TnkrToad

But...the ACP has worked great, in the right conditions--all that's needed is for the FAA to increase the mandatory retirement age to 70, get rid of the 1,500 hour rule, and maybe have another recession or SARS-like scare. I'm sure bumping the bonus up to $35k a year (with Congressional approval; I'm sure McCain will bend over backward to support the CSAF) will compensate for the fact none of the above is like to happen in the near term. Cynicism aside, I don't know how the Air Force--in the near term--can unscrew about a quarter century of misguided personnel decisions. TT

Umm, not sure what you're getting at: - 72k officers/363k total in the USAF to share the workload (vs. 61k officers/307k total now)? - "Feet on the ramp" and other coercive policies to "encourage" folks to stay on AD? I sure hope we don't get to the point where the take rate is the same as FY98 (28% that year). Good news is it's already a whopping 35% TT

The bottom line is a failure to meet retention targets equates to a current (and to a greater extent future) leadership crisis. Big Blue will have the people it needs to fill cockpits, due to the 10-yr commitment. Line flyers will get crushed by the opstempo, but that's mostly a reality of fighting global wars, in an Air Force that the President/Congress are willing to adequately fund. Failure to meet retention targets means there won't be enough people with aviation backgrounds to fill staffs/serve as commanders/go to school/etc. Low ACP take rates equate to low pilot retention, which means flying sq/ccs, og/ccs, and on up are picked based on the best of who bothered to stay in. It further means those leaders are being advised by staffers who (1) are the best of those who didn't make the command cut line, and (2) aren't vitally needed in flying units. If the Air Force fails to meet its ACP take rate targets, expect to see progressively worse decisions from our leaders. The great leaders who stay in--and there are many--will be overworked & likely burn out. The not as great ones, who in prior years would never have made the cut for command, will do the best they can...but again, their actions won't be as awesome as those of prior generations. The decisions they make, and the way their policies are implemented, will be made all the worse, because they'll get their advice from less-capable staff dudes (garbage in/garbage out) . . . and even if leaders' decisions are awesome, they'll be counting on less-capable lower-level commanders and staffers to carry out their policies. In my mind, the ACP take rate is a good way of gauging the likely quality of future Air Force leaders. Judging by last year, and the stats thus far this year, the outlook ain't all that great. Here's to hoping AF leaders will do everything they can to fix what is within their spans of control. Contrary to JQP's typical line of argument, though, I think Presidential/Congressional policy can be blamed for a substantial part of the current crisis. TT

Some recent news, relevant to the bonus discussion: I must have been asleep at the wheel, but Republic Airways filed for bankruptcy six days ago, citing a pilot shortage. If they and other regionals fix their shortages by offering reasonable wages, this could provide all the more incentive for folks to bail from AD. http://www.forbes.com/sites/grantmartin/2016/02/26/republic-airways-files-for-bankruptcy/#b583c9712fc4 The CSAF testified before Congress yesterday re: pilot retention issues. According to the article, "The Air Force also wants to increase retention pay for both manned and unmanned pilots to $35,000 a year—a move Congress will have to sign off on." I almost laughed out loud when I read Welsh called it a "long-awaited" issue. I can't square that rhetoric with the reality of recent pilot force management. http://www.airforcemag.com/DRArchive/Pages/2016/March%202016/March%2003%202016/Welsh-The-Pilot-Retention-Problem-is-Here.aspx The last update of bonus take rate stats was posted on 8 Feb--almost four weeks ago. I suspect it's because they've gotten few new takers, so nothing new to report. TT

I disagree. The point is, with an 84% O-5 promotion opportunity, you will pin on Lt Col, so long as you're not in the bottom 16% of your commissioning year group who: (a) made O-4, and (b) bothered to stay on active duty. - Having a DP going into a board is awesome, but--again--as long as you're somewhere close to the middle of the pack relative to your peers, you will pin on silver oak leaves One more thing: gender matters. - 174 females were selected for O-5 (total--BPZ, IPZ and APZ). There were 188 IPZ female eligibles; this equates to a female promotion opportunity of 92.5% - 1,277 males were selected for O-5, when there were 1,539 IPZ male eligibles; this equates to a male promotion opportunity of 83.0% If you really want to get promoted, be a girl. TT

