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Showing content with the highest reputation on 06/22/2017 in Posts
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Where are you and how do I go there? Sent from my iPhone using Tapatalk4 points
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Naw, just come to gunships. Then you don't have to tell your kids you shoveled sh!t in Louisiana ate Doritos 12 hours a day during the great WW Syria . . . It's way more fun when you get to look out the window and watch the cannon fire killing ISIS scumbags. And some of us have 10x the missiles and bombs too!4 points
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3 points
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Valid, I was speaking only of the dudes who signed the early eligible then chose to opt in to the newer bonus. Should have said so. Those guys are rightfully pissed that they have an extra year, which is an arbitrary (but significant) amount of time.2 points
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ViperMan, you're obviously involved, because you're taking it personally. In either case, here's why you're wrong. This isn't people who signed one bonus, and expect another. They signed early, just to get the paperwork done. But other than the amount of money one gets by having their bonus start on time (as opposed to the usual lateness the Air Force demonstrates each year), early signers were doing the AF a favor. It doesn't matter what the contract says. Logic says that the people who HELPED there Air Force by signing early should be taken care of if the bonus goes up. But even more to the point, it's almost laughable that "leaders" who are now publicly begging for solutions to the problem they let fester can't see why this is such a perceived betrayal. It's like there is some sort of competition at the staff level to see how many tone deaf proclamations and policies they can put out. You say you're on your way out. Good. If the Air Force has any chance at all of pulling out of this dive, it's going to need leaders who can actually empathize with the people they claim to want to retain. I'm sure you felt your dissertation was nothing but solid logic and tough love from the top rope. To me it sounded like someone who is way too excited to tell us how stupid and greedy we are. Which, ironically, probably has way more effect on retention than the bonus you're defending. Sent from my Vitamix 450x Professional using Tapatalk2 points
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Fly yourself to karate lessons? Sent from my iPhone using Tapatalk2 points
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I like to be intellectually lazy and frame every problem in terms of race as well as decide that racism is the only possible root cause.2 points
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Hey everyone, I recently became aware of an "issue" that has been making the rounds on Facebook and which is also the subject of a recent JQP post. My response to his article was "detected as spam." So I'm re-posting this here with a desire to see what the BO rank and file thinks of this latest spear from JQ. As follows: JQP, much like the previous article on the Thunderbird mishap, you are way off base. "But things have gotten sideways. The question now on the table is what happens to those who lock in early only to find that the bonus increases in value significantly following year. This year’s ARP package is offering pilots in some career families $35,000/year — 40% more than last year." This is only a question to one of three people: 1. Those who didn't read the offer. 2. Those who read but didn't understand the offer. 3. Those who have an ax to grind and are now choosing to intentionally misread the statement to forward an agenda. 'The guys signing up early took this as a good faith “opt-in” clause indemnifying them against the risk of lost opportunity due to early action. They thought the USAF was saying “don’t worry … if we offer more next year, we’ll let you opt in at the higher amount.”' I'm sorry, but if anyone thought that, then they didn't read (or understand) the offer. It is CRYSTAL clear in the message that the offer would extended to those contracted pilots 'to sign a NEW CONTRACT worth the higher bonus amount AND/OR longer contract length, in the event...' This statement can mean one of three things: 1. (AND) The AF will let you sign up for a higher bonus AND a longer contract term. 2. (OR) The AF will let you sign up for a higher bonus amount OR a longer contract term, but not both. 3. (AND/OR) The AF will let you sign up for whatever terms they come up with for the next years' bonus; higher amounts, different contract lengths, etc, because they don't know what they will be (i.e $25K for 7 years; $40K for 8 years; $50K for 13 years, etc.). 4. (NEITHER) Keep the bonus you already signed and STFU. Of course, it's advantageous for the complainants to go with option 2a, just take more money and run, but unfortunately, not even a 3rd grade reading is admissible for those who are disinterested. Notice also, that the message specifically references LONGER contract lengths - not SHORTER ones. Hmm. "They were, it now appears, wrong to place that much faith in the service. What those officers are being told when they try to opt in is that if they want the higher bonus payouts, they must commit to an additional year of service commitment. They’ll get five bonus payments but be expected to serve six additional years." Just like everyone else in the Air Force would have to. Jeez, why not back-date the $35K bonus to those who signed up 4 years ago? 6? 