Clark Griswold

So the ship is in SK custody but can a fine be levied against the operator and the company that chartered it? Who could levy it?

Not unlikely but the cure for that is to officially end golden boy / favored son programs / positions (exec and other such suckling jobs) and have the first 6 years or so of everyone’s careers be direct duties performance appraisal with leadership potential only judged around the 8 year point. O-3 and below should be / is focused on operational proficiency / tactical leadership. That has a strong rated view to it as other non rated officers primary function is leadership from the get go but that again leads to separate ratings / promotions for rated and non rated to address that.

F-106 - Project Six Shooter. Skip to the 4:00 mark for the air target tests there and around the 5:30 mark for the shootdown of a MACE drone.

Yup - I am corrected

True and this career path would not be for everyone. If it were CSAF Clark Griswold this program would only be open at the O-4 (selects included) and only based on nomination at the OG/SQ level or possibly by the wisdom of the crowd, allow nominations anonymously of peers that are believed to be the right guy and bypass the filter of the admin/queep/company man filters at various middle levels. Just to home in on one of your comments and to echo it, a strategic leader. That's what I am arguing for, a program/policy to only begin the long process of recruiting and developing a strategic leader vs another company man.

That's the rub, how do you actually execute your reform so you don't open up another can of worms. To reference the example you cited and to expand on the idea of a generalist leader, some part of the career experience would have to be combat operations to lead/command combat operations. Mission commanding combat aviation? Bomber/Fighter/Attack/Strike/EW/ISR with Kinetic Finish/JTAC experience required but that leader also having direct experience in mobility/logistics/cyber/intel is best. Mission commanding cyber operations? Cyber experience required but that leader also having aviation/intel/ndo/space/etc... is best. We should broaden the opportunity for cross flow between career paths for those we believe will be able to use that direct experience and knowledge in likely roles as senior leaders. More opportunities for heavy dudes to flow to bombers/cyber/ndo/etc... (fighters & attack also if it is appropriate and meets the needs of the AF) if said heavy guy is identified and assessed based on his/her operational performance and intellectual capability to be an effective combat leader. Opportunities for fighter/bomber/attack dudes identified as future leaders to flow for an operational assignment to heavies/rpa/isr/cyber/ndo/space without it being a black mark or viewed as a demotion to broaden their experience so as senior leaders, they effectively lead the team in delivering air/space/cyber power. Opportunities for cyber/space/ndo/battlefield airmen to crossflow into aviation/mx/logistics/etc... Right now we have leadership dependent on having a team around them to be the expert in X field to give them advice on how to bring all the elements together to deliver air/space/cyber power. It works but IMO, having a career policy that encourages/guides broadening for those recruited/selected for a leadership path after proving themselves in the first operational community is better.

No doubt that has and continues to happen. The booger fling is a real phenomenon and it is right to beware someone at certain points in their career and they have not attained certain quals/certs as that is possibly indicative of buck passage. My only knowledge of her capability is second hand from when she was being initially discussed as a candidate prior to Fingers, consensus was she was a good egg. My two cents, if the AF was operations / leadership focused vice problem mitigation / management focused, those on the path to leadership would be identified at around the 8-10 year point in their careers, recruited and selected, then sent to other communities to develop a cadre with a broad but not shallow depth of understanding of how air, space and cyber power are delivered for the Joint Force as a total effort. They would say the current AF does this now, not so much IMO.

True but she did start / serve as aircrew and then went on to other domains we operate in, breadth in experience / knowledge is better for overall leadership & management of the institution. Just my two cents but she sounds like what we should be developing for senior leadership. Experience with a broad range of operations versus specialized. The days of the bomber / fighter / pilot only general should be gone. It should be the Operations General with a broad based career to have the 50,000’ view. Said as a proud pilot but we are not the only place in AF where senior leadership should come from

Valid question, what I would say (segueing to a smaller carrier point) is that a small deck carrier is to bring the same (or nearly) capabilities but in smaller amounts (same aircraft but fewer on board probably taking off at lower weights) and at lower costs (acquisition and operation). Won't argue that big carriers, brigades, etc... are valuable (better) for the big fights but they carry their own costs, vulnerabilities in combat (real and budgetary), having a force that has scalable options seems a better fit for the wide security responsibilities the US takes on. NK / China getting frisky? Send two/three Ford Class carriers and the CBGs. Trouble in East Timor or HOA requiring some tactical airpower that's sea based? Send the Agile class (made up) carrier(s) and escorts to thump terrorist base camps / support SOF forces.

