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TnkrToad

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TnkrToad last won the day on February 1 2017

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About TnkrToad

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    Flight Lead
  1. Pilot Shortage Deepens, USAF is SCREWED.

    [quote Will the 1-2 year bonus takers be the tipping point? Hundreds took short bonuses/commitments, will they be persuaded to stay by the AF's recent "fixes"? No.
  2. Pilot Shortage Deepens, USAF is SCREWED.

    Changing crew ratios sure is an easy way to “fix the glitch.” Even better, when the AF bought the C-17, they originally planned on a 5.0 crew ratio (AD + ARC). I heard this straight from Gen Handy when he was TRANSCOM/CC. Air Force mag quoted this same ratio much more recently. http://www.airforcemag.com/MagazineArchive/Documents/2011/February%202011/0211arsenal.pdf AMC will be an awesome place for single dudes who want to rack up ridiculous amounts of flying hours. Not so much for those who like their families...
  3. Pilot Shortage Deepens, USAF is SCREWED.

    Quoted for truth. The positive delta can only be due to creative accounting. Scary part is the AF’ plan is to let the 11M inventory drop by about 840 over the next 5 years, IOT get the other communities healthy. That kind of rapid inventory drop can only happen with really poor retention. Only thing I can figure is that AF planners are hoping they’ll be able to contract out ever-greater portions of the mobility mission—civilian contract air refueling, even more contract airlift, etc. Of course, that would drive up demand for prior-mil folks even more. 11Ms are well aware of their marketability on the outside, and abysmal retention rates are reflecting this reality. TT
  4. Pilot Shortage Deepens, USAF is SCREWED.

    So, if I’m reading the slides right, the AF has a (fictional) surplus of 437 11Ms currently. By 2023, we’re slated to have a shortfall of 496 11Ms. That’s a pretty impressive drop in inventory. This is despite the grand ideas to have regional pilots go through short courses to become heavy drivers, contract UPT instructors, etc. Sure seems to me like there’s an 11M manning crisis. Heavy drivers are getting crushed right now; can’t wait to see what life is like when the community is down another 840 bodies. TT
  5. Leadership at the 'Deid

    I was apparently too subtle...it was a swipe against those who quipped about tanker dudes building tracks in the middle of the weather.
  6. Leadership at the 'Deid

    I'll add: - Plan massive tanker plans for OEF, OIF, etc., in the CAOC, while other tanker patches in WOCs build Night 1 packages for their crews and/or lead Night 1 missions. - Deploy to CAOC (too often) . . . and talk really slowly to CAF/other users who come up with grandiose/unexecutable plans refueling-wise - Plan large, refueling-intensive exercises, act as tanker SMEs in white cells, and/or lead exercise execution - Command ARWs (100 ARW/CC at Mildenhall: two in a row are tanker patches) . . . although this is the exception thus far - Advocate for maintaining standards/work to build & maintain critical skills, in the midst of an opstempo and leadership model that militate against developing expertise - Build AR tracks where users request them NKAWTG's assessment is accurate; those who volunteered for the WIC in the early 2000s in effect volunteered for huge arse pain. Aside from those who were clearly on the HPO track, those who graduated got the dual bonus of alternately deploying as aircrew or staff, followed by a deployment to the CAOC as a tanker planner, followed by another aircrew/deployed staff requirement . . . ad nauseum. Making oneself more eligible for deployments was hardly a selling point for the WIC early on. I'd say we're past that stage at this point; enough tanker patches to spread the wealth a bit more, and folks have a better idea what they bring to the fight. TT
  7. Leadership at the 'Deid

    My point is not about whether or not J O and Smokey Currin, in this case, are good dudes. I assume they are. If you combine folks with minimal tanker experience at the wing level, with folks who have minimal tanker experience at the group and squadron levels, you’re going to get clownish decisions—even if they’re all good dudes. Sprinkle in a bad apple here and there—it’s inevitable that at least some will end up as golden boys—and your odds of clownish behavior increase all the more. In sum, if tanker leaders come across as clowns, they’re directly reflecting the MAF leader development clown show. If you want competent tanker leaders, you need folks who’ve spent substantial portions of their careers in the tanker community. Furthermore, you need competent, experienced tanker bubbas to steer young Wg/CCs away from bad decisions, before they make them. Unfortunately, AMC doesn’t seem to have gotten that memo. TT
  8. Leadership at the 'Deid

