Clark Griswold

With "friends" like these: https://www.breitbart.com/europe/2020/11/21/merkels-germany-tells-trump-not-to-bring-troops-home-from-afghanistan/ From the article: Conservative German MP Roderich Kiesewetter said that the United States is “morally obligated” to rebuild the Afghani military and civil society, saying in September: “A hasty and rash withdrawal would only lead to the collapse of social structures and the return of organized violence of all kinds.” The Germans do not appear to be considering filling the gap left by a potential American withdrawal with their own forces, however. They have the capability, money but apparently not the will for this mission they claim to care so much for. Given the size of our footprint and their resources, even modestly growing their armed forces to just cover this mission or make it their focus is feasible. If NATO is so interested in this, just do it without us. Add this as one more thing to do POTUS, offer to transfer intel, bases and missions to them to continue the Afghanistan Project, do it publicly and hold their feet to the fire. The American and European MSM will either bury it or spin it as bullying but who cares at this point.

Congress wants to stay the course... https://www.breitbart.com/politics/2020/11/20/nearly-all-lawmakers-at-house-armed-services-committee-hearing-opposed-afghanistan-troop-drawdown/ Just leave, tell them to fly everybody out in 69 C-17s and leave whatever is not classified, a weapon and/or scuttle it as a final F you to the Taliban. 2500 guys in perpetuity to do what? In a landlocked shithole surrounded by unfriendly nations to our causes. There is nothing there for us anymore. #Choirpreach, but just leave POTUS, it's your last thing to do on your watch on the long fight against the Swamp.

Florida Man harassed by the Man... I'm not a Libertarian but really what the hell does the state care if one guy chooses to modify his truck to drive in the water in a way that causes no discernable greater effect than a boat? Anyway, God bless weirdos, jackasses and free thinkers causing consternation to busy body, needling government bureaucrats and their minions.

Related to Force Structure: US Air Force chief’s top modernization priorities aren’t what you think they are BLUF: Nuclear Enterprise, Joint C2 system(s) and Better / Faster Acquisitions. How to pay for that though and what will be divested is the question I have, just to be a broken record there is likely no extra check in the mail so something's gotta give...

Yup - Interceptor not fighter. With the capability of technology (Combat ID, Cross cue, Datalink, Sensor Fusion, etc...) and the capability of modern weapons, this platform would fight with those in mind and eschew situations where it would be kinematically at a disadvantage and avoid the knife fight in a phone booth. Range, Weapons Capacity, Sensors, Speed - in that order. Just my idea on what they need to bring to enable/support the LO deep strike platforms and defend HVAAs over large AORs. Now keeping the cost to something reasonable is the really tall order but likely not insurmountable if good idea fairy is kept at arm's length. Copy on USMC plans. From what I've gathered and my little knowledge of amphibious warfare, it sounds like a good idea for the likely next fight(s) in the SCS and Scandinavian/Baltic scenarios.

Concur. Limiting roles/missions can lead to savings, which can lead to larger fleet sizes, focus on those particular missions, etc... in reference to the Century Series, the proposed XF-108 Rapier would be good inspiration for a long range, long endurance escort/patrol interceptor for the Indo-Pacific and another likely theater with the tyranny of distance, the Artic. Just for a visual: Teamed with a very long range/endurance UCAV, this could be help cover the gaps and deliver fires without taxing the resources needed for shorter ranged assets that will have to also be part of the fight even if the AF fleet is shifted to favor more long range strike. Question for you @VMFA187 - what do you think of the Commandant's plan to restructure the USMC?

Maybe as to defense cuts or really more likely IMHO reductions in the budget increment FY to FY, maybe zero increment. Biden if he becomes POTUS (the most likely thing to happen but he's not yet officially POTUS-elect) will survey the security environment and see we have to pull back or reduce where it's really just because we've been there forever (Germany, UK, Spain, SK) and divest what we really don't need in current quantities or at all. This is not a peace dividend but a reallocation to a combat oriented force capable of defeating peer competitors that have been building systems and tactics to asymmetrically destroy or deny what the US has grown accustomed to having in recent combat operations. True but the appetite is just not there and the Globalist / Neo-cons know this, rather than stir the populist pot again I think they will eschew long term military missions to "fix" things in areas of the world not in our interests (hopefully). A Republican Senate and shrunken Democrat House majority also reduce the chance of pointless missions I hope. This idea of Force Structure change is not just for the AF, all of the branches are going to have change to deter, defeat and shape the missions that we have to and will be sent on by the pols. Holding on to MDSs that were designed to support large scale ground maneuver warfare or the mass movement of ground forces to respond to crises in distant theaters is not where we need to spend finite resources as we would not intervene in those conflicts in that manner (likely after 20+ years of large scale ground operations with mixed results). Our allies and partners can expect warheads on foreheads in support if we deem it necessary but not boots on the ground for the most part in defeating aggression against them, we should configure accordingly.

