Clark Griswold

Related to the discussion of KC-X/Y/Z Articles on stealth tanker / cargo aircraft... http://www.nridigital.com/global-defence-technology/july-2017.html?wv=s%2FGlobal%20Defence%20Technology%2F3adead8f-dcd8-5ed1-849a-2e4cab33b0ce%2FGDT1707%2Ftankers.html http://www.thedrive.com/the-war-zone/7012/the-air-force-desperately-needs-a-stealth-tanker This discussion and these articles on a more "tactical" tanker raise the philosophical point of what is it exactly or mainly we want our air refueling aircraft to do? To support CAPs near the fight thru LO or some self-protection in an A2AD environment? To get aircraft to the theater with all their associated equipment and manpower in one quick movement? To do conventional AR, strategic alert, cargo movement, aeromedical evacuation, etc... to an acceptable level in one platform with the lowest possible support cost and the right logistical footprint? All of these questions will drive different requirements, designs and costs and I think that they have not been really considered, we just take AR for granted and want it to do what it has been doing for 60+ years but cheaper, more with less and maybe with some new cool stuff. We're stumbling in this next attempt at acquisition / update of a current capability because we haven't really decided what that capability should be in the 21st century.

Just my two cents but I felt a dual buy of KC-30s and KC-46s was actually the right option. Former POTUS and SECDEF didn't think so but it had some merit, IMO... http://blog.al.com/live/2009/08/why_two_tankers_may_be_better.html The conventional arguments against it (fleet commonality, economy of scale, etc..) are great but when you have in reality only one supplier for a type of system, things get FUBAR. Giving Boeing actual competition in the heavy military aircraft market for USAF contracts would probably incentive their behavior / performance in the right direction, they have the US heavy military market cornered and they know it, they need a true competitor to keep them on point.

All the way to the bank I imagine.

707 Tanker Transport from back in the day: https://www.flightglobal.com/FlightPDFArchive/1983/1983 - 1054.PDF http://1000aircraftphotos.com/Contributions/Visschedijk/7288.htm

Airbus spaceplane concept: https://room.eu.com/news/Airbus_Spaceplane_May_Be_the_Future_of_Space_Tourism

Ditto. Thinking a bit on this, SK and POTUS should be as insistent as the Young General and demand removal of all or most of the artillery concentration just north of the DMZ. The DPRK demands the cessation of large scale military activities between the ROK and US forces, ok fine, then you remove every last artillery piece from within 50 nm of the DMZ. Fat chance but it if they want something we get something in return. We focus on the WMD and that's logical but the conventional situation deserves some time on the front burner. - No artillery within 50 nm of the DMZ. - Declaration and decommission of all clandestine tunnels under and thru the DMZ - No formations of troops or vehicles greater than 2,000 and associated vehicles / equipment (brigade size) within 50 nm of the DMZ. No more than 3 at any one time within 50 nm. Just some ideas off the cuff but the point would be to move forces further back so that if the DPRK did or was planning aggression, then the telegraphing actions prior to attack would be more detectable and would lower tension overall. Focusing on WMDs is fine just don't forget about what they have actually used (recently in fact) to attack the ROK and US forces.

