tac airlifter

Right, because Hercs don't do anything tactical.

That may be true, but I'm not putting 10k rounds through mine a year; I don't have the time or cash! My interest in the piston guns is pretty simple- easier to clean. I love the AR, but cleaning a DI weapon is a tedious task.

That being said, what are you thoughts on the new variety of piston driven AR's out there? I know each is different depending in the company, but in theory it seems to be offering the best of both worlds. Accuracy/modularity of the AR platform with a more reliable operating system (AK). I have an XCR already and am not as impressed as I thought I would be, but I think thats on me for buying that particular rifle. I'm thinking about dropping some serious cash on an LMT piston AR and would liek any thoughts you guys have.

Do you seriously think Airmen doing the bump and grind drinking beer during salsa night at the deid are entitled to the same CZTE/HFP/HDP as the guys driving the perimeter at Kirkuk, just based on the Iranians being unfriendly? I respectfully disagree.

Are you at Maxwell for SOS? I was wondering if we only get partial per diem for SOS in res.

Same subject, slightly different question-- anyone know if the AF will pay for this procedure or perform it?

Good luck. My dad ran in Texas a few years ago. It was an eye opening and disheartening experience for me as I followed it all the way through. Hope you're prepared for the party politics and good ole boy connections. Good for you to take some ownership and try to make a difference, I hope it works out.

Dude, I totally agree. How have we gotten this far off course when something called a "morale patch" is looked at as being bad? Isn't morale supposed to be a good thing? And for the most part it's rated officers driving the push against the patches.

Never recieved any, and I've actually asked.

That seems impractical. How can the squadron/CC be TDY as much as AF one would require?

I totally agree. I'm so sick of the MX leadership attitudes; they act like it's a privledge for us to use our aircraft. Line guys are great, as they usually are, but it seems like at the 05/06 level MX is fighting with ops just to fight.

I finished in Sep and 5 of 6 active duty guys were on CAP (i was the only one who wasn't). It's pretty challenging, but if you do well in flight lead upgrade and know your pubs you'll do fine. We had one guy who was sent home; by far the best GK in the class but he couldn't catch any of the mistakes the IPs were making. He was so flustered by his total SA breakdown that he failed every ride. The ANG threatened an FEB but his unit recalled him instead. It was challenging on the flightline but the hill was an absolute waste of time. If you have any specific questions or need anything while you're here (I'm stationed at LRF) just PM me.

Dude, you're smoking crack.

I talked with Robarms about it when I bought my XCR and was told they no longer import them. I don't know if that means no US company does. They used to be 500$ or so and now the price is in the 900's$ new.

Do you guys know if VEPRs are still being imported? The prices I've seen have been through the roof lately.

My wife and I are looking for a family friendly place to buy a 4 bedroom home, and Navarre seems to have alot of options when we investigate online. Our biggest concern is being able to resell the home, and then after we feel secure about that we're like it to be within 20 minutes of HRT and the beach. Do you have any recommendations for realtors or specific places or people we should stay away from? I'll be TDY quite a bit before I PCS there so consequently most of the research will fall onto my wife. We looked at FWB online but most of the homes seemed old. I've had enough problems with old homes in Arkansas so I'd rather get something made at least in the 90's. Also, since I've never lived in FL, should I expect to pay extra for insurace against hurriucanes or will standard homeowners insurance cover that? What kind of precautions do you take against natural disasters, or am I silly for asking this?

You'll enjoy Balad, as much as you can enjoy being anywhere over there. It's a huge base now and has lots of stuff to do in your free time. The new gym is nice (I assume you're regular AF and therefore living in H-6) although they have several others in the army part of town. There's a pretty cool turkish resturaunt by the Saddam movie theater and a nice pool. Unfortunatly, it's usually filled with hundreds of sweaty army dudes, but theres a downside to everything. I've been deployed there 3 times and stopped in a few more times on various short missions. We started going there in late 05, before that we were in OKAS. I think being in Iraq is easier than being outside (wih the exception of Turkey, that place would be awesome to stage from). It's gotten pretty nice in the last few years, it went from being a mud hole to having sidewalks, hard facilities for showers and living. There is a bus system if you want to go around the base to the west side or wherever. The summer is obviously pretty hot, but October through May it's not a bad place to be. The threat has gone down significantly, you won't even notice nowdays. I've been overnight just about everywhere in OIF and Balad is fine. It has all the gay rules and dudes trying to make rank by shitting on you that other places have; get used to that. I think it's way better than Kirkuk since that place has oil fires buring all the time and smells like shit. Balad does have a burn pit that will put all types of nasty things in your lungs and make it hard to run outside, but you really only smell it in the spring and summer when the winds are from the north. Unfortunatly, winds are almost always from the north. Overall its a good place to go for your first deployment. Pretty much every base is built up there now, and OIF only has a few wild places left, like Al Kut, where you don't have to wear a shirt or shave. If you ge tthe chance to go there, take it!

