pcola

I'm starting to think Buddy Spike must be trolling us here. I've got plenty of time in both, single-seat jets and multi-engine heavies. That experience tells me that just because a jet designed for one pilot can be flown well in an emergency situation doesn't mean a multi-engine heavy can also be flown well by a crew of one in an emergency. A compound emergency in dogshit weather and congested airspace with an incapacitated pilot (under this proposed single-pilot construct)? Recipe for disaster, and as many here have pointed out, AI has a lot of growing up to do before the FAA and Airline execs are willing to assume that much risk betting on automation to save the day. Sent from my iPad using Baseops Network Forums

I have 4 new sets I could send you if you still need it. No need to worry about reimbursement. Someone passed it down like 8 sets to me years ago and for some reason I still have it. I can swing for the price of the stamp. PM me your address... Sent from my iPad using Baseops Network Forums

Agree with this sentiment. Why should it be assumed that the AF can't compete financially with airline salaries? Given the relatively small percentage of mil personnel that are pilots, it would seem that even huge bonuses should constitute a relatively small percentage of DOD $. Take a look at some of the unique medical bonuses and then ask yourself why the AF/DOD/Congress refuses to entertain the idea that its pilot force is as worthy of receiving competitive compensation. Sent from my iPad using Baseops Network Forums

Ouch. Damn dude, nobody's making you read that shit. Just move along. And BTW, it was quite concise given the complexity of the topic. Back to my beer...

Yup. Ours is a Paragon Theater Pop 16oz. http://www.paragonpop.com/paragon-theater-pop.html Pricey ($1400), but I can attest that it gets used and abused, all day, 5 days a week minimum, and has held up like a champ. Another bonus is that you can get replacement parts from them if you need them, and repairs are pretty straightforward (they're simple machines.) Go with one of these if you can swing it.

I really don't want to further derail this otherwise constructive thread, so I'll attempt to offer a few concise points to clarify your confusion on my position (I can see why there is confusion based upon my hasty/incomplete argument in the earlier post.) However, I'm not going to attempt to convince you that I'm right or you're wrong. If anyone would like to further discuss the merits of our military objectives pertaining to VEOs, we can start a new thread or take it offline. With that said, for clarity, what I said in my earlier post was "If the DOD wants to get serious about remaining ready for the future threats posed by the "4+1" it needs to seriously reconsider its objectives as related to dealing with VEOs." I added the bold parts to highlight what was apparently too subtle of a distinction. Yes, I do not believe that "defeat," in a traditional military sense, of the ideology that fuels VEOs is possible given our current pol/strat limitations. Our current NMS clearly states that our objective is to "Disrupt, Degrade, and Defeat VEOs." This aim of "defeat" is what, IMHO, needs to be reconsidered. After reading several of the COIN classics (Galula, Nagl...) and a great newer perspective by Emile Simpson (War From the Ground Up), I became convinced that attempting to defeat the VEO threat requires dismantling and replacing the ideology that supports them. This is not in the US's best interest, for reasons which I believe are beginning to manifest in our USAF (see previous post.) Another great book is Out of the Mountains by David Kilcullen. This read convinced me that this IW fight against non-state actors is the most likely fight of the future. Some of the threats will be from current or new VEOs, while others may be proxy battles with organizations placed, instigated, or supported by nation-state opponents (the 4). Regardless, we need to continue to be able to deter, deny, and defeat state adversaries, while being able to economically wage war against these current or pop-up non-state actors. Expending the vast amount of resources that we do in seeking the holy grail of making these +1 threats "go away" is a losing strategy. So yes, we need to admit that we cannot (and should not) attempt to achieve the defeat of VEOs. Given enough freedom to act, budget, and will, do I think that the US mil could defeat ISIS or AQI or any other single entity? Yes - but that is irrelevant because another similar threat is certain to rise from the ashes. I think a strategy of containment is more feasible. Think whack-a-mole, but where our main effort is weighted towards slowing the rate of mole pop-ups and rapidly thumping it back into its hole, vs chasing it into its hole to root it out and exterminate it. Slowing the rate of mole pop-ups is a job for the D, I and E. The M can Disrupt and Degrade...no problem, but Defeating an ideology is a sucker's bet. Shit, I already wrote much more than I intended, and still have a hopelessly incomplete argument, but I think you can at least see my position, even if you don't agree. My apologies for the sidetrack, back to your regular scheduled "the CSAF is out to fuck us" programming... And also, while I'm here (and on topic), I got to hear a 4-star member of the JCS speak this morning, and he shared some of his thoughts on the retention crisis and this upcoming meeting (won't say who it was because of the nature of the non-attribution setting in which he was speaking.) Anyway, I got the distinct impression that this upcoming meeting is also desired by the "airline execs" as well. Apparently they are also concerned about their pilot shortage and want to work with the Service Chiefs to develop a joint solution to a national problem. Not sure if that changes much. For me, I still think the AF's problem is more internal than external. And yes, TankerToad, I get it, airline hiring obviously has a direct impact on AF retention efforts. That is basic economics. However, from anecdotal stories I've heard (tons of them) the dudes that used to stay did so because they enjoyed the AF lifestyle and they loved flying AF iron. It seems to me that the AF is doing its best to piss away that one advantage that we had over the private sector. What, in the current environment, is going to make guys pass up the airline opportunity now that AF morale is low and AL opportunities are high? If morale is key to retaining folks during times of AL hiring surges, how do we improve morale in the environment which is so strained as a result of this draining war?

