brickhistory

Read the guy's e-mail and you'll see that it's not.* *Chicago Handbook of Style consulted to ensure proper use of "you'll" and "it's."

Hacker, I did include 'generally' in my comment. Absolutely there are times to hammer in public. A blatant disrespectful attitude by a subordinate to a superior in front of a crowd is one such example. Rain down pain upon his skull at that moment. For the given example in the e-mail, I'd go with a private, directive conversation. As a rule, I stand by "praise in public, criticize in private." Technique only and moot for me anymore. Dealing with/in the civilian world is a whole different ballgame although the basics still apply, just the 'niceness/everbody's special' factor has to be there lest HR/the civvie equivalent of social actions roll in.

Not been to UPT, so not qualified to comment on the environment. However, on the 'leadership' by e-mail, yeah, I think it is. Any comm sent out to subordinates - ADO to Flt/CCs is public comm. He directed them to fix the problem as well as put a spurious 'threat' of what would happen to the next guy. He'll never do the entire day brace. First, it's probably not valid and second, it's not the way to do it. Remember praise in public, criticize in private? Generally good advice. A curt "Lt, I'd like to see you in my office," followed by a one-way conversation is the way to go. Not a stooge on public display. Ever wonder why officers are treated with contempt by junior enlisted at training bases? Here's a classic example. Permanent party tend to adopt an attitude towards students. Perpetuating it is not good leadership. Again, this isn't just a UPT thing, assuming that exists there, but it does exist at other training bases. Actually talking to his Flt/CCs and/or making an example of 'the next guy' are examples of leadership. Venting in an e-mail shows a lack professionalism. If he vented here on baseops, fair enough. To do it at work, on e-mail, with the inherent risk that it will be forwarded to all and sundry, is not. Finally, are there really that many meetings at the squadron level that another one is a pain? I would think/hope that any unit leadership directed meetings were few and far between and therefore carry some weight. If not, disregard. But that'd be a whole different leadership problem.

And, if true, was leadership by e-mail. Add face to face contact to the list of 'forgotten' items.

"Black Suburbans, go..." "2" "3" "4"

0 for just shy of 22 years. I did mentor my Lts and airmen starting about the 7 year point. Great post. USAF does (always has) a sucky job at preparing officers to be leaders. If the first time you're leading people is as the Lt Col squadron commander, the institution is as much to blame for the results as the individual. Support does a better job of putting younger guys in leadership positions at an earlier point, I think.

Doug Masters would never 'settle' for anything.

"Down Periscope" is A-list? Must've been a different movie. The chick's rack in that was good, but the movie....ehh

"No Time for Sergeants," "Dr. Strangelove," "Strategic Air Command," "12 o'clock High" and let's not forget, our very own IRON EAGLEs 1- whatever

I think as a citizenry as a whole we are a little different than the Europeans (and I include the Aussies philosophically) who have a longer history of more authoritarian government with a much more socially stratified society. They have a centuries-long history of bending knee. We do not. (No, that's not all inclusive and greatly simplifying the differences). As our roots come from a mass of dissidents/immigrants, I think we are ok for a generation or two. However, as we become more urban, more 'civilized,' more pussified, then this could happen. The constant assualt (no pun intended) on the 2d Amendment by the very liberal (who I contend are more similar to Western Europeans) left in America could eventually make this a reality. Oddly, the GWOT reaction on bigger government for security is also helping this cause. As, thus far, that's been a right of the aisle responsibility, things could get ugly. But not in my lifetime.

"Guests of the Ayatollah: The First Battle in America's War with Militant Islam," Mark Bowden, 2006. About the hostage crisis of 1979-1980. Same guy did "Black Hawk Down," "Killing Pablo," and some others (I highly recommend those other two as well.) Although a little long (600+ pages), it is incredibly thorough. Views of/interviews with the hostages, families, terrorist "students," military, political figures of the time, and so on. Well put together, perhaps even too detailed, but that's minor. The Desert One mission is a highlight: Guys went in undercover, scoped out Tehran, and the desired landing spot. Other guys flew a recce mission to put a Twin Otter on the desert to see if it actually was a good spot for the rescue staging area. USAF combat controller set up a LZ using IR markers, etc, etc. Good description of the attempt and mishap that ended it. Made for a very jaw-tightening read to see how America was humiliated. Makes me dislike Carter even more than I did. Good descriptions of the hostages reactions - some collaborated, some resisted, some in between. US 'do-gooders' went to Tehran to help - criticized the US as evil, said the terrorists were justified for taking hostages, etc, etc. Like Hanoi Jane, part deux. Examples of other attention whores trying to get on the media stage; the press being the press, etc, etc. Good, if long, read.