There are four operational AMC squadrons here at LRF now, and the deployed ops tempo has definitly decreased. I have been home a solid year now, although thats had more to do with a new baby and IP school. Copilots are luckly to be deployed in their first year at the squadron, but on the flip side there are lots of decent missions to be had. Hurricane relief, SAAMs, JA/ATTs, OSTs... there is always some fun place to go TDY with good flying. I've been trying to go back to Iraq and just can't manage to get on the schedule. You'll enjoy the herc, there is a lot of operational flying and the people who do this are great. The bases are not as good as say, C-17 bases, but there are pros and cons to every community. I would definitly recommend the 130 to anyone looking for good operational experience on their first assignment.

Agree. I don't think IP's are "given" anything they haven't earned. The idea behind these FAA equivalency ratings is that you've already met or exceeded the level of training and competancy necessary for the qual, so the FAA is giving you what you've earned in the military. As for the CFII thing, you've already earned a portion at IP, so you go back and meet the other requirements and get your rating. There is only a problem if you think IP school is somehow less rigorous than civilian training. Having just completed IP school, I can tell you that it's much more difficult than anything I've ever done on the civilian side. As for the loadmaster saving the crews in tankers, nothing against loads but any pilot who tries to land gear up should recieve a Q3. That is totally unaccepatable. In hercs we have our Load verify the gear is down because it is possible, although unlikely, that you could have a down and locked indication in the cockpit with a gear not actually locked into position; so its a safety check. But the idea of having loads double check that we didn't forget to put the gear down is just crazy.

Dude, thats been an inside joke with HK for years. The story on HKpro.com is that a long long time ago for their first professional magazine ad the photographer knew nothing about guns and loaded it incorrectly. His pictures made it to print, and ever since then HK has purposely done that as a throwback to their early days. Look at just about any HK picture add, it's nothing new.

Please tell me you don't mean reflective belts while wearing PT gear?

"Bottom line…we have much more important things to worry about than uniform issues…" They say that but they never really mean it. Remember in 05 when there was no official order to wear the AF PT gear and everyone dressed in comfortable clothes and there was never all this drama about being out of uniform? It seems we've made our own "things to worry about" by forcing this PT gear on everyone. If we had left things the way they were, less drama and happier deployers.

It was me who recommended it, and I'm very glad you enjoyed the read. There are quite a few books about the fighter aspect of the AF, but very few about us prop folks. I thought his end story about the "divert field" was about the best I've read from any aviator.

