Clark Griswold

Possibly. Discussing this it is easy to get focused on systems (yours truly guilty of that) but this could be more of a doctrine question.

Valid point. Smart kids are working on it: http://www.economist.com/node/21563702 https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/NAVAIR_Spike The cost aspect of using PGMs to strike a couple of dudes in a Hilux gives a light gunship, maybe incorporated into a LAAR platform, legitimacy. Maybe not enough to justify acquisition but a valid reason none the less.

Truth Sent from my iPhone using Tapatalk

Fair enough, disagreement is healthy. When all the talk is only in one direction, we never step back and evolve if appropriate. I think I understand what he is trying to get across with his article on articulating the concept of "Observation" and I echo your point on military academia publishing for fear of perishing, those papers are not always worth it... It should be a one stop shop for ISR, PED, Comm, Light kinetic, etc... and the key is for it to be in one right sized platform that doesn't need AR, doesn't need to be cued from another sensor platform necessarily, has some legs but doesn't try to match an RPA in persistence and can deliver a right sized kinetic effect without putting itself into the WEZ of likely to encountered threats... all this without breaking the bank in operational cost, development risk and acquisition. Commuter turboprop in the 19-30 passenger range or repurposed small MPA would be my suggestion. Keeps cost in the 2k or less per flight hour, acquisition likely in the 25 mil or less range and enough capacity for all the gear without having to finagle it and some room for growth in weight, power required, etc. The distinction has to be made in who is controlling the mission and how big the information loop is, does the ITC need to be in it? Rhetorically asked but I think that is one of the questions inferred by the OP article. Build a family of systems to fight this war Big Blue rather than showing up with hardware too expensive to operate in these persistent, long marathons to keep the barbarians from over running the tenuous at best governments we support, rightly or wrongly. CSAF believes we are in for another 15 years of this, plan accordingly. AT-6B, A-29 or Scorpion for LAAR. OA-X for LASO (Light Attack, Surveillance & Observation). MQ-9 ERs for extreme persistence ISR / surgical strike. Everything can do ISR / Observation, everything can strike, everything is relatively cheap to operate.

Observation not exactly ISR at least not as we have become accustomed to it usually being performed True mult sensor ISR is already deployed but not as an organic part of the ground maneuver element - I think that is what the article in the OP is advocating for and I think should be explored Just because the VDL can link a TOC ISR cell to a mission doesn't mean they should - you become voice directed RPA. Maybe that is a point for the GFC's to fight but if the AF wants this potential mission the argument has to be made and incorporated as doctrine It is not without merit as we face more capable adversaries in non state actors they may challenge our EM capabilities and require us to operate differently Sent from my iPhone using Tapatalk

Yup - don't see that check from Uncle Sugar Daddy anytime soon after whatever foot-in-the mouth moment Duterte has done this week... On the idea of Observation as new or re-discovered skill or art for an OA-X platform... as most great military aircraft are built around the actual weapon or mission system, what would you build a great Observation / Light Strike aircraft around? Ideally, a new EO/IR sensor with a very wide field of view, as that may be a bridge too far since OA-X would have to stay on a tight, modest budget as it is not an F-35... adapt technology currently available but organically operated together on one platform for Observation, ISR and PED seamless between customer and provider... so you need a platform to do carry all that to the high ground, stay there as the company, team, unit, etc... operates and you support... While it is not in production now, for a contract Beech would probably figure out a way to make new ones or used ones like new again, I would suggest a Beech 1900 (C or D model), Algerian AF is already operating them, it has what Boeing is pitching for JSTARS replacement, SWaP-C, size, weight power and cooling. the 1900 would be just the right size, sts. OA-X: Multiple EO/IR sensors with an additional sensor capability for self cross cue. 1 all WX sensor. 2 hard points, MIL STD 1760 bus capability. Hellfire / SDB primary weapons. Lots of radios but keep it real, probably 6 is enough; voice, data and link with BFT. Exploitation capability on board, crew position and dedicated station for keeping score, watching the re-play for advising GFC, if tasked. Built, trained and employed for 6 hour missions, after that replace on station or call in the droids. Algerian AF 1900, this could be a starting point for OA-X: http://defence-blog.com/aviation/photo-of-raytheon-beech-1900d-multi-mission-surveillance-aircraft-by-algerian-air-force.html http://www.jetmods.com/photos_beech1900.html

