Clark Griswold

5.7 billion for a wall that directly protects the security and sovereignty of ‘Merica vs 15 billion for what exactly in continuing the Syrian mission? 45 billion per year for Afghanistan? X billions per year deterring aggression for Germany with the 4th largest economy in the world? Spending a modest amount to keep out illegal aliens (some from hostile nations and/or members of TNCOs) is well worth it Sent from my iPhone using Tapatalk

Light a candle or curse the darkness We should look at what has worked before if we are unable to make what we have now work Sell the bonds, reopen the gubmint Sent from my iPhone using Tapatalk

That could be true... From CNN: Sell Wall Bonds Who would set the coupon/maturity for this bond?

First one accepted: https://www.thedrive.com/the-war-zone/25896/usaf-finally-accepts-its-first-kc-46a-tanker-but-the-design-still-needs-years-worth-of-fixes

To be honest, not to my knowledge. The military value/effect of first wave heavy strike would likely matter more than the political/psychological effect. I hear your point but I don't think he built his entire argument on that foundation, maybe half the house but not all of it. I agree with him that a change in force structure and organizational core function focus, etc. is needed but can't follow him on his dismissive view of "short range fighters". A reasonable change not a radical one would be prudent, exactly what that is is the 69 billion dollar question. Yeah, I would agree with that idea, that Deep Strike is independent for the most part of support for the entirety or at least majority of its mission and that it is done before Air Superiority/Threat Suppression is complete. As to lingering in a non-permissive, agree again with you that it is not part of the classic conception of deep strike but methinks it will become part of deep strike & aerial interdiction as some/more strategic/theater (AI or DAS type targets) will be mobile, have decoys and be harder to detect in the peer/near peer fights in the future. Lingering will be required sometimes to find-fix-finish a mobile/evading target, be cued from another platform/sensor or re-attack immediately. Not saying this will be a preferred tactic just that I think it will be required as the targets/threats will present themselves for short windows of opportunity.

Yeah, I'm sure he comes to the table with biases as we all do but I would not completely discount his point. Bio and background info I found on Hendrix to give more context to his article and point: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Henry_J._Hendrix https://www.cnas.org/people/dr-jerry-hendrix Classic argument of airpower, destroy his fieled forces vs. his centers of gravity. Tactical vs. Strategic. I would argue it is possible to do both simultaneously with the right mix of sensors/networks/platforms/weapons now. Deep Strike vs Air Superiority is false choice but his point has more merit than we in the current incarnation of the AF might want to admit. Our enemies have built themselves to defeat us as we are now, a change of course may be necessary in force structure. Makes the enemy spread himself too thin: By attacking or presenting the capability to attack both levels of targets simultaneously we will force the enemy to spread his AF/IADS/A2AD resources allowing for greater possibilities of exploiting a gap or weak point in his forward or rear defenses. A significant Deep Strike capability allows for this ability to "prep the battlefield" by forcing the enemy to posture himself in a way we prefer before we go offensive. We may have to: A peer adversary would never let us fight how we have been fighting over the past 30 years in conventional conflicts with steady build up of nearby MOBs to be followed by a massive air campaign ala Desert Storm, Allied Force, etc... with strike assets supplied and enabled close to the target areas...long range, deep strike with as little strategic or tactical telegraphing as possible maybe the only possibility in conventional peer force on force conflicts in the future with the expanding capabilities of the latest A2AD systems and the inherent deterrent effect of holding all of the enemies targets at risk, not just his forward deployed forces. More done per sortie, capabilities per sortie not possible except in a bigger platform: Another potential advantages of Deep Strike assets vs. Tactical Strike assets and thus an argument to increase their share as portion of the force is their range/persistence/payload inherent in a larger platform. A platform able to linger while searching or waiting to be cued from the network or a partner's sensor, deliver more PGMs over one mission and not require as many (or possibly any) support events (AR, EW support) factor towards the Deep Strike, IMHO. Hard first hit stops an aggressor before the fight gets out of hand: Deep Strike capable assets whether used Strategically or Tactically could deliver an unexpected bloody nose that might stop a fight before it starts also. If in one night, X-hundreds of targets are struck and even if the enemy could still fight, his leadership might give pause... That was just a list of what I think supports part of Hendrix's argument (that Deep Strike is more important than the AF has valued it of late) but I'm not 100% on board with his idea that that should be the focus of the AF either. But in practical terms, buy more B-21s, retire the B-52 & B-1to afford it and consider a survivable, reduced signature stand off arsenal platform to round out Deep Strike capabilities.

