TnkrToad

. . . Which helps prove my point. I went with optimistically high mil pilot production, optimistically low annual airline hiring, and an optimistically high number of pilots the AF/Navy can afford to lose to the airlines. FWIW, I've found quotes of up to 1200 each from AF and Navy, hence the 2,400. Using even my most sanguine assumptions, we're still just a few years away from major issues in both the Air Force and the airlines. Feel free to adjust my assumptions to whatever you think closer matches reality, and see where that puts the Air Force and the broader aerospace industry in a few years.

You can check out the annual FY Rated Retention Reports at http://access.afpc.af.mil/vbinDMZ/broker.exe?_program=DEMOGPUB.static_reports.sas&_service=pZ1pub1&_debug=0. The FY16 report still has yet to be published, but here were the losses (to separations, retirements, promotion to Colonel, grounded or "other') over the last few FYs: - FY12: 1420 (590 were separations) - FY13: 1104 (432 were separations) - FY14: 1735 (832 were separations) - FY15: 1139 (579 were separations) If, prior to FY16, we were (1) averaging over 1k/yr losses, (2) only producing a little over 1k pilots/yr, and (3) airline hiring is still just getting warmed up, I'd say the AF is in a tight spot. Especially for heavies, the 1500 hr rule is nothing close to a discriminator. Much like ihtfp06, I had over 1,500 hrs by the end of my first flying assignment. By 10 yrs after SUPT, I was around 3,500. That total was limited by the fact that one of the later flying assignments was at an overseas tanker base, where crews weren't even deploying downrange when I got there. TT

Copy all, but even with the R-ATP option, I still have difficulty seeing how ERAU/UND/Purdue/etc. can/will survive: - ERAU: We'll help you become an airline pilot! - Student: How's that going to work? - ERAU: You'll plunk down $200k+ on a four-year education, along with flight instruction (by which time we'll get you to 250 hrs/commercial ticket! Woohoo!); then you'll get to starve as a CFI, building up to maybe 450 hrs total; then, well, we're not sure--maybe starve as the pilot for a dropzone, if you can find one of those jobs--to get to 750 hrs; then . . . you'll get to pay more for your R-ATP and starve as a regional airline pilot! (If said regional hasn't gone bankrupt, due to all the captains being hired away by the major airlines). If your regional airline does somehow survive, you'll eventually have a shot at getting hired by a major airline! - Student: Hmm. Massive debt and no reasonable expectation of a living wage for at least 6.9 years after graduation? No thanks; I'll just become an electrical engineer and build a totally sweet flight sim for the days I get the flying itch. Sure seems like we're 2-3 years (max) away from a crisis that'll take way more than 2-3 years to unscrew, even if the 1500 hr rule were eliminated today. Hard to see how anyone's even going to want to start into the ERAU/other pipeline, given the barriers to entry. TT

It strikes me that the issue is timing: there is no time to unscrew this: - Assumption (but backed by other posters on this forum): there are only about 3,000 civ pilots who are well-enough qual'd to be hired by the major airlines - Airlines are projected to hire 3,000+ pilots/yr for the foreseeable future (way conservative, but makes the math easier) - Air Force & Navy are producing about 2,400 pilots/yr. Of those--due to illness/injury/death/disinterest in airline careers/promotion to Colonel/etc.--let's say maybe 1,500 of them (total from AF and Navy) will reach the ends of their mil careers and still be viable candidates for the airlines . . . and will actually want to fly for the airlines - The commercial sector doesn't currently have a viable way to get folks to 1,500 hrs, to even start flying for Regionals, so the regionals will soon be going tits up: quality regional captains will be hired away by the majors, and there will be almost no way to get new blood into the ranks - Based on the above assumptions, within 3 years, if not much sooner (my numbers are very optimistic), just about the only viable places US major airlines will be able to find qual'd pilots will be prior-mil folks and foreign pilots. Of course, the demand for pilots will be even greater overseas--particularly in Asia/Pacific--than there is in North America, so expats will be hard to come by - If the 1,500 hr rule remains in place, the only viable way I can remotely imagine this won't be a major crisis--for both the airlines and the military--within the next few years is if the airlines start now (preferably last year or earlier, but oh well) to create a viable path to 1,500 hrs for airline pilot wannabes (a path that doesn't require any regional flying, which--again--will destroy the regionals and drive major airline hiring even higher). Even if they do create a viable path ASAP, I don't see how they're going to be able/willing to afford paying for the numbers of non-revenue generating hours they'll need to buy in order to get folks up to speed. Even if they can afford it, it takes quite a while to build 1,500 hrs--I would think more than 3 years - We haven't even discussed the impact on business aviation, cargo airlines, civilian contractors that perform missions in lieu of military missions, etc. But hey, it's outside of the CSAF's lane to think of such things. If he retires in the next 2-3 years, the crisis should happen on someone else's watch. TT