One (kinda) for the space and missile dudes... THROUGH THE BACK DOOR In the movie “Space Cowboys,” Clint Eastwood plays a Chuck Yeager-ish test pilot/engineer who leads a group of aging astronauts to rescue a former Soviet nuclear-armed satellite. In a case of art imitating life, during the height of the Cold War and space race, both superpowers contemplated basing nuclear weapons in space. One side, the former USSR, actually had an operational system during much of the 1960s. At the beginning of the space confrontation between the two countries, begun with the October 4, 1957 launch of Sputnik, just lofting an object into orbit was a major achievement. Within a very short span of time, the ability to carry useful payloads whether man or machine, became a primary focus. The Soviets jumped out to an early lead in the race by the successively bigger payloads of capsules containing dogs and finally the first man in space, Yuri Gagarin on April 4, 1961. The Soviet premier, Nikita Khrushchev, boasted of the Soviet superiority of his country’s space accomplishments. On August 9, 1961, at a reception for the second Soviet astronaut, Gherman Titov bragged “You do not have 50 or 100 megaton bombs; we have bombs more powerful than 100 megatons. We placed Gagarin and Titov in space and we can replace them with other loads that can be directed to any place on Earth.” (A megaton is the equivalent of one million tons of TNT.) Detecting ICBMs Both sides spent considerable time and energy developing methods of monitoring the nuclear capability of the other. For detection of incoming Soviet intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs), the United States developed both ground and space based systems. One of the earliest and still effective systems was the BMEWS (Ballistic Missile Early Warning System), a network of high-powered long-range radars placed around the northern periphery of the Western Hemisphere. An approach over the North Pole was considered the most likely for any Soviet missile or bomber strike since it was the point of closest approach between the U.S.’s and USSR’s landmasses. By utilizing these radars, and eventually, launch detecting infra-red satellites, the U.S. hoped to gain a good 30 minutes of advance warning of a Soviet nuclear strike. With that much warning, the mighty Strategic Air Command fleet of B-47 and B-52 bombers could be flushed from their mid-western bases and sent on a retaliatory mission. Likewise, the U.S. Titan and Minuteman ICBMs could be launched in a massive counterstrike. Similarly, the Soviets developed missile tracking radars and satellites to counter any U.S. first strike. This standoff between detecting the enemy’s force before he can destroy you and negate your ability to destroy him in turn was known as mutually assured destruction (MAD). Neither side supposedly had an incentive to hit first because the return blow would wipe out the first side’s country. The Back Door The Soviets calculated that a missile fired into a low orbital trajectory would greatly lessen the chances of detection since it would appear above the horizon and thus be visible to the searching radar beams of the Americans much later than would a conventional ICBM profile. For example, the first operational Soviet ICBM, the R-7 (NATO code name SS-6), could loft a nearly three thousand pound payload into a ballistic trajectory of between 600-1200 miles altitude for a target 3,000 miles away. The instant the ascending missile cleared the radar horizon radar and other sensors would detect the rocket and sound the alert. A low orbit weapon using only a 100-200 mile apogee orbit would decrease the warning time to five minutes and that only if the incoming warhead was coming from over the Artic area. If a bomb were to make an approach from the south, the U.S., in the early 1960s, was woefully unguarded. The time from detection to impact would have been only a few minutes. In March 1962, Khrushchev stated, “We can launch missiles not only over the North Pole, but in the opposite direction, too…Global rockets can fly from the oceans or other directions where warning facilities cannot be installed. Given global missiles, the warning system in general has lost its importance. Global missiles cannot be spotted in time to prepare any measures against them.” It was a clear statement of Soviet intentions to place nukes in orbit. By 1967, United Nations Resolution 1884 and the Outer Space Treaty called upon States to refrain from placing in orbit around earth any objects carrying nuclear or other mass-destruction weapons. The USSR promptly dubbed its orbital weapon system a “Fractional Orbital Bombardment System” or FOBS. By simply not inserting the payload into a complete orbit, the Soviets continued with their research into delivering thermonuclear bombs via a low-trajectory, low