That blatant? Not in FMS so I have no inside baseball to draw on, 14 mil a copy seemed reasonable but it is not the real number then... On OA-X... found a summary article written on the main offerings, gives some additional details and seems fairly propaganda free, still caveat emptor... https://warisboring.com/the-pentagon-has-two-choices-for-light-attack-planes-2e4306197b1e#.ojts6rihw

Philippines may pick the Super T as a light CAS platform: http://www.janes.com/article/64358/philippines-set-to-re-launch-bid-to-acquire-close-air-support-aircraft The requirements the PI set out favor the Super T, how the hell is it a $140+ billion AF can find 1.2% of its budget to fund a low risk LAAR / OA-29? 100 A-29s at $14 million per tail, conservatively planning $1,000 per flight hour (double the advertised cost) and programming 3,000 hours per tail per year (way more than you would actually fly) would easily cover the acquisition, program stand up, operational utilization, bed down, etc... A 5th gen will cost about $105k+ per flight hour for an OIR type mission. We have to stop taking crazy pills and thinking this is the way to fight these kinds of conflicts.

I have kids but not old enough that this is an issue, if I was giving advice to nieces, nephews, etc... I would still recommend it but I would have to pull no punches on the bullshit and have them decide after hearing my nuanced encouragement. For every emasculating moment of insanity I can usually balance it with a recollection of the thrill of flying military aircraft in actual operations or in some interesting way, along with other actual military activities or duties that gave me pride in service or were just cool. It's math, this graph is how I think about my AD career, at some point I hit the top and no matter how much effort I put in the benefit (personal/professional satisfaction, respect for BB, etc...) just started to taper off... I've been AD and am now Guard, I would tell them do what you can to get a Guard/Reserve slot, then look at AD AF, if you want to be an AF pilot.

This is the AF:

Checking the site they are unfortunately not taking ISTs currently. http://www.noaacorps.noaa.gov/recruiting/interservice.html Basics: O-4 and below with 12 or less years of service, able to complete 20 years of service prior to age 62.

Maybe but for my opinion that approach (restrictive ROE, maybe overly preoccupied with preventing 2/3rd order effects) is not getting us any closer to victory, an acceptable end state, a point where we can call it good, whatever... the problem is that it destroys a drip at a time the enemy's forces not the enemy himself, leaving him to regenerate his attrited forces to fight another day. This approach however is also keeping the shit to shoe level so it is not without some merit, it just doesn't finish the task. Tactical patience seems like dithering. We have to pick a side, arm the F out of them, look the other way when they do unseemly things and just blast through. 2 We're at 60 CAPs and the plan is to go to 90, great. You perform a mission with tactics as part of a strategy to win a war, prosecute a conflict, affect your enemy's behavior, or shape the battlespace; not to do them because that is what we do because that is what we do. The FMV feed has given the illusion of positive action towards victory / an acceptable outcome along with a false sense of control / insight to whatever element is receiving it. We could grow to 1000 CAPs and it would not matter, without the strategy to win or at least get to an acceptable end state, it is holes in the sky followed by whack a mole sometimes. After some X hundreds of good hits, is this really getting us closer to victory? Maybe, but is it fast enough given that militaries are funded by politicians that get swapped out, loose interest, become impatient, don't understand the military situation and might prematurely pull the plug? You bet. Democracies don't fight long frustrating wars / conflicts well usually. They get tired, bored, frustrated and sustaining the political will becomes problematic. We have to be on the march, moving the ball down the field in an easily perceptible manner. Or we have to be mature enough as a country to accept that we are in for probably 20 years of suppressing an insurgency while simultaneously rebuilding a nation that is likely populated by people who DGAF about what we are doing there at best and likely don't actually want us there, not holding breath...

