hobbitcid
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Posts posted by hobbitcid
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Are you endorsing this as a good thing?
No not at all... There is a distinct chain of command for a reason and the ability of a JFACC or JFC to reach directly through to the shooter causes far more problems than it solves - so perhaps I needed to be more sarcastic. The first time I saw this was during early Balkans operations when a senior officer in the CAOC was speaking directly to an A-10 pilot asking him to confirm his target... The JFACC basically blasted through 2-3 levels of C2 including the flight lead to get involved in the fight... Unfortunately we are likely to see more of this based on ever increasing access to network enabled comms and applications. Technically, we can now connect the JFACC with the shooter in the field. Is it a good idea, I don't think so. Can the Generals be disciplined enough to follow the chain when the s**t hits the fan? I hope so... But the temptation is certainly there...
While this is a little off subject - the concept actually feeds right back to the increase in RPAs... With network enabled control, ISR and targeting applications, automonmous controlled RPAs and access to a wide range of current and archived intelligence and ISR products, it is technically possible to run an entire strike package from the CAOC floor - mission planning, pre-strike recce, strike operations, post strike recce, BDA, intel analysis and debrief with all of the "carbon life forms" (human operators) all within sight of each other... So in essence, the chain of command is flatenned into one single room... We are a long way from there, but its coming... Just my thoughts
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You must be high! You work in the land of endless cash and limitless dreams apparently. The fact is, this country is drowning in debt! Trying to justify that a predator is worth $5 million bucks over a $1 million dollar manned asset that performs at 5 times the level is ludicrous. You sir are misinformed and stuck in the land of make-believe. I get that idiots want to keep pushing this technology as the only future while there is only a limited future in it. The future may not be manned fighters (or aircraft for that matter), but it isn't these things either. The entire future is wasted if all of the eggs are in this RCA bullshit basket. Generals, politicians, and contractors love 'em.
The land of endless cash of limitless dreams? Seriously? Maybe you call the someone over in JFCOM J8 or J9 to find how flush they are - oh that's right, they've been cancelled outright along with most of their experimentation. So OK, RPAs aren't perfect, no one said they were... But from my view of R&D programs for airborne C2 and ISR airborne systems, i'm seeing two trends - RPA (UAV) and corporate jet. The decision makers are rapidly trying to move crew to the ground and use a network enabled strategy ot distributes information dissemination and collection. Manned platforms for these missions are getting smaller or going unmanned. So how does this affect weapons delivery systems? Quite simply they are an evolution of capabilities currently in use. The RQ-1 was not designed to fire weapons but it evolved to this role. Similarly the MQ-9 was supposed to be a more capable RQ-1, but has morphed into a combat paltform as well. The Avenger, the next evolution in the Pred family is being designed with combat capabilities in mind. So yes, RPAs have their problems - its still an immature technology - but so did the airplane at one time as well.
Since you ended up talking about CAS, ask any JTAC in the world if he would rather an A-10, or a goddamn UAV. YGBFSM.
I don't remember bringing up CAS though it is a major area of growth. In fact, a great deal of experimentation is going on with RPAs. Fro the record, I am not a CAS guy by trade though I've worked in that area recently. Based on what I've seen from the current and emerging RPA capability, I'd say some missions still require that " human touch." - the intuition only a human can provide for decision making in complex environments. At this point DCA, CAS, PR (Sandy and Jolly Green) need a human in the loop to evaluate and make decisions based on emerging a dynamic situation (e.g. Situation Awareness). Computers are a long way from that... But, there aree many missions the armed RPA can and possibly should take the lead in - Strike into non-permissive airspace, OCA against heavily defended targets, SEAD, Air Support (airdrop) in non-permissive airspace, etc. Non armed combat missions include ISR, Tactical Recon, Psyops, comm relay (e.g. BACN), etc. The technology is coming...
Basically, I'm not advocating either way. I only posted the article and gave my opinion based on experience and recent programs. RPA's are here to stay and have the R&D money to contuinue their evolution. Its best to figure how to work with them in the short and long term. They will be part of the force for a long time to come.
Centralized control, centralized execution. Classic Air Force!!
So true and with the continued emphasis on network enabled capabilities its only going to get worse... BTW, its referred to as "Flattening the Chain of Command" and is supposed to be a good thing...
