MC-12 Crash in Afghanistan

[LockheedFix]

What's wrong with that?

In all seriousness though, maybe my reading comprehension level is dogshit, but that mates up fairly close to the report I read.

That's what I was thinking, too, keeping in mind that it was written for general SA for primarily non-flyers, and not as a narrative to prevent future mishaps.

[tunes]

not too sure why you are upset about the article, it's pretty factual...except maybe you could take the un out

Edited October 30, 2013 by tunes

[Q1Checkride]

TIME Article : The Crash of Independence 08

wow.

[damastas]

There's some pretty big differences in the SIB vs AIB findings.

[KState_Poke22]

There's some pretty big differences in the SIB vs AIB findings.

I didn't see many differences. The conclusions the author drew from those findings were off base though...

[Bender]

I used to play Mario Kart with Richie Dickson on weather days at BAF. Good guy.

I was provided access to the report the day it was released. I asked and it was handed to me; I read, I sighed, and I returned it.

While everyone had to wait for the briefing, they went out of their way to ensure that everyone had an opportunity to receive it (I can’t vouch for downrange, where I heard the info was disseminated much more slowly). It is craziness to think there are guys flying the MC-12W through the shit weather of Afghanistan right now that have not been privy to this (as well as previous) SIB reports.

The swamp land article that was linked was actually quite well written and highlights only a few of the mission risks accepted by the MC-12 program. It continues to be wrought with an impressive operations tempo, inexperienced aircrew, and a thorough lack of developmental/operational testing to produce/validate even the most basic aerodynamic things as TOLD…Fucking TOLD.

I was in the deployed squadron commander’s office discussing mitigating program risk in late 2011 and I was in the deployed squadron commander’s office discussing mitigating program risk today. Mitigating risk is only a concept truly appreciated at the unit level by the operators forced to execute under such conditions.

It is far more than the safety program that is riddled with error. If only a handful of us could make it through our 15 years unjaded enough to actually give two shits about fixing it. …that my friends, is a difficult, difficult proposition.

[JS]

A pretty good summary of the incident put out by the Air Force Safety Center Times:

http://www.airforcetimes.com/article/20131106/NEWS/311060014/Tragedy-strikes-twice

[KState_Poke22]

A pretty good summary of the incident put out by the Air Force Safety Center Times:

http://www.airforcetimes.com/article/20131106/NEWS/311060014/Tragedy-strikes-twice

Can't read it, says I need a subscription and there's no way in hell that is happening.

[JS]

Yeah, that's odd. I read it this morning in the Defense News Early Bird brief email thingy, and the link from that email brought me to the article without asking for that login information. Now when I click on the same link in the same email, it brings me to the login screen asking for a subscription to AF Times, which I don't have either.

Oh, well, for anyone with a subscription to AF Times, it was a good article with lots of good details on the crash.

[Tulsa]

Why are we pining on this? I'm not talking about the breakdown in everyone's Safety shops. But, Couldn't fly instruments or understand the automation presented. Or totally disregard the fact they couldn't recognize the stall or apply stall recovery mechanics. Yet, we harp on the fact that the info hasn't been disseminated. Telling everyone that you should fly instruments or apply stall recovery procedures doesn't sound like a ground breaking or earth shattering issue.

[Lord Ratner]

Why are we pining on this? I'm not talking about the breakdown in everyone's Safety shops. But, Couldn't fly instruments or understand the automation presented. Or totally disregard the fact they couldn't recognize the stall or apply stall recovery mechanics. Yet, we harp on the fact that the info hasn't been disseminated. Telling everyone that you should fly instruments or apply stall recovery procedures doesn't sound like a ground breaking or earth shattering issue.

Background: FAIP, MC-12 deployment, tankers now.

The training for the MC-12 was terrible, probably because it was new, had few permanent pilots, and many of the people flowing through didn't give a . For me, that masked a lot of the issues that are perhaps more AF-wide.

I haven't been in the tanker long at all, but other than a very brief demo in the sim, I have not seen, heard, or discussed stalls, spins, vertical S's, cross checks, etc. I know as a prior FAIP my whole world was stalls and falls for years, and I didn't expect anything close to the same level of emphasis in the MWS world, but zero emphasis is lower than I expected.

I can't speak for all the other airframes out there, since I haven't flown them, but the basics seem to be left at the UPT bases. EPs are another weak area.

