Clark Griswold

Take the red pill. Just pinned on O-5 after jumping 8+ years ago as an O-3 with lackluster prospects. Surfing orders, doing contract work and enjoying it. Freedom rocks.

Valid - just my interpretation of recent events. Respectfully disagree. I don't think the AF is trying to or did try to set the stage for the Army to make a case for getting the fixed wing CAS mission, the AF would and rightly so see that as a threat to its independent existence. Like the C-27J, once the Army gets a major fixed wing platform, there is room now to make an argument for more Army fixed wing, something the AF will never let happen, I don't fault them for that. The Army would never let us get our own SAM systems as that would undercut their Air Defense Artillery mission so we can't allow poaching on our ranch. We just need to acknowledge that a certain portion of our portfolio is dedicated to supporting the ground commander, formally in doctrine and resource/plan from there. Welsh, et al, could have managed the A-10 vs. F-35 argument by proposing an alternative solution rather than full divestment, send almost the entire CAS mission to the ARC, except for the FTU. This would disperse the iron, getting more Congressmen, Senators and Governors interested in keeping the mission (dedicated CAS and its platform). Argue for an "on-demand" model and put more of that baseline in the ARC's appropriation while also shifting more of the operational cost to the Force Requester when it is called on for combat ops.

Yup - no vendetta against ACC but if you want to fix some major headaches in the AF I would take away 3 core functions from ACC, pass two of them, Global Integrated ISR and Personnel Recovery, other commands. Respectively, a resurrection of Air Intelligence Command for Global Integrated ISR (and Cyberspace Superiority) and pass Personnel Recovery to AFSOC. Command and Control is still there under them but in my opinion could wind up in AFGSC, with a new C2 platform (ideally AWACS, JSTARS and a new Looking Glass type of mission platform based on B737). ACC is just tasked with things that are better suited elsewhere. 2 The problem with the CAS / Divestment of the A-10 shit show of late is that it is a preoccupation with systems and not a strategic approach on how to accomplish a mission set in a changing military realm, I advocate ad nausea for some airplanes, but I realize that in the big picture, it needs to be a team of systems, tactics and flexible capabilities approach to accomplish a strategy. Vague, but we would do better (IMO) to say CAS-ISR-Light Strike are all missions intertwined strongly now and happen in various environments at different levels of threat, demand for fires, persistence and organic capabilities for the supported unit or customer. A family of systems will be fielded to accomplish all of these with each emphasizing a particular capability while retaining others to be flexible and capable in all environments but specialized for a particular one.

Too general for Rule 1 violation but just to quibble even 3-4 AT-6Bs or A-29s would not eclipse the cost of the average 2 ship Viper, Mud Hen, Super Bug, etc... when you factor in AR and other support to that asset. The MC-12 was fine for its tasked mission not for an aspirational mission that we can theorize about but if the USAF is serious about manned, moderate persistence, ISR with precision, low CDE strike capability without the tactical maneuvering capabilities a LAAR would offer then I suggest modifying a small(er) Maritime Patrol Aircraft like the Special Missions Saab 340. Similar mission characteristics as Maritime Patrol, so go get something close to what you need and modify as required... About the right size without being too big, sts... https://saab.com/air/airborne-solutions/airborne-surveillance/saab-340-msa/ Some technical modification required but I doubt a bill that is actually that high relative to the almost hundreds of millions in the first FY of operation the DoD would realize in O&M savings. Google'd it and from an Aviation Week . com airliner cost per hour breakout, it comes to about $1100 for the Saab, triple it for a military version and at $3300 per hour it's still a bargain. 9 hours endurance (with aux tanks), loiter at 140 knots, already flying in a feasibly modifiable configuration for this mission, all it needs now is to not have ACC responsible for the USAF Core Function it performs and it might get funded. ACC bubbas don't take that as a cheap shot but having a command that is primarily concerned with higher end warfare responsible for this Core Function and all the unglamorous duties it sometime (a lot of times) entails is why good ideas on how to do it never come to fruition. This thread is Close Air Support and LAAR / Manned ISR-Strike supports that (kinda) or should this be considered CAS for small maneuver elements / SOF teams? Semantics and somewhat esoteric but if it could get that formally recognized and incorporated into a doctrine document, it would have a leg to stand on for resourcing rather than fervent internet support. WIC guys, take up this charge...

No doubt that a LAAR would be restricted to the Irregular Warfare scenario and maybe if it is a higher end LAAR platform (like Scorpion) it could have some role in larger conflicts but the cost savings is half of the operational requirement I am arguing for. It is so much cheaper to operate these systems and deliver the same effects that it is worth investing the time, money and effort to build out a portion of the USAF dedicated to this type of warfare. On the subject of TASS OA-37s, found this video from circa early 80s I guess set to "Eye of the Tiger" - Killer Tweets raging, conducting AR, pretty much awesome...

