brickhistory

Web photo, not my exact gun. Was able to spend this morning at a range, put 100 rounds of .45ACP through my house gun and 115 rounds through my new carbine. I mainly wanted to ops check both the carbine and the five different clips I'd purchased (one 15 rd mag comes with the gun) - 3 15rd'ers and 2 30 rd'ers. All fed properly and went bang at the appropriate time. The gun was pretty accurate out of the box. As it's cold and I'm getting too old to freeze, I only shot indoors at the 25 yard range. All rounds went through the nine ring. Probably all would go through the 10 ring if I were more proficient. It was a lot of fun to shoot. At .30 cal, there's not a lot of recoil, so a sore shoulder is not an issue like the M1 Garand after a similiar number of trigger pulls. Drawbacks so far - ammo is pretty expensive. Best I have found so far is at Georgia Arms, and even that's $.50 per. Also, after putting those 100+ bullets through, the thing was freakin' hot! Not just really warm, but almost burning skin hot. Gonna pull it apart to clean it and see what's going on inside. I don't recall this being an issue when I had one previously (why, oh why, did I sell that thing?! Dumbass...). Also, it's pretty short for a tall guy. Guess that's why it's called a carbine... Final verdict, as of today, anyway, was it's a fun gun. Able to put out a respectable number of rounds in a short amount of time. Fun to shoot, looks good, a little pricey per trigger pull, however.

I was too slow on the Taurus .45. I consoled myself with a new Auto Ordnance M1 carbine and another .44 special. I'll post on the carbine once I've put some rounds through it. While this is not a historical M1 carbine, it is new which says a lot for me. Looking at the used carbines I could find, there were either really rickety and fairly expensive ($500+) or really nice and really expensive (I found a cherry-looking Rockola, but not for $1,200!). So I have the 1911 .45, an M1 .30-06, and now the M1 carbine .30 cal. I'll call my WWII collection complete if I can get a Thompson and a BAR (ha!).

Anyone owned/shot the Taurus 24/7 OSS in .45ACP? Or the PT845? It fits my hand much better than the XD45 (too narrow) and at $200-ish less expensive, I'm mighty tempted to take a foray into the high-capacity .45 world.

I go off on my own, get stupid drunk for three days AWOL, sober up, come back, tell my tale. Who wouldn't prosecute? I'm a big believer in the simple explanation makes the most sense as you hypothesize. She most likely fucked up, Big Blue made her out to be a hero while embarassing the Krgyz [sic] in getting her out of country ASAP, realizes she has a connection to an up and coming (sts) then three star, decides to cover it up to avoid the public scrutiny. USAF would never do that, would it?

Hey Air Force Times, do that journalism thing.... Oh wait... Upon her next retirement, I see a book deal and maybe a made for TV movie. Oh, and this is unacceptable, Big Blue. Way to uphold honor, integrity, and service before self.

