TnkrToad

Not here to beat you down, but to educate. I think the issue is you've seen the skewed effects of fighter pilot overproduction in the late 90s. My SUPT class, for instance, had more T-38s than all the other 3 tracks (T-1s, T-44s, helos) combined . . . and all the T-38 bubbas either got fighters or FAIP with fighter follow ons. Fast forward to the present day, and we've got about twice as many 11Fs as 11Ms in my year group on active duty. Only one 11M from our SUPT class remains on active duty. It didn't take long to fix the late-90s "glitch"--and soon 11F underproduction was the norm. Anyway, I suspect the reason you have such a sanguine view of talent retention is that you've grown up in fighter squadrons where there are plenty of grey beards around. Talk to a grey beard 11M (O-5 type with 17-20 yrs of service), if you can find one, and ask how the AF has done with talent retention. In my experience, underproduction of 11Ms in the late 90s, combined with Northern Watch, Southern Watch, Allied Force, OEF-Afghanistan, Noble Eagle alert, Iraqi Freedom, Libya, other real world events and exercises, 180/365 deployments and (ironically) backfilling other short-manned AFSCs (did I mention the airlines are hiring?) has gutted the mobility community of its senior talent. As far as I can tell, the only "fat" in the heavy driver community is in the year groups who have yet to reach the end of their SUPT commitments. Combining a limited number of O-5 aviators, with a thinned-out bunch of O-4s with a jaded view of rated management (thanks to VSP/RIF/RPA nonvols) and giving young aviators the opportunity to walk out the door and right into airline careers even earlier in their careers strikes me as exactly the opposite of what the Air Force should do. Who knows, maybe your idea would work with the CAF community. It would be a horribly bad idea for the MAF.

Sorry to ruin your word play, but the actual percentages are even more startling--80% (283/351) of the takers thus far were those who signed early contracts in FY14. This is the overall average, so of course some communities are markedly worse. I haven't done the math on all the MWSs, but using the KC-135 community--most dear to me, over 90% (28/31) of the takers thus far were early contract types. Only 3 KC-135 bubbas have actually signed the bonus since they released it a few months ago. Obviously, still plenty of time for numbers to change, but here's a thought experiment. The early contracts are the canary in the coal mine: - Last year, 38% of FY15 eligibles signed up early - Only 15% (109/744) of FY16 eligibles have taken the early bonus thus far. That doesn't even account for all the IDE types & folks already trapped by ADSCs that'll keep 'em in for another 5 yrs - If the number of early takers doesn't increase dramatically in the next few months, then Big Blue will have to get awfully generous in FY16 to keep talent in the active duty - The only monetary incentives I can think of that might possibly help are dramatically increasing the bonus for initial eligibles and/or offering bonuses to those who are retirement eligible. Hopefully they'll pursue both options, in order to stop the hemorrhaging of talent TT

The AF's track record for managing 11Ms has sucked for at least the last two decades. Force shaping buffoonery--and apparently now nonvols (again) to RPAs are just the latest snafus in a longer-term trend.

Some on this forum seem messianic in their anti-religiousity. Ironic. I was referring to his post before the one where he talked about ISIS. The one where he lists stats about Mass, Alabama, Louisiana & Mississippi in the same post as Pakistan, Iraq & Syria. Pretty clear conflation.

You beat me to it . . . in my neck of the woods, we like to say, "correlation does not equal causation." - I'm sure oil has nothing to do with Norway's per capita success, Swiss success has nothing to do with being surrounded by a whole bunch of other countries (plus the U.S.) who by default provide for much of their country's defense (which frees resources for more economically beneficial outcomes), . . . I could go on - He also conflates "clinging to religion" with subscribing to Christianity; last I knew, Pakistan, Chad, Afghanistan, etc. weren't majority Christian countries, yet he somehow ties their lack of success to the percentage of those in economically unsuccessful southern American states that have relatively large populations of people who self-identify as Christian . . . but he ignores other structural and historical problems with those states HLF does an impressive job of attacking straw men. I suggest not feeding this troll. TT