Related to the topic of this thread (organizational cultural decline & rot) but worth a read: https://www.nationalreview.com/magazine/2019/01/28/how-the-air-force-lost-its-way/

2 What’s so less dangerous about a single engine fighter flying around with thousands of lbs of JP-8, munitions AND hydrazine (a super toxic/energetic fuel) Not worried about leaking JP-8 getting lit off Air Force One movie style by a missile shot after it dropped off a rack at FL450 / 500 true Sent from my iPhone using Tapatalk

I thought I could keep my doctor too but turns out not everything they say is true - as long as he sticks to the core principles of that argument from his campaign - actually trying to secure the border, enforce our immigration laws, not allowing our country to taken advantage of from specious asylum claims and removing illegal aliens with a priority on violent ones I can live with footing that bill Sent from my iPhone using Tapatalk

For what? Why is the only perceived possible future for us one where the bullshit status quo continues, that we can’t address our problems? Sent from my iPhone using Tapatalk

Yup but it's not done anymore. The country is no longer to able to generate the levels of consensus necessary for the Federal government to function as it is currently structured. If we didn't try to do everything at the national level it would not be as big of a problem. Now the Federal budget is not the end all be all of the status of our national civic health, but it is a good bellwether. As to the Dreamers, the memories of President Regan's amnesty in 86 and the unkept promise of border security / immigration enforcement are not forgotten. They have to go first IMO (Dems, leftists, etc...) if they want any sort of permanent legal status for DACA recipients; give us at least 2 years of wall construction, heavy surge in deportations (focused on dangerous illegal aliens first), prosecution of employers who use illegal alien labor and English as an the official language of the USA and the Nationalists/Conservatives will reciprocate in kind... if it were me as leader of the Nationalists/Conservatives following that downpayment by the other side I would offer legal status first for the DACA recipients and then a medium term visa to green card status for the 20 million illegal aliens in the USA now, all of 'em, no path to citizenship at first but at a later state following other give and take transactions. The next big step would be IMO would be a program to allow a path to citizenship for the illegal immigrant population in the USA over a 20 year period but the concession would be a 20 year pause to legal immigration, end to birthright citizenship and an end to chain migration. Legal immigration is about 1 million a year so over 20 years, legalization of the existing illegal immigration would be about a wash over the 20 year period. This would allow enough time to release the pressure slowly not explosively. Harmony can be had thru give and take but both sides have to be willing to give big to get big. If not, this article by Jessie Kelly on the end of the USA becomes more and more possible: https://thefederalist.com/2018/04/10/time-united-states-divorce-things-get-dangerous/