It seems to me like the ATP requirement should actually work in the Air Force's favor. As many have pointed out, the new rules pose a prohibitively high cost of entry into the professional flying community. In theory, this should help the AF's recruitment effort. Judging by this assessment: it would seem that the best path for anybody seriously considering a professional pilot career is through the military. Also, it seems that an experienced (10-year) military pilot is always going to be highly competitive for the major airline jobs. This would indicate that even if the ATP rules were relaxed, allowing the market to become flooded with a legit civilian pilot pipeline, the experienced mil guys/gals transitioning from AD would still remain highly qualified even in a competitive job market. Ultimately, the only solution to the AF problem is internal (or at least resides within the USG.) Relaxing the ATP requirement only serves to reduce the pool of qualified applicants seeking AD military flying jobs, but does little-to-nothing to keep experienced pilots in service on the back end. At the risk of opening a can of worms here, if you ask me, it all boils down to this un-winnable war on VEOs. Allow me to pontificate a bit... Opstempo, morale, toxic leadership, money problems, polarized government and populace - all of these tensions draw (at least in part) from the incredible drain caused by the last 15 years at war. Furthermore, anybody that thinks that these VEOs can be decisively defeated is either disillusioned, ignorant, or just plain stupid. I realize that most will see this sidebar as only being tangentially related at best, but I believe its actually fundamental. The AF is not sinking because of any civilian pilot production capacity issue. The AF is sinking because of a virus which has taken root and festered inside of the conditions created by this un-winnable war. The financial strains drive the requirement for efficiency, yet the security requirements undermine that efficiency. Further, the opstempo drives increased workload for all. This means that we literally have to "do more with less." The toxic leadership results from a culture of refusing to say "no" or "can't" to our civilian political masters. The end result is a force that is stretched thin, past the breaking point, meeting at a juncture with a rebounding economy providing much more tantalizing opportunities for the service's best and brightest. The result is inevitable, a hollow force. If the DOD wants to get serious about remaining ready for the future threats posed by the "4+1" it needs to seriously reconsider its objectives as related to dealing with VEOs. OK, rant off. BL, I agree with the majority that the CSAF is barking up the wrong tree here, and that gearpig is probably closer to the truth than most would like to believe.

Caught in a landslide Sent from my iPad using Baseops Network Forums

Same. My hours were verified by the recommending instructor. The ARMS printout was sufficient. Sent from my iPad using Baseops Network Forums

Just imagine the condition of the lavs after 20-30 mins of AAR. If you thought that last whale watching tour or deep-sea fishing trip was bad, just wait until 250 people start to get sick from the back end of receiver AAR. I've heard the loads tell some terrible/hilarious stories of sick pax in the back of the C-5 after/during taking gas. Can't imagine that it would be much better in any other jumbo jet.

Bottom of the shredder? Sent from my iPad using Baseops Network Forums

I also thought it was reasonable. I just disagreed with it. Sent from my iPad using Baseops Network Forums

OK, I get it that as a sitting member of a promotion board, you interpret the desires of your superiors and you execute your charge in a way that you judge best materializes those wishes. If you could set that aside for the sake of this discussion, does it not seem absurd that the system is designed to promote the unwilling? Why should we aspire to be led by the unwilling, in any quantity (i.e. even if only one?) You've acknowledged it must've been a huge deal to the letter writer. Would they not become a "bitter" Major? Is disregarding the hugely important wishes of the individual on grounds of principle always the best COA? Again, you reemphasize the relative size of the pool that we are talking about. We agree that we should not promote either. Why would it not be in the best interests of the AF to ensure that outcome, especially considering, as you say, the small portion of the total who are affected? This is where you start to lose me... Are you only concerned with executing what you are "charged with," or are you also moved by your sense of right and wrong? Here, you make it seem like you are concerned with the slippery-slope precedent of allowing a fear of "bitterness" to create a back door to an individual's commitment. Considering your charge of reviewing RECORDS, should this be something board members are concerned with? By your preceding post, I took it (and respected it) that you were obligated to execute your duties as directed, and that your personal opinion was beside the point. This perspective seems to inject your personal opinion as to whether or not an individual should be able to renege on their commitment through a letter to the promotion board. I propose that there should be two distinct considerations. First, the board should be charged with promoting the most qualified individuals. It should be obvious that a person that does not wish to be promoted should be removed from consideration. Second, the law should determine who stays and who goes. If the law dictates that a twice-passed over person gets the boot, then so be it, but this should have no bearing on the potential for the person to be promoted. If there is a concern that twice-passed over officers should not be separated before the end of their obligation, then propose a change to the law.