CONUS AAA More CONUS AAA

Back in the good ol' Cold War days, you had a very robust air defense capability in the active duty strangely enough called Air Defense Command (before that it was the Continental Air Defense Command) complete with SAMs (Nike, Nike-Hercules/Nike-Ajax, even some US-based AAA) and interceptors - F-101, F-102, F-106s, Canadian (as part of NORAD before space became a player) with their CF-100s and CF-101s and a hellishly expensive but really amazing for the time radar lines in Canada and the US, off the coasts in picket ships, early AWACS based on the Constellation, and even oil-rig like sea platforms (see Texas Tower 4 for an odd way for USAF dudes to die, RIP). As the threat from Soviet bombers declined, costs from Vietnam and LBJ's "Great Society" escalated, DoD was used, again, to pay for everything else and the budget was cut. One result of that was the air defense mission going completely Guard by the early 1980s. 1st Air Force became the keeper of the airspace and more and more alert positions were eliminated until by 9/11 there were only a handful with birds still on alert. And that mission was for the "threat" coming from outside the ADIZ, not an internal one. So, yes, 9/11 could've happened back in the old days. We weren't watching, nor trained and equipped for an internal air attack as occured that September day. I also think that any self-respecting nation should have a means of protecting its sovereignty, to include airspace defense. Post-9/11, the kneejerk reaction, besides TSA and the like, was a substantial beefing up of the air defense mission with ONE. Lots of $$ spent on tieing in the FAA radars in CONUS to the sector operations centers, lots of $$ spent on upgrading alert facilities and TTPs, etc, etc. And not to mention the money spent on those actually pulling alert. Which, by the way, is a political decision, not really a military one. Congress and the President mandated the CONUS-based operation. Without going into some of the current measures in use today, I still have yet to see how splashing a B767 over Georgetown is better than one hitting the intended target; the bad guys still achieve their aim (no pun intended). But it's a feel good capability. But point the finger at the politicians, not the units involved. If not for that mission, even more fighters would be gone from the inventory. AGRs/extended MPAs/and the like are at the behest of the political leadership. Don't blame the guys who choose to fulfill those missions. Blame the ones who decided they are worthwhile. brick - AGR (ret). DoD air defense liaison to FAA's Air Traffic Control System Command Center, 2002-2008.

MPA = $$ A unit is allocated so many per fiscal year. During GWOT/OCO/etc, etc, etc, the spigot has been wide open. Times are getting tight and units aren't getting a blank check anymore. Guard/Reserve HQs usually also have a pot of MPA that they can shift around to those in hurt status, but that too has been tapped out. A unit has to use that available MPA to keep their crews current/perform their basic mission(s). Additional support requires additional MPA that Uncle DoD has to come up with. One unintended consequence of this open spigot is the thousands of guys/gals who had gone Reserve/Guard well shy of ringing the magic 20 year retirement, i.e., getting retirement immediately upon retirement instead of having to wait until age 60 (yes, I'm aware of the provisions for earlier retirement based upon time activated, yada, yada, yada, but just go with it for now) but due to long-term activation or extended MPA orders now have the time in to qualify. Not an insignificant amount of money involved. Lesson learned (again): Don't go to war expecting it to be cheap...

Dud's (typo intentional) trying to make a living. If he can't drum outrage over something the Administration is doing, then he'll go for it in an inaccurate, skewed essay. Peters was a career Army intel type and wrote a pretty decent Cold War fiction book back in the day - Ivan decides to go for it in Europe type tale. Retired as a Lt Col and went to make his living wielding a pen (or word processor). The Air Force does go 1 v 3 with the other services (I count the USMC as a separate service) for funding. Remember this piece is dated 2005 when the fight for the F-22 (then all-seeing, all-doing F/A-22) was still on-going. But each of the other services also goes 1 v X for its share of the Pentagon funding pie. The USN would love to have a 12 carrier, 400-500 ship blue water navy. The Army spent a boatload (pun intended) on the FCS during the same time as this essay (Peters conveniantly doesn't deal with that as it would counter his own argument). Nothing new here, folks. I look forward to Mr. Peters essay if/when China starts flexing its military muscles in a violent way and all 187 (minus those in depot, down for mx, etc) F-22s are trying to hack it. And not a word back in 2005 for the 40+ year old tankers. Even older BUFFS? Peters knows, actually knew, about boots. Aerospace? Not so much...

I don't think the last Administration (when Powell was actually part of it) and certainly not this Administration believe in the Powell Doctrine. See the arguments about asking for 40,000 troops in Afghanistan, finally getting a committment for 30,000, but with a specific begin to pull out date attached. Don't remember those clauses in the Powell Doctrine. Powell will do himself a disservice if he joins this Administration. Nothing good could come to his reputation from being SECDEF now. The next guy/gal is going to have a helluva rear-guard action either voluntarily or otherwise undoing some Gates' measures, i.e., JFCOM, et al. Congress, of whatever flavor, likes it some defense spending in the home district/state.