Depends on the practical interpretation of legalization... if you mean pathway to citizenship, no thanks; if you mean a pathway to a green card, maybe... There is a yuuuuge moral hazard to anything even remotely close to amnesty for illegal aliens being granted citizenship, if said illegal aliens have a sympathetic / no fault reason for being here when they were minors but just because your dad stole a car and gave it to you and you've been driving it thinking it is your own doesn't mean you really own it. The deal that needs to be made between Globalists/Nationalists, Liberals/Conservatives, etc. on the intertwined issues of border security, immigration enforcement, labor market saturation, social services eligibility, employer culpability, political & economic collusion, etc... is one where for every concession to one side is one where the other side gets a concession to a second order effect of the problem/phenomena being acted on... For example(s): Dreamers/DACA - Ok, Leftists get legal status (green cards) for the Dreamers but then Nationalists get strong Voter ID/Voter Integrity laws/systems as the underlying and not unjustified fear is that Leftists are trying to rapidly changing the voting electorate to ensure permanent national dominance by skewering key states in the SW USA overnight with millions of new citizens who can sponsor family based migration to again continue to skewer the electorate rapidly. Mercy & Opportunity given to a vulnerable group, Vigilance & Integrity over the political process to the citizens. Border Security/Wall - Nationalists want a wall/border security to prevent illegal and/or ill-intended crossings and to emphasize sovereignty/security but Liberals/Libertarians want an open/permissive border for humanitarian and economic reasons. Ok, give the Nationalists/Conservatives the border/port/visa security enforcement they want but then give the liberals/libertarians/businesses/politically inclined US states the to ability to sponsor X number of aliens on visas by application and assumption of financial responsibility. What is so damn infuriating to Nationalists/Conservatives is that entities like agri-business, some hi-tech industries, hospitality industries want the cheap labor of large unskilled alien populations with questionable legal status preventing unionization and agitation for better compensation but not the responsibility for inherent costs that that population will bring with them (strain on social services, criminality, disruption of labor markets, etc...). If business want unlimited H1-B visas, sure... they cost 20% per year of the alien's salary in fees to directly fund social programs for American Citizens to address the effect they have on American workers. If your worker overstays his/her visa then no worries, to get them here you posted a 20k bond to cover apprehension and removal for illegal overstay, we'll just give that to whatever local LE agency picks them up and delivers them to ICE. You (individual or US state) sponsor an alien for humanitarian reasons, sure and you fund their needs until they are self-sufficient and if they can provide for themselves, that alien can apply for a green card or citizenship. Security & Sovereignty given to a wary population, Opportunity & Responsibility given and assigned to those so inclined. Other examples are there but this method of honest compromise would be IMO necessary to begin lower the temperature, honestly admit problems/causes/solutions/costs to vexing modern problems and acknowledge (at least) tacitly that our union is not exactly strong but sustainable if we give each other space and some autonomy... blue and red states stop trying to infiltrate, warp and/or displace the economies, culture and populations of each other.

Yup. If money were free flowing, I would want an LO version of the EKA-3B Skywarrior with more capes (A-A and A-G missiles for cross-cue shots, self-defense, ELINT, etc..). As to fighter dudes flying it I guess you mean exclusively, I can see that point but there have to be golden apples to reach for, I'd want it open to all communities. If we want people who think tactically, operationally and when in higher positions take that attitude with them, we need more people to do missions directly performing kinetic ops or directly supporting kinetic ops (beyond traditional AR). As it's A-A role, it would be purely defensive or supporting as an arsenal platform, supporting the strikers and if called for delivering PGMs, just my two cents being a graduate of IFF would not need be a requirement. Just vaporware of a hypothetical medium weight Chinese LO bomber (H-18) but an approximation of what I think this platform would be:

Copy Not saying a middle man LO tanker with a small offload capacity is a great idea but I think it is likely the only financially feasible / lower technical risk option if the joint team decides it needs that kind of AR capability You could build an LO tanker or LO tanker / bomber / arsenal plane from a B-2 / B-21 with an extra 6.9 billion in development costs that would more closely resemble a conventional tanker in offload and station time but I don’t see the money for that but a smaller less ambitious design from something like an A-12 or F-117 stretched model, maybe... Still would be expensive for those LO “tactical “ tanker/bomber/arsenal platform and it would need to be multi-mission as the LO tanker role would diminish as the A2AD area shrinks as the threats are eliminated/suppressed and the conventional tankers can move closer to the FEBA Sent from my iPhone using Tapatalk

On the idea of an LO tanker, does it need to have a long station time/large offload or could it be one AR event on ingress/egress for the strikers? If large offload is not a requirement, enough to be useful but not nearly as much as a conventional tanker then the possibilities for one adapted from an existing LO design open up, IMO. Thinking about 20k-40k offload at 500 NM from its launch or last AR event. Now if it has a low(er) offload capability but LO to get close or inside the WEZ it could be a go between the LO strikers and the conventional tankers in standoff anchor tracks. Two ship of LO tankers doing yo-yo ops to the conventional tanker(s), one ingresses with the strikers, last top off then 1 returns to the anchor, 2 departs for a point in the WEZ or A2AD area for egress and/or to pass ELINT picked up as it orbits.