The promotion opportunity was 84%: - There were 1,727 people considered for promotion In the Promotion Zone (IPZ) - 1,451 total were promoted (a number equal to 84% of the IPZ pool) - The reality is that folks selected Below and Above the Promotion Zone (BPZ and APZ) "stole" some of that promotion opportunity from the IPZ group: -- 145 were selected for promotion BPZ, and 62 APZ. This meant only 1,244 were promoted IPZ out of a pool of 1,727 candidates, for an IPZ promotion rate of 72% -- The net effect is that BPZ and APZ folks decreased the IPZ rate by 12%. The point is this: those who stay on active duty have a surprisingly good chance of making O-5. For the current IPZ year group, about 84% who made O-4 and bother to stay on active duty will end up getting promoted to O-5. The top 8% were already selected BPZ at a prior board. The top 72% of those left over were just selected as "on time" IPZ types. Another 4% will get picked up APZ at a future board. The Air Force's plan to grow the force (which should mean more O-5 and above requirements) and airline hiring (which will reduce competition) means you guys are in the cat bird's seat. TT

Don't have contact info for you, but thanks for the trip down amnesia lane. First thing that popped into my head when reading your post was, "Welcome to G-Hart Country."Loved the plane, and the Simuflite dudes were awesome.

Point well taken. That does put a different spin on things: - Barely over half of those pilots in the year's group of eligibles who loved RPAs enough to willingly recat to 11U have signed up for the bonus . . . and based on zero new takers in the last month, it is unlikely substantially more will. Not good news for a community the Air Force is growing - The three manned pilot communities primarily responsible for filling RPA billets (11B, 11F, & 11M) have the lowest take rates thus far Too bad AFPC doesn't break down take 11x take rates between those filling RPA billets and those filling the standard flying/staff billets for their respective communities. Sure glad the Air Force is expanding its RPA operation. While necessary, it's coming at a huge cost. Like I've hinted at in a different thread, ground commanders are more than happy to keep screaming for ever-more air (especially RPA) support, because it doesn't cost them anything. When air leaders provide support, they get little credit--it's our job. When they say no, we're outta Schlitz, the ground guys get to complain about Air Force nonsupport. TT

I wonder if the ACP guy reads this forum...updated stats are posted. BLUF, it appears the ACP guy hadn't posted anything new, since there was little change to report. I think the lack of change is worth reporting, however. FY16 stats below: - Bombers: No more takers; still 25% - C2ISR: 1 more taker--now 43.9% - Fighters: 5 more takers--now 27.2% - Mobility: 7 more takers--now 35.1% - Rescue: 1 more taker--now 69% - SOF: 1 more taker--now 35.9% - Unmanned: No more takers--still 51.7% -- Overall FY16 pilot take rate--increased a whopping 2% in a month--now 35.5% overall I won't bother with the FY17 early taker breakdown, but the number of FY17 early takers increased by 33--Overall FY17 early take rate is now 13.9% Armchair analysis: The above stats don't bode well for the Air Force, but a few things are worth noting: - Fighter and Bomber bubbas seem especially unmotivated right now. Their communities' take rates are the lowest for both FY16 and FY17 eligibles - Rescue, C2ISR and--surprisingly--Unmanned seem content. They're signing up at comparatively high rates - Based on sheer mass, though, it seems Mobility pilots will end up running the Air Force. There are as many FY16 takers so far in the Mobility community as there are in the Fighter, Rescue and SOF communities combined TT

Perhaps coincidental, but worth noting: AFPC hasn't posted any updates to ACP take rates for a month now. Explanations would seem to be: - The ACP folks at AFPC are lazy or simply forgot--plausible - The number of ACP takers hasn't changed substantially in a month, so posting new numbers is pointless--seems most likely explanation. Of course, this would be cause for concern; the 20 yr option encourages folks to take the bonus earlier, not later - The number of ACP takers this year is exceeding all expectations, so the folks in AFPC are overwhelmed processing ACP applications and/or the numbers are changing so rapidly that they don't have time to post an update--I suspect this is not the root problem TT

It's not surprising the current crop of GOs seems out of touch, since they're almost completely comprised of folks who stayed in when their peers were getting out and going to the airlines between '95-'01. - Year groups that hit 20 yrs between '95-'01: '75-81 - Year groups that reached bonus eligibility during this time period: '85-'91 - Welsh is a '76 USAFA grad. The youngest GOs are early 90s year group bubbas It should be unsurprising that current GOs are out of touch; they made the exact opposite choice the majority of their peers did two decades ago. In fairness, though, I can see why the current crop of GOs would see we peons as whining, since they all lived through a period where all their peers got out, and those left had to take on huge workloads to compensate for the losses. Looks like our senior AF leaders are doing their best to replicate for the entire Air Force what they got to experience: overwork due to the attrition of their peers. TT

