a budget, and you could probably work the schedule so that you can spend one or two weeknights at home regularly during the week.

This. Especially this when viewed through the recruiting lens you mention above. Right now we end up with officers populating the support world who joined in response to a call to be great leaders of men, to be warriors different than the corporate world, to be basically special operations desk pilots... meanwhile, people with a genuine interest in HR go to work at FedEx (or some other highly rated HR department in a company larger than the Air Force.) I’d way rather have somebody interested in the work than somebody interested in achieving some perverted model of self-actualization that requires special military attributes of office work.

Well, yeah. I mean... notice the date on that post? That “good stuff” wasn’t about the FORMER wing commander... 🙃

That thought process is still happening; the bros did a good job of weeding it out at the interviews. Any U-2 pilot worth a sh1t is a proud UCD-wearing recce professional, not somebody looking to use it as a stepping stone.

You’re on your own!

If you’re talking tactical integration, it should happen outside this type of relationship at the USAFWC. For administrative relationships: I’m all for the flattest organization possible, but in this particular case I don’t think the MAJCOM the right answer. Let’s be real: ISR is always going to be a red-headed stepchild in ACC. BUT ALSO! More important than being the center of attention, ISR needs to be responsive to the needs of ACC. (Why it makes sense to live there.) That said, having the 25th Air Force provides a balance. The two star has a seat at tables that ISR (now cyber and EA as well) wouldn’t otherwise occupy, and ACC can still make demands of their subordinate org in an absolute sense. (Rather than making it a MAJCOM/DRU unto itself.) Now! If we really wanted to make a better structure, we’d dissolve the 480th ISRW and align its component parts with the collectors and customers. That, or suddenly pluck all WSOs up into their own wing with their own rules, own schedules, and admire why B-52s, B-1s, F-15Es, and the rest are suddenly not able to employ effectively. Ever shown up in the mission area an hour after takeoff only to discover that most of your airplane’s crew is out hiking 1,400 miles away?

There’s also value in NAFs that own missions that are inseparable but distributed across multiple organizations. DCGS & U-2 under the 16th AF (formerly 25th). Having a CC to slap the table with force of law (who isn’t shouldering the the MAJCOM/CC role) is important That said: in that case in particular (and I’d suspect in most cases in general), why the fvck are we organized so that two parts of the same machine (front and back end of a system) only touch at the NAF and on operational sorties?

And also don’t be a dickhead. We’re equally guilty of being ignorant and often more guilty of believing that we’ve earned that right.

Recognize that when people feel compelled to say “officer first” they usually mean “aspire to be a leader,” and don’t understand how that works in the flying world. Also realize that the type of leadership that happens in combat aviation is inaccessible to those who haven’t spent years studying combat aviation. A non-rated Captain with many subordinates may see a rated Captain with none and assume that the rated captain isn’t a leader. They don’t see the briefs with hundreds of pages worth of information conveyed in 65 plus or minus five minutes. They don’t see the planning process in which the mission commander coordinates for every domain, service, and discipline of physics to achieve a goal handed to him by the Army four star. They don’t see the split second decision-making that will drive success or failure. They don’t see the meaningful eye contact when you go over something one last time because ing it up will be a disaster. They see a tired Captain with messy hair, who’s never officially supervised anybody and therefore can’t possibly be a leader. That’s not the non-rated officer’s fault; their exposure is movies about aerial combat that’s portrayed more like boxing than war. Give them time, and they’ll get it eventually... or they won’t, and they’ll be sent to tell you that aircrew aren’t leaders. Be a leader; scoff the people who want you to prove it in a silly way. Fly, fight, and win. Don’t apologize for it.

They also graduated their second WIC class yesterday. They’ve got people who get it in charge and being invited to the right seats at the right tables. Pay attention to Beale, and apply if you want to be part of a revolution in ISR.

