Lawman

The Army has been in a come to Jesus scramble thanks to what ISIS did in Mosul with drones. DE and EW are going to be the kings of the day and last I saw they already have a Humvee and Stryker mounted bolt on module testing out in the desert.

In 2 ways. 1 - Citi bank playing Fukfuk games even with the card placed on “mission critical” status. After that long it doesn’t matter, and even when it popped on the 7th Infantry Division bad boy list, didn’t get me paid any faster. 2 - I had thousands of dollars in balances leveraged in top of that on personal credit cards trying to balance all the juggling, awaiting the per diem I wasn’t paid. End total for my TDY was 28 thousand dollars. 18 of that was housing... the other 10 grand was money the Army essentially made me front myself and then not pay back for 2 years after the fact. This is what happens when you jump COCOMs for a WIAS tasking, that your COCOM doesn’t want to support/pay for, and at the end of your TDY the command you were deployed for is discontinued so there is no full bird or chief of staff to get a memo from for whatever shoe says your orders didn’t authorize X/Y/Z. That shit show legitimately made me almost get out of the Army, and it was the most rewarding assignment of my career.

It took me 2 years.... no that wasn’t a typo, Years, to get paid for a 6 month TDY that built a 18k dollar balance on my GTC. This night went across 3 commanders and 2 duty stations. In the end Citi and the govt paid me no interest or any kind of compensation for penalties and interests accrued keeping above water and IG could do absolutely nothing about it. This was literally DFAS and DTS playing “Not my problem call the other guy” for 2 years because of how some F’ing shoe clerk chooses to interpret orders. Citi and the GTC places all of the burden of F ups that are entirely the fault of the bureaucracy on the shoulders of the troops we sent to schools/missions and tell them pay for it via this program. They know it routinely takes months to get people paid, but they are issuing charges and fines like these troops have the money in their pocket the whole time. In doing so citi is making billions (seriously) over the decade long period where they own the contract to facilitate and operate the GTC program. They are nothing more than a predatory lender with connections in congress every time they start to look bad.

But again, what do you want a carrier to do and what is it supposed to bring to a fight. the Brits had 3 classes of Carrier in that near term Falklands conflict. Their “big” Audacious class fleet boats were still in the 50k ton range similar to our Midway boats (the ones that couldn’t embark Tomcat or fully laden A-6s). They were gone, but would have brought a fully capable airborne C2 and long range fighter in the form of Phantom, which would have greatly impacted the Argentines getting anywhere near the fleet compared to an air arm with only light close fight capability. Their intermediate boats of the centaur (which one was at the Falklands but only due to lucky timing) wasn’t big enough to have ever embarked F-4 before it was modified to ski jump, but it still had more room for more airwing than the smaller Invincibles which were barely carriers. Looking at carriers in other nations like the Foch or the Kuznetsov it’s the same old problems. Either they embark small airwings of smaller lighter aircraft because of the smaller ships ability to manage finite room, or they embark a paltry Air wing of large capable fighters (like the Kuznetsov) and usually end up operating those aircraft at much lower weights than their land based cousins so the advantage over VSTOL begins to be nullified. Also the reason everybody wants to talk about the Harriers taking on the Mirage is outside point Defence protection, the Brits didn’t have an airwing that could do much else. They with 2 small carriers and the reinforcements that came off the Atlantic conveyor later lacked anything resembling the kick in the door power needed to take port Stanley direct, which is why they came up with a bold and luckily successful end run around that problem with the Para, Commando, and Marines. If it had been asked to do more with its airwing it simply wouldn’t have been able to generate it while conducting its main role of protecting the staging for the task force. The Argentines didn’t really start hurting the fleet until after the Brits had eroded away its own CAP due to simply not having the airwing for sustained ops. The other thing about it is historic requirement for our force across the globe. If you can find a period where it looks like we won’t need these big boats which are seemingly at the limit with the small fleet we currently have great. Given recent trends and the fact it takes decades now to build a carrier, probably not the safe bet. Small decks would be to Naval planners an augmented addition but to the budget planners would be reason to target the big expensive ships because like Army Brigade types a Brigade is a Brigade and a carrier is a carrier.