9? As you go down that argument trail, hopefully you can begin to see the absurdity of the position which holds that the ones who signed up last year should get something for nothing. That said, philosophically, I agree that if the "bonus" goes up, everyone one who's on it should be given the increased amount - unfortunately, that's not what the agreement says or how it reads. "Finally, and most interestingly, this instruction did not exist when the FY16 early takers made their decisions. It was published months later, in October. The rules governing their opt-in decisions should not spring from this DO DI, but whatever rule was in effect at the time they signed. If no rule existed addressing this situation, they’re entitled to the plain language in their agreements, which would allow them to opt-in without any additional service commitment." Ummm, no, the plain-language interpretation decidedly DOES NOT allow them to pick and choose the terms of the new contract. "They can’t claim a lack of bargaining power constrained them from a fair deal in FY16 ARP negotiations. Nor can they claim the USAF engaged in fraud. There is a clause containing sufficient vagary to portend the mess that has ensued, and they knew or should have known that opting in would come with additional requirements of some sort." Finally, an accurate statement. Seriously, no, seriously - what is vague about the FY16 offer? It is perfectly clear to me and I'm no lawyer. "And just to be clear, this cohort has pretty much no legal leverage. There’s nothing that will invalidate their old contracts and there’s nothing making them enter new ones. They are all bound by their original agreements unless they’re willing to be coerced into new ones." Except for the same leverage I had, which was to not sign the bonus; they made choices. What is the problem? "This is a moral issue. Playing shell games will forfeit the goodwill Gen. Golden and his team have worked to rebuild over the past year. That would be truly unfortunate." No. Just, no. This barely rises to the level of ethics. And if it did, it's not unethical on part of the AF. The only unethical thing I see going on is intentional misinterpretation of the offer and an attempt to exploit an AF that's in a bad situation. "It would be a shame if this turned into yet another social media campaign to interest legislators in an issue that commanders and senior staff should be able to handle tomorrow morning with a 5-minute meeting and some clear direction." Nice veiled threat. Good thing is that most legislators are lawyers by trade and will instantly recognize that this is a baseless complaint. I like to point out problems the AF has as well, and I appreciate some of the work you do, but this is a non-issue, and detracts from actual issues that the AF is suffering from. I hope these folks do take this to the legislature and come away with egg on their faces. ViperMan Anyway, I'd like to know what you all think.1 point
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So, here's a post: "The issue still remains though that the extra year wasn't in the original contract and was added by a DODI that came out in Oct 16 after all of us signed." So they literally changed the deal after these people already signed up, correct? How is that ok?1 point
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I don't, because I passed on it. Nor do I have anything to do with its implementation/creation. Fine if I don't make sense. It was a post slightly out of context because it was a point-by-point response to claims that JQ threw out there to serve what I think is a convenient narrative (and allows him to bitch). So WTF do you think "and/or" means? IMO it means that the AF, when they figure out what the fvcking bonus terms will be during the next FY, will let those takers "sign a new contract" (just like they wrote in black and white). I mean if the USAF was just going to up the money for previous-year bonus takers they could have just written down such a simple concept, right? Something to the effect of "if you sign this early-take bonus agreement (FY16) and the monetary value increases on future-year ARP offers (FY17, 18, 19, ...) during the duration of your incurred ADSC, your payment will increase to the new, higher limit, with no additional incurred ADSC. We want to thank you for your service.", would have done the trick - the thing is, they didn't write it like that. But now there's a fvcking Facebook campaign to somehow posture as if it did. My malfunction is with the invalid narrative that I see routinely pumped from JQP. I DGAF about 80% of what he pushes out there, but every now and then there is a topic that I know something about, and also happens to be completely off base. He runs with BS and plenty of folks scarf it up because it feeds their anger. There are plenty of reasons to bitch about $hit the AF does - I just don't see this as one of them.1 point
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Vance 17-11 2x U-28 4x F-16 2x C-130 1x A-10 5x C-17 4x KC-135 1x RC-135 2x FAIP 1x F-15C 1x F-15E1 point
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Not at the pace things are going this week for the A/A game in Syria! If this keeps up, everyone over there will have about 15 kills by the end of the summer.1 point
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Yea it says the pilot is from OK, but how is he doing? (slowly walks out of the room)1 point
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Guard/Prior Interview/Selected: October 2016 Sent Package to NGB: Jan 2017 Approved by NGB: June 2017 OTS: September 2017 CSO: February 2018 I know I'm going the NAV route but I am excited I finally got my Dates!!1 point
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You must be a real hit at parties... Sent from my iPhone using Baseops Network Forums1 point
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You've obviously forgoten about the memo that says we can roll up our sleeves now.1 point