Totally loved it, why? What are you implying? ;-)

Valid point(s). Just provided to stir the pot and keep the conversation on CAS going, specifically on new / different systems. An ideal version of a AC-27 gunship, this CGI seems to have all the right junk in all the right places.

2 Good article on that idea from FP: https://foreignpolicy.com/2016/01/29/the-u-s-should-admit-it-has-no-middle-east-policy-obama-cold-war-israel-syria/ On that idea and just continuing to discuss CAS and ideas for it, ATK's palletized gun system for the C-27J... a roll on roll off system I am sure has limitations but at least it's something, the AF has got to be more open to ideas out of the normal way of doing business...

True, I'm just arguing for a LAAR program for USAF pilots / CSOs. In my model the instructor cadre would have to be 11Fs / 12Fs initially and then after a year or so, graduates from a non-CAF background that wanted to return as instructors could from the basis of their qualification and experience, assuming ability to instruct & supervise of course.

Follow on, probably a point for another forum but the article made me think of this. This article struck a chord in me for the difference in the AF of that era to the AF of today in that they took pilots from all different backgrounds and they re-trained and flew a direct combat mission. They weren't concerned did you track T-38 or T-1, you were a rated officer and there is fight, we will train you and you'll hack the mission. The fight is different, the equipment much more sophisticated, but for mission focus & esprit de corps that could provide to the officer corps and the second order effect that could have through out the AF by seeding mission focus in a much greater swath of leadership I wish a program like that could happen again, a LAAR aircraft being the best chance of that. We did that with the MC-12 mission to some degree and now we should do that with a LAAR program. Think about the cultural effect of pulling heavy & OSA pilots, navs & non-rated recruits from the officer cadre,etc... for a program like this. Actually getting them into the direct delivery of weapons or direct support to the fight, after a few years of this and the experience these officers would have, you would see as they progressed in their careers a wave of leadership that understands from their own experiences the mission is to fly, fight and win not MICT, SAPR and PME. You can be told something but if you discover it thru the experiences of you own life, the effect is much more pronounced, it's a part of you. Yours truly is a heavy pilot but got to support the dudes on the ground in the MC-12, it was an awesome experience and made me a better officer for it, I had no where to go but up from there but that is a different point... if that experience was good, just giving them ISR support then delivering ISR and Light Attack must be great and I think my take away would have been better if it had been in a LAAR. My positive take away as an AF officer I don't think was unique and I think that it would be the usual effect if aircrew from other non-CAF airframes were rotated thru a LAAR program, make it a regular assignment to get enough bang for the buck but make it available to the MAF, SOF, OSA communities. Some would argue the MQ-1/9 does this, I don't, but the fact that it is an RPA makes 50% of the target population for this idea less than enamored with it, so not really a solution. It would not be without some growing pains but if we want the AF as an institution to be more mission focused then more of its leadership will have to have some portion of their careers actually doing the mission (that is really for non-winged officer recruits for CSOs for this program) and if we can have that mission actually putting ordinance on a target, it would be that much better. Just a thought.

They left a gun off for concerns about getting it cleared for FMS - that was direct Textron Corporate Leadership when I saw the jet and had a chance to talk to their sales team before the GOs showed up and the real sales pitches were made. Got to speak with Andy Vaughan, company pilot and A-10 driver, good dude and pulled no punches when I wasted 15 minutes of his time asking him about the jet. He was not expecting it to be selected for an advanced trainer as it doesn't have the power for a multiple high g turn thrust to weight ratio. I don't see the reason why the State Dept would clear a jet for FMS if it can fire missiles and drop bombs but has no internal gun vs. not clearing the same jet if it has one but that is what the retired GO working for Textron AirLand said. I should clarify that ultimately I am agnostic about a LAAR in terms of supplier, as long as it meets specs, is a affordable and available relatively quickly by being in production in an operational configuration. Scorpion is not in an operational configuration yet as far as I know so that doesn't meet one of my criteria but it is way more aircraft for not that much more acquisition cost, good bit more though in operational cost vs. AT-6B or A-29. I don't think it is sufficient for all CAS needs, really a LAAR is a compliment to the total CAS capability of the USAF over multiple platforms. We need small, medium and large for just the right size so we don't spend ourselves into oblivion to deliver Freedom & Democracy to some fanatics that need to be turned into red mist. Yup - it is a cool little known history of the USAF. Interesting historical video on the A-37 and the BPC mission we were facing then with "Vietnamzation" - small jets just can't catch a break...