Agreed. I'm not sure we have the paitience for the way we decide, plan, execute and sustain our engagements in these conflicts to a satisfactory resolution to keep doing them but if we are going to continue to engage in sustained efforts in these failed states, ungoverned areas, insurgencies, etc... we have to do it differently. The modern American military / Federal government is not built to do this: persevere & sustain a long-term foreign policy involving a WOG effort (military, diplomatic, informational, cultural and developmental efforts) that will stretch over many election cycles, at best will take 20+ years to conclude to a state where withdraw can happen without immediate collapse after something better has been won in thousands of TICs, HVI capture/kills, clearing operations, etc... It (the American Military) was built to deter and if necessary win quickly in a X number of major conventional fights with its active forces and generated reserves (if required). We do not have the depth to constantly sustain thru rotation a long-term counter-insurgency, stabilization, rebuild and assistance mission(s) without eroding our force thru repetitive deployments, use of conventional systems ill-suited for low intensity conflicts and with nebulous mission objectives. I've had a similar debate going with a friend who retired recently and we've been arguing over the points made in this article on NR: https://www.nationalreview.com/2018/12/the-frustrating-necessity-of-staying-in-syria-and-afghanistan-explained/ If you accept what the author (David French) proposes in his article, that leaving only allows for the worst elements to return and plot to attack us again and that long-term engagement at whatever level is required (albeit done well) is better than disengagement then we must accomplish these national efforts differently IMHO. As they are not conventional military conflicts / foreign policy challenges they must be planned, resourced, sustained and executed differently than a force-on-force deterrence/contingency scenario. My suggestions would be: - Public agreements made between the major political parties that objectives, strategy and resourcing will span election cycles, regardless of changes in political majorities. The OODA loop at anyone time in these marathons is longer than a Presidential Term and a helluva lot longer than the 2 year House cycle, allow for reassessment at 6 year cycles with the Senate mainly keeping watch and adjusting as required. Not perfect but without some new legal structure/entity at the Federal level, I think it is best we can do. - Make appropriations for these conflicts separate from the NDAA and have a dedicated funding vehicle (tax). It is a particular foreign policy effort of the USA, not the general defense of our sovereignty, interests and allies and should be created, debated and passed/vetoed as such. Multi-year with specific sunset date(s) with an exit plan, policy decisions and resources set aside to allow for withdrawal if not renewed. The funding vehicle is key, the American people should know what the cost monetarily is explicitly and if I were king for a day, I would require the Executive Branch to justify and report on the operation ala the "Why we Fight" movies of WWII at least every year coincidental with the State of the Union address. - Apply legal restrictions on utilization of military members in these operations to prevent abusive over-utilization unless that member requests specifically to return to the operation. This could require the resurrection of the draft, force the creation of bonuses for deployment above the normal limit or some other manpower solution. So be it. If the nation wants a win / better end state in this effort, pay for it in conscripted national service, money for the warfighters or don't do it. This limit would be different for different AFSCs or MOSs and where you actually deploy too, but everyone would be protected ultimately by a limit to spread the effort. - Allow for acquisitions to be performed outside of the regular DoD / Service Component structure and allow the UCC to legally acquire and own systems during these named operations. If CENTCOM wants the LAAR for example but Big Blue doesn't, CENTCOM has its own resources and legal authority to acquire, operate and sustain. This is not to open the floodgates for X number of specialized systems only suitable for X operation, common sense is to be applied but there must be a method better than what we have now (excluding Big Safari) to allow the UCCs to bypass Force Providers if they are intransigent in the face of real operational requirements. Well, I think I'm rant complete with that. Just my hope we do things differently if we want to keep trying to fix likely un-fixable problems.

Not a movie and not the latest TV show but worth watching, Occupied. Just finished season 2 on Netflix. Norwegian TV series on what a "managed" occupation of Norway by Russia due to EU duplicity. Lots of twists, very interesting.

From The Federalist: https://thefederalist.com/2018/12/27/3-questions-ask-next-open-ended-foreign-intervention/ Best summation of what needs to be asked in Congress before the next adventure in failed state x. No good answers no AUMF.

Question for the forum, mainly for the naysayers: If instead of this particular deal (12 aircraft for 1.2 billion) it was 225 aircraft for 15.7 billion at 70 mil a copy, would that change your opinion on acquiring a new 4.5 gen design to replace the old 4th gens on the line? IDK, there's the granular level decision to the exact capabilities that a particular design can bring to the fight and then the higher level strategic decision of what a fleet of aircraft of a particular design can bring to our capability to deliver Airpower in total effect(s). The cost has to be factored as the AF budget is a finite pie, is this a compromise that can get enough good players on the team while saving enough money to get the other players necessary for the team to win? New AWACS, new RIVET series, etc... While a non-LO design but one that probably would have some of the capabilities of 5th Gens (sensor fusion, advanced sensors, advanced datalink, etc...) will have LIMFACs, but coupled that with new weapons (LREW) and then aforementioned mission support platforms that you can afford thru long term strategic savings by paying now to replace legacy iron, is that the better move?

