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Clark Griswold

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Clark Griswold last won the day on July 29

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About Clark Griswold

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  1. Alrighty then.... ****** MSG ENDS ****** Not to drop into the weeds on this idea but I'll just drop into the weeds... could the US / DoD build a family of systems (just thinking Air but applicable to Naval assets as well) to provide mass at a large discount compared to the frontline systems now and coming online? A US built long range fighter / interceptor for $30-40 million per tail and FH cost under 7k? An arsenal platform under $75 mil per tail and not overly complicated and years behind schedule, etc... as examples. Mass to engage the enemy mass, mass to complicate the enemy's targeting problem and mass to stretch thin the defense of the enemy. That is just my off the cuff concept of why we would look to this, which leads in my mind to an inexpensive (relatively) long range manned and unmanned platform team primarily for the China / Taiwan type fight but applicable elsewhere.
  2. Disagree. Threatening to use special weapons in defense of the territorial sovereignty of allies or other non-existential interest is not a realistic threat / deterrent. Our foes who also possess special weapons with the capability to strike with them intercontinentally know this, that we will not use them against them unless they already have or we truly believe they will use them on us our own homeland. We will have to use conventional means to deter or defeat them in potential conflicts against allies, control of global commons or other vital national interests, hence the percolating idea that we need a force that can take hits and come back on Night 2, 3, etc... I've heard smart folks say resources don't drive requirements, ok maybe but they do shape the answers to those requirements or even if that requirement can be met. So in answer to the requirement (assuming it's valid for this discussion) we might need to first start with a dollar amount or X percentage of the AF appropriation and work backwards from there on what it is we want and for what purpose.
  3. Possibly. Mass could be more of X-tens bigger platforms or capabilities with range versus X-hundreds of smaller platforms without long range capability. I think we conceptualize mass as being always the small, cheap and limited capability when it could be a bit more than that. Seems contradictory I know but it's a trade-off with a sweet spot somewhere. Could even be different for different threats (Russia, China, Iran, NK, etc...) - China is deterred with a big wing arsenal platforms for stand off weapons barrage with range for the Pacific theatre, Russia by an expanded Cyber capability ref @nunya and Iran / NK kept in check with a drone / manned platform capability. That is all in addition to what we have or already planning on acquiring. I asked at the beginning if we had XX billions extra, with future budgets likely being flat or slightly higher what would we be willing to trade to bulk up?
  4. From WOR: BENDING THE PRINCIPLE OF MASS: WHY THAT APPROACH NO LONGER WORKS FOR AIRPOWER Worth a read IMO; if you accept the article's premise that facing potential foes, China namely, that will soon likely combine mass with peer / near peer capabilities that will inevitably attrite and confound asymmetric capabilities used in lieu of actual mass, we will have to add mass to offset this. We have the quality per platform / person covered now we have to have more. Groking a bit on this, does this mean mass in platforms, weapons, weapons/sensors delivered/carried per platform, etc...? Probably some combination not in equal proportions and likely a platform/system(s) different than we have been gearing towards. The exquisite and the few to the adequate and many. That can give some cushion but then what mission(s) do we wish to add mass for? Air Superiority or Attack? ISR or Mobility? Everything costs money to design, build, operate, maintain and train with but could we or should we look for a new family of systems and the people to operate, fix and protect them that are: Inexpensive enough in total ownership cost to buy in mass, Tasked with missions/roles that keep training costs reasonable, Distributed across multiple mission sets to augment with mass the entire AF effort in Joint Operations and Relevant to peer / near peer contingencies. If we were given another XX billions in appropriation to buy more iron, people, improve existing iron or infrastructure, what to choose?
  5. Whoops http://alert5.com/2020/09/23/russian-su-30sm-crashes-said-to-have-been-shot-down-by-su-35-during-dogfight-training/ Sent from my iPhone using Tapatalk
  6. This is going to bite us in the ass sooner rather than later, the loss of the strategic tanker capability. I know limited funds and choices but if we really wanna power project this was one of the systems that enabled that / still does in ways that take a disproportionate amount of other resources to fulfill otherwise. Just two cents from the cheap seats not having to spread the peanut butter and deal with CODELs Sent from my iPhone using Tapatalk
  7. Persons under duress are often are forced to give propaganda messages
  8. There go enlisted volunteers Sent from my iPhone using Tapatalk
  9. Maybe if the weight of palletized AR systems can be kept reasonable Not an Osprey guy and the only data I have is Wikipedia and Boeing’s site which says it can lift 20k in short take off, didn’t specify conditions but would just assume ISA WAG but likely the whole kit and caboodle would come in around 5k at best leaving 15k for offload - likely enough for a two ship with bags some time / options but no extra for anybody on the boom Sent from my iPhone using Tapatalk
  10. Unless said stealth tanker has expeditionary capability (short, rough field with minimal support) then it doesn't really fit in the agile concept employment. From the article: Relying on a 70-year-old refueling paradigm with a 40-year-old operating concept is hardly the way to implement the National Defense Strategy. It’s certainly not innovative. The Air Force needs an “insider tanker” for intra-theater tactical refueling that is tailor-made for expeditious operations in austere airfields. That’s usually where requirements-focused solution seeking ends, but it’s actually not the real problem. The real problem is this: The Air Force needs an “insider tanker” that does not even exist on paper and that the service likely could not afford anyway. and from earlier in the article: This employment concept addresses both of these by focusing on combat generation inside contested anti-access areas with two basic principles. First is to turn anti-access “outsiders” into “insiders” by employing dispersed airpower that can be generated from shorter ranges inside highly contested areas because it is less