THE UNTOLD TRUE STORY OF MAD DOG SHRIVER: Mad Dog led dozens of covert missions into Laos & Cambodia until his luck ran out. By Maj. John L. Plaster, USAR (Ret.) <https://www.ultimatesniper.com/images/macVsog-patch.GIF> There undoubtedly was not a single recon man in SOG more accomplished or renowned than Mad Dog Shriver. Mad Dog! In the late 1960s, no Special Forces trooper at Ft. Bragg even breathed those top secret letters, "S-O-G," but everyone had heard of the legendary Studies and Observations Group Green Beret recon team leader, Sergeant First Class Jerry Shriver, dubbed a "mad dog" by Radio Hanoi. It was Jerry Shriver who'd spoken the most famous rejoinder in SOG history, radioing his superiors not to worry that NVA forces had encircled his tiny team. "No, no," he explained, "I've got 'em right where I want 'em -- surrounded from the inside." Fully decked out, Mad Dog was a walking arsenal with an imposing array of sawed-off shotgun or suppressed submachine gun, pistols, knives and grenades. "He looked like Rambo," First Sergeant Billy Greenwood thought. Blond, tall and thin, Shriver's face bore chiseled features around piercing blue eyes. "There was no soul in the eyes, no emotion," thought SOG Captain Bill O'Rourke. "They were just eyes." By early 1969, Shriver was well into his third continuous year in SOG, leading top secret intelligence gathering teams deep into the enemy's clandestine Cambodian sanctuaries where he'd teased death scores of times. Unknown to him, however, forces beyond his control at the highest levels of government in Hanoi and Washington were steering his fate. The Strategic Picture Every few weeks of early 1969, the docks at Cambodia's seaport of Sihanoukville bustled with East European ships offloading to long lines of Hak Ly Trucking Company lorries. Though ostensibly owned by a Chinese businessman, the Hak Ly Company's true operator was North Vietnam's Trinh Sat intelligence service. The trucks' clandestine cargo of rockets, smallarms ammunition and mortar rounds rolled overnight to the heavily jungled frontier of Kampong Cham Province just three miles from the border with South Vietnam, a place the Americans had nicknamed the Fishhook, where vast stockpiles sustained three full enemy divisions, plus communist units across the border inside South Vietnam -- some 200,000 foes. Cambodian Prince Sihanouk was well aware of these neutrality violations; indeed, his fifth wife, Monique, her mother and half-brother were secretly peddling land rights and political protection to the NVA; other middlemen were selling rice to the NVA by the thousands of tons. Hoping to woo Sihanouk away from the communists, the Johnson Administration had watched passively while thousands of GIs were killed by communist forces operating from Cambodia, and not only did nothing about it, but said nothing, even denied it was happening. And now, each week of February and March 1969, more Americans were dying than lost in the Persian Gulf War, killed by NVA forces that struck quickly then fled back to "neutral" Cambodia. Combined with other data, SOG's Cambodian intelligence appeared on a top secret map which National Security Adviser Henry Kissinger studied aboard Air Force One at Brussels airport the morning of 24 February 1969. Sitting with Kissinger was Colonel Alexander Haig, his military assistant, while representing the president was White House Chief of Staff H.R. "Bob" Haldeman. During the new administration's transition, President Nixon had asked Kissinger to determine how to deal with the Cambodian buildup and counter Hanoi's "fight and talk" strategy. While President Nixon addressed NATO's North Atlantic Council, those aboard Air Force One worked out details for a clandestine U.S. response: The secret bombing of Cambodia's most remote sanctuaries, which would go unacknowledged unless Prince Sihanouk protested. When Air Force One departed Brussels, Kissinger briefed President Nixon, who approved the plan but postponed implementing it. Over the coming three weeks, Nixon twice warned Hanoi, "we will not tolerate attacks which result in heavier casualties to our men at a time that we are honestly trying to seek peace at the conference table in Paris." The day after Nixon's second warning, the NVA bombarded Saigon with 122mm rockets obviously smuggled through Cambodia. Three days later, Nixon turned loose the B-52s on the Fishhook, the first secret Cambodian raid, which set off 73 secondary explosions. A Special SOG Mission Not one peep eminated from Phnom Penh or Hanoi and here was a fitting irony: For four years the North Vietnamese had denied their presence in Cambodia, and now, with U.S. bombs falling upon them, they could say nothing. Nixon suspended further B-52 strikes in hopes Hanoi's negotiators might begin productive discussions in Paris, but the talks droned on pointlessly. To demonstrate that America, too, could "talk and fight," President Nixon approved a second secret B-52 strike, this time against a target proposed by General Creighton Abrams with Ambassador Bunker's endorsement: COSVN, the Central Office for South Vietnam, the almost mythical Viet Cong headquarters which claimed to run the whole war. An NVA deserter had pinpointed the COSVN complex 14 miles