Unfortunately that is likely but one can and must argue for us to remember our roots Centralized planning Decentralized execution The tether that modern links provide has become a chain dragging down our aggressiveness and offensive capability as an AF Sent from my iPhone using Tapatalk

Negatron. OA-X would in my concept be operationally employed not with the tether of VDL or BLOS to a FOB, AOC or other center. It could do that but in intended use, it is focused on supporting and reporting to the ground unit it is supporting, not to the guys watching the feed X miles away. Also, it is not there to conduct persistent stare, that is the role of a RPA, that is an important job but not what OA-X is for, either by design or concept. It's there for "tactical ISR" or Observation along with light strike. On demand or part of the ATO, but there as an aerial scout, operating at the direction of the ground commander and can take a direct tasking but also as an organic part of the mission / unit, taking action independently as part of his role and advising the GC/JTAC for the mission. It could be said the RPAs could do that now, I would argue the OA-X would be better at it for: Concept of Employment, focused on providing Observation and advising as appropriate. Capability of aircraft, more flexible and resilient than an RPA. Physical proximity to the mission leading to overall greater situational awareness. Psychological effect of face to face interaction (if possible) in briefing prior to mission execution. Cost of operation would probably be a quarter of that of an RPA when you factor not just the Air Vehicle but the entire RPA operational structure (LRE, MCE, Reach-back, contingency recovery logistics, etc.) A gun, maybe but the focus IMO needs to be on a PGM delivery. OA-X does not have to be and maybe it should not be an AT-6B, A-29, Scorpion Jet, etc... if you don't deliver direct fire weapons, do you need to pull 6.9 Gs? Probably not and you could carry PGMs that will do the maneuver on the way to the target, not the platform itself. OA-X could be a commuter class turboprop with multiple sensors and a few PGMs, designed and trained for a medium endurance Observation and Light Strike mission.

I am not sure if you can fix the supposed "problems" with the A-10. Deliberately put in quotes as I don't think it has problems, certain limitations like all planes have not problems. I don't think you could modify it or update to address it's alleged "problems" to improve or add capabilities. It is a rock solid design and it's operational record is testament to that but I would add, that times change and that we should not be dedicated to the A-10 but dedicated to the idea of an Attack aircraft. Not a multi role fighter but a dedicated Attack aircraft for the AI and conventional CAS missions. A dedicated Attack aircraft has a unique place in the arsenal of the Air Force and that capability needs to be preserved, not necessarily the aircraft that performs it. I doubt the signature(s) could be reduced significantly, new engines are possible technically but not financially / politically, survivability could be improved but the question of why are you investing in a platform you plan to retire soon becomes difficult to answer, etc. Really, we need to articulate a new mission to put under the Core Function of Global Precision Attack to articulate the ISR / Light Strike mission to answer the CAS challenge you alluded to. It's not exactly CAS but it is not ISR and requires its own MWS probably to effectively and appropriately execute its mission, not an MWS designed for true CAS and not an RPA designed primarily for high persistence ISR. Both are overkill (pardon the pun) at two different ends of the effects / capabilities spectrum, costing too much in money to operate or singularity in design to be necessarily flexible for this fluid mission. OA-X would be assigned this new mission, quick gonk on it and I would offer calling it LASO - Light Attack, Surveillance & Observation. Observation being defined by the OP's War on the Rocks article as basically organic ISR, no PED facility between the aircraft and customer. Different than what an RPA brings by being directly tied to the customer in supplying fires and isr/observation, no middle man (PED or OPS centers) to consult / report to during mission and capable of surveillance but by doctrine not focused on persistent stare but focused ISR, typically in support of on-going ground op:, overwatch, CAS, SCAR, dynamic patrol, etc. Decentralized execution... what a concept. Conventional CAS and AI would remain with the A-10 and eventually the A-X. This follows the hi-lo mix we've pursued with the 15 / 16 and now 22 / 35, a LAAR / A-X is the right COA to deliver effects cost-effectively in the permissive environment and have the higher end platform to perform AI up to the medium threat environment and CAS if necessary in some appropriate way without attriting the force on Night 1.