[TacAirCoug]

I haven't been in the tanker long at all, but other than a very brief demo in the sim, I have not seen, heard, or discussed stalls, spins, vertical S's, cross checks, etc. I know as a prior FAIP my whole world was stalls and falls for years, and I didn't expect anything close to the same level of emphasis in the MWS world, but zero emphasis is lower than I expected.

I can't speak for all the other airframes out there, since I haven't flown them, but the basics seem to be left at the UPT bases. EPs are another weak area.

For comparison, in the Herk we do stalls and falls in the sim every year.

[Right Seat Driver]

Background: FAIP, MC-12 deployment, tankers now.

The training for the MC-12 was terrible, probably because it was new, had few permanent pilots, and many of the people flowing through didn't give a fuck. For me, that masked a lot of the issues that are perhaps more AF-wide.

I haven't been in the tanker long at all, but other than a very brief demo in the sim, I have not seen, heard, or discussed stalls, spins, vertical S's, cross checks, etc. I know as a prior FAIP my whole world was stalls and falls for years, and I didn't expect anything close to the same level of emphasis in the MWS world, but zero emphasis is lower than I expected.

I can't speak for all the other airframes out there, since I haven't flown them, but the basics seem to be left at the UPT bases. EPs are another weak area.

PIQ should intro stalls in the tanker over a few sims (at least in 2009), and it is part of one of the quarterly system sims when you do high and low altitude stalls, and mach tuck recovery. You get another block of stalls in the sim when you are at CFIC, mostly focused on stall recovery in the pattern. The problem with doing stalls in the sim is it is all dependent on your sim operator. Some only talk about stall recovery, other instructors try to make it difficult.

Talk to the sim guys and get their guides for the quarterly system sims. There is a lot in there and ask them to focus on things that you feel you aren't getting enough training on.

[Azimuth]

Background: FAIP, MC-12 deployment, tankers now.

The training for the MC-12 was terrible, probably because it was new, had few permanent pilots, and many of the people flowing through didn't give a fuck. For me, that masked a lot of the issues that are perhaps more AF-wide.

I haven't been in the tanker long at all, but other than a very brief demo in the sim, I have not seen, heard, or discussed stalls, spins, vertical S's, cross checks, etc. I know as a prior FAIP my whole world was stalls and falls for years, and I didn't expect anything close to the same level of emphasis in the MWS world, but zero emphasis is lower than I expected.

I can't speak for all the other airframes out there, since I haven't flown them, but the basics seem to be left at the UPT bases. EPs are another weak area.

That's odd because there are two aero sims and associated academics in the PTX syllabi.

[LookieRookie]

A pretty good summary of the incident put out by the Air Force Safety Center Times:

http://www.airforcetimes.com/article/20131106/NEWS/311060014/Tragedy-strikes-twice

http://www.navytimes.com/article/20131106/NEWS/311060014/Tragedy-strikes-twice

[Lord Ratner]

That's odd because there are two aero sims and associated academics in the PTX syllabi.

You've been in AETC long enough to know that putting something in the syllabus does not ensure it is taught, let alone sufficiently.

I'm not trying to make a point about tankers, just using them as an example of a larger issue. Stall recoveries are mindless, as long as you have more than a thousand feet below you. But looking at some of the recent aviation mishaps, clearly people aren't working on the basics enough. Colgan 3407, Air France 447, the MC-12 crash. We can all get defensive about how our communities are doing just fine with training stalls once a year, or twice in PTX, or fill-in-the-blank, but clearly something is wrong. And this mishap wasn't a one-off either, it was just the first one to cost lives.

[HiFlyer]

Stall recoveries are mindless, as long as you have more than a thousand feet below you.

My experience tells me that part of the problem isn't stall recovery, it's "approach to the stall" recognition.

In UPT(at least when I was an IP) the stall series was taught as a flight maneuver. I can't remember how many times I'd see a student later drive himself right up to the edge of a stall while getting ready for something else and not recognise what was happening. They were so focused on doing something else they simply didn't recognise the situation early enough. I recall the day in 1987 or '88 that a Castle tanker did a horrible approach to a touch and go at Beale, stalled in the flare and banged the #1 nacelle on the runway, then did a go-around and a tight left three engine closed at low airspeed and stalled again, planting the airplane in the field across from the tower (seven fatalities as I recall). In both cases the student and IP didn't recognise what was happening while being preoccupied with instructional and EP issues, I suspect, Late stall recoveries didn't solve their problems!

Recognition is the key, not recovery!

Edited November 10, 2013 by HiFlyer

[xaarman]

I recall the day in 1987 or '88 that a Castle tanker did a horrible approach to a touch and go

Talk about dating yourself... "Back when Reagan was president..."

