Clark Griswold

Dog, what were you going to do if you caught it?

Touche but I would square that circle by some admission of private knowledge / assistance historically not currently of Israel's nuclear deterrence and not concede the point. Just because some sanctimonious hypocritical windbag at the UN or media talking head is upset at that not everything is being done exactly as they think it should be, who cares. Take a page from the authoritarian powers and just DGAF what unrealistic peaceniks, the naive activist crowd and other assorted coddled, spoiled and really childish people think. Pakistan's exclusion from my off the cuff list was not intentional but I would still not include it, democracy (IMO) is not just elections that are somewhat free/fair. It's also the absence of other bad behavior, like assisting the Taliban or other terrorist organizations (cough couch attack in India)... Honest question, do you really believe Iran is not working at least towards breakout capability so that at the appropriate time, they will be able to go from nuclear weapons capable to at least nuclear explosive device (weaponization is another matter) in a matter of months? I'm not saying based on that, that a military option is called for or justified but I have no illusions they are still working getting as close as they can to having a nuclear weapon without getting detected so they have to option to breakout, demonstrate capability and then just say it's done, we will never give them up and deal with it. The West being led by people now who lack even the testicular fortitude to stand up and control their own borders or expel violent illegal aliens will likely navel gaze and fold like a house of cards, but I'm not cynical, not one bit... If you want a third way that is negotiated fine, I can support that but you have to be realistic. These nations will not be cajoled, shamed or convinced by moral persuasion that them not having nuclear weapons is better than having them. It has to be negotiation with the possible outcome of no further relationship and as much isolation/pain without direct conflict as possible to have even a hope of getting something acceptable to us. As to Iran, what's done is done. Watch them like a hawk, arm the Saudis, give Israel LO deep strike capability (conventional) and foil them everywhere you can. As for NK, offer them a period of detente, negotiate with them directly along with the other regional powers and go on the diplomatic / informational offensive and while foiling them every way you can clandestinely. Propose things never seriously discussed and try to break the ice, but just give up on the idea they will ever give up their nuclear weapons, who would looking at recent history if they were on the other side of the table from us?

UFB or in today's AF totally believable... new for the sake of new, not whether or not it is academically worthy of discussion, it's new so good... Yup - if you're a rogue nation, get nukes, you will never be f'd with by the do-gooders ever again. Wish it weren't so but from the perspective of Iran, NK, other bad actors it is the best use of their resources from their perspective If we want to halt the growth of the Nuclear Club, then we have to admit that we have separate policies for the legacy nuclear powers and everyone else. Don't apologize for it and don't discuss it, just state it as fact, more diplomatically than that... but the West + the democracies of Asia (India, SK, Japan, Taiwan, Singapore, Australia) should declare that they will have no trade relations with new nuclear weapons powers, declared or suspected. No trade, no travel except diplomatic, no aid, nothing.... if we don't give a HUGE disincentive to developing nuclear weapons, all the other bad actors of the world (Govs and Non-State Actors) have every reason to cuddle up to NK to try to get some of that garlic that keeps the West at bay...

From NR: How Do You Solve a Problem Like North Korea? https://www.nationalreview.com/article/451011/north-korea-nuclear-problem-kim-jong-un-china-puppet-regime-no-good-solutions If there are no good solutions or good moves to be made directly at the DPRK, then don't make any. From the article: So what to do? Well, the first thing is to recognize that there are no good solutions. But perhaps the least bad option would be to openly declare that America already considers the North Korean regime to be China’s puppet, and that North Korean misdeeds are really Chinese misdeeds. That would come at a price, too. But it would incentivize China either to rein in the North Korean regime or, eventually, get rid of it. Not exactly sure what you could or should do to incentivize China to rein in NK without poking the dragon but at this point deflecting the booger to them may be the only option. But that option would have to be more than just the US imposing some penalty on China. That would quickly pit China vs. US instead of inflicting damage on the DPRK regime, it would have to be the US, Japan, South Korea, Australia, the PI, etc... imposing some significant economic/diplomatic concerted action to bring about some change in behavior.