The first part I can understand...but why on earth would you not give much weight to a do not promote me letter? I would think that a demonstrated unwillingness to perform at the next higher grade would be about the clearest indication of inability to perform at the next higher grade that you could hope for. That's like refusing to accept someone's SIE from UPT; wouldn't happen because it's ridiculous. If a person is telling you that they do not want something, you shouldn't try to force them to take it. Learned that little gem in SAPR training. Sent from my iPad using Baseops Network Forums

As a $25k bonus taker (I had my reasons) I'll be the first to predict that a targeted $35k bonus will cause rates to drop across the board. It won't be enough to keep those that are targeted, and it'll further alienate those deemed not worthy of the raise. I can't believe that they still don't get it. ALL pilot retention is in crisis mode, not just the ones highlighted by the manning spreadsheets. Sent from my iPhone using Baseops Network Forums

Best put by General Mattis: “Be polite, be professional, but have a plan to kill everybody you meet.” Sent from my iPhone using Baseops Network Forums

This. We've already learned this lesson before - during and immediately after Vietnam. Once the drastic (and inexcusable) pilot training shortfalls were brought to light during Vietnam, there was a definite "never again" feeling as the solutions evolved throughout the late '70s and the '80s. Red Flag, and most of the other "flags" are a direct result of the training shortfalls illuminated by the Vietnam war. We've come a long way...but what was the first thing to go when sequestration reared its ugly head? Training. Even Red Flag wasn't off the table when the cuts came. Now we've reached the point of sacrificing the quality of fighter pilot provided to the CAF because that's the best we can do under the current conditions. What a fucking ripoff. Everyone knows that once a new standard is accepted, it becomes the new norm. These cuts in training will be difficult to reverse once they become the accepted standard. We're only a few training cuts away from finding ourselves unprepared for the next war. Yes, I realize that this is a "slippery slope" argument - that doesn't make it any less concerning. It just baffles me that our "highly educated," PME-trained senior leadership is so ignorant of our own history that they've taken this step down the path of repeating our same mistakes.

I've seen on several liberal media outlets that the top google search overnight has been Canadian immigration and that the internet traffic actually took down their website. Trump's election would be a true victory if even half of those Hillary-loving liberal fvcktards actually moved to Canada. Unfortunately, I'm sure that precisely 0 will actually follow through. [emoji631] Sent from my iPad using Baseops Network Forums

True. And further, only if you have the same number of short tours also. Sent from my iPhone using Baseops Network Forums

Was your prior service in the Air Force? If so, did you complete a short tour? If both of those are true, it will count and you need to get it updated in your record. Like Waingro said, a paid voucher will work. There are other methods to get it counted as well, your MPF should be able to help. I was in this situation about 5 years ago. IIRC, if you completed a short tour before commissioning, it may not update your STRD, but it will get you credit for having completed a short tour, which will likely get you off of that non-vol short list. Take a look at AFI 36-2110 for info on short tour credit and STRD. ETA pertinent excerpt from AFI: (emphasis is mine) 3.5.2.2. For prior service personnel who have completed a prior OS short tour, the STRD is either the TAFMSD or date Airman completed the OS short tour, whichever is most recent. If the stop date of a prior service OS short tour is before the adjusted TAFMSD then the OS tour information may be input in the PDS under the OS tour history area for historical purposes, but this data will not adjust the STRD. However, it will it be credited to the short tour counter. The STRD will remain the same as the adjusted TAFMSD if more recent;

Nope, I'd say you've pretty much got it right. Big Blue has a full up viagra induced hard on for school. This is not new. Sent from my iPhone using Baseops Network Forums

List will drop 27 October. Once the declinations are determined, final school assignments will be matched and are slated to be released 8 December Sent from my iPhone using Baseops Network Forums

Well, I wouldn't say "new" password. Sent from my iPad using Baseops Network Forums

Well, it's a good thing you're not a betting man. Betting on a losing cause AFTER the outcome is known is certainly not a winning strategy! From the Washington Post about an hour ago: "The Senate cemented an agreement Wednesday to avoid an Oct. 1 government shutdown after House Republicans allowed a vote on federal aid to address the water crisis in Flint, Mich., removing a major obstacle in negotiations. Senators voted 72-15 to pass a stopgap measure that will keep the government open until Dec. 9, giving appropriators time to pass 2017 spending bills. The measure also provides $1.1 billion in funds to address the Zika virus and $500 million in emergency flood relief." And here I was hoping they'd shut down the gov't and cancel ACSC.

It's ok. Quibbling is the god-given right of all millennials, haven't you heard? Sent from my iPhone using Baseops Network Forums