Question for the Army flyers who frequent this forum, or those who work with them: Is the Army aviation community (especially the fixed wing folks) experiencing the same problems with retention now? With the airlines hiring, and the prospect of making a whole bunch more than Army W.O. pay (I assume the Army is offering its aviators nothing close to what the USAF is), I'd think the Army would be hemorrhaging fixed wing guys like crazy right now. - I get it that most of the Army fleet is rotary wing, but they've got a fair number of fixed wing aircraft, as well. This has to be a topic of discussion among Army aviators - If the Army is having the same retention problems, I have to wonder if this will have a second/third order effect on the USAF. Army shortfalls have a way of getting "fixed" by in-lieu-of (ILO) Air Force "solutions" - If the Army isn't suffering the same pilot losses as the Air Force, then it's worth asking what they're doing right -- I don't expect them to do much of anything right wrt things that fly, but it's worth asking the question TT

Again, my failure to communicate I guess. My overall argument is that our rated managers either 1) don't know what they're doing, or 2) are so hamstrung by whatever restrictions they operate under that they can't implement sound policy. Either way, this provides little cause for optimism. Rated managers, at least from my neck of the woods, looked clueless last year. I think we agree that last year's focus on 11Fs was nonsensical; it would have been smarter to do last year what they did this year (bonus to 20 YAS for everybody). At the very least, they could've offered it to all the overworked communities--meaning they should've at least included 11S & 11H in the list of folks offered the 20 yr option last year. My point with the 11Ms is that losing a large proportion of the largest pilot community will hurt not only the mobility community, but everyone else. See the U-2 thread; if we heavy drivers are the only ones fat on manpower, what happens when the airlines help us slim down? We now face structural problems that have been exacerbated by at least two decades' worth of unfortunate rated management decisions . . . with airline retirements only worsening an already significant problem. You're right; the next 6-9 years will be very challenging.

For those who choose to take the bonus to 20 years of aviation service, it behooves them to sign up earlier than later. The date one reaches 20 YAS doesn't change and the $25k/year is prorated . . . so every day an initial eligible waits to sign up for the bonus equals $68.49 ($25k/365 days) in bonus money said individual can't get. I guess it's the Air Force's way of encouraging folks to decide early as to whether/not they're going to take the bonus. TT

Dude, You're right--$25k/year to 20 YAS isn't enough to convince smart folks to stay on AD. Congrats. What I was trying to get at--obviously unsuccessfully--were my three primary gripes with last year's program--all of which tend to indicate that our rated managers don't seem to know what they're doing: 1) Offering enhanced options to 11Fs, but not to 11Ss (who have been crazy busy since before I was commissioned) & 11Hs (read CSAR guys, who continue to get kicked in the teeth) made no sense. 11Fs weren't the only pilot community that was undermanned, but they got special treatment while other (in my anecdotal experience) communities that were even worse off got offered nothing extra. I have yet to hear a viable rationale for that decision, but fortunately it's been remedied this year. Gotta give credit where it's due. 2) If (as some have asserted on this forum) the bonus has no real impact on people's decision to stay in or get out and essentially everyone who takes the five-year bonus stays in until they hit 20yrs, then (here I go using logic again) I personally don't understand what the economic case is for offering the bonus out to 20 YAS. If the bonus only snares a handful of fence-sitters, but costs the AF a boatload of cash (both fence sitters and those who were going to stay anyway take the bonus) then the marginal cost per fence sitter might very well be astronomical. If the Air Force is willing to shell out the cash, I won't begrudge anyone who takes it. I get it that the bonus adds a degree of predictability, which helps the bean counters. Intuitively, it seems to me that rated managers are focused too intently on predictability--huge financial outlays to convince a small number of fence-sitters--while they miss the root problem, which is nonsensical rated management policy (officer flyers getting deployed to jobs that enlisted non-flyers could do, failing to focus cuts via VSP/RIF where the "fat" really is, etc.--the list is endless). While I'm happy to be shown otherwise, misguided personnel policies seem very much still in effect. 3) 11M manning is obviously something I care (and thus know more) about personally. There are plenty of others on this forum who can speak to 11F issues. The mid-90s year groups have been worse-manned for 11Ms than they have for 11Fs since they graduated from SUPT, but there was no special effort to retain individuals from those year groups. The '95 commissioning year group, for instance, has substantially more 11Fs than 11Ms. Can't wait to see how the next few O-6 boards go, as the Air Force casts around for future mobility senior leaders and realizes they're all working for United/American/Delta/Southwest. Again, rated managers--I would hope--are aware of this pilot bathtub (particularly in the O-5 11M community), but all they've seemed to do is widen and deepen that bathtub. Airline hiring is and will take a substantial toll on the mobility community for the foreseeable future. Considering that TRANSCOM is the only COCOM that's always been led by an Air Force officer, it doesn't bode well that we're failing to retain/train our mobility talent. Call me crazy for thinking this might be a problem for our service and our nation. In sum, my gripe is with rated managers--of which few seem to lurk on this forum. Those who have been on this forum and advocated for rated managers' decisions have yet (IMHO) to offer rational explanations for the concerns voiced above--or pretty much any other flyer's concerns. If someone with insight into HAF/A1M's thinking can chime in, I'm sure we'd all benefit. I'm not holding my breath, though. Fly safe, TT

