Clark Griswold

True - but thinking about this, is he (next CSAF) willing to do what is really necessary to recover the jet. In order to affect the change needed, pretty much he's going to have change out if not the entire GO cadre in USAF, a helluva lot of them and get a SECAF willing to clean out the dead wood on his/her side also. Lower echelons also to some degree. We can come up with great proposals but until you get rid of the obstacles that just water it down till there's no punch nothing will happen... He will have to let a lot of his friends get a chance to get on board or get a pink slip...

I would start looking under the cushions in this jet.

Hmmm - maybe... More unrequited dreams as this is as close to a CL-130 as we'll get But here's the real deal - Japanese US-2 sales video:

Nice - that one has the jet ski STC. Very cool. China's new seaplane is coming together and will have a military mission in the SCS probably, we can not allow a seaplane gap... https://sputniknews.com/military/20150723/1024961315.ht https://www.inform.kz/eng/article/2799758 l

Not sure we're f'd but certainly some communities have been ridden hard and put up wet, no sarcasm or smartass comments as this is about real people's lives, families, careers and their well being. My sympathy is for those who bear the weight of piss poor head in the sand stubborn as a mule thinking a-holes who refuse to change with the times. Years ago at my first assignment right after 9-11, everyone was deployed all the time and between trips to the desert at home station the squadron was a ghost town but the training got done, the local flights happened and you got ready for your next trip. That was evidence enough that most non-mission day to day bs was just that bs that shoe clerks imposed for the imagined purpose of leadership development. Along with that, I remember an OG all call where he explained how the days of the garrison AF were gone and we were now an expeditionary AF. He may have believed that but the big shoe clerks sure as hell didn't and still don't and that is why the AF is in free fall. We are a force needed to be expeditionary in nature - lean, mission focused, not beholden only to the previous way of accomplishing the mission, open to new ideas and responsibilities and above all honest about what we do, how we do it and if that is working. It amazes me the level of self-delusion, rationalization and denial that senior leadership exhibits when most of these guys started their careers as officers in the flying world that would or should never let that happen. If a sortie went like shit, that was not swept under the rug; if someone was not cutting it in their crew position they were pulled from it for the sake of the mission - when did these formative lessons of honesty above all, even when it was uncomfortable and the ability to recognize the need for change and character to act on it get forgotten? Rant - Complete (P,CP).

Thread relight. Found some gems on the Herc on Water concept the USN researched in the 60's & 70's... https://www.secretprojects.co.uk/forum/index.php?topic=26090.0 and on the C-130 float plane pitched in the 90s: https://www.flightglobal.com/pdfarchive/view/1996/1996%20-%202626.html We NEED a Float Plane Herc or Sea Plane Herc, this is a national security issue, trust me Congress, just fund it.

Probably but never say never or just say never. The B-1 went from cancellation in 77 to production and flying again in 83 in the form of the B model, a way different design than the A model.

Probably so - they just don't have enough margin to accommodate two 5th gens but Japan and Australia (outside NATO players) maybe due to their GDP and security situations, I would suggest trying to entice Germany or GB but that's probably a bridge too far for several reasons (political, economic, perceived requirements, existing systems, etc...) The key to off ramping to a lesser buy of 35s and restarting the 22 line is to keep it steady, un-dramatic, with no overall increase in cost to the AF (considering both programs per tail increase in cost of the 35 aside) and with plausible new / changes to the requirements driving the change in course (i.e. the Raptor B has X % increase in range, speed and X new capability therefore looking at the challenges we face from S-400s, J-20s, T-50s, etc... the B model acquisition with a smaller buy of 35As is now the Acquisition & Modernization Strategy of the AF...).

Since a we've been discussing FMS Raptors, Google coughed up a 2 seat F-22 concept in Aussie colors... this hypothetical would have looked better keeping the single piece canopy but still nice... We've already discussed the snowball's chance of a Raptor line restart, the small matter of the probable 10's of billions of dollars in production restart and update being a small hurdle to overcome but thinking out of the container, what if the DoD, USAF, LM & Congress could arrive at some set of capes from the A model Raptor, adjust as required to produce an acceptable B model Raptor cleared for export and then present that to foreign customers for them to fund Design, Test & Production Line Restart? The stated interested parties come up with the money for the B model design/development/testing, we come to an acceptable division of the production between LM/US suppliers and their defense companies; maybe just ceed the engines, wings, etc... and/or let them build 50% of the B model. The catch to this is if they are already an F-35 customer, they have to follow thru with that order, they could adjust delivery but not eventual purchase but allowing them to get B model Raptors first, probably retire other 4th gen in their fleets earlier to free up funds then get their 35's.