Article on effectiveness of a DPRK attack on the ROK. Artillery attack Seoul metropolitan area, logistics required, attrition rates (combat and operational attrition) examined. Long but worth a skim for the big points. http://nautilus.org/napsnet/napsnet-special-reports/mind-the-gap-between-rhetoric-and-reality/ Some highlights: Table 1: Summary of Effects IMPORTANT CAVEATS: 1) No indications there are plans for these events; 2) Assumes most people are at home or in an office i.e. more protection than standing outside in an open field. Scenario Possible Casualties Weapons Surprise Volley (Primarily counter-force i.e. barracks, military bases) ~2,881 initial volley; mainly soldiers 240 MM MRL170 MM KOKSAN Surprise Volley (Countervalue and a-strategic i.e. firing directly into population centers) ~29,661 Civilian; likely~790 Foreign nationals~605 Chinese 240 MM MRL170 MM KOKSAN Counterbattery and counterforcemissions.Very few 240 MM or 170 MM KOKSAN would exist after 1 week. Expect DPRK to lose these weapons at 1%/hour based on historical rates. 467 ROK aircraft; Possibly 1,200 U.S. aircraft 2,660 Main Battle tanks 1,538 Multiple Rocket Launchers Note: These forces already exist on Korea, or come from Guam and from Carrier Strike Groups in international waters. No need to ask third country permission. KPA would likely run out of fuel/ammunition within two weeks. NOTE: another study projects KPA can last up to two months. The point is, once started there is very finite amount of fuel and therefore time left. DPRK needs to drive approximately 2,500 soft-skinned vehicles per day to supply a southward invasion in order to sustain themselves – or spare ROK fuel stores and scavenge from ROK Conventional Artillery Attack of Seoul Here is the summarized table of results and what follows below the table is a more detailed description of deriving these numbers. Table B-1: Conventional Artillery Attack Scenario Possible Casualties Artillery KPA primarily counter-force ~ 2,811 fatalities initial volley.~ 64,000 first day (majority in first three hours)~ 80,000 one week. Very few KOKSAN and 240 MM MRL last more than one week 2/3 of batteries firing max rate for 5 minutes from likely positions between 5 and 10 km north of DMZ and then sustained rate for ½ of batteries for 24 hours. Batteries destroyed by direct, indirect and counter-battery fire at about 1%/hour. Unrealistic assumption of unlimited ammunition and 100% maintenance rate. KPA counter-valueLikely indicates KPA desperation ~29,661 fatalities initial volley.Within the range of a previous study by Bennet, Bruce [20] 2/3 of batteries firing indiscriminately intoSeoulfrom DMZ trace. Most residents at home or office. Lots of data and looks reasonable, well cited. And a Time article on evacuation of non-combatants: http://nation.time.com/2013/04/05/fleeing-imminent-incoming-north-korean-rockets/ There are different accounts of how long the DPRK war machine could operate (fuel, ammunition, attrition absorbance, supplies, etc...) but methinks they could probably operate for a month without resupply from China/Russia. That probably gives the DPRK a few days of advantage (if it generated all of its forces and poured its entire national resources into the attack) before the first waves of the Coalition begin to augment KFOR and begin the push back. Destroy the ports, airfields and basically all telecommunications as you invade SK and you might be able to stymie a data-dependent force with a high logistical footprint.

Ouch. That is why I am not becoming dove on NK but no longer exactly a hawk either. The window for a military solution (pre-emptive first strike followed by regime change and military occupation) is either closed or rapidly closing. The cost is too high in casualties, the military mission risky of expansion involving the PRC and the best outcome is a long term occupation, trillion+ nation building process fraught with known and unknown problems. The conclusion of (occupation/rebuilding) is uncertain and the US is unlikely to ever be thanked for. My humble conclusion is that in starting a new war with NK, there is nothing to be won so why start one. Not respond and win if attacked first but there is nothing to win in first strike. I have no wish to see the NK people further enslaved and used cruelly by a despot and his evil cohorts but ultimately, given our values, the cost and the military facts of the situation, deposing him and company thru an offensive military solution is not a realistic option. But tolerating the current and legacy situation is not an option either, just how to change that is the question hence my belief that it will take something completely different than what we have currently been thinking of for the past decades. Credible conventional military deterrence in theater & Strategic Capability and Retaliation assured against aggression - couple that sword and shield to a new diplomatic effort that proposes partial unification, a formal peace treaty and a trade engagement plan. Everything has built up to a crescendo, the resolution needs to be something other than the first shot fired.