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Okay, I will bite. What didn't seem right?
Well without violating the valid RoE at Baseops RE operations - I'll defer to the current article in the Washington Times.
http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2013/aug/9/kuhner-who-betrayed-navy-seal-team-6/
Just wondering...
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"Gold Wings, Blue Sea: A Naval Aviator's Story" by Capt Rosario Rausa USNR.
Great read about an A-1 Skyraider Pilot's career from flight school to retirement. Lots of great anecdotes about flying the US's last radial engine tac air warplane and his follow on career as a TAR in the USNR (TAR is equivalent to AGR in the ANG).
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I don't understand how expanding unmanned operations DIRECTLY reduces the # of pilots in an airliner (while that might be possible, I don't see how one influences the other).
Money... Pilots cost lots of money, computers don't. If a cargo carrier like FEDEX or UPS can reduce its personnel overhead by say 40% - its bottom line improves significantly...
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You are implying that we would reduce the number of pilots on cargo planes before safety was assured? Either it is safe for both or it is safe for neither. Perhaps you mean, "once the public accepts the idea."
Good point - but FAA/CAA and the rest have to be convinced first - no easy feat.
Basically everyone's point against your argument.
Not my argument - its the USAF's own report from their Chief Scientist.
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TAC Airlifter - "Name me a single mission that will go to RPA's once civilian airspace is approved."
Hmmm... OK well I expect any mission requiring surveillance currently undertaken by a manned platform (Fixed or Rotary) will go RPA. That includes Military, Government (Fed to Local) and civilian... That’s seems a no brainer but given your name I assume you are an airlift guy. One industry currently showing the greatest interest in the Flight in National Airspace (FINAS) program is air cargo. Once FINAS is approved cargo airlines will reduce the number of pilots required to fly their aircraft (that’s their stated goal). At some point in time, I believe airlift will be handled by a single pilot responsible for monitoring the computer. Once that clears the FAA hurdle, it’s simply a matter of time before passenger airlines follow suit. The airlines got rid of navigators, then engineers (2nd officers) – I suspect once safety is assured, they’ll drop the need for two pilots as well.
With regard to your laundry list of technical issues - those are evolutions in capability. Radios will get better, the future is IP based anyway - so VOIP will become the standard. Think BACN like capabilities on aerostats and high altitude UAVs providing WIMAX for the battlespace. More bandwidth equals more capability.
Lack of anti-icing is airframe specific, in the initial phase of the NATO AGS program a RPA version of the Gulfstream G-550 was evaluated as a potential platform. It had great capacity (power-weight), could be flown manned as an option and was virtually COTS (fly by light, auto land/take off, autopilot, etc). It even had fairly good operating altitude (45-50K). The drawback was endurance - the RQ-4 even though it had less capacity and less power won out because of its ability stay on station for 22 hours. And I do believe the G-550 is capable of flying in an icing environment. Not that they would unless they had to.
As to the permissive environment you may want to look at current developments by the US Navy and USAF for UCAVs. These platforms are designed for deep strike, in non-permissive environments. The technology is not perfect but it’s coming…
So you’re right, RPAs have a long way to go, but in the early 20th century no one thought the airplane would amount to much more than an observation platform, in the 1970s the leadership in IBM thought the idea of a home computer was ludicrous. Now both technologies are so commonplace no one can remember being without them.
I work in these areas researching and experimenting with future capabilities for C2 and JISR systems. Almost all the current and future development is in RPAs. Further I spent my USAF career in C2 and ISR aircraft and as much as I hate to say it, the RPA is the future. Once they get clearance to fly in mixed airspace – any mission that is dull, dirty or dangerous will be handled by an RPA.
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In the report, called “Global Horizons: United States Air Force Global Science and Technology Vision,” USAF Chief Scientist Maybury said that the Air Force’s manned air fleet is likely to shrink slightly by 2027. This is primarily due to increases in technology coupled with reduced costs for RPA development world-wide.
During Allied Force in 1999 I sat in on a meeting at the CAOC then in Vicenza where the subject of equipping 1 RQ-1 Predator with a laser range finder had all the fighter pilots in the room up in arms. Gen Short the JFACC, told the group the laser range finder was only there to collect coordinates and not for target designation. Moreover, he said UAVs will not be used as designators nor will they ever be weaponized. Those responsibilies will remain with the manned fleet of fighter aircraft. Just three years later the CIA was launching Hellfires from their version of the pred.