History of towing aircraft: http://www.thinkdefence.co.uk/2017/04/history-airborne-aircraft-towing/ B-29 B-50 on a rigid tow boom

Yup - can't argue that VSTOL can give you high flexibility in logistics. Brits were going to use converted cargo ships for RAF Harriers in the Falklands War to augment the RN Sea Harriers. Atlantic Conveyor launched her Harriers prior to being attacked and it was not a bad plan to quickly increase the landing deck capacity of the British Task Force. http://aviationintel.com/sea-basings-ancestor-the-forgotten-commercial-freighter-aircraft-carriers-of-the-falklands-war/ http://www.thinkdefence.co.uk/2012/04/the-atlantic-conveyor-falklands30/ Good points but to home in on one for debate "that small deck can still do the job" - the cost of the small deck is lower, that it really is that several small decks can get the job done (and overall be cheaper than an all big deck nuclear fleet) and then be less expensive to own/operate when you don't have the need to generate / concentrate naval air power, you break down and have an ability to cover a great number of areas Hi / Lo mix - some big decks some little decks (sts)

Copy that. I remember the joys of the Norther Tier in the winter and while it would not be pleasant to be in the exercise, a combined arms LFE would be an important learning opportunity for the joint force. Just after I retire ;-) I kid I kid... Gotcha IDK, VSTOL is impressive but I am just doubtful of it when you look at the cost in dollars and performance over the whole of airpower strategy (be it naval or conventionally land based). Numerous smaller carriers using conventional fixed wing aircraft seems more bang for the buck and less problematic. Don't get me wrong, VSTOL fighters have proven themselves (ref Falklands War) but overall it seems to me like variable sweep wings, cool technology but not worth the trouble in today's operational environment. FA on smaller carriers: https://foxtrotalpha.jalopnik.com/americas-carrier-gap-crisis-highlights-a-need-for-sma-1740644946 ___________________________ More F-35 news: SK may buy another 20 https://www.reuters.com/article/us-southkorea-usa-airforce/south-korea-plans-to-buy-20-additional-f-35-aircraft-report-idUSKBN1EF051?il=0

If the USMC had opt'd for a folding wing C model vice a VSTOL B, do you think they would have pushed for new smaller carriers capable of amphibious ops support (well decks) and CATOBAR air ops?

Picked AL because: -Sen. Richard Shelby (Senate Appropriations Subcommittee for Defense) & Sen. Jeff Sessions (Former member of Senate Armed Services Committee) -Proximity to Eglin/Duke/Hurby/Tyndall for training/testing opportunities with SOF & 4/5 gen assets (Warning Areas over the Gulf are a plus too) -Montgomery's F-16s are nearing the end of their service lives and moving on to the next big thing makes sense versus recap via new 16s or SLEPs Picked WI because: -Speaker Paul Ryan -WI is a state in play and the Rs are fighting hard to keep it red -There are some training opportunities (LFEs) in the Northern Tier CONUS that a 5th gen asset would be nice to have (probably a small consideration but a legitimate point) Can you get a bonus for the 3 years?

Keeping up with F-35 news, Israel is looking at further mods and getting a single example test jet for development: http://www.thedrive.com/the-war-zone/10665/israel-is-getting-a-single-f-35-test-jet-unlike-any-other More fuel, option of overriding ALIS, additional weapons for the internal bays, etc...

Yup - WI was the other state. http://www.af.mil/News/Article-Display/Article/1402425/af-selects-locations-for-next-two-air-national-guard-f-35-bases/ Glad to see the Militia get some new iron.

Well that makes 2. 1) Agreed. I also should have listed current members, recently retired would be a better descriptor of who out of the retiree community we would be looking for. Not recently retired would still be definitely welcome but the recent experience and outlook on the modern AF is being sought specifically. 3) Agreed. Reaching out to Kane of "Bleeding Talent" I think should be seriously considered. I have never attended a course at AU but are there any instructors there who would join or help a serious public argument for reform? 3) The could work. I think there would be several stand out examples that we could frame the distilled ideas around. Like, Capt X was an outstanding officer / aircrew member / etc... but left as his career and personal goals could not be aligned because of this <idea> and identified by our detailed survey of officers & NCOs... The sale would be in providing evidence that agreeing to updating policy x to something else will improve retention, save money, increase morale, increase operational effectiveness, etc... and then how to do it. Basically, the reformers have to do all the work, present a plan(s), argue incessantly to the machine for change. I am thinking AF specific but this might need to be an all branches movement as some of the updates would be statutorily enacted (elimination of up or out for example). Would that be an unmanageable movement or strength in numbers?