Probably helped that the AF actually had more reasonable manning, while the requirements were less: - FY 99: 70k officers/286k enlisted/356k total - FY 15: 61k officers/246k enlisted/307k total Aside from surges like Allied Force, the deployment rate was reasonable (ONW & OSW), and there were some pretty sweet deals out there (C-21 fleet was twice as big then and had some great locations, for instance). RPAs existed, but there were nowhere near as big of a thing as they are now. In the SUPT squadrons & ops flying squadrons, my experience in the latter part of the 90s was that the older heads had genuinely enjoyed their flying careers & were getting out because of the even better opportunities on the outside, rather than trying to get away from the suck which is the AD today. I don't recall any SUPT or Altus IPs in the late 90s who vol'd to teach at Laughlin to get away from the ops tempo in their MDS. In later years, I knew lots of guys willing to go to Laughlin or Altus to get away from the soul-crushing tempo. TT

Funny. A couple days ago, AMC put out a press release highlighting how, "Air Mobility Command is participating in a national-level discussion about current and future-projected pilot manning shortfalls." My favorite quote is that, "AMC stepped up to bring everyone together." Glad they're doing so, but seems they would've been better served doing this back in '07 when the Age 65 Rule was made law (or in 2012 when it came into effect), or at the latest in 2013 when requirements for airline pilots went way up--making mil pilots all the more valuable. Link: http://www.amc.af.mil/news/story.asp?id=123467501 TT

Just thought I'd throw this out, for those who, like me, are interested in the near- and long-term future of Big Blue: - AFPC has started posting bonus take rates for this fiscal year. There's plenty of time left in the FY, and the last update is as of two weeks ago, so it's pretty useless to read too much into the stats at this point. Nonetheless, as a pilot I feel compelled to pontificate, so here you go. Take rates as of 11 Jan 16: -- Bomber (11B): 25% -- C2ISR (11R): 41.5% -- Fighter (11F): 24.6% -- Mobility (11M): 32.9% -- Rescue (11H): 66.7% -- SOF (11S): 34.6% -- Unmanned (11U): 51.7% -- Total pilot take rate thus far: 33.5% -- There are stats for CSOs and ABMs, but there are only 33 of them total, and I'm too lazy/disinterested to track them. Observations: - 217 of the 251 takers thus far signed up early for the bonus last year. Takers this FY have only increased the take rate by 4.6% (from 28.9% to 33.6%). Last year, they started with 38% (283/745) having taken the bonus early. I would say Big Blue is well behind the power curve when it comes to convincing folks to stay in - If nothing else, it looks like there'll be no problem filling ACSC billets this year. Although some of the super-smart high-potential officers might be getting out and going to the civil sector, with a 33% take rate, there'll be more than enough bodies to ensure we have a core group of hyper-professionalized officers (folks who spend their lives in schools, fellowships, internships and staffs) to fill our future senior officer billets - The reason for low take rates thus far cannot be long processing times. The Rescue take rate is already at 66.7% - Fighter and Bomber bubbas have the lowest take rates so far. Rescue and Unmanned have the highest. Maybe ACC will one day be run by helo and Reaper drivers - The Mobility community has about as many eligibles as the Bomber, C2ISR, Fighter and Unmanned pilots combined . . . and the Mobility take rate is just 33%. Somehow, I don't think mother AMC is going to be able to give up a bunch of 11Ms to backfill 11B/11F/11S billets like they once did - This FY, there are 750 total eligible pilots. Next FY, it'll be 820. Increasing numbers of eligibles, combined with decreasing take rates, is a worrying proposition Fly safe, TT

