Sprkt69
-
Posts
453 -
Joined
-
Last visited
-
Days Won
3
Content Type
Profiles
Forums
Gallery
Blogs
Downloads
Wiki
Posts posted by Sprkt69
-
-
1 hour ago, Seriously said:
The O-6 formerly in charge of the solving the crisis at the Pentagon is quoted as saying, "it's a production problem, not a retention problem." This was about a year ago..
An O-8 just briefed us that “we will produce our way out of the problem.” He also deflected questions about retention. So the AF has that going for it.
-
1
-
-
58 minutes ago, brabus said:
At the recent OG council the OGs advocated for max bonus (i.e. $35k for 1 year orders vs. current $15K), A1 concurred on the idea, saying they agreed with the pilot shortage. FM folks were on board. And then A3 says there isn't a pilot shortage and they don't see a need for increasing bonuses to allowed, full amount. Un-fucking-believable...the operations guys (e.g. "us") say there isn't a problem, but even the manpower non-operators are saying there's a problem. Admittedly I generally blamed this stupidity on A1, well turns out it's our own guys backstabbing us. The ironic thing is I said to my OG a few weeks ago how I had lost all faith in the staff to do anything right (referencing another crucial topic)...well, apparently I can lose more than 100% faith.
And officially the Aircrew Crisis Task Force has been renamed the Aircrew Task Force. No crisis around here fellas. That and the optics of a no-no word
-
8 hours ago, Clark Griswold said:
Modern systems designed from the gear up for dispersed / expeditionary basing
Gripen is already designed this way but my hypothetical resurrected A-7 or Super Scorpion would need designing. Basing a new, modern A-7 on new proven systems and or civil aviation ones like the current iteration of Scorpion is might be one way to get to higher availability rates
There would be a logistical footprint just not an onerous one, shoot for a jet reliable enough that could deploy with 5 to 8 MX per tail
Sent from my iPhone using TapatalkDon’t forget the logistics associated with a relatively long, well kept, and paved runway required of those mentioned airframes. Also the extra fuel, parts, and base defenders.
-
9 hours ago, Clark Griswold said:
Lots of maneuvering room there...
From the article:
Funding projections in the five-year outlook are subject to change as requirements evolve...
LAA [light attack aircraft] squadrons will provide a deployable and sustainable multirole attack capability, capable of performing a diverse array of attack missions, including but not limited to close air support, armed reconnaissance, strike coordination and reconnaissance, airborne forward air control, and interdiction,” according to budget documents.
The new aircraft could also fly combat search-and-rescue, rescue escort, and maritime air support missions, the Air Force said.
LAA will provide a deployable, persistent attack capability that can be employed with low footprint and light logistical support requirements.
My grumbling two cents... I'm getting the feeling we are looking at Light Attack for the last wars not the ones likely in the future.
As we go into the next generation of long term warfare in failed states/ungoverned areas (hybrid warfare, grey zone conflicts, COIN/LIC, etc...) a manned light attack platform is part of the air mission but one more robust/capable than we currently envision.
Next Generation Light Attack (to me) is precision fires delivered with additional effects (ISR, EA, etc..) organically, capable of moderate mission endurance with little or no logistical mission support (DCA, AR or large ground footprint).
Consider a hypothetical mission in a hypothetical failed state called Venezuelastan, where the country's not in civil war but not in stability, military elements of it have split and some are receiving support from outside actors, governments and some direct military support in deployments of foreign military forces.
We support one side(s) and there is sporadic fighting where we provide kinetic/non-kinetic support to our local partners and likewise for the other side(s) with their allies. The foreign military forces are not targeting each other openly but could attack each other in about 6.9 seconds if things change.
To provide that support with a manned platform and provide the level of effects we want to while keeping the risk at an acceptable level and keeping the costs sustainable, we won't need a platform that can't deliver enough effects and is incapable of defending itself thus incurring an unacceptable cost to enable it and defend it; all the current offerings of turboprop based light attack suffer from that. We will need a platform that is not a liability in itself while on mission, one that doesn't normally need DCA or AR support and is cost-effective enough to fly repetitively in long, slow progressing operations.
