Clark Griswold

Farewell video for the HAF RF-4E

Not a bad article, similar to points made in other articles but cracking the edifice of stagnation, stubbornness, delusion and intransigence will take multiple hammer blows of common sense arguments, data and public humiliation of AF HR management of late. Would have added to his Root Causes: The AF went expensive on the planes, cheap on Airmen; pitting human capitol for machine capitol. An apples for oranges trade that made multiple problems (cultural, force structure, loss of institutional respect/trust, etc...).

Just buy one already AF.

Understood, I was at a Northern Tier base years ago and money would not be enough to go back there, a shit load of money maybe. Ultimately it is time, you're never going to get more of that and I understand the low to negative desire to spend it at a base in the middle of BFE. Concur - push back on the COCOMs on staff requirements and give credit where credit is due. On a related note to, an idea to reward 365s, a volunteer could be rewarded with a follow on already decided, ex: 365 to A-Stan with follow on to Hickam, 365 to the Died with follow on to Peterson, etc... There would have to be a data driven argument to convince the AF of the upside for them versus the current method of 365 requirement matching, this should be a survey project for an AU student...

Another special pay for shitholes for 0 to 3 years, bonus for staying beyond three years. Bottom 1/3rd requested bases get a base pay bonus of 10%. Sign up for a 5 year hitch at Turdshit AFB and get years 4 & 5 with a bonus + 10% base pay. Make the bonus appreciable, at least 6 o 12k per year, with increasing pay for tenure at Base X. Coming at it from a perspective of someone with rug rats, steer money to these bases for great housing-facilities-schools (On base DODS or contract schools if the local schools are abortions or grants for local school improvements if it could be done legally). Not saying this from hate but there could be other incentives to encourage movement at appropriate times rather than stagnation at garden spots. You could require the desirable spots to fill X % of 365s first with some caveats to ensure they get sometime in the sun or beach before a 365 to somewhere not so nice. Less desirable bases would then have at least one attractive amenity (or several if you implement that plus a bonus pay).

Yup - it's still a less than 50% chance IMO that Big Blue will acquire a LAAR but argue in whatever venue you can in the hope (maybe in vain) that the powers that be are listening. Looking back, I think it is legitimate that in the 2003 to 2005 time frame, the USAF should have realized that OEF and then OIF were marathons not sprints and that a new way of delivering Strike / ISR was necessary, a compliment to the existing but limited capability in the Predator and soon in 2007 to be introduced Reaper. So with that, does acquiring a LAAR still make sense? Yes. But why when we have the Reaper FOC and years of successful use with it now doing Persistent ISR w/ Strike Capability? Because the LAAR is going to be doing a different mission than Persistent ISR w/ Strike Capability. This manned asset should not as a rule be tasked with Persistent ISR w/ Strike but primarily light BAI, CAS and the derivative mission(s) of FAC-A & SCAR at appropriate effects required / threat appropriate AORs. The drive / requirement of tactical affordability is driven by the strategic implication of economic exchange in warfare. LAAR will support ground maneuver elements more effectively than tasking a UAV for overwatch, react to pop up TICs thus keeping persistent stare on TOIs to complete their long total missions/efforts and provide a cheaper per hour mission and total cost of ownership than if we expand the RPA fleet to use for these types of missions. As W aptly put it "President George W. Bush famously told four senators that he wasn’t “going to fire a $2 million missile at a $10 empty tent and hit a camel in the butt.” Each CAP costs about $20 million per year and Reapers when you factor in the total system cost about $120 million per tail with at least 170 personnel executing the mission and/or supporting it. It is an asset for a certain type of mission with an expensive but necessary capability, extreme endurance, use it for what it is best for not for what it could possibly but inefficiently do. Use a LAAR for what it was built for and can do inexpensively, on demand light strike, ISR and battlefield coordination. Articles on the subject: https://foreignpolicy.com/2014/10/08/destroying-a-30000-islamic-state-pickup-truck-can-cost-half-a-million-dollars/ https://nation.time.com/2012/02/27/1-the-reaper-revolution-revisited/ https://nation.time.com/2012/02/28/2-the-mq-9s-cost-and-performance/

Really? That's a good sign but as you said it's been 3 years and nada. I wonder if one of the other branches proposed to take over this set of COIN / LIC missions if that would get the AF to shit or get off the pot.