Concur. For this to take hold and move forward, I don't know if the retirees pre mid-90's would believe how it has gotten or maybe they would, just don't know as I don't have a lot of contact with retirees from that time. What I am thinking of is a core group of retired officers and senior enlisted members coming together (virtually or IRL) and contributing what they think the "problem" is and then distilling that into a coherent message. When we start to discuss this as current and former members, our experiences and perspectives tend to get us to focus on the specific problems in our operational / support communities. For my two cents, we have to find the motifs running thru all those vignettes and opinions to come up with the overall updates required for the AF in this era. I say updates rather than fixes as I believe the AF is not absolutely fundamentally broken, just needs a major update to work effectively in the modern operational world, the current economy and culture and to fully realize the changes the latest revolutions in tech and evolutions in warfare have brought. Approaching the powers that be with the idea of updates I think extends a more palatable idea for change as we're really talking about convincing politicians, senior civilian officials and AF officers that what they have spent their careers in service to is not fundamentally bad but needs major update. My hope is that if we assemble a large enough chorus for reform, it will be loud enough that it can not be ignored.

Meh - no worries. _________________________ On the idea of a war forcing the institution back to mission focus / operations centric, I think that would apply if a modern, conventional war against a peer foe or a modestly capable foe was going to last for a few years harkening back to WWII / Korea. Just my two cents but in a Taiwan Strait, NK, Baltic Sea / Eastern Ukraine, etc... conflict, hostilities would be over before the evolutionary pressures of a real war with a capable opponent have time to burn thru the institutional processes that create, promote and sustain toxic leaders. Given, that any realistically conceivable major fight would be fought and decided in a matter of weeks, it is even more imperative to have effective capable operationally focused and forged leaders in the Air Force to supply the UCCs with the forces necessary to win the fight and to be ready at anytime. Choir preaching but you see the idea: there will not be enough time to get the guy who should not be there out of the way and bring up the real heavy hitter, against a foe like Russia or China, it will be a done deal by the time the reality demand signal is recognized and reacted to.

Maybe but waiting for that is not an option IMO. Again, I'm not sure the AFA or a sub-organization under it is the right vehicle but if we (those who believe the AF needs a major course correction) do not organize under a banner, communicate clearly and prove to the public and decision makers the problem(s) with viable, feasible, executable reforms offered and defended, then nothing will change. I have no delusions of grandeur nor am I naive to think this would be a sprint to a quick victory, it would be a marathon uphill in a snowstorm but it has to start somewhere. There's more than a few people on this forum I suspect that have access or contact with decision makers (HAF, Congress, Executive Administration, Media, Academia, etc...) and with a strategy, they could fight a good fight in the war for reform. Make a case in the public arena, publish articles, speak to interested media and win converts to the cause. This already being done but it seems to be going nowhere, with the only change of note being the belated and reluctant retirement system reform, nothing is prodding the Air Staff to evolve, something besides JQP and this forum has got to put the status quo on the defensive.

Agreed. The current plight of the AF reminds me of the Upton Sinclair quote: "It is difficult to get a man to understand something, when his salary depends upon his not understanding it." I am convinced that trying moral persuasion on the bureaucracy is impossible as individuals become dependent on it financially and in some ways spiritually (best word I can think of to describe the personal investment of one's prime working years and efforts) to change it as they have spent their working lives building it, maintaining it and defending it on that 20+ year career. I am no different as I just passed year 18 and at peer levels advocated for change, when given the chance by fate honestly spoken my opinion to superiors but not fallen on my sword and just left dropping the mic for effect. The AF is so ossified it will take an outside reformer with enough previous knowledge of its faults and enough authority to enact change but will have to reenter the institution leap frogging all the traps that preclude change. I think AFA is too joined to the AF establishment to be an honest advocate for a reformer, what other organization could AF members, vets, etc... rally under that could seriously garner attention and advocate for a modern Billy Mitchell?

2 I am not sure where the dam breaks but it must. I suspect that a win in the assignment process (pushed to a market driven system where volunteers select and are hired by commanders) is the necessary first step. That could be the first domino to end or massively reduce AFPC, distribute A1 functions to the and under the command of Wings & OGs, etc... the other necessary changes could come afterwards...

Watched a presentation Kane did on his book "Bleeding Talent" at the Hudson Institute on ideas for reform. Disband AFPC, eliminate A1 as a separate directorate, get rid of Up or Out, decentralize the assignment systems and distribute HR functions mostly to Wings/Groups/Squadrons, reform the retirement system (presentation is 2013), tie promotions to some assignments / billets, etc... Not a bad list, keep fighting the good fight

If you opened a new UPT base and co-located it with an ARC RPA unit you probably could get some takers. Fly the UPT line for a few weeks, pick up some orders and direct the droid. Rinse lather repeat. Decent location, civilian flying job and ARC duty in one location and ZERO AF BS when not flying, this could turn out to be a decent deal if done right.

It was this guy