No hate for the 5th gen just hate for the myopic preoccupation with it to the detriment of everything else either in available resources or institutional will / imagination to think outside the container. The cost of the Irregular War Air Force is not so great that we can't have both in the USAF, the majority of assets geared towards fighting a major conflict and some right sized portion to fight the smaller, long lasting, low threat conflicts that have to be fought to keep the barbarians at bay. The argument that I make and I think others is not for a LAAR at the expense of 5th gen but for the necessity of having a LAAR. Whether you have to make an offset in the AF budget to afford it or you request an increase to the AF budget to acquire that capability is a separate issue to the requirement (IMO) of a LAAR. The Big War may happen and we need to be scary as hell to the Russian, Chinese, Iranians, North Koreans, etc... to try to prevent it and win it unequivocally if we have to fight it but we can't keep swatting flies with a hammer. No disagreement on nukes, they are more important that every other weapons system in the inventory as they keep the peace in the largest way, not to crowd out others but they are the first bill to pay, really the Strategic Enterprise in whole (early warning, nuclear weapons, BMD, etc...). I'm sorry but I refuse to believe that in a 140+ billion dollar AF, that it cannot find the money, time and resources to acquire an MDS that will not need AR during its missions, costs about 1/5 the per flight hour cost of a 4th gen fighter and probably 1/10 the cost of a heavy bomber to deliver the same PGM as aforementioned fighters & bombers at probably 1/20th the cost per mission figuring in the wagon train of logistics and operational support to accomplish the same mission. 1 hypothetical Scorpion Mission to deliver 1 PGM at 6 flight hours at $3k per hour, 1 JDAM at $25k and probably 10 personnel at $400 per day deployed cost = $47,000 per mission if they go kinetic (hopefully). 6 flight hours of a two ship of Vipers at $15k per jet, with 2 AR events requiring a 6 hour tanker mission at $15k per flight hour, 1 JDAM at $25k and probably for the whole personnel bill for this mission at 40 at $400 per day = $311,000 Delta of $264,000 per mission. Figure you fly 15 CAP lines a day and that now comes to $3.96 million per day. All very conservative figures for operational costs. Use a per flight hour cost of $50k for a bomber, 1 AR event at 4 tanker flight hours and probably 40 personnel and you really save money by flying that same mission with a LAAR. $354,000 and assuming you fly 4 bomber lines a day, that comes up to $1.4 million, still serious money. Real money even for the DoD. Not to mention the savings in Base Operational Support as you have a lower footprint requiring lower BOS in the AOR. Then you get another bonus from the cost of tail rotation of more expensive fighter/bombers, another bonus for not flying hours and hours on those jets in missions now flown by other less expensive assets and you have fewer PDM events for those fighters/bombers, now you have the money and time to train them in realistic Large Force Exercise against good simulations of high end threats, near peer forces and you have the money you want/need for upgrades to said fighter/bombers, etc... We can afford this plane

True but our portfolio must be flexible, planning for a "1+2" contingency of one major conflict with two low-intensity / irregular actions rather than 2 major conflicts in different theatres would give rise for the need for appropriately scaled and affordable systems like the Scorpion Jet, C-27J, etc... I don't think the Defense establishment is there yet to make that official doctrine but the idea is percolating. https://www.heritage.org/research/reports/2013/01/the-measure-of-superpower-a-two-major-regional-contingency-military-for-21-century On the subject of CAS, read this a couple of years ago on the not praised enough A-37B Killer Tweet, enjoy. https://www.airspacemag.com/military-aviation/legends-of-vietnam-super-tweet-8974282/?no-ist

I can't say you don't have a point. The smaller the aircraft the greater the percentage by aircraft weight required for crew, the larger the aircraft the smaller as a percentage so optionally manned has a greater argument in LSR-B or similar aircraft in size/weight but there are capes that an optionally manned platform brings that don't displace the capes that RPAs bring but compliment them in a Tier II RPA / 25k GW aircraft range that make it worth while. - Easier access to airspace via conventional operation (manned) for missions in the vicinity of commercial or other players not comfy with RPAs. - No telecommunication downlink deconfliction or "landing" rights for links whether BLOS or LOS for the C2 link in host nations that may not want to share a portion of the EM spectrum. - In an airborne CSO you have the capability (not ideal) of not needing a link for PED, you have on board FMV exploitation. If you have limited or denied EM access for streaming your sensor feed b/c of operational restriction, jamming or concern of signal intercept by enemy or unfriendly actors (thinking Afghan ops on the Iranian / Pakistani borders, Russian forces in Syria, etc..), technically you could keep it in the jet and report only as required or prosecute independently and "silently" if necessary. - Everything is there in the jet technically and this could be very flexible for a last minute mission for a QRF or in an AOR where ops are few but when the need arises, need ISR support. Not saying this is an ideal or sustainable way to do business but it gives an organic and flexible capability without having to herd cats to get a link, a reachback architecture, a PED facility, coordinate RPA recovery procedures at a base with manned aircraft, yada yada yada... - Autonomous capability for mission continuation if the link(s) are lost and no operational effects from the air vehicle performing its lost link plan and possibly interfering with other friendly ops or being an easier target if the environment is not permissive. The crew can still fly a mission; gather intel, support a ground maneuver element, etc... rather than just squawk and stumble home. Some of those are a stretch and some are just some of the things we take for granted in the incredible functional simplicity of taking two trained and qualified aviators, put them in a jet and have them go fly a mission when we need to execute. The capability of 16+ hours on station is incredible but not the end all be all of it. We need to be good at a lot of missions not just outstanding in one, my humble opinion. Optionally manned seems to give a better mix at not too high a cost while giving great options; not that I have data to back that up as there has yet to be an operational optionally manned system but just my thoughts on it from having crewed RPAs and manned ISR, YMMV.