Dude, If we're going to talk about the truth, let's talk about the whole truth WRT to enlisted Air Corps pilots. The enlisted pilot thing worked great before, primarily because of economics. The Great Depression made enlisted pilot positions viable during the interwar period. We have the exact opposite economic problem right now. I don't have the stats, but a disproportionate amount (perhaps all) of the interwar enlisted Air Corps aviators were prior O's whose active-duty time as reservists was up. The Army, in its infinite wisdom, didn't let the Air Corps officers get to any more than 12% of the overall Army officer corps through 1939. Bottom line, most of those who attended flying training in the 30s were either flying cadets, with a much smaller number regular officers, and an even smaller number enlisted. The flying cadets and sergeants who graduated would earn reserve commissions, but would only be able to remain on active duty for a year or two. This was so room could be made for yet more reserve officers who were graduating from flying training and entering AD. After the one or two year AD stint, they had the option of becoming traditional reservists or reverting to enlisted rank. The other two members of Chennault's "Three Men on a Flying Trapeze" demo team were enlisted pilots . . . who were reserve Lt's who were trying to compete for a very limited number of regular commissions. They reverted to their Lt rank on days when they flew demo's. Another example--Maurice M. Beach--who ultimately became a Brig Gen. He went through flying training as a Sergeant, pinned on Reserve Lt. rank and served as an AD Lt for two years, then reverted to his prior enlisted rank & kept flying. Shortly before the war, he got an AD commission again, and ultimately went on to command the 53rd Troop Carrier Wing, which towed the gliders across the Channel on D-Day. Bottom line, the enlisted pilot idea worked great, primarily because the American economy sucked so badly in the 30s that serving as an enlisted pilot--with the possibility of earning a regular commission--was far better than the prospects in the civilian sector. That ain't the case today. My perception is that pilots are leaving in significant numbers now in large part due to the greater economic opportunities available to them in the civil sector. If such is the case, it would be galactically stupid to spend the time and money training enlisted pilots, with the hope of retaining them with even worse pay and benefits in the current economy. Enlisted RPA operators might work, if there is no market for RPA pilots in the civil sector. Given that, from this forum (I'm certainly no expert on the RPA field), there are plenty of good opportunities for RPA pilots in the civilian world, the enlisted Global Hawk idea is unlikely to be successful. While I'm happy that the Air Force is trying to think outside the container, and perhaps it's at least worth setting up a test program to see if it's viable, I have difficulty seeing this work in the long term. TT

I think we're in violent agreement, but my point is that getting a degree--particularly one from a PME school--does not necessarily equate to getting an education. We must ensure our senior leaders get adequately educated. My primary point is that operational experience has educational value all its own, but those we seem to be grooming for senior leadership ain't getting a whole lot of real-world education. We've had real-world learning opportunities for airpower leaders to learn their trade for the past 25 years (Desert Shield/Desert Storm was way back in '90-'91, which morphed into OSW/ONW, with Allied Force, OEF, OIF, etc.), but when I look at many senior leaders' bios they often seem to have done little in the way of operational deployments in the past 25 years. Traditionally, interwar education served to compensate for the lack of real-world experience (Sam Huntington had something to say about that in Soldier and the State). Now--at least for the future senior leaders we're developing--it seems we live in a bizarro world where real-world experiences "get in the way" of educational opportunities. There seems to be something wrong with this construct. If we do care about education, you'd think we'd make it a point to send our smart folks to good civilian schools to get their degrees, while allowing them to stay promotable. We should have at least some senior generals with decent civilian pedigrees and/or published books. On the Army side, General Petraeus got a Ph.D. from Princeton, and on the Navy side, Admiral McRaven (SEAL & SOCOM commander) published a book (some might say the book) on special operations. General Shaud (West Point '56/retired in '91) is the only Air Force 4-star with a Ph.D. who comes to mind. The most senior guy Air Force thought leader that comes to mind--Dave Deptula--retired as a 3-star. When it comes to advanced educations, the Air Force seems to do the most ridiculous thing of all; we take our smartest SAASS grads and--rather than pushing them for senior leadership--we send them to get their Ph.D.s and have them go right back to Maxwell . . . to teach at SAASS, where they top out as O-6s. Going back to Homestar's point--learning to work and play well with others can be learned in a multinational operational headquarters, too. You're much more likely to get a better education in diplomacy and you'll be challenged with different perspectives there, than you would at Air War College. My $.02 TT

