Clark Griswold

How did this shoe clerk expect this new crop of "leaders" to lead if they have no technical knowledge, operational experience or shared professional experience with the people they are supposedly going to lead? What was this traveling kool aid salesman's idea of when an aviator is supposed to recuse themselves from actual ops because that's just technical and leadership is really enterprise management or as they used to call it administration... last i checked Admin was not one of the core functions All rhetorical but sometimes the anecdotes of encounters with shoe clerks are infuriating My suspicion is this guy could not lead himself let alone anyone else out of paper bag

Agreed but as busdriver said it is a notional requirements list and the AF is scared to put a ring on it, instead of a no-shit fly off, we're having: "Invitation to Patriciate (ITP) for the Capability Assessment of the Non-Developmental Light Attack Platforms in support of the Office of Strategic Development Planning and Experimentation (SDPE)... blah blah blah" WTF? Grow some balls and make a choice, do you want a LAAR or not? If so, then have a RFP / fly off and make a damn choice. Agreed, but all of them are a bargain IMO. How much more do we need to experiment? 15+ years of COIN / LIC is not enough for us to believe putting a 2 ship of15E/16/18s... at probably 40k+ an hour (factoring in tanker support) is nuts?

Yes. This type of mission, Direct Support, is what's needed. Like the C-27Js in their short life being directly tied to the customer rather than going thru the filter of AMD, it is what is needed. Giving the AF though an escape clause if they are truly tasked with the impossible/stupid could make this a reality.

Agreed. But some kind of improved FOD protection, deep RSC fording, etc. or the capability to have that if called for might be wise. Just how much is the rub. Follow on, AT-6 & A-29 operating on dirt, no luck with the Oracle of Google finding anything on the Scorpion operating on anything less than prepared. Understood.

I wish I had a an excellent counter argument to that but methinks you are probably right but one can hope even in vain. If they pick one, the question now is will they follow thru with the original 100'ish plane purchase? McCain wanted 300 and even LAAR fanatic me thinks that is a bit of a tall order. 100-150 seems like the right number but last I checked the AF was short on pilots and even shorter on CSOs, just buying or even selecting one is only step 1 to acquiring a LAAR capability. Now if they really wanna go outside the container, program the MILPERS for about 5000 man-years of MPA with the purchase and start offering 3 year tours to ARC aircrew, MX & support to stand up the squadrons and detachments that will need to be ready to absorb and host this new MDS.

Not to be negative but they have to pick one, we've been on the cusp before and then the AF backed off and the LAAR languished, just getting enough oxygen to stay alive but not enough to get on its feet. They're all good and let's face it, the mission is not super demanding from an airplane performance perspective and they all meet the original requirements for a USAF LAAR: The selected LAAR aircraft will have to meet several key requirements, including: Rough field operations. The RFI requires that the aircraft be capable of operating from semi-prepared runways such as grass or dirt surfaces. Defensive package. The aircraft will have to include several defensive measures, including a Missile Approach Warning System (MAWS), a Radar warning receiver (RWR), and chaff and flare dispensers. Armored cockpit and engine. Long loiter time. The aircraft must be able to fly 5 hour sorties (with 30 minute fuel reserves). Range. The aircraft must have a 900 nautical mile (1600 km) ferry range. Data link capability. The aircraft is required to have a line-of-sight data link (with beyond line-of-sight desired) capability of transmitting and receiving still and video images. Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance (ISR) capabilities. The aircraft will have to laser track and designate targets, as well as track targets using electro-optical and infrared video/still images. Weaponry. The LAAR aircraft will need at least 4 weapons stores capable of carrying a variety of weapons, including 500 lb bombs, 2.75-inch rockets, rail-launched missiles, and illumination flares. The aircraft will also be capable of aerial gunnery, either with an integrated or pylon mounted gun. Desired traits (but not requirements) include: Infrared signature suppression for the engine(s). 30,000 ft (9000 m) operational ceiling. 6,000 ft (1800 m) takeoff and landing distance. Aerobatic capabilities capable of maneuvers such as the Immelmann turn, Cuban eight, and Split S. https://www.fbo.gov/index?print_preview=1&s=opportunity&mode=form&id=b30065477e7b9159bb2687f2cc2a3667&tab=core&tabmode=list My two cents, the Scorpion is worth the extra money both in acquisition and operations costs.