You're funny.

Observations: - Nothing we've discussed in this thread involves Goldfein in any way restricting AF pilots' ability to get out at the ends of their respective commitments and pursue employment with the airlines. The only restriction is on those with commercial licenses (250 hrs min) who previously could have served as airline first officers -- His recommendation would, however, ultimately expand competition for those jobs--a free-market principle which many on this forum typically espouse - I have yet to hear how life has improved for civilians with less than 1,500 hrs since the FAA rule was enacted. While QOL prior to the ruling might have been a horror show, how is life any better now for those who are trying to build their hours, without the regional airline option available to them? -- As amply discussed on this forum, life is good for those who are already airline pilots (ALPA = the white-collar version of the Pipefitters' Union), and the prospects are pretty darn good for those with essentially a free ticket to the union (prior-mil pilots). Since I've heard no evidence yet to the contrary, I presume that QOL/safety issues have gotten worse for civ pilots who're now having a harder time getting past the higher barrier to entry -- BTW, nobody forced anyone to take those crap regional jobs in the pre-1500 hr rule days Don't get me wrong; I'm the son of a retired airline pilot and a current AD AF pilot. I really like the position of advantage I'm currently in--thanks, FAA/ALPA/rapidly-retiring Baby Boom generation! I just find much of the discussion on this thread to be a bit disingenuous. TT

Honest question: has the 1500 hr rule solved a problem, or simply shifted it elsewhere? The 1500 hr rule has obviously made it impossible for folks with a commercial ticket to build hours for their ATPs by flying with the regionals. The substantial pay raises airline pilots are seeing (in part due to the barrier to entry the 1500 hr rule poses) mean that civilians are still going to look for ways to build enough hours to break into the big leagues. Purely conjecture on my part, but I'd assume this means more folks will be willing to work for slave wages and experience crappy quality of life (but just not in the regionals) as a means to build the necessary hours. I presume they'll remain CFIs, fly for a low-rent cargo outfit, or maybe go overseas and get paid slave wages while flying with a multi-pilot license for a foreign airline. Perhaps there are other ways in the U.S. to build the requisite hours--I have no real background in the civil sector--but I have difficulty seeing how any of them will offer awesome QOL while folks build toward the magic 1500 hr mark. Godspeed to military and civilian folks looking to eventually secure jobs with major airlines. Neither route is easy. TT

Do you really think you'd be unable to make a living outside of the Air Force, if the 1500 hr rule was rescinded? If so, you're completely ignoring decades of pre-1500 hr rule history (and/or you have a very low opinion of your own marketability as an AF pilot). You've apparently ignored my references to the late-90s (read pre-1500 hr rule) hiring spree. Folks hired by the majors back then weren't exactly starving. BTW, the anti-1500 hr rule argument isn't the only thing he's doing to try to stop the hemorrhaging.

I would say that Fingers is trying to find a way to keep adequate numbers of pilots on AD past the ends of their SUPT commitments, in order to meet warfighting requirements. The 1500 rule works directly and dramatically against Fingers' efforts, as discussed above. Rescinding the 1500 hour rule is no panacea--the Air Force will continue to hemorrhage people anyway; the economic and QOL benefits are too substantial even without it. I simply don't understand why folks on this forum are upset with him trying to do his job. There are plenty more valid things to complain about than this.