visibility route. The Equipment In Soviets started a three-pronged approach to get a nuclear orbital system in place. The first proposed orbital missile was the Vladimir Chelomey design based on the UR-1 ICBM. The Soviets gave the ok to proceed with work on this system on March 16, 1961. This was a two stage design, known as the UR-200A, used an RD-0202 first stage engine developing 228 tons of thrust and an RD-0205 second stage with 62 tons of thrust. The second proposal came from the legendary designer Sergey P. Korolev. He had begun preliminary work on the Global Missile No.1 (GR-1) in 1960. The Soviet Central Committee and the USSR Council of Ministers gave the formal go-ahead on September 24, 1962. The GR-1 was a part of Korelev’s N1 lunar program booster. The GR-1 and N1 shared many common design features to aid in the development of both systems. For example, the GR-1 used NK-9 and –9V engines, each developing thrust in the 45-ton range. Korolev’s design team used these same engines as the basis for all of the N1’s stages. It was a three-stage beast using several of the NK-9s. The total mass of Korolev’s GR-1 project was 117 tons, carrying a 2.2 megaton warhead. It would have been accurate to within 3 miles. The third proposal originated with Mikhail K. Yangelis’ R-36-0, approved for development on April 16, 1962. Yangelis based his orbital weapon on the existing design of his R-36 super heavyweight ICBM (NATO called it the SS-9). The –0 variant was a multi-stage missile using storable hypergolic fuels of nitrogen tetroxide and unsymmetrical dimethyl hydrazine. The first stage used a single RD-251 engine actually composed of three twin-chambered RD-250 engines for a total thrust of 241 tons. The second stage used a single RD-250 with 96 tons of ‘oomph.’ The third stage consisted of a guidance section, a retro-rocket and the warhead. The whole contraption was 108 feet long and weighed 180 tons fully fueled. In 1965, the Soviet Strategic Rocket Forces (RSVN) conducted a study to determine the best proposal. Although all three designers had produced hardware, none had yet flown. During the study, Yangelis’ project was chosen as the most promising and work on the other two was stopped. Korolev, however, did continue to work on his GR-1’s third stage, using it as the basis for the upper stage on the N1 and Proton boosters. Having won the design competition, Yangelis was under the gun to make it work. One of the keys to making the rocket perform its deadly mission was the third stage. The instrument section contained an autonomous inertial navigation system, but because of the ‘drift’ inherent in gyroscopic instruments, the system was supplemented by a radar altimeter that would aid the trajectory at two points; once at the start of the orbit and the second just prior to de-orbit burn. The reentry vehicle tipped the scales at 3,000 lbs with an explosive yield in the 2-3 megaton range. Part of the mass of the vehicle included the retro-rocket. That engine used a single chamber RD-854 engine packing 7.7 tons of thrust. It was used to change the plane of the vehicle from an orbital trajectory to a ballistic one. Four nozzles on the sides used bleed thrust from the main chamber yawed the vehicle and four additional corner-mounted thrusters provided pitch control. Testing and Operations The R-36-0 was tested from both aboveground launch facilities at the Tyura-Tam missile range and from in-ground launch silos. The in-ground system was to be the basing mode for the missile. At Tyura-Tam, the 2d Testing Directorate led a series of test launches beginning in December 1965. The table below gives the launch designation, if known, the date, and the CIA assessment of the shot. Designation Date Comments 1 Dec 16, 1965 inertial nav. system malfunction 2 Feb 5, 1965 retrorocket malfunction 3 Mar 16, 1966 fire on launch pad 4 May 20, 1966 successful, apogee of 136 miles 5 Sep 18, 1966 first silo launch, failed during second stage 6 Nov 2, 1966 same as Sep 18 launch attempt 7 Kosmos-139 Jan 25, 1967 success, reentry vehicle impacted at Kapustin Yar test range 8 Mar 22, 1967 failure 9 Kosmos-160 May 17, 1967 successful 10 Kosmos-169 Jul 17, 1967 successful 11 Kosmos-170 Jul 31, 1967 successful 12 Kosmos-171 Aug 8, 1967 successful 13 Kosmos-178 Sep 19, 1967 successful 14 Kosmos-179 Sep 22, 1967 successful 15 Kosmos-183 Oct 18, 1967 successful 16 Kosmos-187 Oct 28, 1967 missed target by 7 miles 17 Kosmos-218 Apr 25, 1968 successful 18 May 21, 1968 successful 19 May 28, 1968 successful 20 Kosmos-244 Oct 2, 1968 successful, first operational missile test launch 21 Kosmos-298 Sep 15, 1969 successful operational test 22 Kosmos-354 Jul 23, 1970 successful operational test 23 Kosmos-365 Sep 25, 1970 successful operational test 24 Kosmos-433 Aug 8, 1971 successful operational test According