[tunes]

Background: FAIP, MC-12 deployment, tankers now.

The training for the MC-12 was terrible, probably because it was new, had few permanent pilots, and many of the people flowing through didn't give a ######. For me, that masked a lot of the issues that are perhaps more AF-wide.

I haven't been in the tanker long at all, but other than a very brief demo in the sim, I have not seen, heard, or discussed stalls, spins, vertical S's, cross checks, etc. I know as a prior FAIP my whole world was stalls and falls for years, and I didn't expect anything close to the same level of emphasis in the MWS world, but zero emphasis is lower than I expected.

I can't speak for all the other airframes out there, since I haven't flown them, but the basics seem to be left at the UPT bases. EPs are another weak area.

As someone who is there now, it's still pretty bad.........

[Lord Ratner]

My experience tells me that part of the problem isn't stall recovery, it's "approach to the stall" recognition.

[...]

Recognition is the key, not recovery!

I agree with everything you said, minus which is key. I don't think either is key, really, though obviously I would rather recognize it before and avoid having to recover at all.

The Castle example is why I think knowing how to recover is so important, still. Sure, they should have seen it coming, but as someone who has never been in a major EP scenario yet, I won't armchair quarterback it. You are correct though, feeling the impending stall would have saved them. Proficiency in TP stalls would have too.

I think we're nit-picking at this point. Stall recognition and recovery should be taught together.

And agree 110% on UPT studs flying stalls like they fly loops. I hooked a kid on his check ride for TP stalls because after recovering the aircraft, he continued to pull up to around 30 degrees nose high, let the airspeed drop off about 40 knots, then right before entering an unintentional power-on stall, called "maneuver complete" and dumped the nose out of the shaker. I asked him to reaccomplish the stall, and he pulled the nose even higher on round two. I started teaching stalls very differently after that.

Edited November 10, 2013 by Lord Ratner

[TreeA10]

Talk about dating yourself... "Back when Reagan was president..."

Let's see.....fighter assignments were plentiful, not a UAV in sight, I was flying my ass off, the bar was a free for all, and everyone was focused on the potential Communist hoards coming through the Fulda Gap or the NODAKS. Yeah, it is now history but it was a hell of a good time to be wearing nomex and strapping a jet to your back.

[JS]

Why are we pining on this?

I assume you meant "pinging."

If it was as easy as simple stall recognition, I guess we could just erase this whole thread - nothing more to see here and nothing to learn from.

Well, I will try and briefly summarize why we are "pinging," based on what I read in those two open source articles from Time and the AF Times:

1. MC-12 dudes are trained on a plane that is physically and aerodynamically different than the MC-12, and stall training is sub-par, to say the least.

2. Most MC-12 dudes, like these MC-12 dudes, are usually very low time guys in the MC-12 due to the quick turnover in the community thanks to the assignment system, or whatever.

3. A lot of the MC-12 guys have tons of jet time, and little or no turboprop time - kind of like these guys. Stalls in a jet are different from stalls in a prop.

4. The mission of this plane is to essentially be in a constant turn for hours at a time. Sometimes they even have to climb while in such a turn. Some times the pilots even have to add max power, without proper training or experience as to the effects that P-factor can have in the direction that the plane is already turning; usually this is the first time guys are experiencing this type of situation - especially former turbojet guys.

5. There is a trend of several MC-12 incidents related to this deadly mix of factors - including non-fatal ones like where they pulled the plane out of like a 10G dive only a few hundred feet above the deck, causing significant damage to the airframe.

6. Dudes have left for MC-12 deployments and competed their tours without ever having seen any safety reports, or having any discussions on these trends or incidents . No matter whose is at fault for the lack of information dissemination - the individual pilots, the local safety weenies, the Chief of Safety, the USAF Safety Center, nsplayr, Vertigo, or Obama or whoever - it is a major fucking FAIL that this information is not being disseminated efficiently when these incidents should be pretty easily preventable.

7. People are dying and millions of dollars worth of aircraft are being destroyed.

So, that's why I am pinging.

[arg]

You've been in AETC long enough to know that putting something in the syllabus does not ensure it is taught, let alone sufficiently.

Are those contract instructors or active duty?

[TarHeelPilot]

Sidebar:

I assume you meant "pinging."

Never heard of pining? Tulsa used it correctly.

[Berry]

For comparison, in the Herk we do stalls and falls in the sim every year.

At the McChord sim, it's covered every other year.