    My guess is it has something to do with the youth movement in tanker leadership, combined with the lack of tanker experience among those leaders. Case in point: the ARW/CCs at both McConnell and Seymour Johnson are dudes who pinned on O-6 at 18 yrs and are Wg/CCs at 20 yrs into their careers. Both assiduously avoided the air refueling community for at least a decade. The McConnell CC never previously flew the KC-135, and the last time he flew the KC-10 was 2005. The SJ commander is slightly better; he actually started in the KC-135, but was gone from the community for 13 years, from ‘03-‘16. If the Wg leadership’s dearth of tanker experience is any indication of group & squadron CCs’ backgrounds, clueless/clownish leadership should come as no surprise. You want good leaders? Put people who know what they’re doing in those jobs. TT
  9. Just checked the ACP take rates, and thought I'd note a couple things: The overall take rate for initial bonus eligibles is still pretty abysmal--barely over 40%. The initial take rates for 11Fs & 11Rs are especially poor--both less than 40%. A glimmer of hope is that take rates for 11Ss & 11Hs are high (both over 55%). Their take rates have historically always been high, though, so this is hardly cause for celebration. If one factors in the old guy (NC & CE) bonus takers, though, things change a bit. More 11Fs have taken the old guy bonus than have initial eligibles; even though the 11F community is undermanned, at least its old farts are willing to hang around. This provides at least some hope that the 11F community might eventually get healthy. The 11H & 11S communities likewise had healthy old guy bonus take rates. Even though (last I checked) they're chronically undermanned, they will have substantially more stability than they would have otherwise without the old guy bonus. The 11R & 11M communities are screwed. Not only do they have low initial eligible take rates, but their old guy bonus take rates are abysmal, too. If neither the mid-career guys nor the grey beard O-5 types want to stay in, then all that'll be left in the squadrons will be high career-potential CCs & DOs leading a bunch of O-1s to O-3s who're merely biding their time until they reach the ends of their respective SUPT commitments and can get out. Not a recipe for success, in the near or long term. It'll be especially interesting when AMC starts picking its O-6s and above, not based on quality, but rather on simply who is left and can fog a mirror. Based on the stats, I presume the same is or will be true in the 11R community--leadership selection by virtue of one's mirror-fogging ability--but as an 11M, I'll just stay in my lane and hope for the best for the C2ISR types. TT
  10. I don't think it's public. All the data, down to each airframe, is posted on AFPC Secure, though. Go to AFPC Secure, then select RAW. In RAW, select Static Demographics. From the list of all the docs, you'll find one that says FY17 ACP Take Rates (or something like that--I'm not using a CAC-enabled computer right now). They break the data down in about 69 different ways--to include numbers of eligibles and takers (both short and long) for each individual MDS.
  11. The take rate listed on RAW is only for long-term (3+ yr) contracts. The overall long-term take (short term take rate doesn't much matter) is right around 40%. If short term contracts were included, the overall rate would be a little over 50%. Still not good news. It's noteworthy that for Tier 2, the 11Bs & 11Ss are bringing up the average. 11Ms are still below 40%. Tanker and C-17 bubbas (the two largest MDS pilot communities) seem especially inclined to get out--they're at about 35% right now. TT
  12. More SARC briefings soon.

    Dude, seriously? There are (and were) valid operational reasons to open and/or encourage greater degrees of military service to females and non-caucasian males. It provided for a substantially greater pool of folks from whom to draw, when the military always needs talent. The costs don't come close to outweighing the benefits in the case of transgendered troops. We can live without whatever additional talent they might bring to the table.
  13. Obviously devil's advocating, but why not argue for increasing the requirement to 3,000 hrs? - Big Blue will keep its shiny penny HPO types (regardless of airframe), since they'll never get that many hours by the time they reach the ends of their SUPT commitments. They'll stay in, and surely will make the service a better place, due to their superior PME and exec experiences - The AF will keep its fighter pilots, because it's way hard to build that many hours as a fighter bubba - The AF will get rid of those pesky heavy drivers who want to do nothing but fly, because they will have no problem meeting the 3k hr threshold by 10 yrs into their flying careers. The line-flyer heavy drivers will depart in droves, leaving the fighter mafia to run the AF, as it's been for most of the Air Force's (and its antecedents') history - Prior mil folks who already have a-word jobs will love it, because the increased barriers to entry will give them/their unions even more clout. They will, of course, point out how the friendly skies will be even safer than before, due to the more-stringent flying hour requirements - Regionals will collapse, but hey, everybody hates the regionals with their slave wages and such. The legacies will start flying smaller airplanes to fill the gaps left by the regionals' collapse--meaning more flying jobs to be had in the majors - For the more-limited number of folks who break into the big leagues, their pay will increase even further still, due to simple supply/demand economics If making regional pilots get ATPs was good, increasing ATP requirements to 3,000 hours must surely be better. Can't be too safe . . . TT
  14. Any mil pilot worth his salt will have no problem getting hired if the 1,500 hr rule is rescinded. Mil pilots got hired left and right in the late 90s, when folks just needed commercial licenses to get hired by regionals. No reason to believe it would be any different now. TT
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