True but does everything need to be Night 1 capable? If the F-35A procurement happens as planned, ultimately we'll have bought 1700+ over the course. At anyone time in the 2020's and beyond, with B-2s, F-22s and the B-21 (eventually), how many LO assets will we need to service those Night 1 targets vs. the opportunity cost / loss by having an almost all LO tactical fleet? Methinks we will have crap ton (LO strikers) but as they are all very expensive, not much of other stuff we need (LAAR, A-X, etc...) It would have costs with it but in my humble internet general's opinion, forgoing the F-15X for the F/A-18 Advanced Capability Hornet while coaxing some allies / partners into purchasing that also for further economies of scale savings (Canada, USN, Aussies, etc...) would have been better and retire the Eagle fleet as these USAF super duper hornets arrive on the ramp. If we decided that an all LO tac fleet (or almost all) was too expensive and we wanted a high / medium / lo mix that is...

But how is Boeing Defense Systems supposed to make up for the write-offs for the KC-46? You're right, the cost is off and my conspiracy tin foil hat side says that money is to shore them up. From the article: What the F-15X doesn't include is a high price. The War Zone has learned that Boeing intends to deliver the F-15X at a flyaway cost well below that of an F-35A—which runs about $95M per copy. And this is not just some attempt to grab business and then deliver an aircraft that costs way more than promised. Our sources tell us that Boeing is willing to put their money where their mouth is via offering the F-15X under a fixed priced contract. In other words, whatever the jets actually end up costing, the Pentagon will pay a fixed price—Boeing would have to eat any overages. Given their experience with the shit sandwich of the the FFP contract of the KC-46 and the teething problems/costs, they were not going to do this on the cheap and needed another cash cow besides the 737 line to fix their bottom line I suspect.

I hear what you are saying but Kurdish independence backed and essentially imposed by the US is a bridge too far. I hate that these loyal allies and decent people in a sea of chaos will not have their own viable nation but by supporting Kurdish independence we are picking a fight with Syria, Iraq, Turkey and Iran. We want out of the ME not further involvement and forging Kurdistan would be a 100 year war.

Agreed, not really close and it was just too obvious to present a coherent front to the world, Allies and Enemies alike. The Globalist Establishment (leftist and neocon alike) just doesn't want to admit it but the effort to force Western forms of government, values and economic systems into areas where there are established and VERY different cultures, customs, norms and attitudes is a failure. These people will work it out based on a multitude of factors and unless we have a direct compelling interest like keeping the flow of commerce in the global commons, defending a strategic ally, directly forestalling / reacting to a humanitarian disaster that will impact us, etc... the bar for long-term engagement with restrictive ROE should be very high. On Syria, end direct action, shift to assist/advise/supply while negotiating the best end state for the Kurds possible with Assad and the Turks. Just being realistic, we are not going to keep X thousands of troops and equipment in "Kurdistan" indefinitely, too much money, political and spiritual cost to the American body politic. On Yemen, stop providing direct support slowly and expand humanitarian aid. Turn a blind eye to the KSA led war as it stymies an ally of Iran. Don't like seeing the people of Yemen caught in the middle but that is the least bad option that we have. On Afghanistan, slowly privatize the war and withdraw uniformed forces then slowly pull the contractors out. Three year process but there is nothing to be gained, won or realized and that should be obvious. Whatever 4 star is in charge over there at the time will tell you the same thing and have been for 15+ years: we're making progress, be patient, just a few more years and we will turn the corner... Arm the hell out of the traditionally non-Taliban tribes in the North, expand airpower to a ridiculous extent over the Afghan AOR to whack a mole even more to forestall a precipitous collapse as we withdraw uniformed forces and leave concentrations of private armies to keep portions of Afghanistan "free" and then declare our military operations complete, fund the remaining factions we like as required to re-establish the pre-911 / pre-invasion Northern Alliance / Taliban split in the country. Best possible outcome. Draw down the Died, build up the 5th fleet and use that as our deterrence presence. Establish new bases in the Southern Med / Eastern Europe (Greece, Romania, Bulgaria) to react quickly to an aggression. Also, deters Russia but could antagonize, difficult needle to thread there. We have things to get ready for on this side of the world, Europe and in the Pacific (Venezuelan collapse, Chinese challenges to FON in the sea lanes, Russian hybrid warfare, etc..) - it is time to disengage greatly from the ME.

