Leaderboard

Chuck, quals....experience, school, only SOS in-Res, others by correspondence. Here's my point and example. I dg'd sos for essentially boozing and going to the gym for 5 weeks. It was a vacation. That meaningless DG essentially set me up for career bullets and perks I earned for nothing special. All I actually learned was why shoe clerks had their well deserved reputation. Going to SOS/ACSC you name it, to be a "leader" is like getting a 4-yr feminist literature degree and thinking you'll be competitive in the workforce. What does this PME education produce? I can't seem to distinguish any of the grads have a greater tactical or strategic viewpoint....nor leadership ability. The leaders the USAF needs do not need school to be USAF leaders.

All these schools, what a waste of time/resources to pull an operator away for a year. We have leadership that can't lead, procure, strategize, manage resources etc. I'd abolish every school we have as they are self-licking ice cream cones of mediocrity.

looks like the chief group meeting is in full swing, patches and sleeves.

The point, in my mind, is not that we shouldn't be educating our current/future senior leaders, but that we are overeducating them, and in the process losing out on experience and operational credibility. It's Friday, so read on if you want a history lesson: - Spaatz (first USAF Chief of Staff): famously despised his time at CGSS/never went to War College . . . yet effectively led the Army Air Forces during WW II (when the AAF peaked at over 2.4 million men). Given his disdain for PME, the fact that they named the officer education center at Maxwell after him is laughable. - Vandenberg (second CSAF): was best educated of the first 5 CSAFs--ACTS, CGSS & War College--but when he taught pursuit at ACTS, he was somehow was incapable of making the case for fighter development during the interwar period. Even though he was a fighter pilot, he de-emphasized fighters as CSAF. He took over from Spaatz as CSAF in 1948--two years before the Korean War. - Twining (CSAF #3): never attended War College, but served as both CSAF and CJCS - White (CSAF #4): also never attended War College - LeMay (CSAF #5): the 3-month ACTS short course (during the '39-'40 academic year) was the only PME he ever attended in his career. Nonetheless managed to build SAC into an impressive war machine between '48 and '57. Ironically, there's a doctrine center at Maxwell named after the guy, even though he never taught or commanded there. None of those individuals, by the way, got any meaningful airpower instruction in their precommissioning sources, and there was no equivalent to ASBC or SOS for any of them. The Air Corps was part of the Army throughout the interwar period when these guys were CGOs, and the Army wasn't all that enthused about preaching the virtues of airpower back then. Now, along the way to earning four stars, our most senior leaders get: 4 years of undergrad precommissioning airpower education/indoctrination, SOS, perhaps 6 months at a WIC, 1 year of IDE, perhaps 1 more year of SAASS, 2.5 months of JPME II, 1 year of SDE, and probably some other fellowships at ivy league schools along the way. It doesn't appear to me that the professionally overeducated crop of senior Air Force leaders is appreciably more competent than the minimally-educated leaders who kicked the snot out of the Axis in WW II and led a much bigger Air Force during the Cold War than exists today. Education is important, but it's pretty clear to me we've gone a bit overboard with the emphasis on education over practical experience. TT

Sad that someone who finished #2 in his class in UPT feels like he "misprioritized" during UPT due to a pt test failure. This is what the USAF focuses on folks. And then wonders why the good people leave.

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I'll get you a hurt feelings report.

I likely worded my argument poorly regarding the educational background of the early USAF leaders. My point, and the intended use of a counterfactual was to suggest that had those leaders spent time in real educational programs instead of PME, maybe one would have emerged to question the legitimacy of area bombing, unescorted bombing, industrial web-theory, etc. In other words, I think less PME, and instead real education, could have been influential. My statement that there was a blind faith in "strategic bombing" was likely hyperbolic. Nevertheless, it took until 1944 for AAF leaders to understand that the trope, "the bomber will get through," was completely wrong. Moreover, despite the fact that leaders adjusted techniques in bombing (see The Science of Bombing by Wakelam), many still adhered to the idea that relentless bombing would break the morale of the German people, which has been shown not to be true (see Rhetoric and Reality in Air Warfare by Tami Biddle Davis). Still, strategic bombing was effective, just not in the way that advocates promised. Adam Tooze's The Wages of Destruction argues this point quite well. BTW, thanks for the suggested reading. I have not read that book, but Ehler's book on the Mediterranean air campaign was fantastic. I mention all of that not to get into a pissing contest either (I, like you, want substantive discussion as well), but to suggest that maybe had some leaders been exposed to a real educational program, where critical thinking was emphasized, they may have had enough exposure to ideas that would cause them to challenge the doctrine of the time. I was fortunate to be selected for SAASS, but I was not the first nor last to attend without going to IDE in-residence. I did get credit for IDE through another program, which likely helped my case. ETA: My omission of history was unintentional. I included the humanities, which history, IMO, is a part.

