grasshopper

Multiple decades, multiple platforms, communities, MAJCOMs, and GCCs. Have watched our support functions go down the drain across the board and the burden continue to be delegated to the ones on the pointy end that actually need the most support to do their jobs, take care of their families, and execute the Service’s core missions. But it wasn’t until leading hundreds of enlisted Airmen across scores of AFSCs that I truly felt the “what are we doing here” hit me in the deepest parts where I’d previously managed to keep alive that spark of pride of service. Showing up late, leaving early, doing the bare minimum and often not even that… some not even able to wear their uniforms, no interest in the actual mission (sometimes lip service and often complaining, but no motivation when given opportunities to participate)… an unhealthy focus on unearned awards, decs, inflated EPBs, and “good deals”… Get off the flight line for a tour or two into a job where enlisted outnumber officers by 100:1 and you’ll see. But at the same time I can’t blame “the enlisted”. It’s culture. It starts with accessions and boot camp, tech school, senior enlisted, and the officers that lead them. That is not to say a single officer can make the changes needed — despite higher leadership edicts and Dunning-Kruger-officer platitudinisms to the contrary. That may sound bitter, but I’m not passed over or at risk of not promoting again. It’s watching officer peers promote with half the motivation, half the understanding of the mission, half the time in service (when weekly input/output is considered), and embodying all of the same “enlisted” issues highlighted above, at senior grades, that is crushing… but they checked the boxes. It’s institutional, and maybe we should start there.

Well, it should be about getting more focused on fighting and winning wars. If your position is ONLY stateside, it’s worth considering that you shouldn’t wear a uniform. It’s not about saving money, it’s about focus. Our culture has been diluted by trying to accommodate 50+ sub-cultures. Leaders that never left the wire (or never deployed) are now making decisions for those who will. We need to make it so that when you look at a uniform-wearer you know you’re looking at someone whose purpose is to put their pink body on the line. That might also mean that not everyone gets their own squadrons anymore. Embed uniformed support personnel in the warfighting squadrons under the warfighting commanders (…what’s old is new). Yeah, the culture will change, but if it is not illegal, immoral, or unethical, and doesn’t degrade readiness, then get out of the way. Put it to the warfighters to hash out and decide final solutions. Then execute. Maybe? If the capacity is focused on warfighting, then don’t do that. It’s most important that we think about what a truly optimal force looks like - either gutting or adding. Maybe not. But let’s not think about staffing pork barrel garden spots. Then, for the jobs we do need let’s assume we pay them dollars on the dollar. Let’s start with what we need to win wars. I get that what we will have to go head to head with entrenched bureaucracy and jobs programs… but that’s step two. Then don’t. We need to stop playing to lose and restructure around what we have to win. Then don’t. Pay them O-4/O-5 pay. Pay organizational leaders bonuses proportional to the size of the organizations they lead. I understand the chip and anger at what the DOD has failed to do in the past, or whatever hidden agendas there might have been previously, but we have to get past that, because we’ve got some serious shit to focus on. Back to fighting wars and staffing warfighting organizations with warfighters. Focus. Shut it down. Move the Aircrew Task Force out from the DAF and make it a direct report to Congress. Staff it with Iron Majors if need-be. If they can’t perform, let them fail. Change management. We’re here to win. I think that was the original point.

Touché… and sad to hear. Although it shouldn’t, I guess it depends on who you work for 😢