to declassified CIA documents, the FOBS mission profile consisted of three phases: 1) launch, 2) coast, and 3) reentry. Prior to launch, the system was targeted while in its silo and cannot use external tracking or guidance after launch. During launch, the SS-9 uses its first and second stages to reach orbit discarding each stage as its fuel empties. The orbit was generally along a near polar orbital path with an inclination of 49.6°. Arriving from the Southern Hemisphere, this would put the warhead on track to hit targets in the central US; a little higher inclination would get the warhead to West Coast targets, a little lower would hit the East Coast. During the coast phase and just prior to reentry, the vehicle initiates a pitch maneuver to reorient itself for reentry. During the reentry phase, the retro-rocket fires for one minute, changing the plane of flight from orbital to ballistic. After the retro-rocket fires, the warhead separates from the vehicle and continues on its trajectory until impact. The launch schedules matched US expectations of a test period to get the system configured (1965-1966) followed by the robust schedule of preparing crews for operations (Jan-Oct 1967). The six-month gap between most subsequent launches fits the profile of an operational system getting a workout for crew training. Indeed, US ICBM launches followed somewhat the same pattern during the 1960s and 1970s. Eighteen operational silos were constructed west of Tyur-Tam. The first officially operational unit was RSVN unit 21422 under the command of Lt Col Eng. A. V. Mieyev, activated on August 25, 1969. Two more battalions joined the first and eventually comprised the 98th Missile Brigade. US Assessment of FOBS FOBS was never assessed as a precision weapon since the circular error probable (CEP – circle in at least 50% of the bombs are expected hit a fixed point) was more than three miles. It wouldn’t be used to destroy hardened US ICBM silos or other protected sites. Instead, the US strategic planners and policy makers thought the more likely FOBS use would be as a ‘pathfinder’ to take out command and control centers like the numerous sites in Washington, DC – the White House, Pentagon, etc. Much like a World War II fighter sweeping enemy aircraft before the bombers come through, the FOBS would take out the ability to launch the retaliatory strike that was sure to come if ICBMs were detected. Because of the interest in the US of more accurate, smaller warheads versus the often times ‘bigger is better’ thought of Khrushchev and a greater reliance on the manned bomber, the US never seriously pursued a nuclear orbital weapon system. (See X-20 DynaSoar sidebar) Also, the thought of a nuclear weapon coming down accidentally was politically more dangerous to US leaders than their Soviet counterparts. By the time of the Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty (SALT) II of 1972 and the emergence of the submarine launched ballistic missile (SLBM) as a safer, stealthier, means of launching nuclear weapons from different areas than over the North Pole, the FOBS weapon was nearing its finale. Although never ratified by the US, but abided by both superpowers, SALT II specifically mentioned the SS-9 FOB system as one marked for deactivation. Additionally, 12 of the 18 silos had to be destroyed and the others converted to different use. By 1982, the RVSN began dismantling the R-36-0 launch installations and retiring the missiles. By February 1983 the last missile was pulled from its silo and in May 1984, the last silo destroyed. Aftermath So unless Hollywood is on to some secret that remains undiscovered, no satellites orbit overhead with the capability to rain mass death and destruction on an unsuspecting populace. Thankfully, both the USSR and the US stepped back from the fallacy of placing nukes in space. Now if we can only find another good space movie, we’re all set. SIDEBAR – American Nuclear Weapons in Space In the 1950s and early 1960s, the U.S Air Force made a strong run to be the space force for America. As part of that attempt, they proposed a reusable spaceplane, the X-20 DynaSoar (Dynamic Soaring) designed for military use. Unlike the concurrent X-15 research program, the X-20 was intended to become an operational system, conducting space missions ranging from reconnaissance, satellite inspection and repair, orbital resupply, and bombardment. The third version of the X-20 would use a Titan IIIC rocket booster and have an orbital capability. This version would contain a bomb bay for delivering nuclear warheads requiring precise targeting and the ability to approach a target from any direction. Deciding against placing nuclear weapons in space the Department of Defense cancelled the first test version of the X-20 less than a year before testing was to have begun in 1964.