just my opinion, it is something new, not low threat but not expressly medium or above, it's an unpredictable threat level environment, most of the time the SAFIREs are small arms but there are MANPADS, medium level AAA pieces (57mm and up) that show up occassionally and the big wild cards are the remaining air defense capabilities of the failed or failing state and in the case of Syria, the very serious capes their allies (Russians especially) bring to the AOR the air environment for what's being called the "Grey Zone" conflict, a mixture of not equal parts of war, tension, stabilization, chaos, crime, etc... Is the A-10 the best weapon for CAS? Right now absolutely, but the operational environment can and always changes. In the future maybe not and if we keep intervening in these Grey Zone fights we will likely need an A-X that is built for the unpredictable threat environment, unpredictable required effects delivery all while not punching a hole in the budget stretched thin from the weight of 5th gen acquisitions What I would design for in a X-gen attack aircraft: Reduced signature and self escort / air to air (BVR) defensive capability Networked with integrated sensors for self-cueing, PID Designed around delivering PGMs vice direct fire weapons Long combat radius or endurance with AR flexibility, boom or drogue UAV wingman or drone control from a backseater, a UAV tanker and/or ISR platform like the X-47 the Navy is developing All those capes I just listed would likely make this hypothetical A-X unaffordable in this climate and may be more than is needed right now but considering how this first Grey Zone conflict in Syria is going, I think the argument can be legitimately be made for this type of attack aircraft. Not a pointless effort to do CAS in high threat environment like a mission over Moscow but one where conventional military capabilities and threats are being used by competitors to shape the operational environment, either by denial, intimidation or actual use in limited ways. Even though it was an abortion of an acquisition attempt, the A-12 Avenger II (or an updated version of it) is what I am thinking of for an A-X

Which is surprising as he was an A-10 guy, I realize there is only so much money and there are a helluva lot of mission and requirements to be met but I doubt the A-10 or Attack aircraft capability is the appropriate thing to give up. Having to prioritize and I hate to loose anybody from the team but I would have looked at one of the two non-stealth heavy bombers as who was going to get the ax, admitting the F-35 Golden Calf was just too damn expensive would have further irked Congress and have done no good. Or alternatively if we are talking trades, looking at accepting the risk and curtailing both the B-1 and B-52 while bringing back the F-117 (stored in a condition that allows for restoration to duty) could have been a short - medium turn COA to save money right now to preserve the A-10 / Attack mission and light a fire to get LSR-B done and fielded. Break, Break... From Wikipedia on the Requirements and Context on the YA-10 vs. YA-9, Attack aircraft competition from the 70s... In May 1970, the USAF issued a modified, and much more detailed request for proposals (RFP). The threat of Soviet armored forces and all-weather attack operations had become more serious. Now included in the requirements was that the aircraft would be designed specifically for the 30 mm cannon. The RFP also called for an aircraft with a maximum speed of 460 mph (740 km/h), takeoff distance of 4,000 feet (1,200 m), external load of 16,000 pounds (7,300 kg), 285-mile (460 km) mission radius, and a unit cost of US$1.4 million.[6] Simplicity and low cost were also vital requirements, with a maximum flyaway cost of $1.4 million based on a 600 aircraft production run. Performance was to be sacrificed where necessary to keep development and production costs under control.[7][8] During this time, a separate RFP was released for A-X's 30 mm cannon with requirements for a high rate of fire (4,000 round/minute) and a high muzzle velocity.[9] Six companies submitted proposals to the USAF, with Northrop and Fairchild Republic selected on December 18, 1970 to build prototypes: the YA-9A and YA-10A, respectively. Meanwhile, General Electric and Philco-Ford were selected to build and test GAU-8 cannon prototypes.[10] Looking at that, you can see how they specified requirements and performance necessary to accomplish them, from the FlightGlobal article you originally posted, it seemed low risk, and in production now will have to influence to some degree the A-X requirements that are being written now. Can an existing 4+ gen meet requirements and keep risk low enough to be a viable COA? Taking those two ideas and then marrying them up to the original, disciplined approach to requirements that led to the A-10 and the specific requirement to design that aircraft for a primary weapons system, in the case of the A-X program of the 70's, a 30 mm cannon, can we not take an existing design and modify (albeit with some risk of cost escalation) around a primary weapon / mission system to quickly design, test and field before the moment to get this done passes? What would an attack aircraft, capable of operating / surviving in a medium threat environment, be built around? A highly capable radar, capable for air to air awareness and self-protection (jamming) but also very capable at SAR ground imaging, GMTI, etc. or cross-queuing with an EO/IR or other sensors? All of this data fed to any PGM quickly the pilot selects? A successor to the 30 mm cannon but this time with case-less ammunition and improved ballistics? Just thinking...