Article from The Atlantic on NK: https://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2017/07/the-worst-problem-on-earth/528717/ BLUF: Four ways to deal with NK (quoted from article) 1. Prevention: A crushing U.S. military strike to eliminate Pyongyang’s arsenals of mass destruction, take out its leadership, and destroy its military. It would end North Korea’s standoff with the United States and South Korea, as well as the Kim dynasty, once and for all. 2. Turning the screws: A limited conventional military attack—or more likely a continuing series of such attacks—using aerial and naval assets, and possibly including narrowly targeted Special Forces operations. These would have to be punishing enough to significantly damage North Korea’s capability—but small enough to avoid being perceived as the beginning of a preventive strike. The goal would be to leave Kim Jong Un in power, but force him to abandon his pursuit of nuclear ICBMs. 3. Decapitation: Removing Kim and his inner circle, most likely by assassination, and replacing the leadership with a more moderate regime willing to open North Korea to the rest of the world. 4. Acceptance: The hardest pill to swallow—acquiescing to Kim’s developing the weapons he wants, while continuing efforts to contain his ambition. Call me naive and crazy but if a military solution is not possible, if a standard diplomatic proposal(s) of sanctions / relief from sanctions are not really breaking the ice then something needs to come from left field and let's face it, the current POTUS is likely the only politician willing / capable of throwing something like that into the ring. What is needed (IMO) is a new option / proposal that: Changes the situation on the ground, gives the NK regime something, the SK government something and the people of Korea something and moves slowly and steadily away from the current situation of cessation of hostilities by armistice rather than treaty, with borders that encourage military tension and lack of robust engagement (economic and cultural). The NK regime has no interest in opening up their nation to the world but we need to have the world believe that the democracies led by the SK & US want to end the Korean situation not just this latest flare up in tensions, peacefully & productively. Therefore, propose not full unification but partial unification, a jointly governed Korean province to replace the DMZ at the 38th parallel with a 25 km area north and south, to be codified in a Korean War peace treaty to replace the 1953 armistice agreement. The new province would have: - No military forces from either North or South stationed in its territory, no heavy military forces within 10 km in the respective sovereign nations of North / South Korea bordering it. Only police with up to light arms from either side are allowed. - UN sponsored stabilization force for 30 years assisting North & South governments, composition to be equally matched by requests from North and South. - No military air traffic allowed over the unified province, civilian traffic allowed only thru dedicated corridors. - Any Korean is allowed to visit and live in the province but no Korean may emigrate to the other Korean nation thru the unified province, integration is the objective. - All international trade and investment in the unified province is tax free of North / South Korean duties for the first 30 years of founding. - North and South Korean leaders would be required once a year to meet physically in the unified province for a summit to plan, negotiate and coordinate. Pie in the sky but something has to change, articles on unification: http://www.newsmax.com/International/north-korea-donald-trump-trump-missile/2017/01/22/id/769850/ https://www.economist.com/blogs/graphicdetail/2016/05/korea-opportunities

True - this could require rapprochement between SK and Japan prior to development but if nothing changes in the overall strategic situation then nothing will ever change. +1 for your idea of no American boots north of the 38th in the event of things going loud/kinetic but it might need to be caveated for no permanent or occupation forces, not sure if the ROK could generate their reserves fast enough to do the job(s) without direct American / Coalition forces, just my guess so worth what you paid for it. Copy and it might be, good stuff on how the Share a Nuke program works with the NATO partners. If really want to send a signal that we are serious, start sending dependents home to the CONUS. Coordinate some evacuation of towns nearest the DMZ, bolster defenses in Seoul (air raid shelters, ROK Army checkpoints, etc...) and deploy more BMD. Then offer a cooling off period followed by no pre-conditioned negotiations with all parties present, they will never agree to certain pre-conditions and neither will we so why keep demanding something we or them will never get.