Methinks HPO should be changed to mean Hyper-Professionalized Officer. The thing that stands out to me in the doc Chuck gave the link to and in senior officers’ bios is the overemphasis on education. While PME should certainly play an important part in future senior officers’ careers, we clearly seem to have gone overboard with education, at the expense of operational competence/credibility. Current Chief of Staff (Welsh): - 4 yrs at USAFA - SOS - Master’s from Webster U - 3 yrs at USAFA as an AOC & Commandant’s exec - 1 yr at CGSC - 1 yr at National War College - 1 yr commanding CADRE (College of Aerospace Doctrine, Research & Education) - 2 yrs as USAFA Commandant - 5 different fellowships—MIT, Harvard x2, NDU, Center for Creative Leadership - Payback on the above investment in/around PME: check the JQP thread First Chief of Staff (Spaatz): - 4 yrs at West Point (hardly a major push for aviation in the 1910s at USMA) - Never went to any company-grade officers’ PME course - Never got a master’s degree - 1 yr at Air Service Field Officers’ School (predecessor to ACTS—before they’d developed High-Altitude Precision Daylight Bombing doctrine) - 1 yr at Army CGSS . . . again, hardly a center for innovative airpower thinking in the 30s - As far as I can tell, he never served as a PME instructor/commander - Payback on the above investment: set a record with the Question Mark; won the air wars in Africa, Europe & Japan; & oversaw the creation of the independent Air Force LeMay (5th CSAF) graduated from Army ROTC & got all of three months of ACTS in his entire military career . . . yet was one of the Air Force’s great tactical leaders, who also built SAC into an effective combat organization. Was a general for over 21 years—3.5 of them as CSAF (when the AF reached at least 880k people). McConnell (6th CSAF) graduated from West Point—and as far as I can tell he never attended any other PME (or civilian school) throughout his entire military career. Was a general for 25 years—3.5 of them as CSAF (when the AF reached over 900k people). Bottom line, the Air Force’s obsession with education doesn’t necessarily seem to be producing substantially better results than were seen with earlier generations of senior Air Force leaders who had little to no significant PME experiences. Given that the early AF leaders all grew up in the Army, not the Air Force, one could say their PME experiences were likely detrimental to their development as airmen. Considering how much time our current GOs end up spending in school, they sure don’t have much to say (few of them publish much of anything worthwhile). Perhaps if Air Force officers spent less time in school, they might have more time to build operational credibility . . . and we might see better decisions on personnel, acquisitions, etc.

If the above is in fact true, one could take this as both very good news and as an indicator of how much the AF has screwed the pooch manning-wise: TLDR version: Rated force mismanagement + extended airline hiring boom = some very tough choices when it comes to selecting AF leaders. Ignoring BPZ/IPZ/APZ status is a good idea which is long overdue, but it's a bandaid fix at this point. - Disregarding BPZ/IPZ/APZ status is, in my estimation, a good move, and one that should have been done long ago. Widening the pool of candidates will help ensure the best folks get promoted. I would hope in current year and future boards, the board members would find themselves seriously discussing the relative merits of promoting experienced, above-average performers who barely missed the IPZ promotion cut, IPZ folks who are hovering near the cut line, and BPZ superior performers who likely have significantly less real-world experience, having spent many years in school. The O-6 board meets in the zone at the 20 year point: would you rather select a 20-yr IPZ guy, who's somewhere around the 50th percentile of his year group, a 22-yr APZ type who just barely missed the IPZ cut but who's continued performing well, or a 16-yr dude who's a total of 4 yrs BPZ (2 yrs below to O-5 and O-6)--and has spent multiple years in school/staff/exec/etc.? Obviously depends on the individuals being discussed, but I can imagine a number of cases where it'd be wiser to promote the APZ guy over the BPZ guy with 6 years (likely more, considering time spent out of the cockpit) less operational experience. - On a less positive note, I read this as an admission that the Air Force has grossly mismanaged its force, especially wrt pilot types. From what I can tell, the APZ year groups are a pretty picked-over lot; the AF produced so relatively few pilots from the 92/93/94 year groups that the majority of high-quality folks have already made O-6 or got out after 20yrs, or never even made it to retirement. The IPZ year group is much the same. Those who stayed past retirement eligibility, aren't already O-6s/O-6 selects, and who didn't spend their careers in the USAFA self-licking ice cream cone (AF funded civlian master's program, to teaching at USAFA, to AF funded civilian phd program, to teaching at USAFA)--or some other similar good deal--are extremely few in number. Bottom line, the Air Force has goofed up manning so badly that it needs to widen the aperture significantly in order to replace the late-Cold War O-6s who are retiring/getting promoted. The problem is, the '96 and later year groups are short of folks, too, and the airline hiring boom will provide a powerful incentive for those folks to retire and never even meet their O-6 boards. If the boards really do ignore APZ/IPZ/BPZ status, that'll work great for a year or two. Some very deserving folks will get selected APZ, and some young true superstars will get opportunities they would not have gotten as early as they would have previously. Once those outliers are picked up over a promotion cycle or two, though, you'll be startled in a year or two by some of the folks selected. Boards will be choosing between guys who are either good dudes, but were never groomed for leadership (and their organizations will suffer for it), and those who've spent a whole lotta time being groomed, but have little operational credibility . . . to an even worse degree than previously. TT