Yup, just thinking how an AF on a budget and really a country with limited means could still get some AR capability but still have a revenue producing aircraft. Thinking something like an E-190 or An-178.

Yup. When I read your original post mentioning that, I was wondering about that and how a smaller LLC (just an assumption) would be able to afford that or talk a partner presumably with more resources to do the design / development / testing for certification for a new system and if you were trying to use an existing system (Boeing), why would they want to help you when you are developing a potential rival to their product? Just an interesting aside, there was an IL-78 used by a company, Tactical Air Defenses, for contract air refueling impounded in Michigan for several months while drama swirled around it (theft allegations, visa overstays, shady destinations, etc...) but eventually it got on it's way I believe. https://www.wired.com/2009/09/soviet-tanker-abandoned-in-michigan-not-just-an-ilyushin/ https://www.upmatters.com/news/russian-jet-at-sawyer-almost-ready/151443411 I am sure this would be about 69 x more complicated than I am imagine it to be (engineering) and I am not sure what exactly the legal ramifications would be (re purposing and de-purposing civilian registered commercial vehicles for use in military operations) but what about adapting a airliner and building into it a wet hard point with a supply line spurring off from its SPR assembly? Airliner most days but available for lease as a light duty tanker? Trying to keep it as simple as possible, just modify the existing fuel system and all support required for the pod (electrical, hydraulic, control) are done via self-contained ram-air powered generators and control done via secure wireless.

Probably an adequate supply of parts as Wiki says there are only 8 others in operation but 250 were built, what's the likelihood the survivors in the boneyard can be picked for spares? Was Israeli AIA going to develop a new boom/pods or partner with Boeing / Airbus to adapt their systems?

Maybe but I doubt they (Russians) will actually build this X-wing as it will cost a crap ton of rubles and unless oil goes up another $50 a barrel, I doubt they have the money to build a truly new platform. Now a big upgrade to the MiG-31, maybe... They're still behind the 8 ball on the Su-57 and they are way down the line on developing that platform and need to follow thru.

Worth a listen: F-35: Pierre Sprey vs Lt Col David 'Chip' Berke debate

Any value in the US developing a like platform?

Restart on thread. RT so caveat emptor but an interesting idea of a super interceptor and taking aerial warfare to sub-orbital: https://alert5.com/2017/08/25/mig-41-mach-4-optionally-piloted-operate-in-space/ and another article on a "MiG 41" https://russiafeed.com/russia-working-ultra-high-speed-mig-fighter-aircraft-capable-spaceflight/

By "high" end conflict suitable for a high end LAAR I mean a medium intensity COIN / IW scenario - fighting irregular forces with sporadic conventional military capabilities that threaten fixed wing assets operating low. This would also be an asset also for a Grey Zone conflict where other ambivalent to cooly hostile military forces are also operating necessitating a platform that could self-defend and egress quickly if needed. Syria being a good example of this but Iraq and Afghanistan also have a need for a what a high end LAAR can bring: jet speeds (400+ KTAS) and mission altitudes (20K+ AGL) for solid on-station times (4+ hours) with sensors & weapons in one asset at sustainable costs.

Valid point but just my two cents, for long term overt assist or pacify missions, we'll probably operate from MOBs (could be smaller than we're accustomed to in Iraq/Afghanistan). We can have both, the OA-8 was sold to Kenya for about 15 mil a copy and that was not a large buy (around 12 aircraft I think) so if the USAF came along and wanted a split buy of LAARs, getting enough OA-8s to get some benefit of the economies of scale and get a higher end LAAR, I think we could do it without breaking the bank. The argument then would be for an AT-6 or A-29 for engine commonality but really what we need are high and low mix. A strategy to prosecute a "high" end LAAR fight and a "low" end LAAR fight. Speed, range and growth capability for the high end LAAR. Ruggedness, endurance and value for the low end LAAR.