Another good article from WOR: https://warontherocks.com/2017/08/deterring-north-korea-the-next-nuclear-tailoring-agenda/ Just my two cents but in this one particular security threat to the world, our nation and allies we should carve out an exception to our/their policies and treaty obligations (NPT) and allow for a small scale development and deployment of a limited, regionally aligned and declared tactical nuclear military deterrent. This would be for SK and Japan to organically deter NK. - Delivery systems only built to limited range, in this case about 225 NM to not threaten China. SK would be land based, Japan would build a sea based deterrence system. - Limited deployment, at most, 30 missiles per SK and Japan. - Very limited warhead yield, 5 kiloton maximum yield. Target intention is for deployed formations of conventional forces or static military / industrial installations. - Develop and share Robust Nuclear Earth Penetrator technology for deeply bunkered targets. - Targeting policy of no civilian population centers, only military / political installations. Reduces deterrence capability and could be stymied by human shielding but philosophically it is to be considered a necessary evil with every intention of only holding military targets at risk. - No first strike policy. Reduces deterrence again but a philosophical statement of defensive and deterrent capability only. The Army is already developing Long Range Precision Fires (LRPF) to replace the MGM-140 ATACMS which SK already has, develop a nuclear capable variant with a new small yield warhead and keep the DPRK at bay. If nothing, this will light a fire under China to change the behavior of NK as this would take sometime to develop, train and deploy and the only way for them to stop SK and Japan from attaining a nuclear deterrence capability is to eliminate the reason for their attaining it.

Very true, as Mark Twain said "history doesn't repeat itself but it rhymes"... As in Vietnam, we prosecuted that war for about the first 5 years as we wished it were to be fought rather than how it should be fought, similarly we are doing the same thing, wishing that cutting off the head of the Hydra didn't grow back with two more in its place, but it does... and in reality it is not the head that is the worst problem but the body. The body of foreign fighters and local jihadis comprising the VEOs, the support (tacit or robust) from sympathetic populations in these semi-governed places and while not politically correct but true the tribal and fundamentalistic Islamic denominations (Salafist, Wahbabist, etc...) that provide the cultural and spiritual motivation and justification for jihad as aggressive war and an oppressive state. The Long War is on three fronts: Cultural, Military and Economic. A war of ideas, a war against fascist theocrats and a war to provide something other than jihad as a means to a dignified life in the countries that spawn these cancers.

Strategy is being very, very generous. The obsession / fixation with the tactic of persistent ISR followed by a precision strike against one target(s) exquisitely developed is distracting "leadership" from overall strategy and overall progress (or lack thereof)... if those damn trees were not in the way we could see the forest.

This meme seems appropriate: The big suppliers want big expensive systems and the big support costs associated with it hence encouraging their talking heads to attack.

No doubt but considering the desired objectives/requirements of the LAE I think it is an outside chance at best. It's a good concept and has successful operational use but for a potential USAF LAAR, IMO this how the current line up stacks up: 1 - Scorpion 2 - AT-6B 3 - A-29B 4 - AT-802L

Wanted to circle back to your question and kind of answer it rhetorically. Gonking some on this, dual qualification is thought of in the AF as a one off or seldom thing, usually temporarily but what if it is how we are to build depth and breadth simultaneously? Why not change the paradigm that you are an F-16, MQ-9 or C-130 pilot but a fighter/recon/mobility pilot? That we will accept and encourage pilots on those career tracks to fly and lead in those fields not just in one airframe? This basically obliterates the justification for collateral or additional duties (not necessarily a bad or good thing) but make this part of the Operational or Technical career track. Just initial thoughts on this, assignments would likely be 6 years at one location (could be good or bad), crew position would likely not be reciprocated without formal training (i.e. AC in one is not AC in the other unless single seat but then flight lead in one would not be flight lead in another) and the intention would be for this to be used for SME development, not just in an airframe but a mission set...

Coming from behind (sts)... https://www.dodbuzz.com/2017/07/31/another-light-attack-jet-offering-joins-air-forces-oa-x-fly-off/

Possibly, particularly for an RPA / manned aircraft pairing.