Good discussion on Force Structure change and the need for it, resistance to it, etc... worth the time: https://warontherocks.com/2020/11/change-or-die/

I would tell you that I agree our debt is looming and in 2024 I believe it was reported considering our current financial vector that interest on the debt will be greater than the currently projected DoD appropriation but it seems like the incoming (assuming no states are changed in recounts) leadership cadre still believe deficits don't matter. That's not my opinion mind you but not what they apparently thing. Reference this article on what is believed to be what a Democrat administration's defense and force structure outlook will possibly be: What Clinton’s Foreign Affairs Article May Mean for the Defense Budget From the article: Clinton notes that “critics will no doubt warn that running up the national debt is itself a national security risk,” but then goes on to assert that “there is a growing consensus among economists that Washington need not be paralyzed by fears of debt.” I think that is wishful thinking at best and lunacy at worst as the more debt you take on the higher risk you become the greater the interest rates your creditors demand, rinse lather repeat and the debt spiral tightens up but if you take this article as most likely what they are thinking, we will probably see DoD budgets around the same size with some significant trimming but not cataclysmic cuts. Going back to the above linked article which touches on force structure, base closures, political ramifications, etc... HRC in her FP article (locked behind a paywall) seems to favor the Deep Strike shift for the AF at the expense/tradeoff of the F-35: From the article: In terms of specific cuts, the program she takes on most directly is the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter, citing its dependence on vulnerable close-in bases due to its short range. She's not a decision maker but influential in their circles, this shift could happen. IMHO should happen but in a way that keeps the shift towards 5th gen in the fighter enterprise on track. I would revise my earlier statement on 4th gen divestment and say the the USAF should consider 4th gen divestment if it allowed for a best mix acquisition of 4th+ gen and 5th gen, then with the changes/focus listed above. The Indo-Pacific and with a reduced Euro footprint will require more strategic platforms to respond to crisis from the CONUS or well distant from the threat forward bases in theater. Larger payloads, range and with the emphasis on sudden rapid reaction to large conventional aggressions vice sustained support to a COIN-LIC operation. Not exactly paradoxically, an austere field/dispersed ops capability in the AF inventory would probably be worth studying. Another problem for the enemy to solve and likely affordable to give the capability to respond to less than peer conflicts if needed in theater. Insurgency suppression, localized deterrence, etc... probably a combo team of manned and unmanned systems. This.

No disagreement the when the operational environment changes and the AF needs to reconfigure itself, the reasonable discussion about requirements, capabilities and priorities quickly degenerates into food fights of don't kill my MDS, kill the other guy's MDS but it must be had. It will come to that after a formal declaration of requirements, assigned missions and then material requirements to accomplish those comes out. I've not thrown around what I think needs to be cut as it is more important to say what is it we want the military to do, the AF to do and then what do we need to do that so... We want the US military to primarily (in regards to major conventional conflict with peer and militarily capable opponents) deter conflict and conclude conflicts on our terms with minimal US & Allied casualties and minimal collateral damage. The AF's primary role now is to deliver decisive long range strikes destroying aggressing enemy forces and enemy defenses that could impede conflict termination on US terms. To accomplish this the fleet of aircraft, manned and unmanned, will be focused around long range strike platforms, protecting and enabling those platforms and supporting our Joint and Allied partners with Mobility, Attack, SOF, C2 and ISR platforms. Now comes the nitty gritty... grow bombers, design / build arsenal platforms, divest 4th gen fighters to grow / sustain 5th gen fighters, fix the KC-46 whatever it takes, focus on Strategic Air Mobility at the expense of Tactical Air Mobility if required, retain an Attack capability, asses SOF requirements and build out a fleet to support SOF in grey zone to medium threat environments, look at the feasibility of consolidating C2 & ISR to one modular type. Much more would follow but I'm only one dude on the internet. As to whether or not something gets fully funded if it is important I would say maybe, reference the B-2 and F-22. Sometimes you can lead the horse to water but it just won't drink. True Congress has the ultimate authority and should but it will likely take its cues from the AF, unless it means that something won't get built in a district of the Chairmen then just shut up.

That's the 69 billion dollar question... The way to start that ugly debate is not which MDS by how much or how many bases but what capabilities / missions are we prioritizing over others and then seeing how far down the to-do list produced based on the funding we are allocated, how we plan to fight with the rest of the Joint Team and what will be our policy on involvement, expectations of Allies in their own defense and our risk tolerance in regards to casualties. The primary role of the AF IMHO going forward planning for peer conventional conflicts would be to deliver effects at ranges greater than carrier based Naval Aviation or conventional, non-dispersed ops, land based fighters relying heavily on AR (multiple events on ingress) to enable their missions could deliver, other missions that support or enable that primary mission are important but the optimized size and method of delivering those deep strike effects is the first priority. Doesn't mean priorities two, three, etc... are resourced far less but we have to realistically look at how to fund with what we have been appropriated.