Let's see... 1. Both the Captain and First Officer in the Colgan Air crash had well over 1,500 hrs, yet they still died. Total flying hours was not the issue. It didn't save them that day. 2. Who is flying the regional jets--mainline or regional airlines--still doesn't fix the fundamental problem--there has to be a financially-viable way for folks (outside of the military) to get to 1,500 hrs. I don't see what your solution is to this problem, other than jacking up mainline payscales so much that the financial incentives are so great that nobody will stay on AD. Seems like a concern the CSAF should involve himself with. 3. As I wrote in a previous post, rescinding the 1,500 hr rule wouldn't preclude a quality prior-mil dude from getting hired when he retires/separates (see late-90s AF retention woes). It'll just tweak the supply/demand curve a bit, so you don't get quite so much cash as you would with the rule still in place. In other words, the concerns you voice are primarily economic/financial; what Goldfein & Co. are doing to try to make is comparatively irrelevant--it's all about the Benjamins. I get it; senior Air Force leaders can/should do more to eliminate queep/refocus on the mission/etc. Objections to the CSAFs efforts to have the 1500 hr rule rescinded, though, sound suspiciously like whining. TT

Umm, since before the Air Force was an independent service. There's a whole lotta butthurtness on this forum over something they really need not to be butthurt over. There was no 1500 hr rule in the late 90s, yet folks had no problem getting hired then. If the airlines keep hiring at the levels they're projecting, you're worth your salt, you'll have no problem getting hired--even if they rescind the 1500 rule. For Goldfein, the issue is that the 1500 hr rule screwed over Air Force pilot retention even more. At least before, there was a marginally financially viable way for folks to build their hours through the civilian-only route. Folks would take the financial risk of paying for all the training and quals, and would suck up flying for peanuts in the regionals, since they had the hope of eventually reaching the big leagues, with their big league pay. The 1500 hr rule screwed that whole path up. Once the pool of maybe 3,000 (I get this number from a previous poster--can't vouch for its accuracy) well-qualified folks dries up, where are the major airlines, regionals, business aviation companies, etc., going to find their pilots, other than the military services--most notably Air Force, but also Navy, Marine Corps and Army? Rescinding the 1500 hr rule would at least offer a little bit of relief, and at this point, every little bit helps. Goldfein faces a further problem, in that a surprising amount of the military mission is executed by civilian contractors. The 1500 hr rule thus not only makes AF pilot retention harder, but it threatens the national aviation industry, by raising the barriers to entry too high for pilots. USTRANSCOM, for instance, contracts a helluva a lot of cargo movement; what happens when Atlas, Kalitta, DHL, etc., can't fly due to aircrew unavailability? It's not like they'll be able to task more C-17s to meet mission requirements, since--you guessed it--the AD and ARC C-17 units will have been gutted by airline hiring. In my mind, it would help if Goldfein approached the problem as a threat to the national aerospace system and industry, than "simply" a pilot retention problem. TT

Dude, I get it about counterfactual history. Can only go so far when blaming AAC/AAF leadership for failing to recognize the need for long-range escort. Limited productive capacity early in the war and substantial technical issues with long-range fighter ideas were major problems. Even more so, the Army screwed its Air Corps WRT funding throughout the Interwar Period, which severely hobbled military aircraft development efforts. My academic geekery is clearly showing through. Not trying to engage in penis measuring, but rather getting on my historical soapbox. Should've made that more clear. Read on, but only if you're interested in a historical diatribe: I think a key part of AAF/AF history needs to be reconsidered, specifically the notions of a "Bomber Mafia" that forced the AAC/AAF to buy too many bombers & de-emphasize fighters. It's a bullcrap, "stab-in-the-back" argument fomented by (as it turns out, primarily fighter pilot) AAF generals to explain the decision not to pursue long-range fighter development (even though the Japanese had been using drop tanks since 1937). As an aside, Mike Worden's Rise of the Fighter Generals makes for interesting reading, but crappy history. I suspect that book has done much to screw up folks' historical understanding. To your point about "What was the leadership scheme from the end of WWII until well into Vietnam?" Well, let's see the list of AAF Chiefs/CSAFs: - Hap Arnold (1941-46) : hard to characterize; I'd call him a generalist. If anything, I'd say fighter pilot (the Wright aircraft he started his career flying certainly weren't bombers) - Tooey Spaatz (1946-48): fighter pilot - Hoyt Vandenberg (1948-53): fighter pilot - Nate Twining (1953-57): fighter pilot - Tommy White (1957-61): fighter pilot - Curt LeMay (1961-65): fighter pilot-turned bomber pilot (BTW, LeMay had a shorter term as CSAF than anyone else on this list) - J.P. McConnell (1965-69): fighter pilot That covers Chiefs of the Air Staff/CSAF from the Second World War through 1969 (you mentioned through Vietnam). Fighter pilot dominance resumed in 1982, with Chuck Gabriel, 13 years after McConnell gave up the throne. Of course, Arnold's interwar predecessors were fighter bubbas, too. In sum, the USAF and its predecessors have been run by fighter pilots for all but about 16 of the last 100 years or so. But who's counting; wouldn't want to get in the way of a good historical narrative. Getting back to the point of the thread: it's ridiculous to me that we've invested so little time in examining our service history, that we've allowed mythical notions of early Air Force bomber pilot dominance persist for so long. Makes one wonder what else we remain woefully ignorant about. TT