Just to color in some balance: They get sedans, and sometimes drivers for official business only. Home-to-work use and vice versa is very rare, and usually not allowed; and personal use and stops are prohibited. They don’t get a round-the-clock chauffeur. GOs that occupy Flag Quarters get aides who assist with official entertaining required by their position. Think folks that set the table and make the food when discussing international agreements with world leaders and senior partners. At the end of the night they go home. Personal services are prohibited. There is no special healthcare plan. In some busy locations (Walter Reed, etc) there are separate areas or appointment processes that help them get seen to take care of issues (or avoid getting seen by the masses for privacy concerns), but they use the same docs and TRICARE plans. You’re right about the pay - the FY2015 capped their pay and retirement. I agree that we need less GOs, and propose less officers overall, but in a more streamlined organization. Here’s what our new friend has to say: Trim the Brass, Sharpen the Spear A wartime-ready blueprint to realign America’s officer corps The U.S. military’s command structure is misaligned with the demands of modern war. The senior officer corps has grown too large relative to the force it leads, distorting spans of control, inflating headquarters, and diluting accountability. We propose a deliberate reduction of general and flag officers from 525 to approximately 350 by FY33, accompanied by a targeted drawdown and restructuring of the broader officer corps. This reform restores wartime focus, reduces decision latency, and enables a more credible, combat-aligned military architecture. The goal is not austerity. It is clarity. The reduction preserves surge capacity, strengthens the operational core, and ensures that uniformed officers serve only where their presence is essential—to command forces, make lethal decisions, or operate under military law. Responsibilities misaligned with those functions—acquisition oversight, installation management, enterprise support—shift to civilians or warrant officers, freeing uniformed talent for operational and combat roles. Rebuilding the Structure for What Comes Next This is not the first time the military has confronted institutional overgrowth. But the nature of this moment is unique: dispersed operations, data-saturated environments, hypersonic timelines, and adversaries that prize speed over scale. It is no longer just inefficient to carry excess headquarters—it is operationally dangerous. To correct course, five principles guide the proposed change: Combat first. Uniformed officers remain where lethal authority, command in battle, or military justice are inherent to the role. Surge capacity preserved. A ready bench of one- and two-star Reserve general officers ensures rapid reinforcement without sustaining unnecessary peacetime overhead. No ornamental billets. Positions that exist for convenience, tradition, or administrative overreach—whether in program offices, family services, or base-level operations—are subject to reassignment or elimination. Every cut validated. Billets are reviewed against theater contingency plans and operational requirements. If it’s needed in war, it stays. If not, it goes. Span of control restored. The target is 1 general or admiral for every 4,000 active-duty service members, supported by a flexible, civilian-heavy institutional base. A Three-Phase Reduction Phase I (FY25–FY27): A freeze on new general and flag officer billets. Retirements and unfilled vacancies begin reducing staff layering across major headquarters. Redundant deputy directorates, overlapping support roles, and administrative excess are trimmed. Estimated reduction: ~10%. Phase II (FY28–FY30): Major consolidation follows. NORTHCOM and NORAD merge into a unified Homeland Defense Command. Navy and Marine Corps departmental headquarters unify under a Maritime Service Secretariat, while operational independence remains intact. Base and installation commanders shift to senior civilian leadership. The Defense Health Agency is streamlined. Spans of control increase meaningfully. Cumulative reduction: ~25%. Phase III (FY31–FY33): Key defense support agencies (DIA, NGA, DTRA, NRO, DISA) transition to civilian SES leadership with uniformed deputies. A new statutory cap of ~350 general and flag officers is established in Title 10, with annual oversight mechanisms to enforce compliance. The Reserve flag pool is formalized and resourced. Final span of control: ~4,000:1. A Promotion System Built for Relevance A smaller senior corps must be matched by a promotion system that recognizes functional need over structural inertia. The following reforms address that reality: Parallel career tracks. Officers will declare either a command track—focused on leading units—or a technical track, optimized for fields like cyber operations, AI, logistics, or advanced sensing. Technical officers may culminate in O-6 “Senior Specialist” billets with appropriate incentives. Up-or-stay. Officers who are not selected for promotion may continue serving if they fill high-need roles. Career progression is no longer tied solely to upward movement. Demand-informed boards. Promotion and continuation boards will use real-time Talent Marketplace data to gauge where officer demand exists, ensuring advancement reflects operational value. Lateral entry and reentry. Officers with critical skills from outside government, or those returning from academic or industry sabbaticals, can enter or reenter service without being penalized by traditional career timing. This modernized system ensures that officers are advanced, retained, or reassigned based on what they contribute—not simply how long they’ve served or how many boxes they’ve checked. Where Uniforms Are No Longer Required Reform is not just about removing billets. It’s about putting the right people in the right roles. Uniformed officers belong where warfighting, military authority, and combat decision-making are required. Elsewhere, stability and expertise often matter more. Installation and community support. Garrison and base leadership transitions to civilian SES or GS-15 professionals, supported by uniformed deputies where appropriate. Enterprise logistics and acquisition. Approximately 1,400 officer billets—especially in procurement, lifecycle management, and depot oversight—shift to civilians or warrant officers. Deployable contracting and sustainment teams remain uniformed. Medical and training institutions. Around 200 field-grade billets at military hospitals, schools, and non-operational centers are transitioned to civilian or warrant roles. Policy and analysis roles. Legislative affairs, public affairs, and long-term policy planning roles that are often filled by staff officers will instead be civilianized to preserve institutional knowledge and reduce rotational disruption. The result is not less capacity—it is more relevant capacity, matched to the function it serves. Risk Is Not Assumed—It’s Managed Forward capability is retained. Military contracting, legal, and finance personnel remain embedded in operational formations. The surge bench is real. Twenty Reserve general and flag officers are maintained, trained, and aligned to COCOMs for rapid activation. Reform is incremental. No mass firings. Reductions are phased in through retirements, billet realignment, and voluntary civilian transition. Every change is rehearsed. Reforms are tested in wargames and planning scenarios. If the billet supports combat power under pressure, it survives. The Force in FY33 General/Flag Officers: 525 → ~350 (−33%) Total Commissioned Officers: 234,000 → ~196,000 (−16%) Span of Control (Flag Officers): 1:1,600 → 1:4,000 Annual Overhead Reduction: ≈ $1 billion; 30,000 fewer PCS moves Decision Latency: Cut by half; command chains shortened from six to three echelons Retention: Technical and tactical experts retained; command-track officers promoted on merit Surge Resilience: Maintained through Reserve flag pool and SES institutional continuity Structure is Strategy The current officer corps was not built for speed. It was built for routine—career patterns, headquarters comfort, and institutional self-preservation. But adversaries do not calibrate to our bureaucracy. They calibrate to our weakest link. If the structure that governs our people, decisions, and actions is bloated or misaligned, the rest of the force cannot compensate for it. This proposal is not about doing more with less. It is about doing better with purpose. It realigns billets to functions. It reduces friction where decisions matter. It builds incentives that reflect today’s needs, not yesterday’s promotions. And it preserves both readiness and resilience. A smaller, faster, more operationally aligned officer corps is not a luxury. It’s the bare minimum for a military preparing to fight at speed and scale against modern threats. By FY33, the United States can—and should—field an officer corps in which every rank, every billet, and every staff function supports the central purpose of the profession: winning in war. That requires sharper tools, not more of them.