Possibly but the size, shape and volume of the 22 and 35 weapons bays are set and relatively small compared to bomber/arsenal platforms. Larger bays will allows new, bigger or just different weapons be developed to deliver better effects. Article on this idea and advocating for greater deep strike capabilities: https://www.defensenews.com/opinion/commentary/2020/05/04/america-must-build-bomber-capacity-to-compete-in-the-pacific/

Not really a high / low mix per se but a change to a more strategic delivery preference for effects. It is about capabilities ultimately but at some point that has to translate down into what kind of iron in what proportions of the total fleet so invariably it will be made out to be more bombers at the expense of what? That's is the 69 billion dollar question but it's not the best way to articulate the question. Hi / Low could still be made part of a newly balanced air fleet though. Not every new platform would have to be LO. Concur with your point on Hi / Low to get the right amount of capacity and capability, less expensive delivery platforms get unfairly tarnished IMHO when the platform may have less capability to afford greater numbers but to close the effects gap we add the capability into the weapons, sensors, equipment it carries for it's mission. I hear ya but I think keeping that coalition together would be difficult as China would focus on peeling them off one by one and most nations now are easily intimidated / bought off by them, no judgement against them as we have / still do the same but we are a far more benign hegemon but it's what great powers do. Other issue is our business community would likely use their vast influence to undercut that threat as they would either have property destroyed or confiscated by the CCP during / after the conflict never to be made whole likely. Destroying their actively attacking forces with limited Chinese homeland strikes (mil only) is probably the only COA the USG would / does really have to deter aggression. I think Taiwan does rise to that level for our interests for several reasons but primarily for what it represents. Like it or not, we have inherited this policy position and walking away from it would be interpreted as capitulation to China; defeat if conflict arises proves their supremacy in the SCS and would likely lead to a far more Chinese oriented world if not outright primary global leadership assumption by them. For better or worse, unless China becomes something other than totally dominated by the CCP, we must ensure Taiwan is free and independent to maintain out world standing against the rival power. Same with Russia in the Baltics and Ukraine, it just has to be otherwise we are diminished. Your right they have a BIG home field advantage but as Taiwan is a well fortified and dug in, China is likely to give pause. The best way we can assist in giving them assistance in deterring them from attacking is raising the probability that no matter how much they bring to the fight (ships, aircraft, uavs, etc...) it will be completely mauled on the way to Taiwan and when the surviving force arrives there, it will be hit again. How to do that best in the Pacific theater ruled by the Tyranny of Distance is the question. *********** Our two big foes have capable air forces and surface to surface fires along with other capabilities (anti-satellite, cyber, etc...) but their ability to project power is limited. Close to their territory they are a force to be reckoned with, far from home their power diminishes significantly. By increasing our capability to strike from longer ranges (distant bases) and from greater stand off ranges, we (the AF particularly) accentuate this weakness as our weapons will be launched before their platforms can intercept and our bases will have the maximum warning times if they choose to use very long range strike capabilities, if they can reach that far (AK, HI, Australian bases, etc...). Longer ranged platforms can also draw the enemy to spread thin his forces by using some portion to draw him with feints and probes to distant quarters allowing for more likely successful attacks on now less well defended main areas. AR can enable shorter ranged (not short range) platforms but that's a potential vulnerability and that vulnerability only increases with multiple AR events required per sortie or per ATO to accomplish the CFACC'S intent. Not saying that we should throw out AR and shorter ranged platforms from the team but we need to acknowledge these risks and mitigate with different approaches to delivering effects in a theater(s) where we want our land based aircraft basing further from enemies home turf and needing fewer operational resources to execute a mission when launched . Rebalancing the fleet to grow deep strike seems the best way to fight capable opponents. The ugly part is who will be the bill payers if this is not funded via additions to the appropriation. If the role of the Army diminishes as is likely with the "Pacific Pivot" does the Air Force require as large an Air Mobility capability then? If more longer ranged platforms are purchased to operate in the vast Indo-Pacific theater, does this reduce the demand for Air Refueling? If we (the AF) determine that using longer ranged platforms is the better COA, what is the right number of tactical / fighter platforms? Not spears thrown but questions asked assuming resources are fixed and potentially less in future FYs.