Been eying this for awhile, wife finally got it for me for our anniversary. Sig Sauer 1911 Emperor Scorpion. First impressions are very good. More to follow.

I get what you're saying, but I think you're missing my point. The men I mentioned were effective as both combat leaders and as organizational leaders of an Air Force that was substantially larger than the one we have today, despite having gotten little in the way of PME. Bottom line, I see no evidence that having those who are being groomed for senior Air Force leadership spend so much of their careers in school (as indicated in my previous post) directly correlates to proportional increases of battlefield effectiveness or at the very least organizational efficiency. To get more academic-like, there's an imbedded counterfactual in your argument--you seem to indicate that: (1) if the functional equivalent of USAFA/AFROTC, ASBC, SOS, JPME II and Air War College had existed before the war (arguably ACSC already existed, in the form of ACTS), and (2) Tooey Spaatz, Hoyt Vandenberg, Nate Twining, Tommy White, Curt LeMay, etc., had the spent more time in those schools, that the Air Force wouldn't have been so bomber-myopic during the Second World War and the early Cold War. In fact, I would say the opposite is true. If they had spent more time getting the HAPDB doctrine preached to them during the interwar years, would they not have been even more misguided? The weird thing is that the first dyed-in-the-wool bomber pilot to become CSAF was John D. Ryan--in 1969. His six predecessors--Spaatz, Vandenberg, Twining, White, LeMay (yes, even including Curt LeMay) and McConnell--started their careers as fighter pilots. All but LeMay were, if anything, more aligned with fighters than bombers throughout the bulk of their respective careers. If they were bomber zealots, even though they came from fighter backgrounds and spent little to no time in PME schools which preached the virtues of strategic bombing, I can only imagine how bomber-focused they would have been in a more fully-articulated interwar airpower PME system. You mention SAASS, which highlights a significant concern about the period of over-professionalization: - Step 1: take your smartest, highest-potential folks from the already-selective IDE pool and put them through an additional year at SAASS (so far so good) - Step 2: pick the smartest/most articulate SAASS students and sponsor them to get their PhDs (taking them out of operations for another three years--not so good). This is done because unwashed non-SAASS grads certainly couldn't teach SAASS students, and surely if a little education is good, then more must certainly be better. - Step 3: send those smart guys to schools that aren't configured to let them get through in 3 years (which describes most civ Ph.D. programs), such that only about half complete their Ph.D. programs on time (oops--our very smartest folks spend up to 5 straight years in school--IDE-SAASS-Civ Ph.D) and now half of them are screwed (five years out of ops/not exactly operationally relevant, yet don't have Ph.D.s in hand, so can't teach at SAASS, as originally intended--really not good) But we have to risk ruining our smartest folks' careers and denying the valuable services they otherwise could be providing to the operational Air Force because having more PME credentials and spending more time in school is magically going to make us smarter than real-world experience. Alternatively, the folks who do get their Ph.D.s in the allotted 3-year timeframe spend most of their careers at Maxwell teaching, rather than leading or serving on senior staffs where they could have value-added operational effects. Education is awesome. The hyper-education I see for our senior leaders, which has second- and third-order effects such as I described above, does more harm than good (IMHO). Not trying to get into a pissing contest, but rather hoping for substantive discussion. I do find it interesting that we're arguing about military history, yet you don't specifically list military history as one of the fields we should be sending folks out to study at civ universities. By the way, the faith in strat bombing wasn't blind, certainly not by the end of the war. You can figure that out by reading (former SAASS instructor) Rob Ehler's book Targeting the Third Reich. Perhaps his book and others like his are being ignored in PME. If so, I really don't know why we have such an extensive PME program. I would say you were very lucky to get a SAASS slot, without having had to attend ACSC beforehand. TT

My bad, my SAPR training and HR CBT are both overdue.

I would kick the kid who said something in the balls. Then I would tell your supervisor you in fact do not have a lease signed and are looking at places, and you will be more than happy to provide a copy of signed lease with date signed if it's a issue. Anyone gives you shit I would march my ass straight to the IG office.