There I was, standing on the flightline, getting ready to step to the turbofan.

If they sent me in-residence I would do it. I think there is a lot of value in the face-to-face sharing of experiences and networking to solve bigger Air Force problems, engage with different perspectives, and grow as a leader and a person. I’m with you on the content. I also started SDE in-correspondence at one point after much encouragement by my leadership, and it wasn’t for me. What I saw in SDE online was not engaging enough that I felt like it was worth the time it required - and I have a hard time BSing. I stopped after giving it the old college try when I was prompted to write about real-world challenges and leadership dilemmas… I felt that I actually needed to dedicate my time to those real-world things instead of sitting in front of a computer. Plus, writing at the sub-FOUO level felt a bit inane when they wanted you to use real examples.

56.7% and 56.1% in 2022 and 2021, respectively, in the zone. https://www.airforcetimes.com/news/your-air-force/2022/08/03/over-500-airmen-promoted-to-colonel-as-open-slots-stagnate/ Someone might drastically increase their chances by doing SDE in-correspondence, but even with that, those numbers are more than fogging a mirror. I don’t plan on doing SDE in-correspondence. The jobs I’m being asked to do and the people I’m being asked to lead at this stage, and my family, deserve better. I’m not going to divide my time further. But I’m also not going to take a dump on the people doing it and getting promoted. I’ve not once been able to say this life is easy, and if they want more of it and can, or are willing to do what the system is asking of them, good on them.

Seems like a weird comment. Trolling? The data shows that back in your day the promotion rate to O-6 was 45%. Today the promotion opportunity is 50%. Also today, most pilots are promoted within the same competitive category, so they’re mainly competing against each other and not the bigger Air Force.