That spaceplane yes... https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Starflight:_The_Plane_That_Couldn't_Land But the next generation of spaceplanes is ready to go, IMO. No incredible leaps in technology required, just the logistical costs to come down, highly likely as demand would increase supply and the economics of scale kick in. The promise of cheap access to LEO was probably a bridge too far for the technology / materials of the 60s / 70s but within reach for the technology we have now. A space access strategy: Privatize and encourage mainly commercial access to LEO, focus national space efforts on HEO and Deep Space access / presence. Continuously launch every year to build logistical supplies and space based infrastructure. Spaceplanes, reusable medium / heavy lift rockets and we need to go all out and make a BDB (big dumb booster) even bigger than the upcoming SLS (Space Launch System) - that BDB should be the Sea Dragon IMO. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sea_Dragon_(rocket) Lift in one mission all the gear or re-supply for an interplanetary mission.

I sure as hell hope so. I realize that no one is going to shoot my ass into space for NASA so I want space plane based tourism to succeed and bring the cost down to somewhere in the middle class mid-life crisis range (10k to 20k) range so for 5 minutes I can float and see the pale blue dot from up high. More spaceplanes: Chinese proposal: https://www.popsci.com/china-plans-space-plane-for-tourists And a really interesting NASA concept from the 70's (like a XB-70 Valkyrie on steroids) that would be a good National / Strategic project for reinvigoration of Space Exploration / Settlement: https://motherboard.vice.com/en_us/article/ezvj4j/the-747-to-space-that-never-was https://www.alternatewars.com/SpaceRace/Star_Raker/Star_Raker.htm

Will not question or quibble with your assessment of the choices but ultimately it is about getting them (and us) an aircraft appropriate for COIN / LIC. Even if it is not the best system we think out of the possible choices, it is first about just getting one on the ramp / dirt strip and supporting door kickers. If the A-29 is what they have their heart set on no matter what and they can afford it, maintain it and use it effectively, so be it. Now if we are paying for their aircraft thru a partnership program, totally different story but if it is their dime, give them your sound professional opinion but let them go their route and get into the business of effectively / efficiently delivering air power for COIN / LIC. As to your valid if just a bit gruff point of whether it is stupidity affecting the assessment of LAE, I will say it is a bit apples to oranges. Most if not all of the operations / missions a USAF LAAR would execute would not be from an austere FOB / FARP. Likely it would be from a MOB with support and tied by VDL to an ITC / C2 element, rightly or wrongly, as I think that is just mainly the way the AF rolls. A LAAR for an ally of lesser means / different ROE may not be the right LAAR for the USAF just given the way it operates (fairly risk averse). Valid points but I would contend we (the USAF and CAA community) need to bisect the LAAR concept into two programs, their LAAR and ours. We can have both with our purchase of their LAAR likely to be only for an FTU and our LAAR in greater numbers, say a schoolhouse at Duke with 15 OA-8s and 100 Scorpions / AT-6s / A-29s over 6 Wings in the ARC. Not sneering at the OA-8 but the GOs can only think so far out of the container, for the USAF LAAR, it will have to be something closer to what they are used to or have now.

You're probably right but one can hope. My take on going all KC-46 is that it puts a fire under the ass of the USAF / Congress / Boeing to fix its problems and get it right. We're not going to have the same tanker force that was built to enable air delivered part of the Strategic Mission, get the fighters across the pond if the bear came over the hill and still have some to spare. But if we want a tanker force to get us to the fight and keep us in the fight if the dragon comes out in the Pacific and have some to spare for contingency X, the current buy won't cut it and a KC-46 only fleet won't do it. We need a big tanker to go with the medium tanker. If development is a problem, go with a KC-30 / KC-45 since EADS has done that work in lieu of developing a KC-777 but negotiate a reciprocal buy of US systems to grease the political skids. We buy 50 KC-30s at 180 mil a pop they (Europeans) buy 9 billion in US systems produced systems. Germany needs to be on the build up and France has a backlog of defense spending, let's make a deal and get new iron on both sides of the pond.