nsplayr, did you hear any more details on Scorpion in this testing? Goes without saying, if OPSEC allows... the article says the AF is limiting a fly-off to AT-6B or A-29, the FlightGlobal article said that the AF excluded Scorpion due to still being in development, but that could be changing also... I checked their site and it looks like they have a conforming configuration (guessing that means operational configuration for a notional or as yet undisclosed customer). I have heard the aircraft not having an operational configuration and testing for full integration of sensors and systems was keeping some potential customers from committing, from their timeline, it looks like they will have one in 2016. On AX-2, fielding in under 5 years is aggressive but I think feasible if LO is not required, only signature reduction with robust self defense. Could any of the 4+ gen fighters out there now in production, be modified for better performance as an attack aircraft? Conformal fuel tanks, new engine option (higher bypass ratio) for lower thrust but better mileage, light weight armor & redundant systems for golden bbs, integrated EO sensor to free up a station, etc... A-10 guys, would this be enough for a successor (not a true replacement) for the Hog?

Better late than never. Just give the aircraft/mission to AFSOC (LAAR / COIN), I suspect ACC will make an effort to look interested then sh*t can the idea after a period of time of seeming to look busy at investigating it.

So I read I read your post and (and a few others) that seem to throw heavy guys who tracked T-1 maybe not under the bus but definitely into oncoming traffic, at first I was pissed (not that it matters) but after gonking a bit I realized it is just a reiteration of a theme I have heard before in muted tones, that we are basically inferior as pilots and I will assume that attitude carries over to us as officers as by your anecdotes we're lazy barely trainable retards. I wish to dispel you of that idea. I'm not going to get into a dick measuring contest with you on quals, instructor/evaluator time, chief of shop(s), FTU cadre, air medals (single events or cumulative), times shot at, times actually in danger or all the other shit that goes into a military flying career over multiple operations, AORs and other missions but sufficient to say when I look back at mine and other "fatty" pilots (actually I like that) the idea that we are stupid, lazy ignoramuses is complete bullshit that needs to stop. I realize that the power of that intellectual statement is overwhelming so I will expound... 1- We tracked T-1 because that is how the order of merit at Track Select placed us and some deliberately chose T-1s. Not me, I wanted to 38s but I didn't place high enough so I gratefully took my T-1, worked hard, enjoyed it and look back with pride on what I accomplished. Sometimes when you have a group of really strong, fast runners the difference between first and last is actually not that much, it is just that in that competitive a race, the 0.1 seconds make the difference, it is not that number 3 or 4 are slow or weak it is just that the race was that competitive. 2 - We worked hard in T-1s and accomplished a difficult syllabus that was not spoon fed to us and we were expected to perform, held to high standards and had the motivation to perform well as we all wanted as you said "pick their top choices based off location and lifestyle". If by our T-1 order of merit we were higher ranking, then we got to pick a better assignment, I can only speak for my class and the others I had friends in but no one slowed down because no one wanted to get stuck somewhere they didn't want to be doing something they didn't want to do. That was going to happen to somebody as there are a finite number of the "dream jobs" but everyone I knew worked hard to have the most control over there own fate, we would have greatly have appreciated having a lazy turd in our class to be a target for a less than desirable assignment but alas we all worked hard and hence kept all of our class working hard. They were not allowing T-1s to track bombers when I was going thru (2000 timeframe) but had they been allowing it, I would have worked my ass off for it. I worked hard, didn't get my first choice but not my last either. I look back and realize my job was not glamorous but important to do well, didn't expect a backslapping recognition for doing it as best I could and moved on. If your community (I assume B-1s) didn't get product they were completely happy with don't stereotype us all. It could have been supplied thru a poor selection process, thru a selection process deliberately fed misfit toys to get rid of them or just not taken seriously by the releasing command(s). 3 - We fly aircraft that take airmanship, intelligence and a strong work ethic to learn to operate, manage the missions, lead the crew, support the team and roll with the punches when things go south. This is recognized and why several friends of mine (all T-1 tracked, heavy drivers) have gone on to fly U-2s, attend TPS, flown for the 89th, exchange tours and the like. Yours truly is a mediocre officer and I rate myself average yoke operator but I was cut from the same training cloth as those other heavy guys who have done more than me, the example of what they have done should give people pause before they have someone all figured out.

