Bender

I'm sure you are not somehow suggesting that one shouldn't write to their elected representatives because "aides/interns respond with canned letters matching the subject". I assume you are merely trying to point out what you consider obvious, and I assure you, we all here appreciate that we have you to do that for us. If you are not interested in the responses because you question their sincerity, that's fine (thanks for sharing your opinion, I'll have my intern draft up a canned letter for you in the morning). I find it difficult to digest your post and derive any value without scotch...so....I'll wait until I get home and reevaluate. Bendy

Mission accomplished! Bendy

This is not the first time I've heard this sentiment, and I still struggle to internalize it. How is it that the "real stars making things happen for the good of the organization" don't look "good on paper"? There are many paths to success and there is no one right answer. Here is my humble viewpoint on this for the younger cats: 1) Find a few people they look up to that have made O-4 already and get their PRFs, 1a) You should look at these PRFs and go, "Holy Shit!", if you don't...find a different one. 1b) At some point along the way, you should find a few sharp O-5's (by most people's standards already a successful career) that are aiming at full bird and start doing this with theirs. 2) Starting with your very first OPR, start writing your own PRF, 2a) With each iteration, compare it to the completed PRFs you acquired from your mentors (identify the "white space" in yours that needs to be filled), 2b) With each OPR, replace weaker content with your stronger content (you are creating a super OPR that covers your career, get guidance on what PRFs look like...there are multiple versions that work). 3) Work very hard to ensure that every single OPR has something worthy of filling in that "white space"...a good OPR may have many things, 3a) By identifying the "white space" and looking at your examples, you should have an idea of what kinds of things you'll need to seek out to do 3b) Be your own person and steer towards what interests you, this will help keep your motivation and passion along the way (the military doesn't change that much though, innovation be damned). 4) Continue this until you have a PRF that's as good, if not better, than your mentor's to meet your board with. 4a) Many people think that doing a good job in what you're handed is enough. If you only do what is asked of you, you will be successful...but, you will NEVER fulfill your potential. This is why you don't want "endless potential" written on your shit. It says you could, but you don't. 5) If you are a "real star that is making things happen for the good of the organization", and you don't look good on paper...you may be a "real star", but you are also likely an idiot. At a minimum, people in the know have seriously let you down along the way. A lot of your peers found (likely sought out) people that did no such things. You must do well at the things that are tasked to you, you must go beyond the minimum, and you must seek out opportunity. If you do not, do not complain about being in a situation where no one gives two shits if your PRF for the next board has a narrative or not. If you do everything you can, and it still doesn't work out...shut up and enjoy your paycheck flying the line and teaching the young guys (there are plenty of guys who won't get continuation or get tossed to the curb just shy of the finish line). Bendy

While I have no pertinent personal thoughts on this topic, I do appreciate it when someone takes the time to write like an adult. Considering the extent of his target audience, it was probably best he proof read a second time. Bendy

5,000th post for Toro! You get a patch for that! You can't wear it until after the CUI is over though... Bendy

What if the PNF started checking the things the PF set, like the glideslope for example? If that's too drastic, maybe the PF could verbalize what he's setting or something like that. Would that help? Maybe we could make that a rule... Nah...it's probably the ORM thing. Let's keep going with that...nothing to see here. Bendy

First of all....F you. I have no way to recover the time I spent reading this thread, and I blame you for "bumping" it. You should have left it where it where you found it. Holy $hit...this is amazing. There are mistakes, and then there is negligence. Taking off emergency fuel on a training sortie is fairly easy to categorize. I don't personally care if she did this or not, but I do care that one would tell other aviators to shrug it off or that this level of incompetence is common or acceptable. I can immediately say a number of things about any person that does this: A) You will never touch one of my aircraft again, B) I will do everything in my power to ensure you never touch anyone else's aircraft, and C) I must attempt to remove you from the equation completely, as you will likely fu<k up anything I task you with, regardless of it's simplicity. Everyone makes mistakes. Taking off without gas on a training sortie is not a mistake at all...it's lack of due regard. Someone that cares that little over things so important...man, I just wish I would have spent my time some other way than reading this garbage. Bendy Edited: 'nuff said

That's strange...the AFnet migration has happened to me twice inside the span of the last year and all it's ever done is prevent me from checking my email and shared drives on the domains I'm a part of. That is, of course, easily rectified within a 1-2 week timeframe...it takes time, after all, it's the first time we've done this...here. Sometimes I feel like other's desire to improve something than isn't actually broken is the real problem. One man's improvement is another man's irritation. We do this over and over until it's barely recognizable anymore. That said, I'm sure I'll look back 30 years later and remember the AF it the way my father looked back on his time in the army...Remember the good people, a few of the bad...the rest just is what it was, it was far from perfect, but it didn't really change the outcome all that much. Speaking of a CSAF: While I think it's good to reflect on all changes to see if they had their intended effect, there is very little changeable within a large organization that will bear immediate fruits that are substantive and/or important. I do not doubt that there are senior leaders that struggle to find them everyday. The problem is that those changes set in motion are rarely kept in motion once individuals move on. It's hard enough to champion change when it's your idea, it's much harder when it's another's. As far as what I think has improved? Not much. It's different, sure...but improved, not really. I don't particularly think it needs to either. If anything, I'd let the O-4 and O-5's that haven't had the pleasure have some of my deployments. Let's just revamp all of it...I'll write up a BBP...there, now it's time to PCS. You got the stick now, Bobby. *right in the trash can, too much work* This thread is not my favorite (although the fat kid falling through the long jump pit did make me smile), Bendy