Served and drank with "Cowboy" Long at RODN. He was good people. Godspeed.

New Auto-Ordnance M-1 carbine or Ruger Mini-14? I had an M-1 carbine (fcuk why did I sell it?!). No experience with the Ruger. Any opinions based on experience?

SAC as a nuclear weapon babysitter was great. SAC as a combat force willing to face its operational weaknesses, not so much. A high alert rate was God. Whatever it took to keep the board green at 97% or better was all. Didn't matter if numbers had to be fudged. Personal observation from 4+ years pulling alert. YMMV. TAC actually went for its own set of mini-nuke bombers - F-100, F-105, B-66, etc, etc. US Navy as well - A-3, A-4, etc. Air Defense Command did the interceptors (F-101, F-102, F-106) with, of course, SAC having its own long-range escort fighters in the inventory for a while. The fact that those faux nuke fighters performed so valiantly in Vietnam is a tribute to the aircrews and support folks determined to get the job done. Those in command, however, screwed the pooch in the main. I wouldn't bring back SAC or TAC. I would have nuclear wings in the same combat command as iron droppers and hold them to the proper standards for nuke surety. I wouldn't have those assets in a swing role. I would hold a wing commander responsible for executing his/her mission. If in peacetime, pass a realistic ORI or retire. In combat, get the job done or retire. We've got some great hardware. Some being the key word. We don't have nearly enough. A lot of it is really, really old. A full on fight with, say, China, will go through our ranks and leave us exhausted with them saying "I've got plenty more." Perhaps this discussion should be moved to a separate thread vice derailing this one? It's related, but also not.

Here's a wild idea: Both TAC and SAC sucked. SAC because it was a "read a step, do a step, get a banana" mentality designed specifically for going toe to toe with Ivan and not really able to do anything else well. Until B-52s were converted to the iron bomb mission for Southeast Asia for the tactical guys. I'd submit that the BUFFS did the trucking bombs mission really well (save for their same way, same day tactics courtesy SAC) but that the tactical guys didn't run the war all that well and they were the ones in charge. TAC, for much of its existance, didn't really have a pot to piss in and took the scraps of budget left over from SAC. It also had it's own nuclear mission that consumed much of its time and attention to the detriment of air-to-air and air-to-ground with little bombs. The results were paid in blood in Vietnam until those lessons were learned again. ACC (TAC ate SAC) was a good compromise unless you were a SAC crewdog (bomber, tanker, or missiles) in which case you were auto-hosed just because you were on the losing team. Not cool. DESERT STORM was a great showcase for the USAF showing it had it's sh1t together. Fighters and bombers played well together doing the jobs best suited for each. I don't think this is nearly the same USAF as then. It's a lot smaller, it's a lot more worn out, but a lot more combat experienced (in COIN and CAS, not so much against a contemporary, capable foe). How about a command where if you can make things go "boom," you're in regardless of the size of the explosion? If you directly support things that go "boom," you are in. If you haul sh1t, you are in. If you put stuff together, you are in. If you cook chow or patrol the flight line, you are in. If you do a good job at your job, you move up. If you don't, you are shown the door. Separate MAJCOMS, for the most part, are jobs for the generals. Use the NAFs, maybe, if a intermediate command between the COCOMS and Air Staff is required. A lot more bang could be had with the same bucks used. Crazy, I know. But gosh darn it, it just might work. C'mon kids, let's dance...

Dang, there you go again; putting facts into the discussion. Pilots (and navs) wouldn't exaggerate for effect. And those slacker PJs, special tactics guys, gunners, FEs, loads, et al, just sit around with their snack jars of paste waiting for someone to fix it for them.

Awww, you airplane guys are funny. CEP with a Mk 12A, now THAT's a CEP...