Maybe but he would probably try something new, see if it worked and if it was worthwhile to pursue further. Experiment and innovate, we have to build better mousetraps not just more expensive ones.

No doubt that there would be some bumps on the way but just because it might be hard doesn't mean it should at least be tried. Maybe just a project and not fielding but think outside the container and do something new and innovative, not just the same old thing. The operational environment is changing, this could be a good place for AMC to start to innovate. Not to be cheesy or naive but this is right in line with what senior leaders have spoken of publicly and I will take them at their word, an AF born in innovation. Maybe and there is likely more operational utility in just having strike aircraft carry more gas than an LO or WEZ penetrating capable taker but we should try to innovate. New technology, tactics and operational concepts will come out of challenging our assumptions. What would Billy do?

Decent chance of that but I am all for wasting money on science projects rather letting it get it spent on some non-mission related bullshit, screw new office furniture and flat screens piled up all over the bases, let's see what we can figure out... Another article quoting the same conversation from this year's AFA on a stealth tanker or tactical tanker: http://www.defensenews.com/articles/air-force-could-pursue-stealthy-penetrating-kc-z-tanker?utm_source=Sailthru&utm_medium=email&utm_campaign=Military EBB 9-21-16&utm_term=Editorial - Military - Early Bird Brief It's probably about 690 times more practical (not necessarily less expensive) to add humpback conformal fuel tanks to the 5th gen fighters we have now and probably not screw up their LO profile like the ones on the Advanced Capability Super Hornet but... Rather than build an LO tanker for the capability of LO AR maybe the goal should be a tanker that could operate towards the end or just inside of the WEZ of a long range SAM with high probability of survival if we actually think we will need that capability... from the article: A KC-Z will likely need to accompany fighter jets and other assets into anti-access, area-denial battlespaces, which means it could incorporate low-observable features. Everhart said he had challenged industry to create a “cloaking device” that would disguise the aircraft’s radar signature and make the tanker appear like a much smaller object. I'm not thinking a cloaking device but a robust set of EW pods on the tanker(s) and data links with other tankers and players to work together to degrade an enemy's EM sensors along possibly with wingman UAVs that could provide more tempting false targets / jamming in the vicinity of the AR track and moving with AR formation as required for ingress, on-station and egress. MALD has an open source endurance listed as 45 minutes, for AR protection it might need to be more than that but if you could put 3 on added hard points on a KC-46 you could conceivably protect a modest AR on station time.

Unfortunately true Just my cynical opinion but leadership uses certain unloved children as bargaining chips Still sucks and not in the good way Sent from my iPhone using Tapatalk