Copy. Losses on missions like the Schweinfurt raid had much to do with inadequate training & experience. Of course, many of those crews were lost because the (primarily fighter pilot) AAC/AAF leadership failed to adequately consider the need for long-range fighters. It is noteworthy that the P-38, P-47, and P-51 (which would define the AAF's long-range fighter fleet) had all flown before the AWPD-1 team first met in Aug 1941. Furthermore, especially in senior leadership billets, fighter pilots grossly outnumbered bomber pilots throughout the war. It must still have been the bomber guys' fault that so many of their crews got shot down over Germany. It couldn't have had anything to do with (ACTS pursuit--read fighter--instructor) Hoyt Vandenberg (who at the time was responsible for global aircraft allocation), who wrote (ACTS fighter instructor) Tooey Spaatz in early 1941 that bomber escort was "incompatible with the mission of pursuit." In this, he was merely parroting the opinion of his ACTS fighter pilot mentor Claire Chennault. Folks like Curt Lemay (who started his career as a fighter pilot) would suffer the consequences of decisions made by men who failed to fully consider what the strategic bombardment mission would entail. Thankfully, American productive capacity and airmen's wartime learning (going back to plan/brief/execute/debrief discussion) enabled the AAF to overcome early wartime strategic planning blunders. I sure hope our senior leaders can convince the President and Congress of the need to maintain adequate numbers of well-trained crews, operating high-quality weapons systems, so we don't suffer any future Schweinfurts. BTW, the 8th AF lost more men over Europe than the Marines did in all of the Pacific. Somehow that never shows up in the Marines' propaganda efforts. What's really crazy is that the AF doesn't advertise how much airpower contributed to winning the Second World War, either. Of course, that would mean airmen would have to read history books. TT

Not Friday yet, but here's a quick history lesson: The AAF graduated over 193,000 pilots (just pilots, not bombardiers, navs, flt engineers, gunners, etc.) in 6 years, between Jul '39 and Aug '45. There were only 966 student pilots in training in Sep 39. By Dec 43, there were 74,000 pilots in stateside training alone. Bottom line, Of course there was little to no briefing. The instructors were barely more qualified than their students. They had comparatively little knowledge to offer, and minimal time to impart what wisdom they did have. Wartime flying "training" was less training than Darwinian survival of the fittest, because it was the blind leading the blind. Consequently, there were 136,000 flying training eliminees and fatalities in stateside training alone. Over 65,000 aircraft were lost in the CONUS alone during the war (15,000 of them were heavy & very heavy bombers). My point--Wanna get people killed or injured? Fight wars without effective planning, briefing and postmission debriefing. WW II sounds really awesome, until you realize the human carnage and piles of bent metal that went along with it. TT

Ouch. Confusion and delay are exactly what Big Blue needs to avoid when it comes to pilot retention initiatives; appreciate the insight.

