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Sure seems like a lot of self righteous assholes in here believing that a flight control check is such basic enough airmanship that you would never takeoff without doing one. I get it. As pilots, that's how this works-we all believe it could never happen to me. Someone else pointed out that in the H we always said "previously checked" on the flight controls step of the before takeoff checklist when we were running it after an ERO. In hindsight that's a shitty practice-but until this crash most guys would tell you the flight controls have been checked. Today. By me. What could have happened to them since then? And it's not even a step on the ERO checklist in the J. I'm glad some of you are good enough to never consider making a mistake like that. Apparently you're so good you would have identified that it wasn't a checklist step and should have been. For the rest of us-There but for the grace of God go I. Don't be a douche, these guys weren't idiots. Learn from them.

I started to comment yesterday and decided against it, but a couple of things to think about. In a larger aircraft when you do a flight control check as a pilot, your flight controls have been checked by someone (in the H it's by the FE and crew chief) physically and visually to confirm correct deflection during the -1 preflight. That is the last time that proper deflection can or will be checked without working outside of established procedures. Once that is done, every other flight control check is to check for binding and/or free movement. Presumably that would have helped in this case...maybe not. They may not have noticed that the yoke was not going full forward. There definitely would not have been binding of the controls due to this issue. Additionally, the pilots checked the flight controls prior to the initial takeoff. The way that Herks operate there are normally multiple stops (average of 3-6) on one mission without ever shutting down engines. Some of those stops are for 5-10 minutes (some are for much longer) and you only opened the crew entrance door and dropped off one guy and taxied back out for takeoff. The primary reason for accomplishing a flight control check when loading/downloading cargo is due to the fact that you have MHE in close proximity to two major control surfaces and it is possible that something was hit or bent by a forklift and/or pallet without anyone noticing or speaking up. However, as has been stated, it is always a good idea. Gearpig, yes, the HUD in the J model is considered primary instrumentation and certified for IFR flight. There is no other PFD required and with limited screens there are other more important items to display. The yoke blocks part of the screen directly in front of the pilot to begin with. The little bit of additional blockage of the one MFD was not likely noticeable at night on NVGs and multiple attempts to recreate it in the sim also went unnoticed by the crews. This is a tragic event that could have been avoided and we all need to learn from it. It seems to me that in my corner of the world that most have learned the lesson. Sounds like multiple other platforms and people already knew it and good on them. Don't let your brothers in arms die in vain. Take whatever you can from their tragic accident report and apply it to your flying career and avoid doing something that writes the next one in your blood. I have been flying the same airplane for nearly 22 years and read lots of SIBs and AIBs and heard about some things that I thought I would have never done. You never know what will happen until you step to one particular aircraft on one particular day. God bless the families of those that perished on Torqe 62. Good luck to all you guys as you continue on your way in your AF career.

Take the emotions out of this. Nobody is saying these guys were idiots. We all have survived multiple screw ups that could very well had ended the other way; we all screw up. Two of my good friends weren't idiots idiots either, were great dudes and above average pilots, but in the end, complacency kills. I sure as shit have made many a mistake and missed a flight control check (and many other things), but it was due to task saturation/distraction, not due to "the T.O. doesn't say I have to, so I won't" or "it was good last flight, nothing could possibly happen/a part fail in between flights." I think its a dangerous mindset to say, "what could have possibly happened since I last looked?" or "it's not in the checklist, so it." That is absolutely the wrong approach to teach people (especially young, impressionable people). This was not one of those unidentified, obscure things nobody thought of until a mishap occurred; it is absolutely something that applies to every aircraft, and again, should be taught to everyone who learns to fly, military or civilian. This is not shitting on people, it is highlighting the extreme importance of the "simple things." Scoff simple things (consciously or subconsciously) and it can end very badly...there's tons of accident reports that point to that, and as you mentioned, we're all vulnerable 100% of the time to making simple mistakes that end tragically.

//startsarcasm// Everyone in the zone has OPRs starting around the same time. The guy at 3 APZ has a few more I think. //endsarcasm// Out

Gents, the real issue here is that the pilot intentionally blocked the flight controls and then forgot about it; CP forgot too. He did something non-standard and there wasn't a checklist item to catch it. Holding the yoke back was/is a common J community technique for their ERO, but I doubt blocking the controls with a pelican case was common. As for a Load checking the controls, who knows if a LM would have been able to see the difference from normal to blocked. But I stand by my biggest point, which is never intentionally block your controls. This was one of the hardest briefs I've ever listened to. I really learned something, even beyond the flight control issue. I hope everyone here does too. Out

My jet has no flight control check per checklist except for the efcs bit....but I sure as hell do one every time before I release brakes. "Flight controls free and correct" since my first flying lesson.

Whether in a 152, viper, or C-5, it makes sense to do a flight control check EVERY time before taking the runway for takeoff. Who cares what a T.O. does or does not say, or how many times that day you've already done it. This should be flying airplanes 101 taught when getting your private or at IFS. Frankly I'm surprised to hear it is/was common practice to not do this. Regardless of what you fly, take the 6-9 sec to do one prior to rolling onto the runway. Its basic airmanship and obviously could very well save yours and maybe others lives.

McDew stated over the last two days he was not chosen to be the CSAF. He said he would remain at TRANSCOM.

Sure, and sorry for the delay. In Iraq circa 2006/7 the Army's #1 airlift request was getting stuff flown into Taji. There was a lot of fighting around Taji. I did a bunch of -130 deployments to Balad, and one day I happened to be the guy picked to fly the AMC/CC around the AOR. I asked him why we weren't flying into Taji, being that Army commanders at LSA Anaconda (Balad) were always asking us the same question, being told to call AMD, and subsequently being told no. He told me that he owned the pushback against authorizing us to fly into Taji, and he was extremely proud of it. Army helos were regularly taking SAFIREs IVO Taji, and he believed he was protecting his people (me) by denying the request. "Why would I make you fly somewhere unsafe?" But the Army had to resupply and operate out of Taji. It's in the heart of the Sunni triangle and at the time, security in that area was crucial to US strategy. Because AMC refused to fly into Taji, the task was left to Army helos and ground convoys. They are significantly more vulnerable to attack. It's pretty hard to hit a herc on a Pen-D with an RPK. It's not hard to use an EFP on some 21 year old kid driving truck #23 of a huge convoy. By embracing risk aversion for his fleet that AMC commander put more people in greater risk. Stated another way: his risk aversion didn't actually decrease risk, it merely forced another to accept it. And the people forced to accept it were far more susceptible to the dangers. When I pointed this out, I was completely blown off with a sarcastic comment about how his priority was my safety..... Etc.. It's a foul philosophy. There's absolutely nothing special about me and I'm sure a lot of dudes reading this have similar tales; but I hope this story illustrates the principal I was attempting to convey.