Don't count out the AT-6, it has a lot of strong points and the Scorpion is ready for prime time now with its production configuration set. The A-29 is still the front runner (IMO) but just pick one AF... This has probably been posted on this thread or the other ones that are on the subject of the LAAR: https://warisboring.com/the-pentagon-has-two-choices-for-light-attack-planes-2e4306197b1e#.utts1rvlb The concept OV-10X would have been sweet (particularly if they incorporated a turret mounted belly 20 or 25mm) but Boeing had nothing more than a proposal and some cool photoshopped graphics, the line was not ready to crank out one new airframe and there are not enough existing OV-10s in serviceable condition to be a viable option. I quoted CH from the beginning of this thread as he has actually flown both and can speak best to this... CH - have you had anymore participation on the LAAR project since this 2009 post? AT-8, A-29 or Scorpion Jet?

No argument, it has to be more than 4th gen 4+ / 4.5 / whatever with very high end weapon(s) / sensors to relevant along with kinematic performance par excellence Just open source on how the other side is trying to play to their strengths and illustrative of this for the discussion The Russians never boast or exaggerate (/s) but decrementing these figures by 20-30% they still have capability in the modern high end fight matched up with an advanced R-77M or K-100. No argument again but it is ever changing ratio that takes common sense, data and professionals not easily influenced unduly by the MIC or ill informed politicians. Spend a lot for today and little for tomorrow? Sure when the barbarians are at the gates. Spend some for today and some for tomorrow? Sure when we've got them pushed back and have some breathing room. The problem is we don't have strategy, we have knee jerk reactions to the crisis du jour and we end up wasting our resources. Here's a strategy: Accquire an appropriate amount of low end inexpensive to operate systems in low threat long term operations so I still accomplish my mission and greatly lower my costs of executing them. Take my savings and build a modern force with a mix of systems, High-Medium-Lower, but all relevant and modern to fight against peer and near-peer foes. Here's our strategy apparently: Buy only high end systems, act like we need to use only high end systems in low intensity conflicts. Set the requirements so high that the high end systems get more expensive and are years behind schedule and never get bought in the amounts we set our long term force structure plans for then keep the legacy systems going even as they get more expensive and less relevant. After all that go ask for more money and promise you'll have it all fixed next year.

More resources are fine but in reality it is the control over the appropriation is really what is needed. How many useless installations, pet projects, make believe jobs, redundancies, "fall out money" spending orgies in the 4th quarter could add up to needed resources? Congress can appropriate more money but it they tell us it can only be spent in Turdshit AFB, USA on a non-relevant money sucking system or mission, then it does not matter. And they have no track record of doing that... On the subject of replacing the Eagle with the Viper... you save money short term but you might be eating your Vipers up faster than you originally planned on thus incurring a risk until the F-35A is FOC and the squadron(s) are supplied. The training bill to convert X number of Eagle drivers into Viper drivers will have a few zeroes on the end of it also, doubt the F-16 FTU has a bunch of open spots also, another problem to solve. It's a damn Rubik's cube... If the Eagle is too expensive to continue flying for Homeland Defense, from the T-X competition develop a light fighter / aggressor and call it good. That squarely favors the T-50 or T-100 but Boeing could figure it out quickly if they won the competition.

Not too quibble with you but I didn't say bankrupt but it is my opinion that it is has a disproportionate place in our acquisition strategy. Its growth in budget and slip in schedule has been tolerated too much, just my two cents. No argument that growth in new missions and the bow wave of recap which is really the chickens of coming home to roost for years of poor acquisition strategy and execution. I am an advocate for shedding certain missions/core functions as they detract from what should be our focus on air & space power projection, cyber is awesome but beyond a certain level of organic capability it probably should be in a separate institution, that's not just for the AF but all branches of the military. I do. As Carl Sagan would say billions and billions and I would say that Space Superiority and all the missions from that core function rate higher or should on our acquisitions strategy. How that displaces the air acquisition is messy but probably necessary. Would not count that as a face palm moment for SECDEF Gates' comment. It was not out of touch but an observation on our force structure and a public question to ask the leadership and military strategy community to think if that truly still what is needed. If this were the late 30's and a Secretary of War publicly questioned the penchant of the USN for battleships versus aircraft carriers, prevailing opinion would have chided him but he would have been prescient. If a concept, doctrine or strategy is correct or wise it should be defensible enough to withstand public comment. If we don't challenge our assumptions we are susceptible to delude ourselves or ignore changing operational/strategic conditions. Agreed but I would also caution not to get distracted by what we should focus on being high end, the platform or the weapons they deliver? Would our finite resources be better spent on more advanced weapons or platforms? Honest question. As pilots we are naturally inclined to think the airplane but as military officers we have to step back and question our biases. Also, perhaps High Low Mix isn't the right term with the 4+ fighters Low doesn't seem right to describe them. Yes, but how do you do that? Pardon my inference but I think you are implying that we have to have the ability from an aircraft to deliver ordinance to any target no matter the environment. That may be a bridge too far in some cases now but that same mission might be more appropriately performed with new technology, like a hypersonic missile. No disagreement that we need the capability but I think we need to recognize how we deliver the capability is changing.