Bump-- It's been 4 months since the FY closed out, but AFPC still has yet to post the FY16 Rated Retention Report. I have no way of knowing if this is due to ignorance, incompetence, or concern about publishing bad news. Observations: - The early take rate for the FY17 eligibles was 28.4% (233/820). I reckon this covers all the IDE selects, folks in AF-sponsored Masters & Ph.D. programs, etc.--i.e., folks who were bound to stay in anyway -- These are overall stats; the 11F & 11B communities are pretty darn bad--19.7% early takers for fighters & 22.4% early takers for bombers. These stats pretty much match the early take rates from the prior FY, though - We're a third of the way into the new FY, but I haven't heard anybody griping about Big Blue's delay in implementing this FY's policy -- The lack of concern/discussion on this forum seems like a pretty clear negative indicator of interest in taking the bonus After all the AF senior leaders' public handwringing over pilot shortages, it'll be interesting to see how much this FY's ACP offering changes. TT

I get what you're saying. The issue--and trying to keep this related to the "fighter enterprise"--is that unity of command for the CAF, but particularly fighters, fits well with unity of command under geographic COCOMs. You deploy to CENTCOM with your A-10, you're never going to support anyone other than folks in the CENTCOM AOR. For heavies, the issue is whose unity of command is more important: the geographic combatant commander, or the functional combatant commander? Unity of command for CENTCOM suggests the CENTCOM/CC (via the JFACC) should have OPCON of all the heavies in theater. Unity of command for TRANSCOM--with its responsibility for airlift & tanker ops around the globe--would suggest the TRANSCOM/CC needs to exercise OPCON through the TACC and manage heavies globally (rather than giving each GCC his own rice bowl of assets). We don't penny packet out A-10s to each Army division, for the same reason we shouldn't just penny packet (CHOP) heavies to geographic commanders, when those heavies can support multiple COCOMs from one day to the next. Anyway, sounds like we both agree--we'd both like to have more C2 tail at home (sts). TT

So, you'd rather be deployed to the CAOC, than do the exact same job from St. Louis? BTW, the Army's (read CENTCOM's) notions of unity of command lead to stupid stuff like 80 CAPs worth of UASs/RPAs sitting in Army garrisons back in the US, while the AF struggles to meet COCOMs' requirements for 65 CAPs. But, hey, unity of command is far more important than providing combat capabilities to warfighters . . .

With regard to fighters and bombers, you probably could do the MAAP job remotely, at least in a steady-state fight. In my experience, the fighter bubbas spent about 69 seconds of their duty days planning which CAPs they were going to orbit in, and the rest watching movies on the morale server. The more dynamic the operation is, the more you need to have pax forward-deployed to the CAOC. For tankers/other HVAA, remote planning is a much tougher sell. Lots of coord required within and outside of Plans--with Ops Div, AMD, ISRD, SOLE, BCD, coalition partners, etc.--IOT balance competing requirements in multiple JOAs (even in a steady-state operation). Never enough HVAA to go around, so planning those assets is all the more involved and painful. Collocation helps speed coordination. The above said, TACC could likely take on an even bigger role in moving pax/cargo around theater, which could allow the AMD to shrink significantly. Of course, it would hurt the CENTCOM/CC's feelings to know that he doesn't have complete control (COCOM or OPCON) of everything in his AOR.

In general, the justification for 365s is, or at least should be, that it's long enough for someone to make substantial changes, if they're called for. If deployed to a CAOC, for instance, it takes some time to get the lay of the land/get settled into the job. If on a 90- or 120-day rotation, by the time you really get to know what's broke, know which key players you need to convince to fix whatever's broke and earn their trust, you're basically out of time to actually enact any value-added change. The more people there are in the CAOC/JTF-Whatever you're deployed to who are on 90-120 day rotations, the worse this dynamic is. Jjust about the time you're ready to pull the trigger on a substantial change, the other key players rotate out and you're back to square one. Gotta educate and build trust with the FNGs. Before you know it, you reach the end of your tour, and--despite your and others' best efforts--the status quo remains. It's hard enough to enact change in the CAOC, where you're primarily working with other AF bubbas, with a smattering of air minded folks from other countries. It's even worse when working in a JTF, where you have to convince senior leaders from other services to make changes to processes or programs. Their experiential blinders and service parochial interests can be (and frequently are) huge impediments to success. I presume Big Blue has done the calculus, and has determined that losing some folks to 7-day opts is worth it, in order to ensure we have staffers who can save lives and money by fighting bad ideas (the Army is especially full of them) downrange. If we're deploying folks to 365s to serve as Powerpoint rangers and other monkey-work billets, though, that crap has gotta stop. TT