There's a logic to geographic distribution beyond the AvFID focused bases. AFSOC might not be the only place to put them, ACC could get a contingent of the buy. They have a common baseline configuration but each MAJCOM could add their pods & mods as they see fit. ACC could focus on light strike, tactical ISR, FAC-A in conventional operations once the threat is suppressed and AFSOC has the advise and train mission along with SOF support.

A typo Sent from my iPhone using Tapatalk

They want contract A-29 IPs in SA, TX... https://www.jobs.net/jobs/dyncorp/en-us/job/United-States/Instructor-Pilot-A-29-Super-Tuscano-Fighter/J3F2DH652PRCT05GG12/

Yup, completely caught with their pants down, attacking as their diplomatic delegation was enroute and anticipated in NYC. Further on a Korean War / Crisis, the refugee factor: https://foxtrotalpha.jalopnik.com/war-with-north-korea-could-mean-a-refugee-crisis-no-one-1794498603 and another good series of articles from Stratfor, the 3rd & 4th, on how the US/ROK would preemptively strike and how NK would respond: https://www.stratfor.com/analysis/what-us-would-use-strike-north-korea https://www.stratfor.com/article/how-north-korea-would-retaliate

Agree that this (leadership purge will not happen) just my opinion that it likely must.

The answer is one that leadership will likely never accept, they (almost all) must go. At this point the only thing that will save the AF from itself is over a 2 to 3 year process, retiring almost all the GOs, eliminating their enablers in the O5 & O6 ranks and retiring a lot E8 to E9s with a whole sale elimination of many of the civilian deputies in these organizations there for continuity but they just continue the same reign of madness, one shinny penny to the next. Take a page from the corporate world, when a dying once great company makes a turnaround, there is a 99.69% chance it will NOT be with the same management that made a once great company a dying formerly great company.

Saw this one on the early bird today: https://mwi.usma.edu/thunder-run-seoul-assessing-north-koreas-war-plan/ So North Korea is getting frisky again and I doubt it will happen but if NK ever did attack (not just the small provocative attacks from time to time) but a major to the death attack, what would it be? I had read some other hypothetical scenarios if NK ever decided to go for broke and this assessment is similar to those but most assume no Chinese intervention (for the purpose of theorizing) of any kind as all bets are off if they directly intervene, ostensibly for NK. I doubt they would intervene directly (on the ground) but what about in the air, only over NK and in a "defensive" way? From a think tank (Journal of Political Risk): They could assert a no fly zone pretty easily over NK, declaring a buffer zone for their national security and giving NK sanctuary from most air attack (cruise missile and artillery still an option to strike into NK) while not directly getting into the fight but supporting their sometimes useful proxy. NK uses its AF in the opening hours / days to maximize damage and disregarding its attrition by knowing that they won't need it as the PLAAF will keep their skies for them after their AF is gone. NK still loses ultimately (probably) but the regime could remain intact with this kind of assistance. Just thinking outside the lines. So you have a conflict where the enemy has a safe haven from air strike or reprisal (Pakistan, Cambodia, Laos, North Vietnam for a while, etc...) so how do you as a JFACC fight and support when you can only engage the enemy in your territory? Rhetorical and loaded with OPSEC problems question I know but can you just focus on AS / BAI / CAS locally and allow the enemy to attrit himself by relentless attack into your well defended and ready AOR? That does not work from our historical experience usually if our objective is to win (defeating fielded military forces/toppling the enemy political regime) and fighting not to lose is not sustainable ultimately.

Concur.