All thats holding the RPA revolution back is the ability to fly in mixed airspace with civilian traffic. Once that's cleared, many missions will go to the RPAs...
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Definitely a class act... Current politicians on both sides could learn something - note that I did not say leaders since most of our political class seems to be more interested in power than leadership... Thanks to former Pres HW Bush
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Hmmm... Did not mean to start a firestorm here - I no longer have access to SIPR (retired) to read the final report but based on my own limited experience there seemed to be a lot of inconsistencies with regard to the mission. The way it went down just did not seem right...
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Like most incentives the 15 year retirement will attract many of the best and brightest, improving the promotion opportunities for the less capable. These types of incentives provide short term immediate savings while costing more in the future. Yes the 15 year retirees take a hit down to 32% but the benefits associated with additional opportunities exceed the loss in revenue very quickly. for eample, a Maj retiring at 15 years will be around 37-40 years of age, will be at the peak of his or her expertise, will have more than 25 years of viable employment lef and will have medical benefits and a pension for life. This makes them very valuable... The best and brigtest know this and will take advantage of the opportunity.
I don't have access to .mil sites but if this is anything like what I saw in the '90s I suspect there will be signifcant restrictions on the AFSCs authorized to participate and will be accompanies by a reduction in continuation to 20 for Majors. In essence, you dont make Lt Col on the first round, you either take early retirement or take your chances at the next board with no continuation to fall back on. In about 3-5 years the Major ranks will be so decimated that continuation to 24 will be the norm (my year group) and promotion to Lt Col in following year groups will rise to 85-90%...
The cycle continues to repeat itself...
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About time too - lots of questions about this mission...
http://thehill.com/homenews/house/313039-congress-to-probe-lethal-seal-crash
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Grandfather (mother's side): B-17 Tail Gunner - Italy WWII
Wife's Uncle: JU-52 Pilot, German POW Soviet Union - Eastern Front WW II
Father: Naval Aviator (Hellcat, Demon, Fury, Crusader)
Father in law: Lt Col National Volks Army (Band Leader/Composer)
Me: ABM (AWACS/JSTARS)
Daughter: USAF Pilot (RC-135/T-1)
Nephew: Naval Aviator Student Pilot (T-45)
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http://chronicle.com...oud-the/134830/
Interesting article by an English Professor at USNA. The primary points and recommendations seem to be as follows
1. Academies are superfluous because more officers are generated from ROTC and OCS/OTS than from the academies themselves. Comment: It is true ROTC and OTS provide more officers than the academies. It is also true that Lts from the academy are generally no better than those from ROTC or OTS. Based on my own experience, the most effective JOs are prior service from OTS, ROTC and/or the academy. Largely because they are more mature (age) and more committed. By the time they reach Capt/Lt they all kind of even out. So yes, I think the author has a valid point here.
2. The author infantilism as the often childish and inane way cadets are treated. The rules, regulations and traditions do not match the level of the “alphas” that have been selected to attend the academy. Comment: The author despite teaching at USNA for 25 years, has no clue about how these childish and inane regulations and traditions work. First, they are the great equalizers. The alphas have all come from the very top of their schools and need to be brought to the same level in order to bond as a class. Yes very much a part of leadership. Second, these traditions and regulations increase pressure on the cadets or midhipment. This in turn forces them to adapt, prioritizing their tasks (military, physical, academic, personal) in a dynamic environment. This is critical to the development of military leaders. Live operations do not allow time off to collect your thoughts. Officers need to get used to prioritizing and decision making under pressure.
3. Cadets and midshipmen are unhappy and constantly bitch about their existence so the rules should lighten up to give them a more collegial experience. Comment: get real; cadets and midshipmen would bitch about a TDY to Hawaii, first class travel and an upgraded oceanfront hotel room. Why? Because they bitch about everything. It’s their nature so unless something is really wrong, it should be a positive sign of engagement.
4. Too many rules – cadets and midshipmen don’t follow them anyway, so just dispense with them and all will be well in the happy world of military academia. Comment: The rules are there for a reason. If they are being broken the organization needs to know why. If the rules are valid they should be enforced – not deleted to make the unhappy cadets or midshipmen happy.