Clearly, you haven't spent much time in joint billets.

Thanks for the insight, Azimuth. - I know few people who saw Altus as a good assignment--even before the RPA nonvol threat, it was--at best--the better of several bad alternatives. The idea of second-assignment FTU IPs being considered normal is frightening. I'm surprised at Altus' ability to hire reservists--yay us--but question how long that will last. Considering how quickly I perceive folks are moving up in seniority at the majors, I have a hard time seeing folks clinging to reserve jobs at Altus . . . but I'm happy to be wrong in this case. Bringing this thread back on topic--if you go through T-1s at SUPT, this is great news! - If you go straight to your MWS and are a good pilot, you stand a good chance of flying lots (while getting kicked in the teeth with deployments/TDYs) on your first assignment, followed by a bunch of flying in a schoolhouse IP assignment, followed by . . . staff, because they'll need you there--and you'll be nonflying when you reach the end of your SUPT commitment. You'll probably backfill an 11F or 11S on staff, because those are the communities which are really short on bodies. Ok, maybe not great news for you, but great news for the Air Force anyway - If you're a FAIP, really great news! You stand a great chance of flying your butt off as a FAIP, flying and deploying your butt off in an MWS assignment, then teaching at Altus for your third assignment. You will be physically, mentally and emotionally prepared to get out of the Air Force and go to the airlines at the earliest opportunity. The masses of reservists hanging out at Altus will be a great asset in helping you transition to the civil sector - If you get RPAs, this is potentially good news. No, seriously: fly RPAs, then (hopefully) go to your mobility MWS for your second assignment, then FTU IP for your third . . . you'll be ready to lead the Air Force into its unmanned future, or follow your buddies to the majors I'm sure glad 11Us and 11Fs are the only communities with manning issues. Otherwise, the above might come across as bad news for the Air Force.

Why is there such a backlog at mobility schoolhouses? Is the issue iron on the ramp or instructor availability? I suspect the latter. - Looking at the ACP thread, I suspect the problem is a shortage of schoolhouse IPs. Indications are that force shaping and RPA nonvols gutted the now-3rd assignment 11M year groups . . . which would be the prime targets for schoolhouse IP assignments. If the problem is a shortage of experienced, quality 11M IPs, this is going to be difficult to unscrew. 4th+ assignment AD dudes are also in short supply, and I don't foresee the Air Force recruiting a whole lotta reservists to teach at Altus. I don't know where else we're going to get a critical mass of quality 11Ms for schoolhouse assignments. - Different circumstances, but there is a precedent in T-1s for getting/keeping guys current before sending them off to MWS training. Early-90s year group guys who were "banked" (went through UPT, but since there were no openings in flying squadrons for them to fill when they graduated, they did non rated jobs for a few years) got a refresher course in T-1s/T-38s before heading off to IFF/their respective MWS schoolhouses. They were getting recurrent while "recats"--folks who did a nonflying tour before starting UPT--entered pilot training. The banked/recat program was a debacle that I hope the Air Force will never revisit. TT edited for minor wording change

Thanks for the insight, guys . . . and there you go, folks--the results of misapplied rated force management. TT