I've not seen the brief you've seen, but a few things just don't make sense to me: - There should be no 11F required 365s? I agree that requirements need to be scrutinized, but c'mon, man--if 11F experience were that valueless downrange, Big Blue wouldn't be quite so concerned about 11F retention. The point is to have competent folks in force application/other 11F-relevant billets. Who else would you suggest fill those CAF-type downrange billets? 11Ms? Intel officers? Space officers? It ain't like the 11B community is awash with extra bodies. - Re: IDE, I'd say this should be the other way around--follow the Petraeus model. If one wants to go to IDE, or especially SAASS, he/she should have a meaningful overseas deployment under his/her belt. Too often the bright and shinies find ways to avoid ever doing much of anything operationally relevant as they work their way up the ranks - Airline hiring is a major factor. I'd say you need to think a bit bigger-picture: -- There is a very clear historical negative correlation between a-word hiring and AF pilot retention. This is true in all AF pilot communities -- Going back to the discussion above, even if a-word doesn't necessarily make a direct difference in 11Fs' decisions to take the bonus, the indirect impact is huge. Let's say Big Blue works to limit the number of 11F-required billets downrange, and adds other sweeteners (beyond pay) to encourage 11Fs to stay on AD. Guess what--the billet will likely still be filled. Problem is, it ends up being filled by an 11M or perhaps 11R--which our primarily fighter pilot leaders have blithely decided are somehow healthy on manning. Hmm--11Ms have the choice between either getting beaten down on active duty, or heading for the exits and within a year enjoying better pay, better quality of life, and freedom from getting tagged with downrange deployments that should in fact be filled by folks with force application backgrounds (not to mention the many other 11M-required billets). At a very minimum, the airlines drain the Air Force of all the other folks that are backfilling 11Fs in jobs around the globe. -- I would be curious if the survey only focused on those approaching the ends of their SUPT commitments, or if they also surveyed those hitting the 20-yr retirement decision. The choices then are even more stark--one can remain on AD and effectively work for half pay and postpone building airline seniority, or get out at exactly 20 years, and within a year be making more--between AF retirement and a-word paycheck--than they ever would have on AD. In sum, I get that 11F manning is a substantial concern. I agree the Air Force needs to make a number of changes--not all of them costly--to encourage folks to stay in (reviewing AFSC requirements for various billets, minimizing unnecessary PCSs, pushing back against stupid COCOM requirements, etc.), no argument there. The above said, AF senior leaders are rightfully acknowledging that airline hiring is a big deal, and they need to continue working to find ways to minimize its negative effects on retention. Perhaps just as importantly, they need to stop insulting our intelligence. All the public handwringing over 11F shortages (with little mention of other pilot communities) implies that other AF pilot communities are somehow fat, dumb and happy. Nothing could be further from the truth, and a-word hiring is just getting warmed up. A sure way to keep retention low is to stay on this fighter-myopic track the USAF is currently on. TT

I can only speak to the AD side, so someone else will have to chime in from the ARC perspective. What Azimuth said checks; in my mind, no heavy driver (AD or ARC) should deploy for much more than 60 days: fly (with waiver) at a rate of 150 hrs/month for two months, then redeploy IOT remain within the 330 hrs/90 days FAA limit. Deploying heavy drivers--eventually to include KC-46s--for 90 or more days is just dumb, unless they're deploying to the CAOC or some other nonflying/min flying (Sq CC or DO) type billet. If you're at a deployed location and sq leadership isn't at least moderately concerned about managing crews' max flying hours, then there are too many folks deployed/not enough home station with mom & the kids. TT