Can't deny the logic of that Out of all the ideas for restarting the Raptor line, I thought that his (Tyson Wetzel) were reasonable, not likely to happen but reasonable.

Concur Japan and Israel would have all their own issues but we've had Aussie exchange pilots already in the Raptor, if we want to make a Pacific Pivot this would put a ring on it. The trouble then is how to explain it to Japan / Israel when / if we sell it to the Aussies without screwing up those relationships. There are a lot of ways to make an export version fighter without completely spilling the beans, the Russians don't sell their absolute best stuff but still supply their allies with good capability. An export Raptor could have a support package controlled by Americans if we want to limit their access to deep technical details - I give that 0.069% chance of being accepted by foreign buyers but just an idea.

Interesting article on Raptor restart: https://fightersweep.com/5023/case-re-opening-raptor-line/ worth a read, makes a good case on how to pay for it: Slow down USAF F-35A procurement down to pay for a new F-22, let the Allies get them first while we continue to buy at LRIP levels Allowing Aussies, Japan and Israel to buy a B model Raptor to further spread the cost. Replace Guard 15C models one to one with new Raptors for cost savings and to get more political backing. Keep swinging for the fences.

True, we have an insidious decent below MDA while simultaneously slowing below ref, the time is now to fix it. Pontificating into the ether, if I were an incoming CSAF and trying to keep this hypothetical contained to the realm of the possible, focus on few key changes and ignore the rest: 1 - Allow for specialization in officer career paths - Line, Staff, Leadership with appropriate development, education, career goals and gates to guide each. This would lead to a policy level change of the AF for the implementation of "Up or Out". 2 - Develop a WO program geared to recruit from the Enlisted cadre to fulfill growing missions or highly specialized, highly technical fields that do not require a leadership/management role requiring a regular officer's commission. 3 - Change the philosophy of procurement to allow some high end "silver bullet" fleets but white elephants will be avoided.

No doubt - no passive aggressive or implied bullshit against his credentials, I read his bio and his flying record/hours, assignments, awards, commands give me confidence that he is a solid leader but I am interested if he is thought of as an innovator or reformer. I don't think things have to be changed completely when someone new comes into an office, keep what works change what doesn't and have the wisdom to know the difference between the two. But it is obvious (at least in my opinion) that the AF needs serious change (new priorities in procurement, officer development & career focus, massive reduction in bureaucracy at all staff levels, etc...) going forward. Just wanted the forum's opinion if Gen Goldfein will change the vector. You are right on his legit ops cred: https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/checkpoint/wp/2015/08/12/how-the-air-forces-new-no-2-officer-survived-getting-shot-down-over-serbia/

Does anyone expect a major change in policies, strategy, etc...? Air Force Times mentioned he was the first CSAF (when confirmed) to have crewed an RPA, besides that, he seems similar to most of the previous CSAFs (careerwise) in the past 30 years. Not a swipe at him but is he capable or demonstrated a willingness to change the status quo when it is needed?

Maybe but it could be a longer road to get to that place than we think, hence my argument for immediate feedback to negative activity. No way, our allies are the tip of the spear ready to go at a moment's notice... https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/nato-runs-short-on-some-munitions-in-libya/2011/04/15/AF3O7ElD_story.html https://www.defenseone.com/politics/2015/06/nato-members-defense-spending-two-charts/116008/ NATO is a well balanced defense organization, sharing the burden amongst members pulling their weight and not overly dependent on the US...

More good news. https://warontherocks.com/2016/04/outnumbered-outranged-and-outgunned-how-russia-defeats-nato/ While not likely (IMO) still food for thought. What is more likely is what they did / are doing in Eastern Ukraine, a new Hybrid War using "little green men", info, cyber, and lawfare while the West dithers on what to do, they establish facts on the ground and it is done with no real chance of it being reversed anytime soon. BBC on the "little green men" in Ukraine. https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-26532154 Why not establish a policy like Kennedy did during the Cuban Missile Crisis Except this time establish it as the policy of NATO, the EU, US and as many allies as we could sign up to regard the use of destabilizing clandestine action either leading to military conflict or not as attack requiring escalating responses to include direct military action. Establish that it will be the sole prerogative of Allied Nations to determine when they or their Allies are under attack and use escalating diplomatic, economic, informational, electronic retaliation all while increasing your readiness and posture for direct action. On the next aggressive flyby or intercept, do a show of force with a suspension of commercial air & naval activity for 2 weeks, give travelers 72 hours to get out of dodge. If that is not loud enough, take the amp to 11, and seize assets. The West wants to avoid war and not be bullied then it needs to use what it can short of going to war to get the bully to respect them