Surely, today's generation with the gee-whiz electronics as part of the standard cell phone/tricorder/portable Death Star package can do something updated.

Man, I knew it was cold in space, but this thread is approaching absolute zero as well!

On the current "I only want to be a pilot" thread, there are a couple of dudes with four generations of military flying. One of the things that adds to the growing divide between the military and the general civilian population is a lack of familiarity with the military. Related to that is the anecdotal evidence of sons/daughters of military dudes following in those footsteps. So my question (I'd post a poll if I could figure it out) is how many generations of military flying do you have? If you are the first, what fired you up to pursue your vocation (Doesn't have to be the guy/gal driving, anybody who straps in would be welcome). If a succeeding generation, why did you follow those steps? For me, my dad was enlisted in the USAAF, then USAF, then went aviation cadets in 1952, flew various SAC tankers including the -135A when it was new (something significant that we still the -135 albeit in the -R model guise). Uncle was a USAAF GCI operator in the Pacific in WWII - invasions of Bougainville and the Philippines. I posted part of his story in the History Friday thread about GCI in the Southwest Pacific story. My oldest brother started out as an Army medic, got commissioned, retired LTC MI type. I didn't have the eyes (as well as, probably, the eye-hand skills to make it in the time allotted), so wound up as a weapons controller (ABM now) on E-3s and E-8s. Retired now. Anyone else? Anyone? Bueller?

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My post (damn work getting in the way and having to stop mid-post to deal with pesky bosses) was meant to be online prior to M2's clarification otherwise I wouldn't have bothered as I was obviously wrong. I would differ on the appropriateness of opinions expressed here vs. the 'real world' but as it's not my site and I'm not a mod, I will play nice and follow the 'guidance.' Can I say hypothetically that a congresswoman from California is scary and a socialist? Can I say that I'm glad of one thing from this election, namely that this should be the final stake in Hillary's further political ambition? Obama will be on the Democratic ticket next time and he doesn't need her for any cabinet posts, so given that she'll be 70+ by 2016, the reign of the Bubbas might finally be over. Can I say that? Please?

I didn't take the opener as applying to baseops, but rather a skull's up to not get carried away in the 'real world.'

***WARNING***ATTENTION WHORE POST****WARNING****** This is the first Presidential election I've voted in since college. The years in between I wore Uncle's uniform and I never thought it appropriate to vote for my boss. Local and state elections, yes, but not for the CinC. *****END ATTENTION WHORE POST******** As to what CH initially posted, beside the UCMJ ramifications, talking politics - badmouthing any party/incumbent/candidate - to anyone who knows you serve, to me, lessens the professionalism of the military. Even though we get tools in the chain of command, we took that Oath to Protect and Defend the Constitution. Don't ruin it by taking away the respect of one of the last bastions of perceived honor in our country. Say, how'd this soapbox get so high?