Agree that Duke Field is a good location but faces problems with range saturation. Even with that factor, being at the hub of all things AFSOC is a must for LAAR. As to Moody, if there is no space there then I would propose Maxwell or an Active Associate unit across town with the AL ANG at KMGM. Could go either way (sts) for Moody ranges to the east or south for Eglin ranges and as the AL ANG is likely to get the F-35, a unique opportunity to train with a 5th gen asset on a regular basis. If LAAR can get out of the chute, a good geographical distribution for valid and political/parochial reasons could help the program fend off efforts to kill it when other programs inevitably go over budget and turn cannibal. I think we mostly consider LAAR in support of SOF ground forces but there has to be role/mission for training with conventional Army/USMC units, what would be an ideal base(s) for training with "Big Army" or USMC?

My musings are based on the observed institutional problems the LAAR is experiencing keeping it stillborn. The RPA community thinks it is encroaching on their mission(s), the Strike/Attack community thinks it is a drain of limited resources and undermines the F-35 and large swaths of the DoD live in the fantasy that we can somehow extract ourselves from Iraq/Syria, Afghanistan, HOA and other theaters and return to preparing only for major conventional warfare, dream on. A LAAR has to have institutional strategy along with meeting an operational need. As it is a capability the majority of the leadership of the AF (military & civilian) are skeptical we need let alone we can afford in terms of money and manpower, it has to quash the arguments against it by thoughtfully designing its force/logistical structure to add value besides inexpensive ISR/Strike. I realize that some of the proposed basing choices might not be the best in terms of QoL (especially Creech, its not Hell but you can see it from there) but considering the time in garrison, not deployed to other swanky destinations, what can it do to win friends and supporters? Offer training synergies and access to capabilities that other FTUs or Centers of other branches might not have regular access to. As to the dual qual I would offer a lot of guys already are dual qualified (ARC pilots who are Commercial/Airline pilots) and that it is possible to maintain proficiency in two MDS's. Is it for everyone? No. Should it be as verboten as it is currently treated in the AF? No. Should it be applied smartly to volunteers and those deemed capable of it? Yes. Also, I didn't imply the MQ-9 is not a full on qual with suggesting that LAAR aircrew could be dual qualified with it. Just my suggestion that the individuals in the community are likely capable of it and the idea should not be taken off the table just because we don't currently do it. As to my statement on CSOs with Commercial Tickets being allowed RPA pilot quals that is my bad as I should have caveated that with either getting an 18X AFSC awarded via equivalent training recognized from their FAA ticket or reversing the policy back to 12U. I have some staff stink on me from a few years back and from that experience of watching the sausage being made I realize that certain programs are always going to be under the gun having to prove their worth while the favored ones can be billions over budget, late, only meet reduced specs and Dad will still make excuses for them. LAAR ain't one those, it is going to have to hustle, eat an excrement sandwich in some areas and still be suspect in the eyes of some. Copy. Off the cuff and this is an honest question - where do you think these planes should be and where should the folks come from? Nothing passive/aggressive but adding more cockpits to fill when the AF is hemorrhaging pilots is another hurdle in this effort to acquire a LAAR and I think that is a legit question to have an answer for when the nay sayers come out after the idea of getting one.

No, they'll do a study and determine that Thule is the best place to put all of them. I think back somewhere in this thread I came up with a list but going for take 2 on this idea: Assume the AF pulls its head out of the rear orifice and buys 125. Assign 15 per regular squadron and the FTU gets 20 so 7 squadrons with even distribution. My humble suggestion would be FTU at Seymour-Johnson for training with the Army at Ft. Bragg and USMC out of Camp Lejune, others in the area but those readily come to mind. Also, probably viable for a Reserve Associate unit and a good location IMO. Regular unit locations and strategy/rationale: AD & Reserve - Moody (FMS customers), Duke (SF community), Whiteman (train with USA/USMC out of Ft. Leavenworth) and DM (train with Ft. Huachuca). ANG - AR ANG at Ft. Smith (allow dual quals with Reaper also recruit CSOs with a Comm Instrument ticket for RPA pilot quals), NM ANG at Kirkland AFB (AFSOC affiliated) and NV ANG at Creech (dual quals again with Reaper also recruit CSOs with a Comm Instrument ticket for RPA pilot quals and supporting JTAC training out of Nellis). If a LAAR ever sees the light of day, having a plan on who is going to fly it and where the planes go along with a good why will help. Again AF, just buy one...