Unilaterally withdrawing from Syria may not be the best short term move but it may be the best long term move, not for the fight against ISIS, Al Nusra, Iran / Russia action in the ME, etc... but in the fight against the Swamp, Deep State, Globablists, etc... that the worm has turned and a sizable portion of America thru their elected representation be it in the Legislative or Executive branch is not going resource with blood and treasure endless conflicts that have no readily achievable goals or relevant goals for America, no matter if there are laudable side effects to a Pax America enforced order. Like it or not we have hit the end of our ability to protect X number of others, to deter for X number of others, to fight for X number of others, not really for a lack of material resources but spiritual resources to be willing to do so. Explain in a clear way to the forgotten people of the Rust Belt, Bible Belt, Urban Jungles... that denying victory / deterring Russia, Iran and their proxy Alawite pawn in Syria which has no natural resources we purchase, no strategic role in trade, defense or significant cultural position to America is a reason we should spend 15+ billion a year bombing random jihadis half-way around the world when we have 8,000+ fighting age males massing on our border and demanding entrance or else... explain how this time, this operation will resolve something, will lead to a situation that is marginally better for them or for us, explain how just another 15 billion over there versus spent over here on anything is better... Indeterminate involvement may have some positive effects for others, some are probably worth defending but America's resources are finite. Even though the material cost for this particular operation is / was not onerous per year in the grand scheme of things, the fact that it would be never-ending has caused the American Nationalist movement thru its somewhat brash and inarticulate standard bearer to say no more. No matter if you believe we should be militarily engaged in many places around the world, the fact that 67+ million Americans said no more, should give you pause.

Agree with your sentiment (incredulity that the AF does not view tactical operational leadership as "leadership" per se or a demonstration of ability that is indicative of future leadership potential, that it mistakes management of the day to day and admin of the AF more highly) and that yes men, shoe clerks, some other disparaging epithet, etc... are the impediment to change but in other news water is wet. We know what "the problem" is but it is the questions that arise from "knowing" that are important (IMHO): Is the problem cultural or procedural / structural? Both? If so, then what can be done? By whom? How do you convince an authority that could change / fix the "problem" that: a) the problem exists when the institution is basically functional (engine runs but sometimes backfires and belches smoke but it runs) and symptoms that would be recognized by someone not in the institution exist when it appears from the outside looking in that it works? Planes still fly, missiles are on alert, satellites are controlled, wrenches turn, gates guarded, etc... yeah, stories of cluster-foxes make the news occasionally but to the average citizen, reporter, congressman / staffer... the AF still works seemingly well. How do you transmit your insider perception to someone who could change things but has an outsider perspective? b) if you do get the traction to get the "problem" fixed, can the AF do it in a vacuum or do you need / have to get all the branches fixed? If the AF is changed in a way that is more operationally focused but very different than the way the other 3 branches matriculate their leadership (particularly the officer cadre) will that put the AF at a disadvantage in the arena of Joint Leadership? Will their be enough guys with enough staff experience and rank that the AF would have equal representation? c) if you get the authority to change, do we really know what to do? dog finally catches car and now wtf? We can all rattle off any number of immediate actions but I would guess that those would either be highly specific and limited to the little corner of the AF we are in or too vague to be implemented and have a desired effect institution wide. "Stop all the PC crap", "Focus on the mission", etc... are good ideas but what are they really? Start at the bottom or top? How do you change but are still ready for the call over the number of years it will take? That's a lot questions without a lot of answers / suggestions but the proponents of major change / reform (count me as one fwiw) need to say why we need to change, what we want to change to, how we are going to change and why going thru the pain / cost of changing is worth it. Until then, we're just going to be yelling into the void.