southeast of Memot, Cambodia, in the Fishhook, just a mile beyond the South Vietnamese border. The COSVN raid was laid on for 24 April. Apprised of the upcoming B-52 strike, Brigadier General Philip Davidson, the MACV J-2, thought that instead of just bombing COSVN, a top secret SOG raiding force should hit the enemy headquarters as soon as the bombs stopped falling. He phoned Colonel Steve Cavanaugh, Chief SOG, who agreed and ordered the Ban Me Thuot-based Command and Control South, CCS, to prepare a Green Beret-led company of Montagnard mercenaries for the special mission. At CCS, the historic COSVN raid fell upon its most accomplished man, that living recon legend, Mad Dog Shriver, and Captain Bill O'Rourke. Though O'Rourke would command the company-size raiding force, Shriver equally would influence the operation, continuing an eight-month collaboration they'd begun when they ran recon together. "Ready to insert deep into Cambodia on a covert operation, "Mad Dog" carries his trusty suppressed Grease Gun, Gerber fighting knife and plenty of grenades." (Photo by Medal of Honor winner, Jim Fleming) Mad Dog -- the Man and the Myth There was no one at CCS quite like Mad Dog Shriver. Medal of Honor recipient Jim Fleming, who flew USAF Hueys for SOG, found Shriver, "the quintessential warrior-loner, anti-social, possessed by what he was doing, the best team, always training, constantly training." Shriver rarely spoke and walked around camp for days wearing the same clothes. In his sleep he cradled a loaded rifle, and in the club he'd buy a case of beer, open every can, then go alone to a corner and drink them all. Though he'd been awarded a Silver Star, five Bronze Stars and the Soldiers Medal, the 28-year-old Green Beret didn't care about decorations. But he did care about the Montagnard hill tribesmen, and spent all his money on them, even collected food, clothes, whatever people would give, to distribute in Yard villages. He was the only American at CCS who lived in the Montagnard barracks. "He was almost revered by the Montagnards," O'Rourke says. Shriver's closest companion was a German shepherd he'd brought back from Taiwan which he named Klaus. One night Klaus got sick on beer some recon men fed him and crapped on the NCO club floor; they rubbed his nose in it and threw him out. Shriver arrived, drank a beer, removed his blue velvet smoking jacket and derby hat, put a .38 revolver on a table, then dropped his pants and defecated on the floor. "If you want to rub my nose in this," he dared, "come on over." Everyone pretended not to hear him; one man who'd fed Klaus beer urged the Recon Company commander to intervene. The captain laughed in his face. "He had this way of looking at you with his eyes half-open," recon man Frank Burkhart remembers. "If he looked at me like that, I'd just about freeze." Shriver always had been different. In the early 1960s, when Rich Ryan served with him in the 7th Army's Long Range Patrol Company in Germany, Shriver's buddies called him "Digger" since they thought he looked like an undertaker. As a joke his LRRP comrades concocted their own religion, The Mahoganites," which worshipped a mahogany statue. "So we would carry Shriver around on an empty bunk with a sheet over him and candles on the corners," recalled Ryan, "and chant, 'Maaa-haa-ga-ney, Maaa-haa-ga-ney.' Scared the hell out of new guys." Medal of Honor recipient Fleming says Shriver "convinced me that for the rest of my life I would not go into a bar and cross someone I didn't know." But no recon man was better in the woods. "He was like having a dog you could talk to," O'Rourke explained. "He could hear and sense things; he was more alive in the woods than any other human being I've ever met." During a company operation on the Cambodian border Shriver and an old Yard compatriot were sitting against a tree, O'Rourke recalled. "Suddenly he sat bolt upright, they looked at each other, shook their heads and leaned back against the tree. I'm watching this and wondering, what the hell's going on? And all of a sudden these birds flew by, then a nano-second later, way off in the distance, 'Boom-boom!' -- shotguns. They'd heard that, ascertained what it was and relaxed before I even knew the birds were flying." Shriver once went up to SOG's Command and Control North for a mission into the DMZ where Captain Jim Storter encountered him just before insert. "He had pistols stuck everywhere on him, I mean, he had five or six .38 caliber revolvers." Storter asked him, "Sergeant Shriver, would you like a CAR-15 or M-16 or something? You know the DMZ is not a real mellow area to go into." But Mad Dog replied, "No, them long guns'll get you in trouble and besides, if I need more than these I got troubles anyhow." Rather than stand down after an operation, Shriver would go out with another team. "He lived for the game; that's all he lived for," Dale Libby, a fellow CCS man said. Shriver once promised everyone he was going on R&R but instead sneaked up to Plei Djerang Special Forces camp to go to the field with Rich Ryan's A Team. During a short leave stateside in 1968, fellow Green Beret Larry White hung out with Shriver, whose only real interest was finding a lever action .444 Marlin rifle. Purchasing one of