5. Military professionals have no business running a university; academies should be divided into two equal elements – military training and academia. Academia should be led by a professor, preferably a woman. Comment: Typical academic elitism and wrong at that. The dean (academic commander) of an academy is normally a General Officer with a PhD. Does the author infer that just because a PhD has a military background they are somehow not qualified? I preferred professors with real world experience. Career academics often have problems translating academic research to real world application. Academic snob…
6. Academies should be more like college, with off campus accommodations and transfer of credits from other accredited institutions. Comment: Many non-military universities require on-campus accommodation, mostly for the first one or two years. The reason most often cited is the desire to help the student assimilate into the university experience (e.g. study hours, access to classes, libraries, labs, etc). The academies have far more activities than civilian universities and far more classes. Imagine a cadet who must attend drill, classes, specialty training (e.g. flight training, seamanship), intramural sports, military training (e.g. marksmanship, survival) and must show he or she can maintain an organized living space and military appearance. Now imagine said cadet leaving campus at 1800 and returning the next day at 0600 each day… Not going to happen. Those previously mentioned events are part and parcel of a cadet’s training. They are also part and parcel of an ROTC or an OTS cadets training as well, albeit on a shorter schedule.
7. The current academic level of the student body is diminished by those who have been selected to attend for reasons other than academic achievement. He takes special interest in the military’s use of prep schools to groom cadet athletes, enlisted personnel and yes, those chosen for reasons of affirmative action. Comment: Once again, more academic snobbery. The academies are not only about academics, they are about the whole person. They are also attempting to be inclusive, basing their student bodies on those achieving high marks, those who can excel athletically and those who wish to move up the ranks and have the aptitude but not the marks. Most states already have a program similar to this. In Florida, it is very difficult to get into FSU or University of Florida as a freshman without being the very top of the class. But after successfully attending junior college for one or two years, acceptance is automatic. Does the author feel these students as well are less qualified? Seems a bit prejudiced to me...
So basically, of the author’s main points, the only one that seems to have validity is the fact that officers from the academy are largely the same as officers from ROTC and OTS. So why not dispense with academies altogether. I don’t agree, there is a need for military institutions that breed leaders. Academies used to do that and likely still do. They probably need to be tightened up a bit and their programs reviewed for currency (academic and military). But I think they do provide a valid resource.
As to his other points, I would have to raise the BS flag. Despite his 25 year tenure at USNA it is obvious the author has never understood his institution or the methods by which it grooms officers. He seems to think that traditions and regulations are inane and stupid in this environment of alpha achievers. Moreover, they must be protected and nurtured in ways that enhance their academic qualifications. All other activities, issues and requirements are superfluous and should be abandoned. Further, he complains vociferously about the “pollution” of the academic gene pool by interlopers being foisted upon the academy by prep schools for reasons other than academia. Finally he seems to think that like most of the rest of academia, the culture of all academies should change with the norms.
In short, the guy simply has no clue… While reading this article, the following warning from Sun Tzu came to mind:
“There are three ways in which a ruler can bring misfortune upon his army: By commanding the army to advance or to retreat, being ignorant of the fact that it cannot obey; This is called hobbling the army. By attempting to govern an army in the same way as he administers a kingdom, being ignorant of the conditions which obtain in an army; This causes restlessness in the soldier's minds. By employing the officers of his army without discrimination, through ignorance of the military principle of adaptation to circumstances. This shakes the confidence of the soldiers.”
By making the academy conform to civilian modes of academia, the author is advocating the civilianization of the military, making the institution more like the civil population than a military force that fights on behalf of the nation. This seems good in an abstract sense, but not particularly effective when dealing with a dynamic and determined threat.
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Contracting out maintenance - good for the balance sheet, perhaps not for the bottom line - Valujet 592 is a cautionary tale. The company contracted out some maintenance to Sabre Tech who routinely transported hazardous materials on aircraft in violation of FAA directives. Not only did the company transport materials illegally, they were not maintained in accordance with TOs. As a result, the chemical O2 generators stored in the hold ignited and destroyed the aircraft. Might be a good lesson to review for AA...