You guys are the very specific service. honestly I’m all for anything that keeps smaller (read less capable) carriers out of the structure. It would be the same kind of confused self justification to essentially gut the real capability that the Naval strike arm brings in with a big nuclear carrier. The Midways and other non nuclear carriers did that all through the big money Reagan days. To the people holding the purse strings they don’t want to hear arguments on number of sorties it can make, operational times without refuel, etc, they just see a flat top boat with aircraft on it and think a carrier is a carrier. Never mind you had a couple carriers that would have been bringing F-4s and A-7s instead of Tomcats or fully laden Intruders and calling them equal when it was time to pay for it all. To some an LHA is a “carrier” which is just laughable (unless it’s the America which gets no other option). Small deck boats mixed with big boats just make that way too easy to find ourselves in a similar position to the Brits or French thinking “how did we get here?” People like to point at the Falklands as an arguement that small deck can still do the job. What they ignore about that is had it not been for the Courageous sinking the Belgrano and scaring the Argentine Carrier back into port that task force would have come under a hell of a lot worse than what it saw and wouldn’t have had a counter punch too it. It also would would have gone far differently had a heck of a lot more Strike power had the British had even 1 ship in its fleet comparable to any of our 80k+ ton full size carriers.

I doubt Marine leadership would think any differently than Army leadership when it comes to getting more and employing on a wider envelope when it comes to Aviation. The idea of going to the table to fight for a small deck carrier wouldn’t even rate discussion over spending the time arguing about getting a new rifle or artillery or some other toy for the service chief level people. Kinda like how Army Aviation poured all this money into getting Apache on to Link-16 and putting drones into the Aviation Brigade but there is no way in hell the bullet heads in charge would ever change our ownership model to allow us to actually plan and coordinate and exercise it where it’s at all useful.

Ok? If you were to tell any pointy nose state side aircraft unit go across the worlds largest body of water and not have or want to allocate a tanker chain to tow them across what would they do? If you can get C-12s into Afghanistan without taking them apart and stuffing them into the belly of a C-17, getting the 35 somewhere isn’t the impossibility it’s critics would make this out to be. Park a boat or boats for plane guard if you have to for the CRM aspect, if we needed to put 35B’s on Hawaii or Wake or some other far and away isolated location it’s entirely possible to do it. This isn’t the first aircraft with a set of challenges it’s planners have to work around to make the mission happen. That’s every aircraft. And like I said, it’s not like wing tanks aren’t in the works for approval. For the major part part of the forest being missed through the trees... Critics on this point need to answer what is the more likely scenario where a COCOM is screaming for more into their theatre of responsibility to fight a major peer threat? Is it getting 35Bs to Japan in a NK/China scenario or is it to Hawaii or Wake Island or some other far flung off location in the middle of nowhere to fight a giant ocean borne lizard rising out of the sea? Isolated remote locations outside of exercise participation aren’t necessarily the place I’d want to be generating lines for the ATO out of in a real shooting war.

You can thank congress for folding a 4.5 gen Harrier replacement in with everybody else’s program. No doubt the 35 would have been an entirely different aircraft without that funky VSTOL requirement. That said, the Marines screwed themselves walking away from the Rhino. That left them with no bargining room at the tribal council except, give Lockheed whateve they want because we are all in on 35. Still you can’t seriously say that though better stuff shoulda/coulda/mighthave... from the crowd of AV and F/A guys looking at what the 35B will be in a couple years you’ve gotta admit you are getting a whole lot more plane. Unless you’re a two anchor guy, because then you are getting the shaft.

On the 35B 1. Flight testing for clearance will happen. It’s not like the guys in the VX squadrons are done with the plane. It’s not like they haven’t flown the thing with tanks on and discovered it’s unsafe and needs a redesign. 2. Compare the 35 to the plane the Marines replace with it (Harrier). A clean F-35 without tanks isn’t going to have much issue outranging even a ferry configured AV-8B. 3. https://www.stripes.com/news/16-high-tech-f-35b-stealth-fighters-now-deployed-to-japan-1.498071 the Marines just self deployed to Japan so the idea that it’s stuck in one place until it gets those tanks sounds more like 35 haters talking smack than reality.