That said just to be clear is not to discount a light attack platform for a SOCOM type mission (individual or coordinated one time strikes supporting SOF) but for a conventional type mission (major campaign or operation using combined or coalition forces over extended time), this is where a Next Gen Light Attack is needed IMHO.
Not to padlock on specific aircraft but something like a modernized/modified A-7, modified Gripen or enhanced Scorpion is what I would envision filling this role.
Good Strike Capability, Tactical ISR, Self-Defense Capable, Excellent Range/Endurance with other modern effects capabilities. All that at a modest and sustainable price/footprint.
If we are willing to pay $40 million a tail for light attack platform, I think we can/should get more capability.
A-7, Gripen or Scorpion...thought you wanted something that would not require a large logistical footprint. Or did I miss something
-
1 hour ago, Clark Griswold said:
Don't worry, those two will cost as much each as the original 20, so no under execution problem
And built by Boeing, so will also need to be torn apart and rebuilt upon “acceptance”
-
1 hour ago, BeerMan said:
I'm on the fence about Light Attack. There is no way OSD would have purchased enough light attack back in 2008 in the quantities needed to reduce the Ops Tempo for other fighter squadrons to dial back. BCA made sure of that. Do you think Light Attack would have changed our behavior in any of the AORs? I don't think so. Now it's too little, too late for our National Security Strategy and it doesn't rank high enough on the priority list in its current form.
Assuming a good enough number of LA purchased, I doubt it would have changed any behavior down range. However, I would say it would have some pros and cons. Pros, major cost savings. Especially if you forward deploy aircraft with ground units like it should be. Also it would have saved much of the fighter/bomber fleets in terms of wear and tear. Side bonus, if properly trained, forward deploying into a true joint environment would help repair the Army/Air Force relationship.Cons, higher risk of losing an aircraft/aircrew and the political fallout associated with that
-
7 hours ago, di1630 said:
Back in ‘07 timeframe I remember when I supported the COIN mentality wondering why we wanted so many -22’s.
12 years later I eat my words. We’ve seemed to learn nothing, still bogged down in the Stan. Still have supersonic A/A fighters and low level swept wing supersonic bombers spinning holes instead of light attack.
A lot of criticism from many corners back then was based on the belief we had competent decision makers elsewhere.
Now we’ve worn out our fighter fleet, short F-22’s and thinking about buying new F-15’s.
Hindsight
Sent from my iPhone using Baseops Network mobile appIn 2007, did you take into account TAMI21 and the near zeroing of 11F production in the name of reasons?
-
1
-
-
1 hour ago, Homestar said:
They wouldn't care so much if the pay were to rise more significantly with time in service.
That’s not going to happen. Gotta get buy in from the sister services and there is no way the Army is going to agree.
-
Good news gentlemen, the pilot AFSCs will be separated for promotion boards. The bad news is that, according to HAF, pilots will have less people promoted to O-5 and above. Acquisitions will have the greatest increase because reasons.
I hear the Guard/Reserves are hiring though. And the airlines
-
18 hours ago, TTP said:
The time to experience savings of six months is interesting, but not the main benefit. BTW - did anyone else notice that the time to experience chart used 4FL as the metric under the current system and 2FL under the proposed T-X system? A bit of an apples-to-oranges comparison. There is basically no savings in the time to experience when you look at the time to be a 4FL. The time to create an MR wingman is also longer under the proposed T-X system.
The real benefits from the proposed T-X system are: repurpose some FTU jets to be CC-coded due to lower training bill (increase sq PAA or increase number of ops sqds); ops units focus more on advanced TTPs than building blocks (train for high end fight); greater first ops assignment stability due to longer time on station and less PCSing (QoL).
Of course to gain the benefit of those FTU jets, many would require significant upgrades to be CC-coded.You mean like changing the whole 500 hrs thing to a flight position? Or is Holmes just moving some goal posts a little closer to make the numbers work?
-
“Synergy”
-
11 hours ago, pawnman said:
I'm sure that will stop the exodus of aviators.
Was that ever the actual goal?
-
3 hours ago, JeremiahWeed said:
To piggy back on the well written post above........