the powerful Marlins, Shriver shipped it back to SOG so he could carry it into Cambodia, "to bust bunkers," probably the only levergun used in the war. And the Real Jerry Shriver Unless you were one of Mad Dog's close friends, the image was perfect prowess -- but the truth was, Shriver confided to fellow SOG Green Beret Sammy Hernadez, he feared death and didn't think he'd live much longer. He'd beat bad odds too many times, and could feel a terrible payback looming. "He wanted to quit," Medal of Honor winner Fred Zabitosky could see. "He really wanted to quit, Jerry did. I said, 'Why don't you just tell them I want off, I don't want to run any more?' He said he would but he never did; just kept running." The 5th Special Forces Group executive officer, Lieutenant Colonel Charlie Norton, had been watching SOG recon casualties skyrocket and grew concerned about men like Mad Dog whose lives had become a continuous flirtation with death. Norton went to the 5th Group commander and urged, "Don't approve the goddamn extensions these guys are asking for. You approve it again, your chances of killing that guy are very, very good." But the group commander explained SOG needed experienced men for its high priority missions. "Bullshit," Norton snapped, "you're signing that guy's death warrant." Eventually 5th Group turned down a few extensions but only a very few; the most experienced recon men never had extensions denied. Never. "Mad Dog was wanting to get out of recon and didn't know how," said recon team leader Sonny Franks, though the half-measure came when Shriver left recon to join his teammate O'Rourke's raider company. And now the COSVN raid would make a fitting final operation; Shriver could face his fear head-on, charge right into COSVN's mysterious mouth and afterward at last call it quits. Into COSVN's Mouth The morning of 24 April 1969, while high-flying B-52s winged their way from distant Guam, the SOG raider company lined up beside the airfield at Quan Loi, South Vietnam, only 20 miles southeast of COSVN's secret lair. But just five Hueys were flyable that morning, enough to lift only two platoons; the big bombers could not be delayed, which meant Lieutenant Bob Killebrew's 3rd Platoon would have to stand by at Quan Loi while the 1st Platoon under First Lieutenant Walter Marcantel, and 2nd Platoon under First Lieutenant Greg Harrigan, raided COSVN. Capt. O'Rourke and Mad Dog didn't like it, but they could do nothing.* Nor could they do anything about their minimal fire support. Although whole waves of B-52s were about to dump thousands of bombs into COSVN, the highly classified Cambodian Rules of Engagement forbad tactical air strikes; it was better to lose an American-led SOG team, the State Department rules suggested, then leave documentable evidence that U.S. F4 Phantoms had bombed this "neutral" territory. It was a curious logic so concerned about telltale napalm streaks or cluster bomb fins, but unconcerned about B-52 bomb craters from horizon to horizon. Chief SOG Cavanaugh found the contradiction "ridiculous," but he could not change the rules. The B-52 contrails were not yet visible when the raiding force Hueys began cranking and the raiders boarded; Capt. O'Rourke would be aboard the first bird and Shriver on the last so they'd be at each end of the landing Hueys. As they lifted off for the ten-minute flight, the B-52s were making final alignments for the run-in. Minutes later the lead chopper had to turn back because of mechanical problems; O'Rourke could only wish the others Godspeed. Command passed to an operations officer in the second bird who'd come along for the raid, Captain Paul Cahill. Momentarily the raiders could see dirt geysers bounding skyward amid collapsing trees. Then as the dust settled a violin-shaped clearing took form and the Hueys descended in-trail, hovered for men to leap off, then climbed away. Then fire exploded from all directions, horrible fire that skimmed the ground and mowed down anyone who didn't dive into a bomb crater or roll behind a fallen treetrunk. From the back of the LZ, Mad Dog radioed that a machinegun bunker to his left-front had his *(Greg Harrigan and I had been boyhood friends in northeast Minneapolis.) men pinned and asked if anyone could fire at it to relieve the pressure. Holed up in a bomb crater beneath murderous fire, Capt. Cahill, 1st Lt. Marcantel and a medic, Sergeant Ernest Jamison, radioed that they were pinned, too. Then Jamison dashed out to retrieve a wounded man; heavy fire cut him down, killing him on the spot. No one else could engage the machinegun that trapped Shriver's men -- it was up to Mad Dog. Skittish Yards looked to Shriver and his half-grin restored a sense of confidence. Then they were on their feet, charging -- Shriver was his old self, running to the sound of guns, a True Believer Yard on either side, all of them dashing through the flying bullets, into the treeline, into the very guts of Mad Dog's great nemesis, COSVN. And Mad Dog Shriver was never seen again. The Fight Continues At the other end of the LZ, Jamison's body lay just a few yards from the crater where Capt. Cahill heard bullets cracking and RPGs rocking the ground. When Cahill lifted his head, an AK round hit him in the mouth, deflected