2 Hate to say it but it only gives more credence to more droids over X failed state we're executing Operation Whack a Mole but that's not the only way to skin this ugly cat. Just my two cents, but instead of a manned only CAS platform for mod+ threat environments, go for trying to acquire an optionally manned low to mod threat CAS & persistence capable ISR/Strike platform ( no AR 6 hrs. on station capability ). The Scorpion Jet is still in its developmental configuration and could be designed at this phase (with a sizeable check from Uncle Sam) for manned / unmanned operations. This center bay is built for up to 3,000 lbs. of whatever your mission needs to haul, put the black containers in there with BLOS antenna(s) on the back and the systems architecture and you really have a new capability that gives tactical flexibility. Optionally manned is not pie in the sky. The NG Firebird has been flying for several years now in both modes https://www.northropgrumman.com/Capabilities/Firebird/Pages/default.aspx Not a replacement for the A-10 but a CAS platform for permissive environment fights we are in and likely to be in with the unique capability to bring the manned element in for when the irreplaceable SA of being actually in the battlespace is needed / advantageous.

Yup - got the software stability issues addressed to an acceptable level and that was probably the biggest rock to IOC. https://www.flightglobal.com/news/articles/f-35-locked-and-loaded-with-improved-block-3i-softwa-425098/

Back from commercial break... Here's one guy that legitimately can't go around...

He seems gullible, just a gut feeling based on the few articles/interviews of his I have read. I think he believes basically hook, line and sinker anything anyone writes about how the AF doesn't give a shit about the Army, USMC and how the Navy is perfect. His background professionally is all in academia with no gaps for military, government or private service and as you said, no real check from reality that would open his ideas to the tactile reality of the cultures, motives, strengths, weaknesses, obsessions and quirks of each of the services. If he had that first hand knowledge from a stint of service, particularly with anytime working jointly, I think he would be able to more readily see the competitive and somewhat cutthroat nature of the jockeying for money, power and prestige all branches of service have with each other. Just the nature of the beast and everything that any branch says about another branch should be taken with a generous dash of salt.

Not a bad idea, send a message, reduce risk and start the process of getting our people and shit out of the declining Turkish republic. Unfortunately, that is why we probably won't do it.

A new seaplane to love. First AG600 off the line. https://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2016-07/23/c_135534988_2.htm We can not allow a seaplane gap... ************************************************** CCTV video on the AG600

Yup - Erdogan is applying what pressure he can for extradition of Gulen without causing damage, just being annoying... if he ups the ante then lets pull up stakes and throw cold water on direct military to military cooperation with Turkey. Interesting article on Erdogan's jet and what is reported on Coup F-16s trying to ID it for an intercept (seems they were more interested in forcing a landing than a shootdown)... Switched transponder to a Turkish Airlines code and cut all nav / strobe lighting, F-4s tried to provide cover for his jet but had no AAM... https://warisboring.com/pilots-flying-old-f-4-fighters-were-the-turkish-presidents-most-loyal-aerial-defenders-f05322e31146#.c10c9h3u9

3 days and still on generators at Incirlik: https://www.stripes.com/news/incirlik-relying-on-generators-to-power-operations-1.419841 The question is starting to get asked is it a good idea to keep nuclear weapons in Turkey: https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/checkpoint/wp/2016/07/19/an-old-nuclear-weapons-deal-raises-new-questions-about-u-s-bombs-in-turkey/

Hadn't heard of this, just googled it and they are still unaccounted for, would have thought they would be in port by now. Kind of Hunt for Red October, assuming it is mainly the officers who were part or supporters of the coup.

Follow up to story on re-tasking of CAS to New Syrian Army for BAI against an ISIS convoy. Impressive results: 200 enemy vehicles, 300 enemy KIA. https://www.airforcetimes.com/story/military/2016/07/15/diverting-fallujah-syrian-town-right-call-target-isis-general-says/87135774/

Almost did: At height of Turkish coup bid, rebel jets had Erdogan's plane in their sights https://www.reuters.com/article/us-turkey-security-plot-insight-idUSKCN0ZX0Q9