In my opinion, there is a lot more to pilot retention than bumping up the pay check, QOL or additional duties. Those have always been issues and have forced a percentage of pilots out. Those basics need to happen and are actually pretty easy fixes if someone in senior leadership would grow a pair, acknowledge the obvious and fix it. 365s shouldn’t be a requirement like PME. But another important but possibly intangible issue is the struggle to maintain a culture of warriors in the USAF. What seems to be a new, added problem is the attempt to move USAF away from a force lead by the actual war fighters towards what looks more like a peacetime corporation. It’s been a slow leak over the last couple of decades.
I have a lot to say about this but I'm finding it tough to put some of it into a sensible message. When I entered the ranks of USAF fighter pilots, it was 1989 and although we didn't know it yet, we had reached the pinnacle of a long journey toward an extremely lethal combat air force. As a Lt, I had no part in that. I simply benefited from being exposed to some of the most hard-charging, capable fighter pilots created during the post-Carter, Cold War, Reagan years of huge military expansion, boo-coo dollars and total focus on enhancing our capability to wage war from the air. As a result, we brought serious game to the first protracted combat ops in almost 2 decades when Desert Storm kicked off. It was a truly amazing thing to be a part of.
Here's where I begin to struggle to put some concepts into words: I'll do my best.
I had the honor of meeting and hearing a few hours of wisdom from George "Bud" Day during ROTC field training. Five years later, he presented me (and everyone in my UPT class) with our wings, drank whiskey with us and told us amazing stories at the O-club standing among us in his mess dress and Medal of Honor. I heard similar stories from F-4, B-52 and Thud Drivers, guys with gold stars on their flight suit sleeves (anyone remember those?), read books by Broughton, Basel, Risner, Drury and many more. I and my contemporaries soaked in every bit of warrior lore and attitude we could find and experience. It was evident that it was all important. None of us needed that explained to us. We came to realize that the traditions, attitudes and perpetuation of the fighting spirit that was born out of past air wars were absolutely necessary to becoming an effective Air Force combat pilot. The simple fact is that pilots who woke up every day to begin preparations for missions like daylight bomber or fighter raids on Germany, attacking the Paul Doumer bridge, going "downtown" to Hanoi or any number of other daily tests of testicular fortitude knew there was a high chance they wouldn't see the next sunrise or if they did it would be through prison bars. If it wasn't them, then it likely was someone else in their unit with whom they shared the experience of air combat. While I don't claim anything close to that, my small exposure to what it must have been like for them came on my third combat mission. I had "that feeling" based on experiences on my first two missions and strapped on my jet with a solid, tangible feeling that I wasn't coming back. I couldn't shake it, of course I went anyway and thankfully, I was wrong. You don't do that every day, strap on a fighter or bomber, lose friends, fly RESCAP over their smoking holes, come up initial in a 3-ship that left as four without coping mechanisms. Drinking in a readily accessible squadron bar might be the most obvious, sharing stories only another warrior could understand or appreciate, raunchy fighter pilot songs, running the gauntlet of hurled whiskey glasses in a wake to mourn a fallen comrade, burning pianos, and the list goes on. To outsiders they may seem strange, stupid or unnecessary, offensive antics by fraternity brothers who are still waiting to mature into adults. We didn't have to explain ourselves in the past, but that no longer appears to be the case. But those same PC, judgmental, clueless outsiders, politicians or leaders with a lower-case "L" have no idea what it takes to willingly take on a mission like that during sustained combat operations where we potentially lose people and aircraft daily. The pilots who do are long since retired and far more have left this world. My war in 1991 lasted about 6-weeks and losses in the air were in the double digits at most. Since then, we've had a few surges but nothing that rivals the experiences of our predecessors. But that doesn't mean their combat tested traditions should be forgotten or set aside as relics of the past. The fraternal bonds of combat are indescribable and something no one can appreciate second hand. They are also absolutely necessary for a fighting force to gain the required trust in each other and be truly effective in their mission. They also don't just happen out of thin air when a squadron suddenly finds themselves launching their first combat mission.
