Good video Clark— thanks for posting. It’s nice to see actual experts discussing the big issues instead of some computer-voice-overs created by DCS gamers claiming to be credible sources of information.
One major item missing from the discussion, as always though, is actual A-10 expertise and experience.
Here are my thoughts on the video, for what it’s worth… this discussion and a couple bucks will get you a halfway decent cup of coffee… this is gonna be a long read, so you might as well grab a cup of joe before settling in…
Carrol and Herzinger hit on a key concept in the discussion of transferring ANY aircraft to Ukraine— the proficiency and ability to sustain the assets logistically. Even if we’re discussing F-16s, which fit the billet of multi-role needs of that nation, comes with a hefty price tag in terms of ground-based requirements. They jokingly refer to a HAZMAT program to deal with the hydrazine, to which the Ukrainians would probably scoff, but those are long-term, very real considerations. Do they have fuel trucks that can hook up to these fighters? What munitions are you giving them? How many crew chiefs and specs are you sending to get trained in the US? ANY transfer of aircraft in terms of hardware of this caliber will not produce an immediate effect on the battlefield, and in fact, as I mentioned briefly, can very well be a net DRAIN on their forces as they try to sustain something that is 100% foreign to them.
Multi-role works best for smaller air forces— they HAVE to live in that realm. Hell, multi-role is a cornerstone of our programs, but I don’t believe that EVERY aircraft needs to be born and employed under that mantra. We have that luxury as a force that we can have specialization— though the budgeteers might disagree, we as an American Air Force have that ability whereas others do not. You could say the same for our approach to CSAR— we have the luxury and budget to dedicate such forces to the mission.
“Give us an aircraft solution similar to the HIMARS.”
That’s just not going to happen with western equipment for the reasons listed above and in their presentation.
Now, back to the A-10.
These guys are qualified experts in their field— Carrol world-renowned. But not in the A-10. If you think that MANPADs make brick walls and close off airspace to A-10s, then you’re not familiar with the Hog’s current suite of defensive systems, tactics, or weapons availability. If you throw out pics of KC’s battle-damaged A-10 and say that this proves the A-10’snvulnerabilities, then you don’t know the context of that situation. Anyone know how many passes that formation made prior to that hit?
5.
Down the same ‘chute, same angle, while carrying 4x Mk-82s.
Well that doesn’t sound smart now does it?
It’s what they had to do.
US forces were pinned down across the river by Iraqi forces under a bridge escarpment, and the only way to hit those Iraqi’s was to come in at a relatively low angle, from one direction, multiple times trying to get gun and rocket passes under the bridge with effective effects based on that battlefield terrain. A-10 defensive systems were not automatic at that time, and they became predictable due to the requirements of the troops on the ground. That hit aligns pretty well with the historical averages going back to Desert Storm— no A-10 has ever been hit on its first pass, and it’s usually around that fifth or sixth attack in the same area that gets them.
The jet wasn’t carrying precision munitions that might have allowed for more standoff at that time either— they were A-10As, and precision engagement wouldn’t start for a few more years.
The point is, in every discussion about hits that the A-10 has taken over the years, there’s A LOT of context required. The experiences over the Republican Guard in 1991 come up often in this realm, but without getting into that right now, the discussion needs to start with the question, “Why were A-10s operating in that environment at that time that led to those losses?” It’s a great story that adds so much more to the understanding of what led to those hits. William Smallwood does a great compilation in his book, “Warthog—Flying the A-10 in the Gulf War.” A stat you don’t see thrown around often— did you know that we lost just as many F-16s as A-10s during Ops Desert Shield and Desert Storm?
Which brings me to the point of the SU-25s getting their “asses handed to them,” so why would anyone want something similar?
I haven’t seen the numbers lately, but during the first three months of the war, SU-25 loss rates were comparable to all other fast-movers. If you classify the Frog as its own entity vs all other fighters, you’ll see that more traditional fighters were lost than -25s. Personally, since such a distinction is made between the Frog and all other fighters in terms of survivability, I think this is a fair comparison that proves that the Frog is being lost at a slightly lower rate than other, faster fighters.
I also am not impressed by the tactics, training, or the apparent lack of effective equipment on the Frogs for that matter. If you read up on the SU-25SM (Russia’s “best” Frog), you’ll see that it boasts some pretty impressive equipment— on paper, it looks like it’s on par with US gear. But videos of Frogs in action shows that either this equipment (such as automatic counter measures) either doesn’t work, or the pilots don’t operate them correctly. So I think that it’s a natural attempt, but ultimately incorrect comparison between the battlefield employment of SU-25s to A-10Cs.
The quote that the A-10 was “deemed unsurvivable in the 1980s” just shows the lack of familiarity with what upgrades have been done to the jet since then. I honestly think that many of the “pundits” commenting on the A-10 think that all she does is employ the same tactics, with the same suites and weapons as she did in 1984. While we’re still VERY good at those tactics, the envelope, effectiveness, and survivability has grown exponentially since then. If you want an interesting read, check out Douglas Campbell’s book, “The A-10 and the Close Air Support Debate.” There are passages and quotes in there from the 1980s that I swore were date-stamped 2013 the last time we had this discussion.
Carrol makes the point that you can’t have an air threat and do CAS— I agree. In fact, that’s written in the JPUB. I do NOT agree that you need a limited MANPAD or even SAM threat, particularly when you’re talking about what would REALISTICALLY be associated with front-line units in a CAS fight.
Carrol and Herzinger both hint at the cynical nature of this original discussion— a desperate long-ball to try to affect a final solution on the A-10. That knife kind of cuts both ways when you’re offering it to someone else, and you kind of get caught talking out of both sides of your mouth. “Hey, this jet isn’t good enough for us, but I think it’s just what YOU need in the same fight that I just said it wouldn’t be able to fight!”
WTF?
Let me close with this (the old man will stop yelling at clouds for the day). There are a lot of people with a lot of opinions about the A-10 who don’t have the familiarity with what the airframe can actually do. I’m reminded of a story from about ten years ago when a VERY senior civilian DoD member who was actively advocating for the divestiture of the A-10 was given a tour by one of the Hog units. Upon learning about the defensive capabilities of the Hog, this VERY senior civilian was shocked—this person had no idea about what upgrades and capabilities the aircraft actually possessed. And yet here that person was repeatedly professing the lack of survivability of the aircraft, advocating for a solution without being given the full information.
We just shook our heads then as we do now.
If you know, you know.