Discussion - http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/ValuJet_Flight_592
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Flankers up close
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Makes sense - India has been buying its weapons systems from Russia (Mig 21, 27, 29, SU30, IL76, TU142, IL38, MIL an Kamov helos), USA (C-130J, C-17, P-8, 737 VIP) and France (Mirage 2000, Sepecat Jaguar [brit also]). The Indians apparantly passed on Russian and US fighters (F/A-18E/F) in order to be less dependent on a specific nation. By purchasing Rafael, they can do this and already have an MOU/MOA in place for the Mirage 2000. Typhoon, like the Jaguar and the Tornado are managed by an international consortium (GBR, DEU, ESP, ITA) making MOUs and MOAs all the more difficult. Finally, the French have been flogging Rafael to anyone and everyone they can to no avail. I'm guessing the offset offered in this deal is more than 100% - meaning India will get back more than it spends in other trade and benefits.
The big question I now have is will the Indian Navy follow suit and give up their Mig 29Ks for the Naval Rafael? It might be possible but would require refit of their new carriers (no catapults). Interesting...
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I recently attended the IQPC Air Power for Irregular Warfare Conference and one of the speakers was a Super Tucano pilot from the Brazilian AF. The aircraft already has an impressive record, flying COIN and "ISR" operations for a number of South American Air Forces. The AT-6 was also briefed but by a company rep. The capabilities were similar but the aircraft still has to go beyond the prototype stage. If the USAF wants a ready aircraft, straight from factory to the line without all of the R&D and associated cost overruns, the Super Tucano is the go to weapons system.
More importantly, there may be some quid pro quo involved with Brazil and Embraer, especially since the Brazilian AF is looking at the F/A-18, Gripen and Rafael for its next generation Air Defense Fighter. Buying a fair number of Super Tucanos could provide a significant offset against a Brazilian F/A-18 order.
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Once again the USAF sticks it to themselves and other services to fund a pet project. I've just recently briefed a conference on irregular warfare and several LAAR advocates were there (military, GS and contractor). All of them said the fate of the LAAR was tied like the C-27J to the F-35. Until JSF is fully funded the USAF will shut down all other projects not deemed nationally critical (e.g. MQ-9 and RQ-4 production) and re-program those funds.
This is an old story as well. While on active duty I watched as several vital and viable weapons systems were shut down before they had adequate replacements (F-4G, RF-4, ABCCC, E-10, EF-111). Yes they were expensive but their replacements; if they had a replacement (think ABCCC, RF-4 and E-10) were either not immediately up to the task or were simply discounted. But the key requirement was the development and production of the F/A-22 - I had several colleagues in the Acquisition world who referred to the F/A-22 as the vampire as it sucked everyone else's programs dry.
So now we have the F/A-22 that has not been down range yet, the F-35 which probably won't go down range anytime soon and we as an AF are shutting down F-16 and F-15 guard units, slashing at needed airlift (no more C-17s, reduced upgrades for C-5s) and ignoring the lessons of current conflicts (Afghanistan, Columbia) to go after the top shelf weapons systems over something that is available, safe and cheap (AT-6) ready made for low level conflicts and irregular missions (convoy support, immediate CAS against emerging targets in urban environments).
But its coming back around. The Army is getting screwed on the C-27J and LAAR so they may soon go their own way. I expect to see LAAR and C-27J contracts for SOF and Army - which further begs the question: If the USAF cannot actually support the Army, Navy and Marines then what does it actually do? Cyber warfare, Space, strategic air lift and defence?
One of our speakers, a Professor from a National Military University noted increased calls for the USAF to go back to being the US Army Air Corps. Don't think for a moment, they won't do it. Warrant Officers now fly Apache - in many ways more complex than current fighters so that argument is lost. The only thing the USAF can hang its hat on is Strategic defence and once the Navy takes over with subs and the army takes over Space command (ICBMS are just big guided mortars after all) then the USAF has nowhere to go. Our leadership really needs to wake up and smell the coffee. Otherwise we'll all be going green and it won't have anything to do bio fuels and bio-degradable paint.
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Question - what are the qualifications for an RQ-4 Global Hawk pilot? Given the weapons system is fully autonomous I would have thought the new UAS/RPV pilots would be the first option.
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Such a horrific loss... Our prayers go out to their families and their fellow warriors.