As to our current force structure, are we built to win the next fight(s) against China / Russia? I've been thinking a bit on this lately and a few articles I've read are making me believe we need a change. Peer competitors will not allow us to build up and then operate with impunity from MOBs near their territory or newly captured territory or areas they now assert control over in conflicts or high tension periods. One of the articles I read (WHY THE PENTAGON SHOULD FOCUS ON TAIWAN) and for the purposes of this thread's debate I will say we accept it. One of the arguments from article is that if we use this scenario to primarily prepare for, it will also prepare us for other contingencies (Russian territorial aggression in the Baltic, Iranian actions to close the Staits of Hormuz, etc...), that's probably true. My two cents: They have seen that movie and know the ending therefore the Joint Team but specifically for this thread, the Air Force needs capabilities that are less vulnerable to attack at base, less reliant on a vulnerable enabling support capability (AR), capable of penetrating some level of the A2/AD system to deliver effects and with enough mass to absorb losses at least initially.and a more combat oriented and equipped Air Force. Not a swipe but a respectful critique of the force we currently have but I don't think it can answer all of those requirements when facing the peer threats we say we need to pivot and prepare for. In fairness, I doubt any platform or system of platforms can fully answer all of those requirements but we probably can build a better portfolio of platforms if we decide that our mission requirements and focus is to be a primarily longer ranged combat focused air force. All that said as I think we would have to do this inside of the current and realistic future budgets, like how the USMC is restructuring itself that there will be bill payers inside of the service vice Congress just appropriating more money for the new systems while maintaining legacy systems that while valuable, now fall lower on the priority list. This is where the long knives come out and potentially nothing gets done. So all that said, we need an Air Force that has greater range, greater numbers and is more focused on delivering desired effects directly in operations vice enabling other services with support. Agree, disagree or Shitter's full Clark?

Yup https://warontherocks.com/2020/10/every-brief-ever/ Sent from my iPhone using Tapatalk

Not enough of a reason to stay there or in Syria. Leave the ME, empower allies and partners to keep Iran in check with the price for support being accepting the existence of Israel. Look the other way when they do things we find in poor taste (to a degree). There's just so much Schliz in the cooler, we can't waste it in areas we don't have a vital interest necessitating a direct military presence. Damn genius Gump.

Aircrew didn’t survive unfortunately but thankfully no one on the ground hurt https://www.google.com/amp/s/fox2now.com/news/national/2-dead-in-alabama-naval-aircraft-crash/amp/ Sent from my iPhone using Tapatalk

Fair enough

But I don't think our presence in Afghanistan influences them in anyway and building it up to a potential that could would be difficult to say the least. Iran to the West, Pakistan to the South and Russia to the North and last but not least China to the East, all while inside of Afghanistan where the Taliban and other VEOs will be forces either to be reckoned with or the government of Afghanistan. Pakistan is getting closer and closer to China and could be pursued to close air routes into country as China has the means to immediately fill the void that estrangement with the US would leave them. All places in the world we have made a stand and kept a long term mission to deter aggression and keep watch on the other side were defensible and connected to allies via land or sea routes with air access available. Guantanamo Bay and West Berlin being obvious enclave exceptions to that but you get my drift. No disagreement giving China a problem on it's Western border would be beneficial to us, I just don't think Afghanistan is the place to do it. Reasonably courting a better relationship with India and the nations of SE Asia who have legitimate concerns of intimidation by China is a better place IMHO along with getting the Islamic nations to finally push back on their genocidal treatment of the Uighurs.

Understand your point but in this case the juice is not worth the squeeze No enduring / residual presence in the amounts being suggested could either generate offensive combat power to keep China out or intimidate them. It would just be a liability to us that gives our enemies a tempting target to harass, embarrass and distract us if they choose to. I’m more familiar with Chess than Go so does one pawn moved well forward with no pieces behind it and in an exposed portion of the board really do anything other than provide a convent point of attack for your opponent? Sent from my iPhone using Tapatalk

No Sent from my iPhone using Tapatalk

True POTUS could choose more conventional means of major policy announcements but so be it No matter which way it goes Nov 3 just end it POTUS Sent from my iPhone using Tapatalk

No I think they know it is wishful thinking at best but no one wants to be there and then get the blame and scorn of history put on them, unfairly I might add but those are the breaks. I also think there is a reluctance on the CJCS as he is an Army GO and the withdrawal from the Stan will lead to a loss of funding for the Army and to some degree operational prestige as the large scale ground operations in the ME are wrapped up. Sent from my iPhone using Tapatalk

https://www.nytimes.com/2020/10/12/world/asia/trump-milley-afghanistan.html I get that no one wants to be in the seat when the fall of Kabul happens and seeing the last helicopter get the hell out with the last group as the inevitable happens but the CJCS has got to realize this is going to happen, America is no longer interested in continuing this operation and that we are leaving come hell or high water. He doesn't have to like it but don't drag your feet.