You know, years later, it's kind of funny to look back at the connection between the shitty OPR writing advice thread and the eventual continuation after being passed over thread. I wonder if we can do it again...you know, for future generations of AF officers to behold. There is a lot of good stuff here on this website, it's just going to take a hell of a lot of beer to sift through the all the shit (although all my posts seems to have been deleted, so that should help significantly). As for "eligible", it goes completely without saying, what they mean is "*eligible". It meant what they wanted it to mean when they released the announcement, and it means what they want it to mean now that they're reporting on it. They don't report to you! How dare you question the accuracy of these precise computations, or the conclusions drawn from it. *shakes head* How dare you... I believe it's what my current boss refers to as the Army Planning Model (or something like that), where I just make the numbers support what he wants to do. Quite standard really... Bendy

2. There was just so much hilarity there I could barely handle it. If they ask nicely, maybe the tower controller will drive up there and fly the plane over for them himself. Simply amazing... Bendy

Caveat: While I have little doubt that you do completely understand... So what's that assumption exactly about the power again in your plane? I wonder what the boldface/CAP for power is in the MC-12 for an engine failure on takeoff continued (a step before applied before airspeed)... hmmm.... It's not that cosmic, sure...but I'm willing to bet the monkey causes a big wreck off the end of the runway nine times out of ten. **He learned to blindly applying mantras by reading this thread.** Bendy

HaHa, that's cute...well, they are boots too I suppose. You see, it's just not important how it works, nor how to ops check it. --> Did you check to see if they work? "Yes." Okay, did you check to see if they worked the way you were taught to check them? "No." Okay, are we in some kind of hurry today and I'm just not aware of it? "No." Good, so are we going to check it? *sigh* "Fine." You thought who was past that? There is a reason for that "mentality", but I agree it sometimes clouds prioritization. There are always metrics. Those metrics change as you move from the tactical to the operational, and to the strategic. There has been discontent over the higher level metrics of ISR for quite some time. While I haven't thought about it all that much, I'm not sure I can come up with a better strategic metric than currently exists without dipping back into the operational/tactical level. I would imagine that the A-10's flying under us are rolling up the same type of "effective" missions that don't ever engage anything. I'm sorry to hear that, Winchester. I can empathize with your loss. Cheers. Nice hip check there, Champ. Absolutely nothing to understand if you have the boldface memorized that makes the aircraft meet those assumptions immediately after you lose your engine at 120 knots on takeoff. As long as you know what/how, no need for silly things like why. While I can get on board with it being more important that you don't sacrifice the what/how for the why's, sometimes it helps people to learn the how's when they understand the why's. In the bigger picture, it's imperative to understand the why's as you branch out and are looked at to teach the systems and mission. I know your high school teachers knew the why's since you managed to graduate and all...burn. Bendy

Hmmm...well, 600 hours isn't all that far off from when I upgraded to aircraft commander, so I don't think that's it. Do you think it could be in the way we try and teach them? I've found the LTs to be adequately receptive to what I have to say. I'm perfectly fine with the confidence, what I would expect from a type A flyer. Talking with them about things they should know, but clearly don't have a grasp of in the right way can break through that. If they don't seem to be listening, perhaps we could take a look at how we're conveying the message before we write them off completely. Anomaly aside, of course...there are some people that won't let you help them no matter how much you'd like to. Rolling and flipping switches?!? That's the non-standard standard...we have a lot of those. Sigh...well there is something to be said about asking when you don't know I suppose; just seems like a bit too much of the go to answer (don't worry, the DO will look it up for you and put out an SRF with the answer soon). Quite frankly, there are *'s, **'s, ***'s, and/or T's on that SDP I still can't figure out. It's in my flight bag to continue looking at until I somehow figure it out. Bendy