Excellent WOR article on Hi-Lo strategy: Rethinking the High-Low Mix, Part II: Complexity’s Death Spiral

I said take a page not copy and follow the whole thing. Like it or not we may have hit "peak fighter" with our 5th Gens not only being deadly to the enemy but to their own forces by their relentless consumption of resources to the detriment of everything else that might need sustainment, upgrade or replacement. Some people like to crow that we spent the Soviets into oblivion with SDI and the 80's build up but in a way we're doing that to ourselves by a non-stop obsession with the absolute best or nothing. There is a point when you say that is just too much to do it that way. We've been here before with other airplanes from way back in the day, ref. the XB-70 Valkyrie and the XF-108 Rapier, both the pinnacles of design for their times in their mission types but the AF realized (wisely) that it can't spend the lion's share of the team's salary on one player. We cancelled the programs and thought about how to accomplish those missions better not just focusing on what will fly/fight in them. I'm not saying that in the USAF, USN, USMC, etc... pilots flying a multi-role strike aircraft have to be in some barely relevant old POS, what am saying is that the core aircraft(s) of Tactical Aviation by the sheer number of aircraft to be bought can not be so expensive to procure, operate and maintain that they degrade the Total Joint Team.

Word. Circling back to the original subject of this thread, substantially improved existing designs in lieu of an all 5th Gen fleet, seem to be popular to our two realistic peer AFs, China & Russia. Perhaps it is time to take a page from their playbook as our budget doesn't seem to be able cover that and all the other missions / systems we have or need to do.

No argument that its a problem just my option that the software will be the largest gripe and an on-going gripe to fix/update for stability & security. Baby definitely has back... comparison to a. Harrier: 2

Not me, saw it after business hours. And now for something completely different... HAL Tejas

Copy that. If someone can speak to this (OPSEC allowing) has there been any planning / discussion on if a LAAR is to be purchased, how they will be integrated into the AF? Most of the discussion that I have seen in open sources has not really addressed that and if the green light is given, a plan in place to stand up units, change MWS of existing units, etc... The logistics and manpower could be a stumbling block even if an aircraft purchase is approved.

The B model is only part of the problem(s), the software and updates/fixes needed are also BIG rocks to deal with. Giving the USMC a smaller carrier capable of STOBAR / ski jump operations and supporting amphibious operations and consolidating all USN acquisition on the C model, in hindsight, might have kept the JSF close to a historically successful multi-service, multi nation fighter program, the F-4. Deleting the B which is going to be only 14% of the US purchase of F-35s would have reduced risk/cost/complexity - water under the bridge.

Valid.

Maybe but SCAR may not go far enough in empowering the mission crew and FAC(A) is probably too much for what I think we are discussing, release authority for a LAAR acting independently of a C2 node when there is no real risk of fratricide. From the Lemay center, AF doctrine annex on Counterland missions (derivative missions) https://doctrine.af.mil/download.jsp?filename=3-03-D08-LAND-Derivative-msns.pdf ...Forward Air Controller (Airborne) (FAC[A]). FAC(A) missions provide terminal attack control (TAC) for CAS aircraft operating in close proximity to friendly ground forces. Because of the risk of fratricide, FAC(A)s are specially trained aviation officers qualified to provide delivery clearance to CAS aircraft. The FAC(A) is the only person cleared to perform such control from the air, and can be especially useful in controlling CAS against targets that are beyond the visual range of friendly ground forces... FAC(A) doesn't really fit as the training requirements are very high and again this is not release with friendlies close. SCAR missions use aircraft to detect targets for dedicated AI missions in a specified geographic zone. The area may be defined by a box or grid where worthwhile potential targets are known or suspected to exist, or where mobile enemy surface units have relocated because of ground fighting. ...Even though some SCAR responsibilities are similar to that of a FAC(A), SCAR aircrew do not have the authority to conduct terminal control of CAS. FAC(A)s undergo specialized training to effectively coordinate and integrate air-ground forces to conduct TAC safely during CAS—a SCAR aircrew does not have release authority, nor do they clear other aircraft for employment of munitions... SCAR doesn't seem to give a LAAR enough independence of control. A new mission that emphasizes independence of control from a rear echelon C2 or ISR cell but using the ground element as required and having independent release authority if there are no friendly ground forces in the immediate vicinity of a kinetic action seems in order. What we have works but could be improved, just rantings from the internet.