Probably so

Ok he's down... Fearmycessna, don't let all this get to you, merely par for the course given the material first posted. But, the reality is the AF (like all branches of the armed forces) for the past 15+ years have been involved in COIN, low to mod intensity operations in AORs that in almost all respects are permissive, some SAFIREs and hits unfortunately but for the fixed wing world, air to air hasn't been a real concern. This leads to the lived reality that for the most part we will likely be involved in long, slow grinding, intractable conflicts against enemies that have no army, air force, major infrastructure and in large part aided and abetted by civilian populations sympathetic (sometimes) to their causes by either religious, ethnic or racial connections that make doing what we usually do to achieve victory - drop a X-thousands of tons of iron on the right DMPIs destroying the IADS, the enemy's fielded forces and strategic infrastructure paving the way for the land forces to go in unharnessed by the enemy's air force and artillery and seize territory - very difficult or not able to accomplish. We have to be prepared for Major Combat Operations against a peer or near peer adversary but that is unlikely, we are likely to be continued to be harassed by them (ref Russian intercepts of RC-135s and Navy ships) and we have to be able to effectively, efficiently and sustainably fight in conflicts that probably can't be won militarily. Not glorious but challenging to figure out.

My vote

Depending on the persuasion of the writer, reporter, staffer it can vary widely. Wired had a good article on it contrasting some of the various methods of calculation. https://www.wired.com/2011/12/f-22-real-cost/

First flight https://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/087f09e8-0837-11e6-b6d3-746f8e9cdd33.html#axzz46bZo6bia

Likewise but you never know, every now and the idea comes back, either like herpes or hope springing eternally. It has percolated to CNN now: https://www.cnn.com/2016/04/21/politics/f22-raptor-congress/index.html We're coming up on a change in leadership at the top, likely other positions when the new CSAF comes in, there is a narrow gap in a slightly open window at that time for a change in major procurement vector(s) if it is ever going to happen it would have to be then. Anyway, some plane porn just because...

True - just my musings on if they really want to do this, what they should do and how to get it funded. On requirement creep, no doubt it (a Raptor 2.0) would invite some over the top ideas and a new Raptor buy is not financially possible with the procurement bow wave developing (35, 46, LSR-B, etc...) but if we make strategic decisions now to re-plan and re-program it could be. That's just a nice way of saying CNX some other program to pay for this one but it's possible, not likely but possible. If you didn't want to add new capabilities baked into a new Raptor you could build a new Raptor with the ability to easily accept new systems, equipment, etc... without screwing up the LO profile. That would still be pricey but probably less than the Christmas list of new capes I listed above. Raptor 2.0 has more room for growth and updated mission software specifically designed to accept / integrate updates or additions for new systems, just another idea... Addition: More on the Congressional effort to study a Raptor restart: https://www.airforcetimes.com/story/defense/air-space/2016/04/21/facing-election-fight-forbes-pushes-f-22-revival/83352746/

RAND estimated it would be 17 billion for 75 more Raptors in 2010 dollars, the article said Congress was interested in studying the cost of 194 new Raptors, just doing simple math and applying inflation I come up with about 48 billion, could be less with the larger purchase driving down the per tail cost but if we were serious about this these new Raptors would / should be "Super Raptors", something to make it worth the inevitably large design-development-testing-production problems. New features, capabilities, etc.. that address issues with the F-22A. Just some suggestions from what has been released in open sources would be: Conformal fuel tanks for range and additional thermal signature suppression. Improved weapons bays for more load out and compatibility with new / more weapons (Meteor, stand off glide weapons, etc...) External station on fuselage for conformal LO mission pods (targeting, jamming, recce, etc..) LO IRST sensor In addition to this, if the AF or interested parties in Congress are really going to push for this, it needs to be pitched as part of family of systems to address specific requirements, threats, scenarios and then put forward as part of a future force. The new Raptor is for Assured Air Superiority in A2AD environments coupled with a new arsenal plane (like the B-1R concept) for mass delivery of PGMs to overwhelm the enemy IADS initially, etc...