I have seen the video recreation of the IE08 mishap and there is more than sufficient detail in the SIB (as is normally the case) for mishap prevention. There is very little to nothing that could have been put in the SIB that isn't there. I believe they did an excellent job in both the report and the briefings. The first thing we can do is stop wanting to get out of the MC-12 program or the MC-12 program to get out of ACC. We have a large number of first assignment pilots who we are teaching a horrible example to with the caviler, often downright shitty, attitude we approaching it with and present. The young guys/gals are in serious trouble when they move on to another community as in the MC-12 they are not currently encouraged, expected, or forced to excel at their jobs; getting the ATO lines flown seems to be enough. They are missing out on the huge opportunity presented to fly this many hours in combat with seasoned aviators from just about every airframe the air force has to offer. They are too young to know what they should ask, and a lot of guys are too jaded to offer. There is a very sloppy culture with regard to work ethic, not on a personal level, but on a professional level. There are far too many examples to begin listing them out. However, it reaches all the way down to the very underlying basics: It's surprising how often a pilot flips a switch (such as the autofeather), without ever giving a thought to why it should be done. The checklist says "as required", not "off"...yet never after 500 hours of flying the plane thinks about why one might leave it on. Sure, it's not complicated, but you still have to apply some critical thought to your job. The second thing we can do it to give up how busy we think we are. Even the C-17 and C-130 peeps think they are so busy flying their 5.0 sorties that we gasp at the thought of having to sit down and talk about tactical topics (and not so tactical topics). It's somehow okay to know just enough to get by...compounded with leadership that thinks we should complicate the situation with advanced capabilities like buddy lazing, while we don't remember that losing a generator makes the back of the plane go dark or who can talk on what radio when it does happen. There has been so much wrong for so long now, that it might not be able to be fixed with the time the program has left in ACC. The elimination of the flow though manning construct will make strides towards providing the continuity required for lasting change, but it takes people (read IPs) to step up and make that change take hold. Lastly (although there are many more), we can have discussions about mishaps...rather than grumble because we had to sit through listening to safety brief it to us. Alas, we are very busy...we fly pretty much everyday (unless you're lucky enough to be an Operations Supervisor or Supervisor of Flying). I need those other 14 hours of my day to check my Facebook and play my Zynga games. Ain't no one got time for talking about mishaps! This is the game, man. Why we going to sit around and talk about practice. Your defensive post has been noted.

This is really not true. I don't know if you are at Kandahar or Bagram, but if you're at Bagram send me a PM and we'll sit down for a few minutes and talk about it. You have a decent grasp on the confounding variable of power in the Indy08 situation (although it is the spin it would have contributed to, not the stall itself)...but there was, as has been non-sensically addressed here, a number of others that made the chain that eventually couldn't be broken. It is not acceptable for either squadron to have the subject be taboo and equally unacceptable to even make you feel like it is. As with any other control inputs, it is the performance of the aircraft that is what's important. That mantra is applicable, however it takes a little more than just the blind application of mantras or even procedures to be a good aviator. While the application of boldface (or critical action procedures, if you will) are important to apply in a timely fashion, they still should not be done without critical thought. Doing things without thinking first gets you killed, in the MC-12 and every other aircraft ever made. We have gone out and induced approach to stalls in the mission orbit climb profile and it is very easy (and disturbingly sad) to recover from. However, if you let the autopilot trim the climb, "relaxing" will do little to nothing for you. Rolling wings level will always help, as it will direct the lift where you really need it...while this is not necessary for recovery, it should always be done when available. The power at a low airspeed is needed to not lose altitude, but must be applied very judiciously and with the nose down trim...no rush, there is plenty of time...IF YOU PUT THE NOSE DOWN. I've seen a number of similar situations where the lack of auto-throttles have led to rapidly decaying airspeed, with the autopilot ferociously trimming nose up. Put the nose back to where you need it to be and the situation begins to resolve itself. Control and performance...it very much is airmanship 101. We should learn everything we can each time. I don't believe one should focus solely on one thing or the other. Some in the MC-12 community has learn a great deal from this tragedy, while unfortunately other have not. However, I would argue those people can't be helped until they help themselves first. This was never once said to me during IQT. Had I not asked, I'm not sure anything about the flight guidance panel would have been said. However, the flip attitude of "it's airmanship plain and simple" is a little rough. Maybe that's just due to my current position, but I think even you (with an amazing 600 hours in type) could learn at least a thing or two. Bendy

I used to play Mario Kart with Richie Dickson on weather days at BAF. Good guy. I was provided access to the report the day it was released. I asked and it was handed to me; I read, I sighed, and I returned it. While everyone had to wait for the briefing, they went out of their way to ensure that everyone had an opportunity to receive it (I can’t vouch for downrange, where I heard the info was disseminated much more slowly). It is craziness to think there are guys flying the MC-12W through the shit weather of Afghanistan right now that have not been privy to this (as well as previous) SIB reports. The swamp land article that was linked was actually quite well written and highlights only a few of the mission risks accepted by the MC-12 program. It continues to be wrought with an impressive operations tempo, inexperienced aircrew, and a thorough lack of developmental/operational testing to produce/validate even the most basic aerodynamic things as TOLD…Fucking TOLD. I was in the deployed squadron commander’s office discussing mitigating program risk in late 2011 and I was in the deployed squadron commander’s office discussing mitigating program risk today. Mitigating risk is only a concept truly appreciated at the unit level by the operators forced to execute under such conditions. It is far more than the safety program that is riddled with error. If only a handful of us could make it through our 15 years unjaded enough to actually give two shits about fixing it. …that my friends, is a difficult, difficult proposition.