reliant on fixed operating locations. Agile combat employment is lean, agile, and less predictable because it is expeditious and austere. Operational maneuver — not firepower or technology — is the predominant mechanism to negate anti-access. They want a force constantly shifting its logistical footprint to make the enemy targeting problem harder. An LO tanker likely would be like other LO assets that are support intensive, not saying we don't need or could justify an LO tanker just that it is not what they (Joint Leadership) are calling for in systems to execute this concept. IDK, I'm a believer in distributed ops / agile combat employment but I wonder if our current platforms aside from the Mobility assets can really do this as they were not designed for this but really this begs the question if land based fighter aircraft with relatively short ranges (for the Pacific theater) albeit extendable with AR are the right platform to plan to deter/defeat Chinese aggression in the SCS, Taiwan, etc... methinks that LO bombers with longer unrefuelled ranges and greater potential delivery of LO standoff munitions per sortie might be where the AF needs to focus on delivering our piece of the Joint Force if WW3 kicks off with the PRC. Fewer AR events during mission and could refuel further away from A2AD area prior to ingress thus lowering risk to the tanker / mission enabling capability. I'm not a Douhet acolyte but in this case, given our potential foe and his capabilities at least until they are severely degraded, we might best help the team by providing this type of capability and not incurring a liability to the team. That is our fires platforms footprint (the AF's) is primarily based far outside his targeting capability so we launch with impunity at very long range from our fixed bases, use our organic AR resources to get over the tyranny of distance, deliver weapons and RTB but keep the cycle going so the enemy gets no respite and further complicates his defensive choices.
  11. Possibly as to re-framing it as a boom equipped tanker uav but his idea was a gain in capability in existing platform(s) not a new platform as new iron is not possible in the short term. Just a WAG but from proposal to IOC for a tanker uav would be at least 10 years, pathetic but given our acquisition plinko machine even that seems optimistic. But you have start somewhere so... Taking a cue from the article, he proposed breaking the system into two separate RFPs for the palletized tank and bolt on boom kit, put a third RFP for a an optionally manned boom station to develop the hardware / software for use into a successor tanker boom equipped uav.
  12. How to mass resupply the remote island base? Author didn't address that and I had the same question from a friend at work who read the article and wondered the same, my answer was likely covert logistics that could stand a better chance of survival / delivery from air and naval threats. WOR on the rocks had a good article related to this proposing "Cocaine Logistics" for the USMC if they plan to operate inside the range of Chinese (or Russian, Iranian, etc...) power projection. https://warontherocks.com/2020/07/cocaine-logistics-for-the-marine-corps/ For these remote island FARP / FOLs, if the air to surface threat has not been suppressed, a semi-submersible supply ship could probably deliver the 690 tons of fuel, fresh water and food with a reasonable amount of risk / vulnerability. As for port facilities to allow for the offload, that's another problem to solve but likely not insurmountable. Valid question as how the other logistics / support bills the ACE concept requires to be paid will be addressed as when a Herc gets this Agile Boom kit installed it's mainly a tanker now. I got a ride way back in 13 in Afghanistan on a KC-130T with around 20 of my closest friends and it was tight and we only had one pallet of bags. Last thing, KC-390 might be another candidate to try this on
  13. Valid question - my guess is Benitez (article author) envisions them (new AR tanker Agile Boom equipped C-130s) refuelling on small reopenned island airfields and then launching with this fuel to AR inside the A2AD as it is being attacked / disrupted to enable CAPs to remain airborne and less vulnerable during intense combat than cycling thru often FARPs and FOLs. Marines have been doing this (reopening old island airfields and there are a number out there in the Western Pacific) https://foreignpolicy.com/2012/06/05/u-s-reopening-world-war-ii-bases-in-pacific/ http://www.airfields-freeman.com/HI/Airfields_W_Pacific.htm Pushes the risk to the 130s when they land to get fuel to go to another AR mission but there is risk always, shifting some of that risk to the expediently modified tanker is better tactically than risking the few and essentially irreplaceable 22s / 35s. Where the booms come from? Loadmaster force trained to an appropriate level and skill set maintained at some level that is acceptable until it appears soon to be called for then brought to a higher level of proficiency. There's a cost to be associated with that to be sure and would have to be factored in, not advocating one way or the other just where I would see this Agile Boom operator crew coming from. Alternative to that is to make all those 130s AR capable to increase options for the Agile Boom 130s to use and extend Tanker Bridges but that seems to violate the intention of the proposal by Benitez to gain a new capability by only modifying existing platforms with as little modification as you have to. Getting receiver capability would then incur a pilot training bill, probably outside the realm of the possible. Your idea is not that pie in the sky but to my knowledge not done since the 50s: USS Guavina (AGSS-362), refueling a P5M-1 Marlin flying boat off Norfolk, Virginia (USA), in 1955. Prior to World War II several submarines were fitted to refuel seaplanes. Was proposed for the Seamaster but never tested I believe Now we (the US / USAF) don't have any in inventory but the A400M seems like a better candidate platform to try this concept with. Much better speed for fighters and still has short unprepared field capability with a more relevant fuel offload capability assuming a parallelized fuel tank and ramp boom system could work on the Grizzly. Ask the Brits, get Cobham as an contractor entrant in the experiment / demo and they might bite.
  14. Thread revival Not really about booms on C-130s but an argument for booms on C-130s... really for growing expeditionary air refuelling capability as part of Agile Combat Employment but whatevs worth a read and discussion AGILITY BOOM: FUELING INNOVATION AND THE AIR FORCE’S BLUNT LAYER Points for not advocating the acquisition of a new platform as that is likely impossible in the next few years and proposing a technically feasible reuse of what we already have but is the juice worth the squeeze? Methinks it is worth a test / demo at least.
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