With all the new wizzbang actually usable tech from 1960s concepts like laser... How good would these systems have to get before the emphasis on building block ways you guys train on the idea of being able to also reach for the contingent circumstances changed. Every time I see the conversation about the gun in ATA with 35 it’s never really about “when we run out of Missiles” that starts the argument but instead “we forgot it in Vietnam with the F4 and it was terrible.” Is anybody really gonna pretend that the tech of the 60s and the tech of today aren’t light years apart in expected performance? I see the possibility of some ideas like DE based defensive/offensive systems as very quite possibly being the magic auto-kill/auto-defeat god mode in the game we have always dreamed of. Like if tomorrow somebody put a forcefield on the jet that could just absorb a flying telephone pole of death that will absolutely kill you without it... how much time and money would you spend on the contingencies to that system. I’m not gonna speak to the idea “you need to do____” for ATA, I’m just curious what point do you think the hold for old cultural norms would still be overriding reality of what you have. Watching the tech fight the culture has been interesting the last couple years with the rotary wing world in the IR MANPADS game. I can only imagine the same fights are existing in other communities.

We talk amongst ourselves about the procurement nightmare caused by generals coming up with continuously updated lists of must haves.... I can only imagine how much compounded suck you get when you then start mixing countries with very different ideas on how and what their Air Force requirements are.

I wonder how pushed in both offensive and defensive DE weapons are going to change what is important to all of us in the Air. Hard kill is growing into about the only option for the RF field for all us slow low people on the battlefield and DARPA is definitely chasing that dragon. I wonder if similarly that was made, proven, and integrated into the High speed end of the spectrum how much would that change you guys emphasis on this stuff above vs managing and processing the information at your use for the greatest efficiency to inflict maximum destruction on the other guy.

Crazier than the pilots of those jets.... the test pilots for them... “Hey Dave your flying this plane we built in 9 months... take it up and see how many was it tries to kill you, then report back so we can tweek it.”

But we can and should have both discussions. 1. Was his sentencing and trial fair.... no. Seriously guns do not just “go off.” His negligence/stupidity led to that weapon firing same as if he was in a car randomly touching stuff and ran her over. It’s pitiful that wasn’t the standard applies. 2. Sanctuary cities and their contribution to the death of the victim. Zarate wasn’t arrested by SF.... he was in Federal Custody. SF actively extradited him to the city to stand for a 20 year old drug Warrant, they didn’t charge him, and then through policy refused to hold him so he could be returned to Federal Custody. WTFO!? How is the city, and the state not called to task for that by the media. Somehow supporters of these policies or the #resist people against all things Trump seem to be ignoring that fact entirely. If I was the families lawyer I would be naming the city, DAs office, and State in a hell of a civil case for setting the conditions which directly contributed to the victims death.

That writing was in the wall 4 years ago when you could walk around the headquarters of the Strike Wing and they already had posters of it in Phil colors up on the wall.

It’s like if we fully adopt that scenario... ok fine. The tankers and support aircraft (River Joint/Jstars/Etc) have to be LO capable like... yesterday. After all we need them for the scenario of no air superiority and a swath of Red Air that somehow doesn’t have to deal with Blue Air and just gets a free pass at the soft underbelly of the stack.

If they can put Army Rotary Wing in the airspace, they can put a low tech CAS solution in the airspace. And we did....been there, got the T-shirt. Put CAP and SEAD in the air and tell the people that might make things complicated “go ahead bro... we love proving just how good AMRAAM and HARM are.” The authors point reads like an advertisement for more 5th gen solutions to A-10/U-28/Predator problems. We don’t all need to be contingency capable for the knock down fight with the Russians. There was a reason for the Hi-Low mix, and this makes it out like we will completely ignore the Hi part of the equation which when you look at how we supported Raptor and Lightning while wholesale abandoning stuff the 4.5 gen fighters need like the loss of Raven, Weasel, etc we did exactly the opposite.

I don’t think you’re getting my meaning. He never went through the ordeal to become a Non-commission Officer. He was promoted to specialist (E4) a year into captivity. A year after that he was awarded E5 and with it the title of Non-commissioned Officer. He never boarded for it. He never had his points matched to his MOS to meet the promotional requirement. He never did anything to actually earn his stripes except F up, walk away from his post, and get captured. So when I read posts like I did earlier in this thread of “how does a coast guard washout make Sgt in the Army?” I think it’s important to note. He didn’t make crap, the Army and administration made him something for the purpose of his family and his face value. Bergdahl never was and never will be anything but another private.... and he can even claim that with any sense of honor now. Best thing this guy could do is move somewhere remote, get a different hair cut, and never talk about the Army again. Jus wait until our collective short term memory moves on.