up and destroyed an eye. Badly wounded, he collapsed. In a nearby crater, young Lt. Greg Harrigan directed helicopter gunships whose rockets and mini-guns were the only thing holding off the aggressive NVA. Already, Harrigan reported, more than half his platoon were killed or wounded. For 45 minutes the Green Beret lieutenant kept the enemy at bay, then Harrigan, too, was hit. He died minutes later. Bill O'Rourke tried to land on another helicopter but his bird couldn't penetrate the NVA veil of lead. Lieutenant Colonel Earl Trabue, their CCS Commander, arrived and flew overhead with O'Rourke but they could do little. Hours dragged by. Wounded men laid untreated, exposed in the sun. Several times the Hueys attempted to retrieve them and each time heavy fire drove them off. One door gunner was badly wounded. Finally a passing Australian twin-jet Canberra bomber from No. 2 Squadron at Phan Rang heard their predicament on the emergency radio frequency, ignored the fact it was Cambodia, and dropped a bombload which, O'Rourke reports, "broke the stranglehold those guys were in, and it allowed us to go in." Only 1st Lt. Marcantel was still directing air, and finally he had to bring ordnance so close it wounded himself and his surviving nine Montagnards. One medic ran to Harrigan's hole and attempted to lift his body out but couldn't. "They were pretty well drained physically and emotionally," O'Rourke said. Finally, three Hueys raced in and picked up 15 wounded men. Lieutenant Dan Hall carried out a radio operator, then managed to drag Lt. Harrigan's body to an aircraft. Thus ended the COSVN raid. A Time for Reflection Afterward Chief SOG Cavanaugh talked to survivors and learned, "The fire was so heavy and so intense that even the guys trying to [evade] and move out of the area were being cut down." It seemed almost an ambush. "That really shook them up at MACV, to realize anybody survived that [b-52] strike," Col. Cavanaugh said. The heavy losses especially affected Brig. Gen. Davidson, the MACV J-2, who blamed himself for the catastrophe. "General," Chief SOG Cavanaugh assured him, "if I'd have felt we were going to lose people like that, I wouldn't have put them in there." It's that ambush-like reception despite a B-52 strike that opens the disturbing possibility of treachery and, it turns out, it was more than a mere possibility. One year after the COSVN raid, the NSA twice intercepted enemy messages warning of imminent SOG operations which could only have come from a mole or moles in SOG headquarters. It would only be long after the war that it became clear Hanoi's Trinh Sat had penetrated SOG, inserting at least one high ranking South Vietnamese officer in SOG whose treachery killed untold Americans, including, most likely, the COSVN raiders. Of those raiders, Lt. Walter Marcantel survived his wounds only to die six months later in a parachuting accident at Ft. Devens, Mass., while Capt. Paul Cahill was medically retired. Eventually, Green Beret medic Ernest Jamison's body was recovered. But those lost in the COSVN raid have not been forgotten. Under a beautiful spring sky on Memorial Day, 1993, with American flags waving and an Army Reserve Huey strewing flower petals as it passed low-level, members of Special Forces Association Chapter XX assembled at Lt. Greg Harrigan's grave in Minneapolis, Minn. Before the young lieutenant's family, a Special Forces honor guard placed a green beret at his grave, at last conferring some recognition to the fallen SOG man, a gesture the COSVN raid's high classification had made impossible a quarter-century earlier. Until now, neither Harrigan's family nor the families of the other lost men knew the full story of the top secret COSVN raid. But the story remains incomplete. As in the case of SOG's other MIAs, Hanoi continues to deny any knowledge of Jerry Shriver. Capt. O'Rourke concluded Mad Dog died that day. "I felt very privileged to have been his friend," O'Rourke says, "and when he died I grieved as much as for my younger brother when he was killed. Twenty some-odd years later, it still sticks in my craw that I wasn't there. I wish I had been there." There remains a popular myth among SOG veterans, that any day now Mad Dog Shriver will emerge from the Cambodian jungle as if only ten minutes have gone by, look right and left and holler, "Hey! Where'd everybody go?" Indeed, to those who knew him and fought beside him, Mad Dog will live forever. (This article is derived from Maj. Plaster's book, SOG: The Secret Wars of America's Commandos in Vietnam, published by Simon & Schuster.)

Yes. I also had the pleasure of being at Balad while she was there (although she thankfully never tried to fly with me deployed), then coming home and having to baby sit her as she flew pattern work. Hands down the worst pilot I've ever flown with; low SA, bad hands and a lack of self-confidence coupled with an inability to distinguish between things that matter and things that don't. I won't say she is the worst leader I've experienced, but she is certainly the worst of the leaders at her rank I personally have dealt with. She is destined to be a GO and knows it. She made life miserable at Balad and now is even more empowered at the Died for a year. My sympathies.