2. Are you saying that sociology as a whole is not to be trusted or only the pop-sociology that we can digest in 30 second sound bites? 1. You’ve told us that women really want to be in historically women’s professions; I’d love to see the science (sociology) and whether there was any attempt at separating correlation from causation. It’s way more difficult than just asking. A) Ask 10 aircrew what their first choice of airframes was when they were two weeks from track select. 6-9 will lie and cite their current airframe; 1-2 got their then-first choice. All others were FAIPS. B) Even if you figure out how to get the truth, getting the why behind the truth remains a problem—know any males who quit dancing, singing, playing the piano, or doing art when it became costly socially? That’s acting on a preference and is a measured choice, but is also counter to that individual’s natural predilection. Not saying it’s impossible or even unlikely, just that the study of such a thing would be difficult. Got a source? “Google it yourself” is fine if you don’t want to point to something specifically. 3. I’ve got a bit of an issue with this one. You use the word progress, as if it’s a march towards a better state. That acknowledges a gradient, two sides. One less desirable, one more desirable. When you say “inflame the issue” when we move too fast, I have a hard time finding an explanation for the “inflammation” that isn’t simply the feelings of those accustomed to the old (less progress) and uncomfortable with the new (progress). I am certain that you don’t mean that we should avoid empowering historically oppressed groups because it might upset people. What exactly do you mean? I think moving towards a less racist world/country/system is worth a bit of discomfort. 4. Honest question: what do you mean when you say ‘human nature’? Plato, Moses, Dennett, and Kant would all reach different conclusions. It’s literally one of the central questions of philosophy. Regardless, agree that the government should stay out. 5. It’s a shame that the most outrageous ideas seem to get the most attention. Wouldn’t it be great if critical thinking skills were sexy?

Thanks for the answer about T-1s. Follow on question: Do T-38 trained folks struggle/wash out of heavy FTUs at an increased rate?

Honest question: What did you learn in the T-1 that can’t be taught in a sim or extended T-6 syllabus?

TLDR: kill IFF Not read up on the plan for UPT 2.5+; assumptions based on the discussion above. We’re all treating IFF as a sacred cow. Let’s be real; it’s an eight week top-off. A program like that can screen, but it’s not enough time to teach much beyond vocabulary and how to fake it for those who don’t have it. I know, I know... the fighter pilot attitude, aggressiveness, intangibles, Excel spreadsheet bombing! More on that later. It sounds like we are downloading expectations for basic airmanship to the basic trainer (reasonable) and at pretty much the same time phasing out our T-1 and T-38 fleets as we field the T-7. What if we killed IFF or, said another way: expanded its scope? All studs who require the T-7 (I think there’s a lot of merit to a single trainer track for some airframes, having not flown them) would start in one squadron, per UPT base, for transition to the new airframe, eventually being selected into a fighter or non-fighter track after two months. The non-fighter studs stay in the jet transition squadron and finish a syllabus similar to current phase III. 3 more months. Basic form and nav focused. AETC, AMC, ACC/ISR and AFGSC have equal seats at this unit’s post-track syllabus development table. Syllabus tailored to airframe with multiple off-ramps for each community’s needs. The jet transition squadron is manned primarily with AFGSC/MAF/ISR backgrounds. T-7 FAIPs start here. The fighter tracked studs finish UPT phase III in what was formerly IFF. Manned by fighter pilots, syllabus written by ACC/CAF and AETC. 6(+) months. Single syllabus to create a what would be a T-7 CMR wingman if the T-7 had real weapons. Begins with advanced formation and progresses to the limit of the T-7, or as deemed appropriate by ACC. No more trying to fix bad habits from a six month phase III in an eight week course. IFF is no longer screening, they’re building the product. Don’t like the intangibles? You’ve got six months to instill the fighter pilot mentality. It’s no longer a program that studs are just trying to get through, they actually have to absorb to survive, and contribute to the squadron. There’s room and time for truly valuable events to build confidence and airmanship. An ADAIR TDY to Nellis could be the capstone. If we’re going to stay ahead of the world, it’s time to rethink the model they copied. And oh yeah, VR and shit.

Depends on whether you read the words or actions. Ever visited the reunification train station? It’s basically built like a movie set; pretty clear nobody actually expects to use it (likely because it will be annihilated in the first 30 seconds of the war).

Tactical advantage? Sure. Strategically: What’s the desired end-state for Korea and does a war on the peninsula get us there faster? More broadly, even if the conflict stays conventional, do we want that unstable smoking mess in the middle of our don’t-call-it-a-Cold War? This. Three generations of Korean military have planned to fight this war so their kids don’t have to.

When there’s not a lot of sky to hang onto, making sure it doesn’t fall out of it is an attention demanding job. There’s as much to do as you’re willing to invest. Some missions are way more demanding than others, but on the ones where you’re not constantly worried about putting the airplane in the right place without bending it, there’s room to be an athlete in other ways. “Optimizing collect” or just paying attention to what’s going around you is a full time job. Lots of folks working hard to make it one of the busiest (and most capable) cockpits in the Air Force.

Yeah, living in Nevada with the option to visit a successful neighboring state does sound great! #stateofjefforson ETClarify: not down with splitting the union