A little lovin' for the USN Cold War shore-based warriors... Between The Rock and a Hard Place “We were getting our socks jammed off by the cabbies in Morocco on one side and other ones on Gibraltar on the other side. The only way we could maintain contact was to take it down on the deck.” This is how former Lockheed P-3 Orion pilot John Maffei describes tracking a Soviet nuclear submarine entering the Mediterranean Sea during the Cold War. His quarry in this case was a ‘Victor I’ class Soviet attack boat. Attack subs in any navy have a primary responsibility for taking out the other side’s ballistic missile-carrying submarines (nicknamed “boomers” for obvious reasons) as well as preying on adversary attack boats. Additionally, many subs, can lob cruise missiles and carry the sobriquet of “shooter.” In Maffei’s case, the taxi drivers on either side of the busy Strait of Gibraltar weren’t engaged in some massive James Bond-style operation to thwart the good guys, it was just that their dispatch radios in the cabs operated on some of the same frequencies that the P-3 used to track underwater targets via sonobouys. Coming in a variety of flavors, sonobouys are disposable, self-contained sonar receivers and radio transmitters. Dropped at low level, the sonobouys listen below the waves for sound and transmit those sounds to the P-3’s highly trained crew to classify and identify. Each sonobouy is programmed to transmit on a separate frequency so as not to interfere with another, but with only so many frequencies available, the cabbies’ chatter was interfering with prosecuting this contact. After a set time, the sonobouys run out of electrical power and sink. By getting below the line of sight transmissions of the cabs, the sensor operators in the P-3 could better listen to the string of sonobouys that Maffei and company had dropped to pick up the Victor. The US Navy spent an enormous amount of time, effort, energy and money to negate the massive USSR submarine fleet during the Cold War years. There was a real fear in the Pentagon that the Russian’s submarine quantity would overwhelm the U.S. and NATO’s maritime quality, thus stopping any reinforcements from reaching Europe in the event of another war on that battered continent. Likewise, if the Soviets could take our US boomers in the opening stage of a nuclear Armageddon, then a very large part of U.S. retaliatory capability was lost. Thus the USN wanted to know where the bad guys were, 24/7. To track those subs and if need be, kill them, the Navy invested in many squadrons of P-3 sub-hunters. Deployed around the world, these aircraft spent hundreds of thousands of hours airborne searching for, tracking, monitoring, occasionally annoying, and sometimes helping Soviet subs. Thus it was that Bronx-born Naval Academy graduate aviator Lieutenant John Maffei found himself launched from Rota Air Field, Spain to find this sub entering the Med. He and his crew (see sidebar for crew composition) gathered their flight material and received a briefing from the ASWOC (Anti-Submarine Warfare Operations Center). “The ASWOC gets its data from a variety of sources – the Sound Surveillance System, a multi-billion dollar network of underwater microphones scattered around the world’s oceans; from contacts gained by US or allied submarines, other P-3s as well as other means still classified. In any event, the crew knew that a Victor sub was lurking in the Atlantic not far from the Strait of Gibraltar and that it was probably there to relieve another Soviet sub already on-station within the Mediterranean. My crew’s job was to find this sub and track it until relieved by another ASW platform,” says Maffei. As mentioned earlier, the Navy took sub hunting seriously. In peacetime, careers were made or broken over successful sub tracking whether in an aircraft, ship or submarine. If you found a bad guy sub, you tailed it until the higher ups said “enough.” If you lost contact and the sub got away, you could expect to “dance with the skipper” upon your return. And that dance was usually not very enjoyable. The commander of the attack sub USS Lapon, legendary within the ASW community, tracked a new Soviet boomer for 47 days without being discovered. By that time, the US sub, in conjunction with P-3s orbiting overhead, recorded every sound, captured via underwater photography every rivet and detail, and monitored every transmission the unsuspecting Soviet boat made. Think of the sub tracking scenes from the movie “Hunt for Red October” and you’ll have a fair idea of the game. In wartime, these abilities to find and monitor had to be quickly adjusted to find and kill. If the nuclear balloon was to ever go up, it is fairly safe to say that a boomer opening his missile launch tubes would have found himself in small pieces before the launch order was given. Back to Maffei’s problem; he had a fixed target time to arrive where the intel shop thought the sub would be so he and his crew backed all their preparations, pre-flight, equipment checks, start/taxi/take-off times to mesh with the required overhead time. With a big, complex aircraft