Dunno, but that would be kinda funny if FY14 takers who signed extensions were counted as new contracts: - 7/8 of the total contracts were already committed via FY14 early contracts - If a substantial number of the remaining 1/8 were in fact FY14 early contract folks who renegotiated terms, then the take rate since they released the bonus a month ago would look pretty dismal indeed At 44% take rate, all the ARP program has done is offer extra pay to those who plan to stay anyway.

Honest question--how much would contracting out mx really help? Seems to me, if I were LockMart, the first place I'd look to hire maintainers would be AD maintainers (preferably at Luke) approaching retirement/the ends of their enlistments.

Probably also helps that that the community is small (sets)--only 35 total eligibles from all the rescue communities, so 2 or 3 takers move the needle pretty significantly. The HC-130J helped--4/4 takers; unsurprising, since I'm sure they got initial qual ADSCs. The Rescue community has always had a healthy take rate, though. Funny thing is, the SOF take rate is pretty low so far, whereas they historically have had a high take rate, too. Seems like they've had a downward trend over the last few years. Cannon effect, perhaps?

Looks like AFPC has posted ARP take rates through 27 Apr. It can be found at: http://access.afpc.af.mil/vbinDMZ/broker.exe?_program=DEMOGPUB.static_reports.sas&_service=pZ1pub1&_debug=0 Overall take rate thus far for FY15 initial eligibles is 44.3% (329 takers out of 743 eligibles). Funny thing is that 283 of those takers signed early contracts in FY14--only 46 new contracts signed for initial pilot eligibles since the bonus details were released a month ago. Bottom line, the response to the new bonus offering seems underwhelming, but five months remain in the FY. The below stats could change dramatically in that time. Take rates by pilot community are (in ascending order): Fighter (11F): 35.4% Bomber (11B): 42.9% Mobility (11M): 45.5% SOF (11S): 46.3% Unmanned (11U): 46.3% C2ISR (11R): 53.8% Rescue (11H): 71.4% Notes: -- The two communities with the largest numbers of eligibles (11M & 11F) have two of the three lowest take rates thus far -- The reason for low take rates wouldn't seem to be processing time, since Rescue is already at 71% TT

Sooo . . . We've gone through the standard round of sniping back and forth over the relative virtues of taking the bonus, and we're about a month past the bonus being offered. I'm confident that bonus eligibles have gotten more than enough advice, whether they want it or not. Seems like by now most eligibles probably have a pretty good idea what direction they'll go. Questions: - Has anybody on this forum taken the bonus this FY--or is planning to? - Can anybody currently in an operational flying squadron give some insight into the current mood among crew dawgs WRT taking the bonus?

Just curious-- Now that this year's ACP bonus offering has been out for a while & folks are being forced to show their cards, anyone seen/heard any data on take rates thus far? From the anecdotal evidence on this forum (the silence is deafening), I'm guessing the take rate numbers are gonna be grim. I'd love to be wrong in my pessimism, however. I'm sure someone will chime in and tell me to wait 'til Final Jeopardy (late Sep) when the numbers can really change . . . but I imagine most of this year's bonus eligibles have a pretty good idea whether they're staying in or getting out. Is SUPT getting to be like it was in the late 90s, when the IPs spent more time talking about airline hiring than they did teaching students how to fly? For those making the decision, best wishes, regardless of what you choose. TT