Important note... He’s not a Sgt. He never really was a Sgt. He was promoted retroactively and was actually an E-3 when he deserted. But now he’s private again.

So basically learn nothing and repeat the mistake the Marines made on skipping the Super Hornet to wait for 5th gen.... Yeah what could go wrong?

Is that like when weather always seems like it is exactly within the minimums even when you walk back from the aircraft soaked/covered in snow. Gotta love that crap.

Having just come back from the AOR I can tell both of you guys a lot of "wtf?!!" Went on immediately following this event. A lot of stuff and requirements were re-evaluated and/or changed. All and all though Syria is muddy water to say the least. The TAGS/AAGS diagram really doesn't cover the whole picture.

Range with usable load, loiter time, ruggedness to austere field usage, etc. If the point of this whole scenrio was: 1. Display minimal show that the US is in town. 2. Money is tight, do this on the cheap. 3. You need minimal footprint for logistics because where you are going is far more forward than a Bagram or Balad. 4. Have an aircraft you could train the locals to fly while you do mission and support with FMS. For the partner nation it was a question of how do we support operations against targets in a pacific scenario but it works to our what a mole coin game too. How do I take an airfield that can barely be called that in the middle of craptasistan and put enough planes there so as to provide these CAG guys with 3 strike lines on the ATO a night which plane is best suited?" The AT just killed the A-29 and AT-6 when the numbers stacked for comparison. Particularly for persistence with a pod and a useful amount of variable mission packages at ranges away from the MX hub. We were war gaming it against the other 2 options and it just killed them. Scorpion changes the equation a bit because with the added speed maybe you can support from a bigger hub, but if you go look at some of the crazy high side stuff going on in the fight in OIR, getting in the dirt is an expectation you can't get away from. Hell even at Al Asad or Erbil yeah the concrete is well poured, but who is to say there is enough lift in the theatre to support you better than if you were living in the dirt. Africa/PACOM/SouthCOM would be the same kind of problem. We need an aircraft that can be comfortably used in wars we aren't trying to be full might of the US. We've grown entirely too comfortable with the idea there's always a C-17 ring route, you will always live in a CHU, and sustainment is a given because 19 KBR convoys come in and out a day. Take a look at Q-West right now and tell me that logistics and sustainability wouldn't be a primary planning factor for putting a light weight CAS plane over Tal Afar or the Western Syria-Iraq border over speed, sexiness, 2x 34s instead of 4x 114s.

You know I spent 6 months with 2 other AF pilots trying to convince the leadership in the Phil AF that the Air Tractor was the quantifiable better in every catagory that mattered aircraft for their turboprop CAS program. That was in addition to the guys that had been there before us trying to convince them of the same thing. They were hung up on Tacano. And their aversion to the AT came back to the same problem, it wasn't sexy looking and it had the name Tractor. I wonder how much of that same stupidity is coloring our guys opinion of it for the trials.

Comparing artillery effects from pre-1950s to now would be like comparing military effects of strategic bombing from pre jet age to now. The stuff assembled prior to the modern era didn't have anywhere near the lethality of current systems. Also most of those historic numbers of thousands of artillery pieces are inflated with dozens of separate sized field guns, direct fire short range howitzers, carriage guns of modern equivalence, and mobile carriage mortar systems being part of the count. By comparison the Army of today has 2 artillery calibers with 105 and 155 respectively and 3 mortar calibers ranging from 60 to 120. We have simplified to the number of systems most generally effective for their role. So have they. Gone are the super heavy railroad guns etc designed to reduce ground works or entrenched defenses. Gone or replaced with man portable missiles are the field guns like the 75mm or 88mm which was good for a pillbox or tank but not sustained battery fire. Tens of thousands of modern artillery pieces and MLRS pointed at Seoul is a city sitting underneath and umbrella of fire that is the total equivalent of what the Soviets planned to attack across most of Europe with. Look at it this way, throughout the later half of the 20th century air power has carried most of the fight with artillery being left in favor of high mobility and rapid movement by ground forces. Even so, if you could up historical casualty numbers despite the unquestionable increase in effectiveness and depth to attack undefended targets in the enemy's support zone vs artillery working against defended targets and the fact that by eastern doctrine they mass 3x the amount of arty we do by comparison in combined arms maneuver.... Artillery still has air power and even direct combat casualties beat for production of loss in the 20th century. Not by much, but still.