Understood but sometimes a tanker has to do what a tanker has to do... But I think you get my point about what is it exactly the tanker is supposed to do as that will drive design, cost, etc... Just my two cents but the 46 like the 35 for all of its flaws is a major part of the future AF and V1 on this project was 30 knots ago... let's mitigate the problems / limitations due to adapting an airliner to a military mission and press forward by acknowledging problems with the KC-46 total concept: - We need to buy more keep lowering costs and while not planned, going ahead with a KC-46 buy of 325 aircraft to replace 425 KC-135s . This will also give the medium size tanker force fleet commonality and lower logistical costs while putting new iron on the ramp. - Acknowledge the KC-46 is not a suitable replacement for the KC-10 or Heavy / Strategic tanker mission, even when employed in numbers that can deliver the same capability for an assigned mission. The AF and the Joint Team need a lower density high capacity heavy tanker / cargo aircraft for quick response and movement of initial forces into theater or for operating at extreme AR ranges (1000+ nm). While this might be rewarding sub-par performance, a KC-777 with the same but improved AR systems from the KC-46 is a logical compliment and round out to the the USAF's AR force. - Study and determine if a Tactical Tanker is worth the effort, if the CAF determines it is, let them define the requirements and fund that project. A future AR / Mobility strategy: Robust modern Medium AR capability, Focused Heavy AR / Mobility capability and limited Tactical AR capability to expressly compliment some assets . Medium AR covered by the KC-46. Heavy AR / Mobility covered by a KC-777. Tactical AR covered by two systems - a KC-X LO system to compliment night 1 strikers with AR pre / post ingress AR and EW while on mission and a SOF focused AR / ISR unmanned system to compliment and support the MC-130s.

Related to the discussion of KC-X/Y/Z Articles on stealth tanker / cargo aircraft... https://www.nridigital.com/global-defence-technology/july-2017.html?wv=s%2FGlobal%20Defence%20Technology%2F3adead8f-dcd8-5ed1-849a-2e4cab33b0ce%2FGDT1707%2Ftankers.html https://www.thedrive.com/the-war-zone/7012/the-air-force-desperately-needs-a-stealth-tanker This discussion and these articles on a more "tactical" tanker raise the philosophical point of what is it exactly or mainly we want our air refueling aircraft to do? To support CAPs near the fight thru LO or some self-protection in an A2AD environment? To get aircraft to the theater with all their associated equipment and manpower in one quick movement? To do conventional AR, strategic alert, cargo movement, aeromedical evacuation, etc... to an acceptable level in one platform with the lowest possible support cost and the right logistical footprint? All of these questions will drive different requirements, designs and costs and I think that they have not been really considered, we just take AR for granted and want it to do what it has been doing for 60+ years but cheaper, more with less and maybe with some new cool stuff. We're stumbling in this next attempt at acquisition / update of a current capability because we haven't really decided what that capability should be in the 21st century.

Just my two cents but I felt a dual buy of KC-30s and KC-46s was actually the right option. Former POTUS and SECDEF didn't think so but it had some merit, IMO... https://blog.al.com/live/2009/08/why_two_tankers_may_be_better.html The conventional arguments against it (fleet commonality, economy of scale, etc..) are great but when you have in reality only one supplier for a type of system, things get FUBAR. Giving Boeing actual competition in the heavy military aircraft market for USAF contracts would probably incentive their behavior / performance in the right direction, they have the US heavy military market cornered and they know it, they need a true competitor to keep them on point.

All the way to the bank I imagine.

707 Tanker Transport from back in the day: https://www.flightglobal.com/FlightPDFArchive/1983/1983 - 1054.PDF https://1000aircraftphotos.com/Contributions/Visschedijk/7288.htm

Airbus spaceplane concept: https://room.eu.com/news/Airbus_Spaceplane_May_Be_the_Future_of_Space_Tourism