Some very basic analysis from the recent O-6 board that folks here might find illuminating. I don't know what the breakdown is by pilot community; just going off the overall stats: Bottom line is making O-6 is more possible than some on this forum might think: - For pilots who met the O-6 board in the zone, 87/170 got selected in the zone, for a 51% overall promo rate o Not bad odds, really, they are even better than one might think - If you discount those who didn’t bother to do SDE by correspondence or in residence (correspondence SDE ain’t a huge hurdle), the effective IPZ promo rate pilots who really cared was 87/140, for an effective promo rate of 62.1% - This is, of course, after the top perhaps 10% have been skimmed off the top via BPZ promotion What the above all means to me is that, for those pilots in the ’94 year group that recently met the board: - If they made O-5, stayed on active duty and did the minimal work of doing at least SDE by correspondence, they essentially had a 70+% chance of making O-6 - If you factor in folks whose ADSCs/other circumstances kept them on Active Duty long enough to meet the board, but who 1) initially kept their options open by doing corr SDE, but 2) have little interest in actually making O-6, then the chances for those who really want to make O-6 are even better still (although I can’t find a way to quantify this) What this might mean to folks on this forum who haven’t met the O-6 board yet (if the most recent board is any indication): - If you managed to make O-5 and actually want to wear chickens on your shoulders: o Do SDE by correspondence (minimal work required—if you really care, I’m sure you know this and already have it done anyway), and keep plugging away (whether you’ve ever been an exec, WIC grad, Sq/CC, or not). Your chances are demonstrably very good What this might mean to USAF leadership: - An effective promo rate of 70+% to O-6 (among those who are actually trying) hardly sounds all that competitive - I suspect future O-6 boards will be even less competitive—especially for 11M types—given both A-word hiring and HAF/A1M’s mismanagement of the 11M community TT

I know it's not Friday, but perhaps it's time to review a little history. It seems funny how Arnold, Spaatz, Vandenberg, LeMay, etc., didn't seem to spend a whole lotta time (if any at all) as execs, and they certainly didn't each have 3-4 master's degrees--yet they all were effective CSAFs (ok, technically, Arnold was never CSAF, but the AAF he led had 2.4 million people in it, and kicked the crap out of Germany, Italy & Japan). As far as I can tell, the last PME school LeMay attended was ACTS--during the '39-'40 academic year, when they shortened the course in order to quadruple throughput. As far as I can tell, LeMay was a two-star before he even had a Pentagon tour . . . and that was when two-stars had way more responsibility than two-buttons today. Norstad never even attended CGSC, yet ended up as SHAPE commander, Kuter's last school was ACTS, yet he was Arnold's rep at the Yalta Conference and served as both CINCPACAF and CINCNORAD. I could go on, but I'll spare you. Bottom line, it seems to me that there was a time when the Air Force (and its predecessors--AAC, AAF) produced better strategic, global leaders. They did so without going through innumerable schools and spending inordinate time as execs. I wish current senior leaders could and would think and write as clearly and effectively as Hal George, Haywood Hansell, Larry Kuter and others did in their day. It seems to me that GC and his A1 buddies need to read some history. What made early Air Force leaders so effective? It certainly wasn't the current system (that GC is promoting), and which many on this forum are railing against. I think AF leaders did better when they promoted folks based on performance and potential, rather than PME diplomas and secretarial skills.

It's a very good call to divest Mildenhall, in my opinion. Good to see at least some rational overseas basing decisions are being made.

Lawman, thanks for your thoughts on all this. I hope you'll take my questions/discussions as critiques of your service, rather than you personally. So here goes: When I'm talking to my Army buddies about air support to ground users, my response will be: - The Air Force is putting every bit of its unmanned and manned ISR capability forward to support (due to the most-optimal employment methodology), while the Army keeps significant numbers of LD/HD RPA assets at home station due to its ridiculous operational concept for aviation. COCOMs aren't screaming for more trucks, or people for that matter (our civ leadership has declared peace is at hand), but they desperately want unmanned ISR - From the above discussion, I presume the Army has excess capacity in its MC-12/U-28 equivalent fleet, but due to the same flawed concept it's actively denying that capability to theater, as well - You can/should strip a BCT/CAB of particular assets--if those assets are LD/HD and thus desperately needed in theater, and the unit is far out from its next deployment I'll go back to my original question, then: why in the farging world would Gen Carlisle, when discussing RPAs to theater not say, "We are pushing unmanned and manned ISR to COCOMs as much as we can--to the extent that we're breaking the backs of our aircrews (and in the process mortgaging our future). While it is, and properly should be the Air Force's role to provide unmanned/manned ISR & strike to COCOMs, you might want to talk to the Army, which is actively withholding excess capacity stateside. If you want the best possible ISR & strike support to ground users, you should look no further than the U.S. Air Force. In the short term, the Army should divorce its RPA units from their respective parent units and push them to the COCOMs to the max extent possible. In the long term, they should at the very least embrace the Air Force's operational concept--or even better give those assets to a service that will use them more effectively." Furthermore, why are we airmen not saying this every time we talk to our Army brethren? I'm no apologist for our senior leaders (see my posts on the ACP thread), but the Air Force's RPA operational concept seems far superior to the Army. If such is the case, why do our senior leaders (and we) not say so--at least as often as Army dudes make ridiculous claims that airmen don't care about soldiers?