A1 question(s) for you General Chang... is your primary data source to determine this RAW? If I understand it correctly, RAW is just matching AFSCs (from individuals) with billets to determine if they filled. This misses an important point that it does not characterize the duties of the individuals (primarily operational/support vs. administrative) so while you could say MAJCOM X is healthy in AFSC X, Y and Z you would be missing what do these people actually do, to reference the Bobs. Is there any other data point on an individual SURF that could capture this?

Yup - this is probably a moot point for the US and NATO partners as the investments in our PGMs have already been done but the Russians are a different story (concerning their SVP-24 targeting system).

I should have elaborated further on my idea of a "Saturday Night Special" PGM. This would have no sensors on board, just guidance fins, actuators, a radio or IR beacon and command receiver/processor. The guiding platform would monitor the bomb, adjust based on the deviation determined from the beacon and guide to target with the bomb being totally blind/dumb inflight. The releasing platform would probably have to be straight and level till impact with basically uninterrupted updates, like the VB-6 (Allied) or Fritz-X (Axis) guided bombs in WWII, the historical inspiration for a cheap (relatively) remotely guided glide munition. This would all have to be automated for the tolerances required for release in a very tight window, inflight updates and likely could only be used to strike static targets to get to desired CEPs but if you really wanted to get the cost as low as possible, I could see this working, how well is another question.

Copy that and thanks for the reference - had heard/read the idea of this force/organization before but could not reference exactly where. Given where national & international politics is generally heading, the SysAdmin is likely a generation away, if ever. I lean towards favoring it to be formed but with a lot of reservations as I am not for paper tigers conjured up just to show we are doing "something." On the subject of cheaper PGMs, the Russians are trying to build a better mousetrap and may have had some success with their SVP-24 system. Basically, a very accurate (purportedly) automatic bombing system to drop unguided munitions in a very tight and thereby accurate window (3-5m CEP claimed). https://nationalinterest.org/feature/did-russia-really-build-smarter-smart-bomb-15484 As all things on the net, caveat emptor. Gonking on their concept, what if you were able to eliminate some or all of the guidance unit on the munition and only have a kit for flight/glide control to the target with a data link from the platform giving course corrections to put the munition on the DPI? Know your aircraft position down to 0.69 MGRS and release the remotely updated "PGM" during its glide using a cheap(er) beacon on the bomb to gauge its actual performance to the computed solution, adjust as required and then voila, freedom delivered at a lower cost by the minimization of expensive sensors on a one way trip.

AFSOC would be my choice of MAJCOM for a LAAR but I'm referring to the entirety of COIN operations and efforts. We need a new or repurposed USG agency to serve as the lead agency when the USG commits resources, not just military, to a COIN-Recovery-Stabilization-Rebuilding Whole of Government mission. Not quibbling with you but looking at the doctrinal definition of Special Operation: Special operations are operations requiring unique modes of employment, tactical techniques, equipment and training often conducted in hostile, denied, or politically sensitive environments and characterized by one or more of the following: time sensitive, clandestine, low visibility, conducted with and/or through indigenous forces, requiring regional expertise, and/or a high degree of risk. https://doctrine.af.mil/download.jsp?filename=3-05-D02-SOF-Spec-Ops-Defined.pdf LAAR or SCAR may not exactly fit the "special" of Special Ops, it is just that they (the MAJCOM) is just as a community open minded and not threatened by a LAAR to their traditional missions/platforms.