As I alluded to at the start, it's difficult to put this into a cogent message. I don't know if I have but I have no doubt many of you fellow warriors, past and present, have a general idea of what I'm trying to say. Being an effective combat pilot isn't something you just start doing the day the balloon goes up and shit gets real. Combat pilots from the 40's, 50's, 60's and 70's showed us how it was done, gave us traditions to perpetuate and those were carried by the next generation of pilots into the final two decades of the 20th century. I have no doubt that today's combat pilots are doing their best to follow in the footsteps of the warriors who came before them. However, doing so is not supposed to be a struggle with the very leadership you're charged with following. We should be embracing and continuing these traditions, not throwing them aside because of someone's BS sensibilities.
I guess the bottom line is this: Being a warrior, an aggressive, professional, lethal killer is not a politically correct, peacetime, 9 to 5 job. It's highly specialized and the skill set necessary to excel at it requires an extraordinary amount of resources and effort, probably more so today than ever before. Pilots attempting to attain and maintain this excellence need to be able to focus the majority of their working hours on this task. We have been fighting this battle for at least 50 years and probably will continue to do so. What is new, however, is the fact that pilots now have to prove that they and their mission are, in fact, actually different from other officers and support personnel. That they are not interchangeable and in spite of how "unfair" it might be to some, not everyone in the USAF is an actual war-fighter. No excuses are necessary for this - it's simply reality. If that offends someone - too fucking bad. You want in on it, go to UPT or shut the F.U. and support the mission. We need warriors. They don't come about using an HR department, worrying about a PC culture or who is going to be offended by the process of creating highly trained, lethal killers. Rant over - 🤬
I think we have to bring you back to pep talk management
-
-
3 hours ago, jango220 said:
You know, that's an argument that I have heard for a long time and completely disagree with. A lot of people in the tanker community also believe that for some reason as well. The Bone and Buff hold a crap ton of gas (~265K and ~312K, respectively), even compared to the legacy tankers (~200K for the -135 and ~340K for the -10), in addition to their weapons loadout. A large aircraft with weapons doesn't equate to a leaky gas can and a lit fuse.
Edit: Adding weapons decreases fuel capacity, but still, each bomber holds a lot of gas
The P-8 has both hard points and a bomb bay, and is a great model for future weapons employment methods for large aircraft. It is absolutely do-able for a platform like the KC-46 (sorry, C-46...).
I can almost envision the <2G out relying on everything except kinetics to stay alive
-
1
-
-
36 minutes ago, YoungnDumb said:
Good luck with your degree but know that even if you briefed this to the CSAF or Congress nothing would change, bureaucracy is to entrenched.
The Frozen Middle will destroy all good ideas
-
1
-
2
-
-
1 hour ago, brabus said:
You missed my point. Your comments on the F-35 specifically are in line with a lot of dudes who don't have insight/knowledge beyond the surface level of the program (a basic program brief and a healthy dose of invalid WOMs). That's not a personal attack, it's a fact that applies to a lot of the CAF, let alone everyone else who doesn't even work in the current, fighter community. No, I do not want to be in a Block 70, an F-15X, etc. over F-35/F-22 in several scenarios (though of course I would prefer those if the only alternative was a current F-16/F-15). We don't need a hoard of 4th or 4.5 gen fighters (a misnomer many are hung up on) - there are means to solve problems other than bravehearting our way into the fight with hundreds/thousands of manned 4-4.5 gen fighters. Our current 4th gen fighters properly SLEPd and upgraded will fulfill our defense requirements, and this will cost less/allow allocation of more funds to other things that will net us more warfighting capability than purchasing new, non-5th gen aircraft. Like you and many others, I love my 4th gen fighter and hate to see it get shoved from the front of the line, and I want to see it "survive," but that's a myopic and emotional viewpoint, I can admit that.
You want to divert funds to something that will get use fairly quickly and have a warfighting impact with low sustainability cost, send it to light attack and other related programs. $1.2B on those are more useful and have better "warfighting payoff" longevity than 1/2 a squadron's worth of F-15X, Block 70, etc. Not an emotionally popular opinion in a 4th gen fighter squadron, but it has truth to it if dude's are willing to take a step back and see all portions of the big picture.