No argument that the blame is on both sides and the 5th Gen only crowd didn't set the stage we have now by themselves but absent an even larger increase to the AF budget than the current admin is proposing what we have in the plans for the AF is just not affordable and maintaining the force structure we have / missions allocated to us We know we need more to do everything on the books and we would have to if the ballon goes up but that kind of extra funding and the control over the money vice the MIC and parochial Congressional interests is not coming So what to do? Load shed. Propose fewer missions and more affordable mission systems vice an all silver bullet fleet but emphasizing we NEED some silver bullets. There has been an exponential growth in mission sets that are not warheads on foreheads, mobility, nuclear deterrence, etc... New missions and responsibilities that are being disproportionate being saddled on the AF need to culled, reassigned or cost shared to keep us focused and resourced effectively Sent from my iPhone using Tapatalk

Dambusters reenactment http://worldwarwings.com/wwii-era-bouncing Sent from my iPhone using Tapatalk

On the subject of who's in charge... I can understand (somewhat) the hesitation to not let go of control of the mission if the target has been surveilled and developed prior to arrival of the asset on station and that asset is continuing the persistent stare with VDL back to a GCC or other ISR element but when a target is developed in the mission either by the air asset or by cue from another ground or air asset, the authority should / needs to remain with the mission crew. For a LAAR, this should be it's primary modus operandi (IMO) and lends itself more to the proposed Observation mission than ISR as doctrine defines that mission now. Observation mission as proposed by a previous reference in this thread article from a War on the Rocks: https://warontherocks.com/2016/08/oa-x-more-than-just-light-attack/ How to get leadership on board with this? Not sure, but the arguments I see supporting it are: - Shortened kill chain, fewer levels of approval. Possible risk in that understood. - Lower footprint due to lower amount of FMV requiring PED from ground element in rear echelon, PED is to be usually organically supplied by supported element or mission crew if customer is not VDL capable. - Can be allocated to customers / targets that are lower priority for high persistence assets thereby allowing greater focus of high persistence, ISR focused assets against higher value targets. Allows longer surveillance of targets that should be under constant stare. - Concept of Employment and primary mission of Observation / Light Strike in direct support / coordination with GFC or JTAC not aligned with longer decision cycle involving rear echelon ground elements.

2 With perfect hindsight, the introduction of 5th Gen had and has an apparent flaw that with the technology, materials and designs we have now they don't work with the Hi - Lo concept that was successful with the 15 & 16, that is you really can't make a "cheap" 5th Gen fighter. The barn is wide open and it doesn't matter but if we had committed to a full run of 22's (in the 500+ range) to replace the 15Cs and Es, developing an FB-22 and kept our requirements in check for the 16 and 18 replacement (forgoing the VSTOL altogether) to not be go full 5th Gen but 4++ with unique capabilities or design to be relevant but not in the first wave on night 1, things might have worked out better. The lesson learned for the 35 acquisition and development is strive for good improvement not unrealistic improvement over the previous jet. The price soars, the schedule goes late, you reduce your goals to keep it alive and undermine your service reputation, important because you'll want to get another toy in the future and politicians trust you less or not at all anymore.

Textron gets a demo event this summer for the USAF... http://www.defensenews.com/articles/textron-sets-its-sights-on-air-forces-light-aircraft-experiment

You got right some of what I was thinking after I read the article, my posts were / are skeptical of the concept, I was just imagining and putting up a visual of what I thought this modern LWF F-45 if brought to life would be or likely to be.. I can describe in words what a hot girl looks like but if I put up a picture, that's about 69% more effective...