Ditto. Thinking a bit on this, SK and POTUS should be as insistent as the Young General and demand removal of all or most of the artillery concentration just north of the DMZ. The DPRK demands the cessation of large scale military activities between the ROK and US forces, ok fine, then you remove every last artillery piece from within 50 nm of the DMZ. Fat chance but it if they want something we get something in return. We focus on the WMD and that's logical but the conventional situation deserves some time on the front burner. - No artillery within 50 nm of the DMZ. - Declaration and decommission of all clandestine tunnels under and thru the DMZ - No formations of troops or vehicles greater than 2,000 and associated vehicles / equipment (brigade size) within 50 nm of the DMZ. No more than 3 at any one time within 50 nm. Just some ideas off the cuff but the point would be to move forces further back so that if the DPRK did or was planning aggression, then the telegraphing actions prior to attack would be more detectable and would lower tension overall. Focusing on WMDs is fine just don't forget about what they have actually used (recently in fact) to attack the ROK and US forces.

Article on effectiveness of a DPRK attack on the ROK. Artillery attack Seoul metropolitan area, logistics required, attrition rates (combat and operational attrition) examined. Long but worth a skim for the big points. https://nautilus.org/napsnet/napsnet-special-reports/mind-the-gap-between-rhetoric-and-reality/ Some highlights: Table 1: Summary of Effects IMPORTANT CAVEATS: 1) No indications there are plans for these events; 2) Assumes most people are at home or in an office i.e. more protection than standing outside in an open field. Scenario Possible Casualties Weapons Surprise Volley (Primarily counter-force i.e. barracks, military bases) ~2,881 initial volley; mainly soldiers 240 MM MRL170 MM KOKSAN Surprise Volley (Countervalue and a-strategic i.e. firing directly into population centers) ~29,661 Civilian; likely~790 Foreign nationals~605 Chinese 240 MM MRL170 MM KOKSAN Counterbattery and counterforcemissions.Very few 240 MM or 170 MM KOKSAN would exist after 1 week. Expect DPRK to lose these weapons at 1%/hour based on historical rates. 467 ROK aircraft; Possibly 1,200 U.S. aircraft 2,660 Main Battle tanks 1,538 Multiple Rocket Launchers Note: These forces already exist on Korea, or come from Guam and from Carrier Strike Groups in international waters. No need to ask third country permission. KPA would likely run out of fuel/ammunition within two weeks. NOTE: another study projects KPA can last up to two months. The point is, once started there is very finite amount of fuel and therefore time left. DPRK needs to drive approximately 2,500 soft-skinned vehicles per day to supply a southward invasion in order to sustain themselves – or spare ROK fuel stores and scavenge from ROK Conventional Artillery Attack of Seoul Here is the summarized table of results and what follows below the table is a more detailed description of deriving these numbers. Table B-1: Conventional Artillery Attack Scenario Possible Casualties Artillery KPA primarily counter-force ~ 2,811 fatalities initial volley.~ 64,000 first day (majority in first three hours)~ 80,000 one week. Very few KOKSAN and 240 MM MRL last more than one week 2/3 of batteries firing max rate for 5 minutes from likely positions between 5 and 10 km north of DMZ and then sustained rate for ½ of batteries for 24 hours. Batteries destroyed by direct, indirect and counter-battery fire at about 1%/hour. Unrealistic assumption of unlimited ammunition and 100% maintenance rate. KPA counter-valueLikely indicates KPA desperation ~29,661 fatalities initial volley.Within the range of a previous study by Bennet, Bruce [20] 2/3 of batteries firing indiscriminately intoSeoulfrom DMZ trace. Most residents at home or office. Lots of data and looks reasonable, well cited. And a Time article on evacuation of non-combatants: https://nation.time.com/2013/04/05/fleeing-imminent-incoming-north-korean-rockets/ There are different accounts of how long the DPRK war machine could operate (fuel, ammunition, attrition absorbance, supplies, etc...) but methinks they could probably operate for a month without resupply from China/Russia. That probably gives the DPRK a few days of advantage (if it generated all of its forces and poured its entire national resources into the attack) before the first waves of the Coalition begin to augment KFOR and begin the push back. Destroy the ports, airfields and basically all telecommunications as you invade SK and you might be able to stymie a data-dependent force with a high logistical footprint.