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An excellent answer to continue the deserved praise for the details you provided. I left the GH 8+ years ago and was there when the program was just about to "normalize" and all the old crusty guys there told me very similar but smaller scale anecdotes to why things were the way they were in the program. My line has always been the AF just took the test aircraft and called it good, never developing a real platform. Classic min run but ends up costing a bajillion more than necessary if you did the development & acquisition right in the first place. A good idea, a long endurance unmanned platform to compliment not replace the U-2 and provide a virtual satellite in essence for other missions, BACN being a great example of what it can / should do in addition to doing a certain type ISR. As I didn't actually fly it, the emotional connection is not there but overall my experience was positive and no hate for the RPA. It is definitely not glamorous or particularly exciting usually but important to do well as others may depend or use what you deliver for missions where friendlies are in harm's way. Have pride Global Chicken drivers but don't expect envy or many people to be interested in what you do... ever... not a cutdown, just the truth.1 point
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A valid question; here's my opinion based on my involvement as an AF O-6 at NSA working airborne programs for the Asst Dep Director for Operations, Military Affairs and post- retirement as a civilian in OSD (DARO, OUSD/ISR, and NIMA/NGA)at the time The answer is that in the very early 90s, Bill Lynn, the Director of DARPA (actually named "ARPA" at that point but returned to its original title of "DARPA" later in the 90s), and Bill Perry, the DepSecDef (not sure if they were in those exact positions in the very beginning, but by mid-90s they were) believed that unmanned aircraft had the potential to revolutionize airborne operations, starting with ISR, by reducing personal exposure to threats, enabling extended ISR (long duration ops) and save money by reducing the manpower costs in the systems. Additionally, they believed that a new acquisition concept called the Advanced Concept Technology Demonstration (ACTD) could speed up the introduction of new systems from the current (in the 90s) and painful 15-20 years. The idea was to marry up the contractor side and the government side early in the development cycle to better work out operational issues while designing the vehicles (sounds good...didn't work!). They married the two ideas and DARPA initiated the High Altitude Endurance (HAE) and Medium Altitude Endurance (MAE) programs in 1994. The HAE program envisioned two platforms; a high altitude "U-2-like" vehicle and a smaller low observable, craft for better penetration of highly defended areas, referred to as "tier 2+ and "Tier 3-" in their concept terminology. The MAE program started with an existing much less capable unmanned RPA called the "Gnat", built by General Atomics for another purpose. You'll note here that this effort was a DARPA technology development effort, not an acquisition effort responding to an approved DoD mission need. In fact, the Air Force was not particularly enamored with the idea of unmanned mission aircraft and did not support the effort; there was no AF money or manning in the POM to support it. In fact the HAE program plan itself says there is only one required outcome...and let me quote from the ARPA 6 Oct 1994 ver 1.0 HAE CONOP..."A dominant objective of the HAE UAV program is to obtain the maximum capability possible for a set, non-waiverable Unit Flyaway Price (UFP); accordingly, while there are performance objectives, the only requirement that must be met is the UFP." In other words, it doesn't have to do anything except fly, hold a camera, and cost less that $10 million a copy; no operational needs have to be satisfied. To many in the system, the real effort was for DARPA to develop the new acquisition concept, using the HAE and MAE as exemplars. The AF eventually got the aircraft because the outcome of an ACTD was to be either: 1) a failed program, so cancel it, 2) showed promise, so move on and correct issues, or 3) Provide program residuals to the eventual user (AF in this case) for them to decide to either keep and operate or dump. The ARPA and SECDEF seniors decided it flew, collected something, and (sort of) met the UFP goal (at about $15.5 each), so they chose option 3 and passed it all to the AF (both HAE and MAE, although the DarkStar segment of HAE was cancelled after it crashed on flight 2. Why they kept it was the usual case of political and industrial influence, I guess. Some of us suggested the best course of action was to dump the Global Hawk because it met few operational needs, would cost too much to upgrade (if it could ever be upgraded...too little space, too little power, too little payload), and met few of the original desired capabilities, We felt it would be cheaper to take the money and start with a clean sheet design, using the knowledge gained to drive the new (unmanned) platform (which we referred to as "Global Truck"). The estimated $200-400 million extra was consider too much money by leadership, so we stay on the "cheap" track...which I suspect has cost us an extra $5-8 Billion by now (just my guess). As for the ACTD experiment, it hit a few bumps, too. When the Predator program was turned over to the AF and told to operate it, they found the DARPA program provided no money or manpower in the DoD budget to do so, no tech data was ever developed for the Service (it was all contractor proprietary) so they couldn't fix it, no ground control systems built except the contractor's test stuff so they couldn't deploy or fly it fly, No additional money was provided by DoD or Congress to the AF so the AF started a program called "Predator 911" to find money (to operate and buy support) and manpower, and facilities, "robbing" it from the current and future years budgets, causing major disruptions for years. As for GH, the idea of killing the U-2 and replacing it with the GH didn't float either, because the GH had practically no operational capability as delivered and it took a decade to develop the RQ-4B with more capability and slightly better sensors. So, that's why we have it! BTW, as far as Perry and Lynn were concerned, the success of unmanned systems since then probably indicates their vision was a success, and I can't really argue that they'd be wrong. Its all in your perspective.1 point
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The 138th seems to have a bunch of class A's. Sent from my SAMSUNG-SM-G530AZ using Baseops Network Forums mobile app-1 points