like the P-3, prepping the plane and preflighting was no “kick the tires and light the fires” affair. Maffei describes what it was like, “The pilots, the TACCO and nav, Sensors 1 and 2 would meet at the ASWOC to get the ‘gouge’ for this mission. Meanwhile, the ‘Ord,’ (Ordinanceman) would take a truck to the munitions area and get the number and type of sonobouys that he and the TACCO had previously briefed. “The Eng (flight engineer) would head out and start looking over the aircraft. Soon the 3P and the nav would arrive carrying the box of crypto codes. While the 3P and eng pre-flighted, the nav would load up all the crypto in the secure radios and other equipment, ops check the radios to make sure they worked. “Meanwhile, whoever was the mission commander, could be the PPC or the TACCO depending on seniority or training, would fine-tune the mission and prepare the expected sonobouy patterns we thought would work best to acquire the contact. “As it got closer to take-off, the 2P would file at base ops for our ATC clearance. Once we were away from traffic, we would leave ATC freq and go tactical for the mission until we were heading home again.” “Ord has loaded the sonobouys on the aircraft per the TACCOs instructions; we carried 48 externally in the belly and as many as we could stuff internally that we dropped via sonobouy chutes in the fuselage. He would load those when it came time to drop. “Ground ops were pretty standard and off we went.” Transit time varied from one to several hours depending on where the plane was based and where the sub was thought to be. “We arrive overhead our patrol area, drop an area search pattern called a “a barrier” of sonobouys to try and pick our boy,” says Maffei of this hunt. “The Med is one of the busiest areas of shipping in the world and the Strait of Gibraltar is a very busy choke point for traffic entering or exiting the Med. Only eight miles wide and less than a thousand feet deep, everything has to funnel through it. All that traffic makes for a lot of noise underwater. Noise is a sub’s best friend when he’s trying to evade detection and an ASW platform’s worst enemy. “In quiet, deep water like the North Atlantic or North Pacific, we might get sonobouy ‘hits’ from 30 miles or more. In churned up, busy water like the Straight, detection drops to a few hundred yards. In fact, the ASW in-house joke is that the Strait is actually much shallower than it used to be because of all the sonobouys dropped in it over the years. “A favorite tactic of sub drivers entering a congested area is to hide underneath a surface ship. By using the ship as a shield in both noise and metal detection, a sub can get away if you are not careful. That takes some skill on his part to get in close and stay there. “We picked up our contact just west of the Strait, with a faint acoustic contact. We stayed with him, but just barely. With intermittent contact due to all the shipping noise and the radio interference, we were sweating this one. If we didn’t establish a solid track on him soon, we might not find him until he was within potential shooting distance from a battle group or such.” “Finally, our contact made his move. Trying to mask himself underneath an inbound freighter, he entered the Strait. Here we were darting low level at 200 feet or less, trying to maintain a plot, avoid going over somebody else’s territory and setting up an international incident, and we are about to lose this guy. “Finally he did fade. We went to our back up plan and zipped over to the eastern exit of the Strait. We laid our last line of sonobouys across the Strait and set up an orbit listening until our ears were just about bleeding. “As the time for likely intercept wound down, we were only getting confusing garbage – many ships’ screw noises, marine life like shrimp, whales and who knows what else, but no Victor noise.” “We were just about out of gas and ideas when on the last sonobouy at the end of the line when we could reasonably expect to hear him, we saw a feather of breaking water just about directly underneath us. “As I racked the P-3 around for another pass, marking the spot of our contact, I directed Sensor 3 to ready the MAD (Magnetic Anomaly Detector –essentially a tail boom mounted metal detector). Normally, we depend on sound for detection, but with all the scrambled noise in the area, I chose the MAD even though it is a close in sensor. “As we passed over the spot, Senor 3 bellowed “MAD, MAD, MAD!” which was a short way of letting the crew know he had a good, solid contact. We had just gotten extremely lucky because the Victor’s captain had brought his boat up to periscope depth for a quick look around. “We were able to drop down on top of him and take pictures at low level. Even if the Soviet skipper didn’t see us through his ‘scope,’ he could hear us through his own sound systems. The four turboprops set up quiet a harmonic disturbance in the water that he’d have to be deaf not to hear. “He wasn’t and he went just about ape-s*** to lose us. He tried the whole ‘Crazy Ivan’ dance, diving while turning sharply, ascending and changing