But I have a question... Why would we put that many high value assets on a single helicopter into a hot LZ? Placing a huge number of SEAL team 6 on board one aircraft seems like a disaster waiting to happen... Are they short on helos or is there an attempt to reduce footprint? I sure hope not...
At any rate - salute to the finest warriors ever to grace our great nation. They will be missed...
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Really sad... I saw first hand the Major RIF in the early 90's. The difference here is that during that RIF, majors who could reach 15 years were offered early retirement with a penalty for years lost. Big time unfair but still the money and the benefits were there. I had a few friends in that group and they were told - OK you've been passed over once - you can retire or you can take your chances with the next board. You lose that board you are out... Most took the money and ran. There were some knuckleheads that thought they could game the system and make it - they of course did not... But you cannot cure stupid... It is telling that this option was not offered this time and in my opinion unfair.
BTW, about three years later we were so short of officers that the USAF was offering 100 percent continuation to 20 years for Capts and 24 years for Majors. The sin wave of personnel mismanagement continues undisturbed by reality or common sense.
Hobbit
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OK - the 20 year retirement is designed as a retainer,not a retirement per se. The idea is that by taking the retirement check, you place yourself in line for reactivation should the nation require it. Doesn't happen but it can. So why 20 years? Well, for this we go back to the reason fora young service. When 20 year career was developed, there was a lot more gruntwork requiring young, very fit service members able to keep up with the demandsof infantry, flight in un or poorly pressurized cockpits, hot bunking on ships,etc. Since WWII we have moved more into a technologically service orientedforce that requires more brain power and less brute power (some career fields exemptedof course - infantry, tactical aviation, special ops, etc.). This means that servicemembers are not only more valuable longer but are more valuable over time(experience). So while a 42 year old infantryman may be struggling to keep up with a 22 year old infantryman, a 42 year old acquisition specialist is running circles around a 22 year old newbie just out of tech school. And will be for the foreseeable future. So in essence, the need for a young force is less important now than it was in 1950. In some cases (acquisition,intelligence, logistics, maintenance, etc.) older is probably better and by age 42, the service member in question is likely at the peak of his or her proficiency and therefore a very valuable commodity.
The other reason for the 20 year retirement deals with the military culture andhow our careers evolve. We generally move every 3-4 years and have a few remotes/six month deployments and several PCS schools (e.g. PME, Tech School, UPT, RTU, etc.) over a 2 - 24 year period. This means the typical military family (member and spouse) cannot generally build deep roots in any community they live in. Even if they buy a house they live there for only 3-4 years then it's on the road again. For spouses this means no second careers. Even spouses with portable jobs (e.g. teachers, nurses) have a hard time maintaining a career as they move from one location to another. As a result, by age 38-44 the typical military family (member, spouse and now probably 1-3 teenage kids) will have less than 3-4 years on station when the member retires.
Now contrast that with the neighbour who has lived in the same house and worked in the same area for the last 20-22 years. That family unit probably has paid down their house significantly, both spouses probably work and have viable careers and the family has established lifelong friends and connections. This means the military family at age 42 is essentially starting where the civilian family did 22 years earlier. And you don't get those years back. The military member may find work paying the equivalent to his or her former position but not the seniority. In this case, the military member is starting at the bottom. For the spouse its worse. He or she has been off the career track for 20-22 years and now must start over competing against other candidates more than a generation younger. So you have a new house (with a full 30 year mortgage), two new jobs (one at absolute beginning status) and live in a community that maybe wonderful but is alien and will take years to really integrate into. Who would do this to themselves voluntarily?
The answer is "the military" and primarily for the retirement. The immediate support of the retirement check and medical benefits is a cushion allowing for an easier transition to the civilian world. While you don't get rich off of retirement it will generally pay the house payment, the utilities and the car payment. After that, all you need to do is cover food - and youcould do that as a greeter at Wal-Mart. Not that most military would do this... It is however an option. So if retirement was taken off the table with a general promise of less money at age 57 but not before the rank and file are going to bail. If they go through with this 10 year retirement at 57 it will be even worse. There is no incentive to stay past 10 years since you are vested and you won't get your money earlier anyway. In fact staying the extra 10 years would be devastating financially as the member could have made far more and paid off more of his or her house/cars etc. in that next 10 years. Simple economics...