Legit analytical question. My primary response would be a philosophical one, to arrest the drift of the officer cadre to equating the administration and management of the Air Force to their Operational Skill. By having an intense period of focused operational duties, ideally in the first six years or so of an officer's career, it may be possible to inoculate a cohort again queepitis. My secondary response is this could be a legitimate strategy to get Big Blue to acquire programs/systems that they are reluctant to by giving BB a less resource intensive method of having a capability but not being obligated to sustain it like favored or primary capabilities. No - just asking the forum for opinions. I was discussing this with others in another thread and this sidebar topic was going full deflection so I thought moving the discussion to a dedicated thread was better. Copy - being safe and basically capable might be the best COA for the secondary aircraft. If that is the approach, then really what I think it lends itself to is a companion manned aircraft for RPA and staff assignments. The intentions then would be morale, skill maintenance and operational community engagement (rated staff dudes flying with the line enough to remember where they came from and keeping that in their cross check). Agreed and well thought out. This would not be for everyone and not being chosen or not participating (declining an assignment with dual qualification as a duty) could not be viewed or documented as a negative against a member. Thinking a bit on this: Instrument qual would only be required in one aircraft and all instrument events would dual log from aircraft to aircraft. Basic flight events (takeoff, night landing, etc...) could be dual logged. Mission sortie events would be the kicker, RAP count would have to be adjusted in the tables but not so much to be meaningless. Dual qual assignments might require on-premises simulator capability or at a minimum part task trainers.

New thread for the sidebar topic in Track Select and Assignment night threads... Dual qualification, is it time for the USAF to try it with either some test wings with platforms / qualification levels that could support this for operational needs, manning retention/morale, crew force development (varied experience, technical proficiency, expanded talent pool) and efficiency? I put efficiency last as I think that it is probably the last factor that should be considered for a strategy for implementing dual qualification as a semi-general rule than an a seldom or unique policy. Considering what it takes to make and maintain an aviator - aero rating, qualification & certifications, currency, proficiency and eligibility-viability (catch all term for medical qual, security clearance, career profile, etc..) - how could you make this work? Not whether you it is a good idea or not but how could you build the professional community of two MDS's to be realistically viable? IMO there are some compatible pairings: LAAR & RPA, Fighter/Bomber & Aggressor/Trainer, RPA & Companion Training Aircraft (T-6 or a like platform)... All of this dependent on being intentionally and carefully implemented with no hesitation to do things differently than are typically done, like maintaining full MQT in one platform and BMC in another with a spin up if needed to fully generate for the other MDS. Thoughts, comments, jabs, smart a$$ comments requested but come from the perspective that you were at your desk at 1629(L) on Friday and the good idea fairy e-mails you this and you are to brief COAs for this at Monday's stand up and failure / not doing it are not COAs... you have to have some kind of plan.

True - the temptation / habit to build it for everyone and it ends up serving no one is there but there have been times where we got it right My two cents would be for splitting the baby to get Congress to buy this concept - systems built mainly in some states and stationed in others to spread the wealth but keep the execution clean(er) Sent from my iPhone using Tapatalk

Valid but the employment in combat between the two airframes in discussion (a LAAR and an RPA) are engaging in similar missions using similar sensors, could be made to use similar nav / displays (particularly for the pilot), same weapons, etc... If this was done in a non-AF way, with careful thought and strategy, it is my opinion it could work.

Possible but I would at least like the AF to try - an experimental group with a cross section of subjects based on previous flying experience, qualifications, recs, etc... to see if it is viable, how to balance that with real world responsibilities to the customer I don't know Another idea for this (dual qualify) would be do both crew positions in the manned platform require dual quals status? Could you just require the CSO or Pilot to maintain dual qualification not both? Would that be beneficial to the mission, needs of the AF, etc while responsibly managing risk? Sent from my iPhone using Tapatalk

This I am hoping for a Tigershark situation in reverse so Big Blue can grow a brain and buy it also. It may take an FMS sale to spur a domestic buy. Sent from my iPhone using Tapatalk

Valid point(s) but I wonder if the problem is not the concept of dual qual but the current execution / concept of it. We (the USAF) have always executed it as an afterthought or in response to a manning crisis / operational need instead of anticipating it or planning to make it part of our strategy to deliver a Core Function / Mission Set. Flight deck commonality, synchronized and reciprocative training, tactics coordination, etc... these and other factors could be planned in advance to execute dual qual way better than the concept now of marriage to a faithful wife and having a girlfriend on the side... one is suspicious and the other only wants more, there has to be a better way of doing this.