Our current 4th Gen will not be properly SLEPd. Too many issues with age and patchwork fixes. Therefore you will spend way more trying to keep them running than purchasing new 4.5 Gen to do the missions F-35 is not required for. I’m not going to get into a “believe me cause I know stuff” argument since I probably fly the same stuff you do. I know, it’s difficult to understand long term funding in terms of man power and parts allocation or even flying hours. Just ask yourself, what is the cost associated with flying a 15/16 vs 35. If you really want to get into the weeds, go hang out with your maintenance as ask intelligent questions.
-
2
-
-
34 minutes ago, brabus said:
Not even remotely what I said. We will continue to upgrade current 4th gen fighters for a long time, which is in general a more fiscally sound proposition than spending $90M+ on a non-5th gen aircraft. If companies cut the cost to $40M per, then maybe it'd be worth looking at, but I don't see any company doing that, as its not in their best interest to do so.
You do realize the operational cost benefit of purchasing new 4.5+ Gen aircraft have over bandaiding jets built in the 70s and 80s right? All fun and games until the next 4 Gen grounding over failed structure for an aircraft past service life. Or death of one of our bros
-
11 hours ago, brabus said:
No, it doesn't. Those who seriously think it does make sense (especially at that price tag) do not have enough knowledge on "future us" and "future them," either via lack of read-ins, lack of understanding of said read-ins, and/or lack of understanding of future capes on other platforms (including non-fighter platforms).
Bottom line, while buying Block 70 Vipers or F-15X seems like a good move to replace our aging fleet, it is not for many reasons. If we had infinite resources, then sure lets buy a bunch of each, but we don't, so as Danger said: spending $80K on a full resto on an old and busted 69 mustang will still never make it a 2019 Corvette ZR1. Lipstick on a pig and all that (and yes, that's a dig at my Ford friends!)
So we should get rid of our 4th Gen now instead of limping them along into the 2040s?
-
4 hours ago, cragspider said:
Same thing could be said of having enlisted patches. But now we have them in multiple communities. I don’t see namings happening in the MAF for other reasons besides enlisted aircrew, primarily it’s not part of the culture or heritage of them.
Big Blue does not care about heritage. Unless it involves a new uniform. Then they will be All In
-
33 minutes ago, Standby said:
My thought: $1.2B for 12 old airplanes...what a steal. If only we had purchased more Raptors when they were $140M a copy.
The contract that was turned down for the next lot of Raptors would have brought that cost down quite a bit. That’s the Ghost of Ole St Gates affecting the present and future.
-
2
-
-
23 hours ago, Sua Sponte said:
The VA is rated nine slots higher than the USAF. That should speak volumes.
So is the Army. That should be a big red indicator too
-
1
-
-
1 hour ago, Motofalcon said:
We did. But when every airman/NCO/SNCO in the afe chain responds with “well sir, the AFI says...” then I give all that feedback to the oss/CC (who seemed receptive) and went on about my business. I don’t have time to 847 every damn afe reg, and since I can’t order people to use common sense, not sure what other recourse there is that is worth my time. I tried to used the CSAFs “if it doesn’t make sense, stop doing it” mantra, but good luck finding a SMSgt who will let their shop actually violate an AFI, whether it makes sense or not.
If you want that change done quickly, allow the mission to fail (in training) or like mentioned above, make the pain be felt at a much higher level. This fight from the bottom up will only burn you out, make you bitter, and then go Guard. I once had a Vice Wing/CC tell me “I don’t want to hear about your problems, take care of them at your level.”
It it would be nice if I got paid the salaries of all the other people whose jobs I’ve had to do over the years
-
11 hours ago, jrobe said:
If the pool went down to 3 and 2 took the bonus...the AirForce would say they met their quota
This is exactly what I was thinking after reading that article. I’m sure there are Generals and Cols congratulating each other for fixing the fighter pilot problem. At least that is what their OPRs/awards will say
Aviation Continuation Pay (ACP - The Bonus)
in General Discussion
Posted
He said they attempted, and the other services (namely Army) shot the bonus amount down ($70k)