"2" to the above. You made the cut for IDE in residence. You, apparently, want to stay in up to 20. By showing your cards, you lose the support of those who did so and will become the fodder for whatever POS assignment/TDY/deployment/bad deal that Randolph and/or your unit(s) will come up with. If you are going for the full ride to retirement, think long and hard about this decision. My advice is that you will make your remaining time harder on yourself for no real reason. Besides, do the numbers for an O-4 vs. O-5 retirement.

Yep, didn't think $8K+ was a bargain but had never been in the market for one either. Would be cool to make my own "technical" for lovely DC. And I recognized the hardware in the avatar. Nice!

Saw a Barrett (used) going for $8,400-ish at "The Nation's Gun Show" outside DC yesterday. I guess if I ever win the lottery, that'll be on the list.

200 rounds of .44 special showed up three days from ordering via Georgia Arms. Sweet! Will give the other recommendations a try as well. Mucho thanks for the advice.

Thanks for the point outs. My google search was simply hits without any validation. I will check these places out.

On-line ammo? Ok, I've apparently exhausted the supply of .44 special (4 boxes of 50) in a 50 NM radius. Having checked, I think, the applicable Virginia laws, I believe I can order ammo and have it delivered to my home. Any reputable/proven vendors used by anyone here?

A Surprise Squadron A few minutes after take-off from Land’s End in Great Britain, 1Lt Jack Illfrey felt a bump underneath his Lockheed P-38G Lightning. His wingman’s note, held up to preserve radio silence, let Illfrey know he was going to have a bad day. “One belly tank” meant that the bump Illfrey felt was his other tank dropping off. Illfrey needed every drop of gas if he had any chance of making Oran, Algeria, 1,500 miles from his start. With the loss of his tank, his options just narrowed to turn back or make for the British base at Gibraltar. He chose the latter and pressed on. After several more hours, Illfrey realized that he wouldn’t make it even to Gibraltar. His new options now being ditch or land in Portugal, he chose the latter. Portugal, however, was a neutral country. As such, they were obligated to intern the aircraft and pilot. After his landing, Illfrey was instructing Portuguese pilot Costa Macedo in operating the Lightning so that Macedo could ferry the aircraft from the civil Lisbon airport to a nearby Portuguese Army field. Macedo knelt on the wing while Illfrey explained the by now refueled P-38’s systems. Recognizing an opportunity after he had cranked the P-38’s engines, Illfrey slammed the cockpit hood shut and gunned the might Allison liquid-cooled engines, blowing Macedo off. Illfrey took off and although he created an international incident by doing so, made it to Algeria and the combat duty he desired. The Portuguese learned from this experience and impounded every belligerent airplane that touched down from then on. Since the Allies sent hundreds of aircraft from Britain to the North African Theater on the same route that Illfrey pioneered, many other aircraft landed in Portugal. Many of these aircraft included the Bell P-39 Airacobras. In this way, the impoverished Iberian country expanded its tiny Air Force and soon had a squadron of P-39s as well another P-38 and even a couple of B-24s. This story concentrates on the more numerous P-39s. During December 1942 and February 1943, 19 Airacobras from the 81st and 350th Fighter Groups made emergency landings on Portuguese soil. Portuguese Army pilot 2d Lieutenant Bras Oliveira witnessed the arrival of the humming P-39s. Sailing with a friend on the Tagus River outside Lisbon, he ducked when a flight of five P-39s buzzed his boat while on final to the brand new airfield at Portela. Forced to fly antiquated Potez XXV and Vickers Valparaiso biplanes since leaving flight school, Oliveira laughed and said to his friend, “Well, at least our guys will have some God damn modern fighters after all!” Little did he realize he’d find himself stuffed into one of those low-flying P-39s in a few months. One of the last P-39s to land caused a local stir when on February 8, 1943, a 350th Fighter Group bird, trying to drop in on a tiny Portuguese naval air service emergency strip, jettisoned his belly tank prior to landing. The local citizens scrambled for cover believing that a much feared bombing campaign by either side had begun. Portugal was now the proud owner of five P-39Ls and 14 P-400s. The main difference between the two was the –39 carried the original 37mm cannon firing through the propeller hub and the P-400s, originally destined for export use, fired a 20mm cannon instead.