speed, the whole pocketful of tricks he had to lose us. “We had him solid now though. Since he was through the Strait and had to go relieve the other waiting boat, he was committed to staying in. That fact really simplified our targeting. “Eventually, he settled down and resumed his course towards his patrol area. We stayed with him until another of my squadron’s P-3s relieved us. We turned for the barn and landed after nearly a 12-hour mission. Now a United Airlines pilot, Maffei concludes his tale, “The beer tasted really good that evening.” SIDEBAR P-3 Crew composition PPC- Patrol Plane Commander – the aircraft commander, the head guy responsible for aircraft safety and operation. Can also be the Mission Commander, person responsible for successful specific mission accomplishment. Since most P-3 missions were 8-14 hours long, much of it at low level, an extra pilot is a vital part of the crew’s safety. 2P – 2d Pilot – a more experienced pilot than a new guy, but still in upgrade to becoming a PPC. 3P – 3d Pilot – most junior of the pilots, usually just reported in from pilot training/type conversion. Does most of the ‘grunt’ work; preflighting the aircraft, inventorying and guarding the extensive cryptographic codes used by the crew to carry out a mission as well as gaining flying experience. Flight Engineer – enlisted aviator monitors engine and aircraft performance, fuel flow, and assists in flight deck duties. Acts as the plane’s crew chief if the P-3 has to land at other than home station during a mission. Usually due to mission lengths, two are aboard. TACCO – Tactical Coordinator – senior of the two naval flight officers (navigators), responsible for coordinating the use/presentation of the P-3’s multiple sensor systems in conducting the assigned mission., positioning the aircraft during the tactical portion of the mission. Navigator – junior of the NFO’s, responsible for the ‘point A to point B’ positioning, monitoring the various communication systems; obtaining, loading, accounting for the crypto items. Sensor 1 & 2 – enlisted acoustic sensor operators; monitor and interpret the data collected from the sonobouys; air dropped miniature sonar receivers used to listen for underwater activity. From detected sounds, the sensor operators can classify and identify most things in the water. Once a target is acquired, they will track it until the mission is completed. Sensor 3 – enlisted non-acoustic sensor operator- uses the P-3’s radar, forward looking infrared (FLIR) pod, magnetic anomaly detector (MAD), and electronic support (ESM) equipment to aid in mission accomplishment. Ordinanceman – enlisted weapons specialist; responsible for loading, setting directed parameters, on-board caretaking of the aircraft’s various weapons when loaded and for the same functions for the multitude of sonobouys carried. In flight Technician – enlisted electrical repairman; performs on-board trouble-shooting/repair of the electrical components on the P-3. Typical P-3 Missions Primarily developed from the Lockheed Electra airliner of the 1950s as a long-range patrol and anti-submarine warfare (ASW) aircraft, the continuously updated P-3 conducts a variety of missions ASW – using on-board sensors, the P-3 locates, identifies, tracks, and if need be, kills enemy submarines. The P-3’s weapons inventory for this mission includes torpedoes and depth charges. SSC- Surface Search and Control – the P-3 identifies all surface shipping within a defined area. Ducking down to 200 feet above the water, the P-3 will fly close to a ship and “rig” it; inspecting it visually and photographically. Often used against warships in open water, it is also useful in counter-drug operations, environmental maritime patrol and anti-terrorism missions. Strike – the P-3 can carry an amazing variety and amount of ordinance. For anti-shipping strikes, HARPOON anti-ship missiles and torpedoes are the weapons of choice. For ground targets, everything from iron bombs, Maverick anti-armor missiles, cluster bomb units (CBUs), to Zuni rockets are pickled from the Orion. CSAR – Combat Search and Rescue – with a long loiter ability and extensive communications capability; the P-3 can serve as the airborne command post for any rescue operations.

Technique only, but.... Don't do the help no matter what rank (O or E) you are. Keep the paycheck and the fun separate, at least until after the marriage. Then the fun disappears, so the adage is still valid.

On Okinawa? Other than the MWR site (which was a remote, 1 O, a couple of Es, playing Skipper and a couple of Gilligans for the facility) I'm curious as to anything else USAF on the island.

Now that is the most effective mix of disturbing and funny seen in a long while. My stomach is quesy...

Can you smell what the caveman is cooking? I see political office in M2's future. In order from the paraphrased quote above: He's succinctly nailed (sts) what the mainstream America wants/likes He's articulated a policy of restoring personal responsibility into society. He's crafted an easily understood, no nonsense foreign policy.

Ah, that'd be British cuisine...