Not an AMC planner, so my advice is worth what you paid for it. I suspect it'll be like Obamacare--gotta get it on the ramp before we see what it can really do; hence, difficult to predict with certainty how it'll be deployed. BLUF, I suspect the KC-46 will be a great airplane to go to, if you're either (1) single and like to be gone a ton, or (2) are married and don't like your family: - Tanker requirements always exceed the AD's capacity to meet them, so KC-46 crews--just like KC-135 and -10 crews--will get tasked heavily to meet demand - The KC-46 will have capabilities that the other two tanker airframes lack, which will make them all the more desirable by COCOMs - Big Blue, wanting to show off the wisdom of buying the KC-46, will be all the more motivated to deploy it downrange/ employ it all over the world. Even if it didn't have many requirements, they'd come up with some - Once we're in full-rate production, the aircraft will arrive faster than adequate numbers of aircrews can be produced to fly them. Big Blue, wanting to highlight the aircraft's capabilities, will accept the "necessity" to overtask the limited numbers of crews, in order to showcase their shiny new plane (see bullet above) - KC-46 aircrew production will be further hobbled by the fact that Big Blue is prioritizing CAF pilot production, while MAF bubbas walk toward the light at the end of their SUPT commitments - Better still, the ARC owns about half the tanker mission, but it's got its own manning woes; less help from ARC = heavier taskings for AD Hopefully someone who flew C-17s in the late 90s/early 2000s will chime in; my impression is that community experienced much the same dynamic. I seem to remember my C-17 buddies just getting crushed during this timeframe. If you're highly motivated/ambitious, want to fly a bunch and make your mark in a community that will surely still be defining itself, the KC-46 will be an awesome opportunity. You'll be part of developing tactics and writing regs to a degree that is nigh to impossible in older, more established communities. Best of luck, but go in with your eyes wide open. TT

I can tell you (at least roughly) how it's going to play out for the MAF year group(s)--like the one that's currently graduating--which get shorted for bodies, in favor of the CAF: - They'll all start their flying careers being really busy, flying a bunch and getting sq jobs folks in prior year groups would never have gotten so early - Way too early in their careers, the bright and shiny types will be identified, and will quickly join the protected class which rarely flies or deploys/is set up for the string of jobs/assignments that will make them really promotable. The next tier down--the ones not on the leadership track, but who are competent/dependable--will get crushed with all the important, yet non-sexy (read hardship) deployments & home station jobs. The middle of the packers--good flyers, but not great leaders/staff types--will fly their arses off and also get crushed with deployments. Those (at least according to AF perceptions) who are at the bottom of the pack will likely enjoy a level of job security that in prior years they never would have had. That is, until such time that they get RIFd--because, of course, the AF needs to retain its critically manned 11Fs (even though in this year group the 11Fs will be overmanned relative to 11Ms/others). - About 10 years from now, the bright and shinies (the ones who bother to stay on AD) will be in IDE & will already be largely disconnected from ground truths in the mobility community. The second-tier & middle of the road guys--if the civil sector is hiring--will get out in droves. The bottom of the pack folks will likely stay in. - 20 years from now, the bright and shinies will still be bright and shiny, and more importantly will have had careers that in no way reflect the experiences of the masses. The second-tier and middle of the road folks will all be retired, or--at best--will still be on AD, but enjoying cush jobs (the only kinds of jobs that could entice them to stay in). The bottom dwellers who survived being passed over/RIFs/etc. will still be on AD, too. They'll be the middle managers. The O-6 and above MAF leaders will have some really awesome ideas, after having spent so much time in schools/as execs/on staffs. Problem is, their middle managers--the passed-over O-4 and O-5 types--will almost exclusively be the middle of the roaders and bottom dwellers of yesteryear. Those executing the missions will almost exclusively be folks with less than 10 years rated service--i.e., folks who haven't yet had the opportunity to punch. In sum, we'll have a whole bunch of good idea generators, but lack adequate numbers of competent people to put those ideas (whether good--or more likely good-sounding but questionable) into action. Funny. This situation I describe twenty years from now kinda sounds like where the MAF is today: out of touch O-6 and above types, a razor-thin slice of competent O4s and O-5s trying to keep the ship afloat, and a bunch of junior dudes who are 1) eyeing life outside of AD, and 2) unimpressed by the AF clownshow. Problem is, ten years ago, we had the "good fortune" of 9/11, the Great Recession, and FAA rule changes to encourage folks to remain on AD. Consequently, we were able to retain at least a degree of talent. Barring another catastrophe, I don't see the Air Force future as being quite so rosy for the current crop of recent MAF SUPT graduates. The MAF will be even more broken, but at least there'll be enough CAF bubbas to fill the AF's senior leadership roles, going forward. So we'll have that going for us. TT

Omega Air already does contract AR; I'm sure they'd be happy to take on more requirements ... Sent from my iPhone using Baseops Network Forums