* Since Britain, Portugal’s primary arms dealer, had been dragging its feet on delivering promised modern equipment like Supermarine Spitfires and Hawker Hurricanes, the Portuguese were thrilled with the unexpected aircraft (for the rest of this story both models will be referred to as “P-39s”). Approaching the American Embassy with a proposal to buy the interned aircraft, the Portuguese traded on the Allies’ desire to use Portugal’s strategically placed Azores Islands as an anti-submarine base when phrasing the purchase request. By international law, interned weapons are only supposed to be seized during hostilities and returned at the end of combat. The Americans recognized a good bargain and sold all the interned aircraft to Portugal on an “as is” basis and for the return of all interned airmen. So for $700,000 US dollars, Portugal bought the 19 P-39s, the P-38, and the B-24 Liberators. In late April, 1943, 1Lt. Rogério Oliveira Seixas, formerly a Gloster Gladiator biplane pilot, received orders to establish the “Esquadrilha Airacobra” at Ota’s Air Base No.2, the newest and best Portuguese military airfield, commissioned in 1940. The P-39s/P-400s would operate alongside previously purchased Curtiss P-36 Mohawks IV. At Ota, the Airacobras were serialed as “300 – 318,” had the Portuguese ‘Cross of Christ’ roundels applied, and then sat while the Portuguese tried to figure out how to operate the complex aircraft. The previously mentioned Costa Macedo, by this time an Army major, and Lt Seixas journeyed to the United States for a brief training course on P-39 and P-38 maintenance and operations. By July of 1943, they knew enough to begin flying the Airacobras regularly. Four of the P-39s were sent to Air Base No. 1 at Sintra and were flown by some of the instructors of the Escola Militar de Aeronautica (Portuguese Military Aeronautics School). In August, Lt Seixas led a ten ship formation on a training mission with 2Lts. Oliveria and Rogriques, his most experienced pilots, acting as element leads. All went well until landing. Although the P-39 had a tricycle landing gear and should have been easier to land than the more conventional tail draggers the Portuguese usually flew, the pilots inexperience in handling the new mounts resulted in three slightly damaged aircraft, nos. 305, 310, and 314, while the young, inexperienced pilot of ship 309 landed long and completely overshot the runway, damaging his mount beyond repair. Two weeks later, on August 16th, 1st Sergeant Alves Ferreira, an experienced Gloster Gladiator pilot, took aircraft 304 up for some aerobatic training. He crashed over the airfield in full view of his squadronmates and perished in the ensuing fire. Another fortnight passed and another P-39 plummeted from the sky. In this case, Lt Oliveira survived a crash landing on the beach of a resort south of Lisbon, but the rising tide claimed the wreck before it could be salvaged. Soon after, Lt Oliveira was posted to a long-awaited Hurricane unit just forming from British deliveries of both Hurricanes and Spitfire Mk Vbs. With the lack of spare parts to keep the P-39s flying – remember the Americans had sold them “as is” – and the new British equipment, the Airacobras soon fell by the wayside. They lay dormant, basking in the warm Iberian sun while Portugal conducted its largest ever military exercise on a great plain on the banks of the Tagus River. More than 40,000 men conducted maneuvers and combined arms practice with the new Hurris’ and Spits. The P-39s didn’t fly in this exercise, but would eventually take to the air again, but this time as a concerted effort on the part of the Portuguese and American governments. In December 1943, an eleven man delegation of US Army Air Force pilots and mechanics arrived in Lisbon. After requests by Portugal for more P-39s and training in their care and use, US Major Willard Wilson brought many spare parts for the P-39s, the sole P-38 and the B-24s. His mission was to bring to operational status as many of the Portuguese aircraft as his team could and train the Portuguese in properly servicing those aircraft. Starting work in January 