Dude, as you noted, I'm going off of overall numbers from the final ACP report and personal experience which both indicate the Air Force is way short on O-5 mobility types. I'm not a personnelist, so take my rantings for what they're worth. Good on you and your peers for getting back to flying billets as you approach retirement eligibility. The numbers I've found simply don't support anything remotely close to an overage of senior 11Ms. There are, for instance, only 65 Lt Cols with 19 yrs service filling 11M billets right now--across the entire Air Force, in all mobility aircraft types. That doesn't seem to equate to excess capacity. I suspect, but have no way to verify, that the relative overmanning of O-5s at your location is due purely to your being in a CAF wing. I can only think of a couple places with an active duty tanker sq at a CAF base, and both are significant deviations from the MAF norm in multiple ways. Cynically, I see the circumstance at your base as an underhanded way to backfill 11F billets at your base at the expense of the tanker squadron: - The Air Force is short (verifiably so) of 11Fs - Recognizing an opportunity, AFPC sends O-5 11Ms to the tanker sq, knowing that many of them will get farmed out to the group/wing (and likely not the most promotable jobs), thus sparing 11Fs to fly the line and/or fill group/wing staff jobs that matter and will get them promoted - Sending all you experienced O-5 11Ms to the squadron (even though that's not where many of you are really working) means that, at least according to AFPC, you have more than enough experience in the squadron (you already have 7 O-5s "in the squadron") so you thus don't really need any more senior O-3 or O-4 types. Of course, 11M O-4s hardly exist if current take rates are any indication: most are in school, on staff, or deployed to buttkrakistan, so asking for more of them is a fool's errand; and the senior O-3s are likely stuck at Altus I'm not at a tanker base and it's entirely possible I'm reading the numbers all wrong--maybe the MAF community is awash in greybeard Lt Col types. I'd love to hear from someone at McConnell or Fairchild as to their current experience mix. Bringing this back to the ACP discussion, I suspect the crew mix at tanker wings will indicate that force shaping has been less than successful for the 11M community, and tankers in particular. TT

Copy. I figured the short version--"11Ms are being driven into the ground by rated force managers and the senior leaders dumb enough to listen to them"--didn't cut it. The video works though. - BTW, I'm sure the $35k bonus for RPA drivers is totally going to make a difference by convincing the eleven FY16 initial eligible RPA pilots who didn't already take the early bonus to stay on active duty TT

No doubt in my mind that the mobility pilot community is hurting, and the evidence is in the ACP reports. It’s difficult to comprehend why the 20 YAS option wasn’t offered to 11Ms until last FY. Maybe if rated managers had acknowledged the clearly pending train wreck in the 11M community years ago, there might be some experience at the wing level and below, and we might have enough 11Ms remain on active duty long enough to be picky about future senior mobility leaders. Read below for the long version. Not saying other communities aren’t equally screwed, but rather sticking with what I know: - The 11M community alone has, over the past 3 years, lost 600 pilots/year (to all causes—retirements, separations, promotion to O-6, etc.) - About 250 of the above were 11Ms who either retired or were promoted to O-6 --- The majority of the remaining 350 were experienced aviators with 12-19 yrs commissioned service (folks who might have stayed if not offered TERA and/or were offered 20 YAS option) - I’ll be very generous and estimate that the AF is producing 400 11Ms/yr (my guess is it’s closer to 300-350, maybe even less after discounting those lost to 11U billets) Bottom line, the Air Force is losing 11Ms at least 50% faster than they’re replacing them, and those highly experienced folks who left are being backfilled with dudes who are being crushed by undermanning, a dearth of experienced pilots in the squadrons, the threat of RPA nonvols, etc. The Air Force’s apparent response, as indicated by congressional rulemaking, is to further incentivize folks to pursue RPA assignments. It’ll take some very inspired leadership to pull the 11M community through the next several years, but the stats don’t bode well in this respect, either. Optimistically, about 60 11M O-5s will meet the O-6 board in the zone at the next board. The Air Force has promoted 43 11Ms per year (on average, over the past 3 years) to O-6. At a 45% IPZ promotion rate, that’ll yield just 27 new 11-M O-6s . . . which will mean that the few 11Ms promoted to O-6 will be all the more stretched thin, with ever-fewer graybeard O-5 11M types in wings/groups/squadrons to back them up. The 12M community has shrunk so significantly that they can’t help as much with filling OSS/other billets in lieu of 11Ms like they used to during years past. The ensuing inevitable clown show in the mobility community—due to senior leaders and their staffs being overworked—will provide all the more incentive for young 11Ms to get out at the earliest opportunity, thus perpetuating the cycle. Meanwhile, the Air Force fiddles with the soup du jour (RPAs), while the overall pilot community burns. The 11M community, if 11F take rates and discussion all over this forum are any indication, isn’t the only one suffering from a lack of foresight from rated force managers. TT