So if the committee wants to really change the retirement system, they really need to change what a military career is. For this, we need to discard the notion of a need for a young service. We also need to discard the "up or out" policies we have now. In short, like many of our allies a military career is something you do for life, not for 20 years before finding something else to do.
Proposal - set the mandatory retirement age at 57 - all officers are fully qualified to Lt Col all enlisted fully qualified to MSgt. The cream as always will climb to the top while the rest will fulfil their careers moving from tactical to staff and training positions over time. In some services, the pilot force is managed in this fashion - in Sweden for example, all pilots are supposed to be fighter pilots in their "youth" progressing to transports and helicopters as they get older. Those who want to leave and fly for the airlines do so but at a loss of retirement benefits. Several NATO allies have an all or nothing retirement program that requires their members toreach age 55 before retirement. At least one NATO member even restricts retirees from taking on new work by reducing their payments by the same amount they receive from their new position (discourages the military to contractor revolving door).
There are some benefits to this plan. The biggest being the re-branding of a military career as a calling versus a job. Unless the member wants to be CSAF there is little need for the careerism we see today. Members would choose jobs according to AF and personal needs and desires versus how it affects their careers. There will be less pressure to get promoted "on time" allowing for more broadening of careers and longer assignments (5-6 years). You still have the spouse issue, but since the member is staying in one place longer, there is less disruption. Moreover, by the time the member is ready to retire they are more likely to be grandparents than parents of school age children - even less disruption. And finally - retiring at age 57 means the retirement package starts right then allowing for a better transition.
In my opinion, the establishment of a career to age 57 is critical to any changes in the retirement system. If the government decides to simply move retirement to 57 and high five then the exodus will be huge. Mainly because military members simply aren't crazy or stupid enough to place themselves and their families in the position of starting over at age 38-44 with nothing but a promise and a plaque. It's just not fair. This is common sense...
Just my thoughts
Hobbit
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On most of the test flight videos I have seen, they rarely raise the gear for the first flight.
I once knew a test pilot who when asked the same question said "we don't raise the gear on the first flight because we're not sure if it will come down."
In reality, every event in flight testing (and ground testing) is done according to a test card or script. These cards and/or scripts are extensions of an approved test plan that stretches out over the entire test and evaluation program. As a result, the first flight often does not include cycling of the gear as they are testing everything from avionics to low speed handling. They simply don't have time for it. So while it may look strange, the flight deck and engineers in the aircraft are up to their ears in tests. There is a lot of "can you hear me know" kind of mundane testing going on. Not really that exciting at this point.
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The Airbus A400M finally has its first flight. Looking at the video you'd think the huge collection of politicians and airbus leadership had just launched a ship to the moon. Interestingly the aircaft claims to take the place between the C-17 and the C-130 though its expected performance to date (overweight - reduced range and payload) make it look more like a very expensive C-130J. In fact, the program is so far behind schedule and over budget that any thought of profitability is long gone. Further, most of its customers are now using penalty clauses to demand rebates and reduced costs, which is kind of stupid since Airbus is heavily subsidized by most of those same countries (FR, UK, GE, LX etc). Any losses the consortium realizes in lack of sales have to be made up by the nations themselves... So they will be "robbing Peter to pay Paul"... To add insult to injury, South Africa, one of the only non-European countries to contract the A400M in decent numbers has cancelled the order because it is so late to need. Meanwhile the UK has ordered yet another C-17 bringing their numbers to seven.
Still it looks cool...
QDR General: USAF Must Rethink Strategies
in General Discussion
Posted
Interesting - Maj. Gen. Steven Kwast said, responsible for the USAF portion of the QDR is giving a more balanced view of the USAF's tech future. In what might be seen as a challenge to the USAF Chief Scientist's report, Gen Kwast argues against placing all of the USAF's "eggs" into the RPA basket. In essence, he sites the the immature nature of the technology and the need to develop achievable operational and technical capabilities. Good points all... Further he denies any rumours of F-35 cancellation, calling it an important part of the overall concept of operations.
Note that this is just the USAF point of view, and that once the QDR starts many pre-concieved notions will change. But it is an interesting and public disagreement among the leaders who will shape the USAF in both the short and long term.
http://www.defensene...hink-Strategies