1944, within two weeks the P-39s were flyable again. US pilots Capt William Thompson and Lt Richard Heddens were test flying the machines and delivering them back to the Portuguese. They also conducted flying training with a new group of Portuguese pilots. Regarding the Portuguese maintenance practices, Major Wilson had this to say in his official report: Unlike any modern air force, the Portuguese fail to realize the importance of organized maintenance training. A mechanic becomes a mechanic through year of watchful waiting. He waits his turn for promotion to corporal and when that time comes it is assumed that he is able to take up the duties of a mechanic. There is no mechanics school of any kind. On top of it all, the officers and enlisted men are terribly rank conscious. Among the enlisted it is perhaps worse than the officers……no officer or enlisted man will perform a menial or physical task if a man of lesser rank is available….. Each mechanic has two helpers who are of little value except perhaps for the muscle they provide. These mechanics will not allow their helpers to perform any actual mechanical work so the process…..is a slow and painful one. A Lt Solano de Almeida, one of the few English speaking Portuguese pilots, assumed command of the rejuvenated P-39 squadron, but was chagrined to have to report to the visiting Americans that one of the squadron’s young pilots had taxied too fast and collided with three other recently repaired P-39s and the just-repaired P-38. This was February 4th, 1944, the day prior to Wilson’s scheduled progress report to the Portuguese commanders. A week later, Corporal Lopes lost an engine on take off and crashed. He survived the accident but the ‘Cobra did not. By late February, the Portuguese reorganized their squadron designators and the P-39 squadron picked up the British-style side codes of ‘OK.’ Obviously, the squadron also picked up an instant unit nickname with this designation. Under the command of Captain Albuquerque Freitas, Lt Solano de Alameida as his second, the ten OK squadron pilots, mostly non-commissioned pilots, flew 2-3 sorties per week. In May, Esquadrilha OK flew in a massive (by Portuguese standards) aeronautical parade under the watchful eyes of President of the Republic, General and Doctor Salazar. Salazar wanted this parade to demonstrate to the increasingly desperate Germans not to think of attacking Portugal. By the second half of 1944, tight fuel supplies dramatically reduced the flying time for OK Squadron. It is not until December 4th that a few flights sortied, all the while the P-39s declining in operational numbers. OK Squadron is disbanded and the remaining half-dozen Airacobras are assigned to Fighter Squadron 4. For the next several years, they are flown only sporadically until late 1946; a Lt Rosa Rodrigues is the sole P-39 pilot trying to fly the machines. The squadron by this time consisted of an eclectic mix of P-39s, Gladiators, Spitfire I and Vbs. In early 1947, the now remaining three P-39s, nos. 305, 306, 315, are assigned to Fighter squadron 3, where now-Captain Rodrigues flew them “just for maintenance purposes.” Finally, mercifully, the Portuguese command issued a Service Order, dated June 8, 1948 to strike off charge the P-39, number 305, the last of the “Cross of Christ” ‘Cobras. (The author is grateful for the help and advice of Dr. Jose Correia for information and photos about the Portuguese Air Force.) *Popular joke at the time about the P-400’s designator asked, “What’s a P-400? Why, that’s a P-39 with a Japanese Zero on its tail!”

I caught a news article where the last known survivor of Stalag Luft III died the other day. It reminded me of some great books about what became known as "The Great Escape." Some books on topic: "The Great Escape," by Paul Brickhill. GREAT read and what the great movie by the same name is based on. 33 Months as a POW in Stalag Luft III," by Albert Clark, a USAAF pilot shot down on his first mission in theater. He was flying with the Brits in a Spitfire. "The Longest Tunnel," by Alan Burgess.

Ok so far. To me, still ok. An investigation is just that, not a determination of guilt. If the investigation had come up dry, by putting this into the promotion process, it's guilty without proof. And the USAF would never do that, right? Fail although if the PRF cut-off had passed, then it's a gut check as this was not an official part of the record.