So what I'm hearing you say is you think you have found a place online but you're not quite sure. You have the place reserved but haven't signed the lease. Seems like PTDY is due. Take that shoe clerk!

And this is why we don't have more veterans in politics. We can't even get fellow service members to unite behind them, why would we expect the public to? I've got plenty of pictures in a flight suit wearing unauthorized patches, some from different MDSes (including one wearing the patch of the Canadian JTAC unit that came down to train with us). I can only imagine the vitriol if I were to run for public office. "Look at this jackass, pretending to be a JTAC. His record clearly states he was never a member of an ASOS. And it's a Canadian patch. Why would an American military member side with the Canadians?" No thanks.

Who said the helmet was his or that he took the helmet with him?. My "almost guarantee" is based on the n my experience of going to air shows and exercises and trading patches.

12B is critical, eh? I'll hold my breath waiting for that bonus.

"hey, sir....I know we're in a budget crunch, so I just really wanted to apologize for the $20 million aircraft in the field over there."

Just announced the obvious, Blues will not fly the airshow here this wknd. Prayers for Capt Kuss and his family

If dudes haven't been in AETC and are thinking CAF attached, two different ball games. In AETC an attached guy could fly 2x sometimes 3x per day if they want. And if they don't, they finally have a reason not to get abused by the scheduler. Plus, having a wg level job in AETC gets you the same surf duty title with 69% less work than CAF when it comes promotion time.

Inspections isn't a bad way to go. Take the opportunity to help your wing get rid of queep and the BS that doesn't matter. Make sure the guys at your wing waive the stuff that doesn't help your base or your mission. It's all about "smart compliance" now (meaning you're supposed to actually say "no" to things; that's why it's now called an Effectiveness Inspection vice Compliance). Shoot me a PM with any questions.

I'm doubting he's a Major. The willfull cluelessness, unwillingness to listen to those actually doing the job, beclowning himself on an online forum, vomiting blue koolaid nonsense on officership and being stupid enough to volunteer for RPAs all point to 2 Lt.

What a huge crock. The only thing truthful in this statement is "money in the airlines isn't everything." Which is ironic coming from you. WTF is wrong with someone deciding to go on to a different career path, especially after serving 12 years of his life in honorable military service. I understand you're always ganged up on this forum and thus feel the need to be defensive at every turn, but what is wrong with a guy getting out to earn more money and have a better QOL with his family. He may very well find out that it was a mistake on the outside (and god forbid continue to serve in our guard or reserve force), but shake his hand, or on the message boards of the interwebs version, wish him good luck. He's already made his choice, so no need to tell him what a dumb ass he is for making it. Instead, why not say "thanks for your service, please tell all the kids that you give wings to to fly for the USAF, and I'm sure the guy that gets your spot at IDE will be grateful and kick ass since 99% of us do." That's how you tactfully respond as a leader. Even on the anonymous internet. Not by being a dick. A WG/CC of mine years ago made an 11F who just quit (and not to join the airlines mind you, but just to go AGR) report to his office for a severe ass chewing for being a quitter and effectively gave him a much more foul mouthed version of what you basically just told wolfpack. Then he finished and said, "I want you to go back to the squadron and tell every MFer what just happened here in case any one of them is thinking of quitting." And he did. Immediately. The effect of this crossfit loving 1 star did not go as intended. No one felt threatened. Everyone did though have their "he's a dick" suspicions validated.

fyi....i chose "no" on this. It just wasnt a good move for me....airlines are too much potential

This is simply a preview of what's to come if the AF implements Colonel Abdeen's suggestions to aid pilot retention. See JQP - Internal Email Shows Air Force Pilot Shortage at “CRISIS” Level To quote: – Syllabi: We can NOT shoot for the “Gold-Plated” standard in this period of crisis … what can the squadrons/COCOMs accept as risk if students didn’t receive certain training?

You guessed wrong. I'm nobody particularly special. A late bloomer, actually. Someone who regrets the bad attitude he picked up from the cool kids crowd early in his career. Live and learn. I know, it's shocking to think that one of your own isn't a jaded O-4 who rags on and on about how horrible life is (I mean, the man IS holding us all down with these CBTs, amiright?) while doing better financially than 89% of the rest of the country. This was supposed to be a flying club, wasn't it? That's what the brochure said, IT'S NOT FAIR!!! Don't forget to collect your awesome bro-points on your way out...