I forgot about the Shadow. Okay, so help me out with this, then. From what I can find on the interwebz the Army has: - 450+ Shadows - Somewhere between 75-150 Warriors/Gray Eagles What I just read from you above is that approx 20 of these RPAs are currently deployed in Afghanistan. I probably misunderstood what you wrote. I'm often wrong. Otherwise, that would seem like a pretty underwhelming commitment of resources to the fight (even after accounting for training/depot mx/etc.). Is it really true that less than 30% of the Army's Grey Eagles (and less than 5% of the overall Grey Eagle/Shadow fleet) are deployed in Afghanistan, at a time when CENTCOM is apparently screaming for every single airframe they can get their hands on? What am I missing here?

Honest questions: - What is the current status of the Army's Gray Eagles (Predator equivalents)? - If they exist in significant numbers stateside, why are COCOMs not screaming for them to be deployed to theater, and furthermore why is this not even mentioned in the article? Bottom line, my understanding is that Army RPAs--to include the Predator-equivalent Gray Eagles--deploy and redeploy with their parent units, which by definition means that LD/HD assets are available stateside but going grossly underutilized. If RPAs are LD/HD assets that COCOMs desperately need, and the Army has Grey Eagles stateside, but is unwilling to give them up (while Air Force RPA units are getting crushed), why is this not much bigger news? We love to bash the Air Force for not being team players/being unwilling to support the guys on the ground, but this would seem to indicate that the Army is equally culpable of screwing over its own people/our coalition ground partners. Of course, if the Army is in fact supporting joint warfighters by detaching their RPA units from their parent divisions and releasing them to support broader joint requirements, why is this not bigger news?

No argument with your points above, but to get back to the author's underlying point--if/when you get to the point in a mission when the ground SOF unit no longer needs you, are you sent straight home, or are you released to support conventional units if needed (assuming crew duty day/turn times allow)? - If not, that's a foul--as the article indicates - In my experience with TSOCs, JSOTFs and JSOACs--and I've got plenty--integration/mutual support between SOF and conventional units is a significant problem. Within the Air Force, there is plenty of blame to go around between conventional and AFSOC components. Even more so, however, I have seen too few AFSOC guys who were able/willing to advocate for the rational use of airpower--whether they be gunships, MC-130s, or other assets--to TSOC commanders. The end result is SOF air that could support conventional folks gets held back by TSOCs, and missions that conventional aircraft could do as well (and in some cases better) than AFSOC assets never get asked for. As a result you end up with Talons flying basic airland missions and (if the article is to be believed), guys in conventional units die because TSOCs are unwilling to provide excess capacity (when they have it) to support the joint force The article's author isn't the only one who has trouble understanding the operational and strategic levels of war.

While I get what you're saying, the author's basic point is that airpower gets misused when it's penny packeted out to ground units. In this case, it's a foul that the TSOC had control of the AC-130s in theater and, even though the gunships could/should have been released to support conventional units in many cases, the TSOC wouldn't let them go. We won this argument way back in Northwest Africa during WW II, ensuring airmen were in charge of running air support and getting away from air umbrellas. Apparently, AFSOC leadership never read their history (FM 100-20), nor did they ever clue in about current Air Force doctrine. If senior AFSOC leaders and the folks they deploy to theater JSOACs are so obtuse about (or incapable of arguing for) value-added airpower employment--or conversely the ARSOF/NAVSOF commanders are so thick skulled that they can't be convinced to do the right thing and release their assets to conventional units when they have the greater need, then we really are in trouble. Seifert gets no points for style, going way outside of his chain of command, but his general point is valid. There is never enough airpower to go around--it should be used wisely. I hope that it is.

This is already being discussed in the What's Wrong with the Air Force thread.

I hear ya', brother. Just to be clear--I'm not on staff, and I'm in no position to task any aviators on this forum. Just offering insight as one of those who the crap has rolled downhill onto at the unit level more times than I can count, and who has spent some time on HHQ staffs.