Jump to content

Mobility Guardian 2021


Recommended Posts

4 hours ago, passingtime69 said:

Love all this near peer talk from the C-17 guys. Spoiler alert: even if ya had the link, the radar warning, and all the other tactical gear the patches and airdroppers think they need to push into a dense threat area, it aint gonna happen. These “high speed” individuals in the community truly do have an identity complex that pushes them to somehow think they’ll be a night one train just behind a strike train and need all that gear to survive - any knowledge of current “near peer” threat would tell ya you won’t be. It hurts to hear it, but the money is absolutely better invested in equipment and upgrades that allow the jet to be more safe in hauling the mail worldwide in a permissive area where you’re not a liability to other assets trying to protect a miles long train flying 130 knots to drop jumpers.

That said - I do agree, pretty bullshit all the steps you have to take to plot a ring on the display or trouble needed to find your bullseye.


Sent from my iPhone using Baseops Network mobile app

You must work pretty deep in the JCS to predict what the construct of the next war will look like?

What are the odds of us seeing a B-2 employ a nuke in our lifetime? Does that mean that B-2 dudes don’t train for the worst case, high end fight nor ensure they have the best equipment to deliver that effect? 
 

To other posters talking about the current ops tempo, I got it - but I’m tired of that being an excuse.  What we do in CENTCOM and other commandant commands as MAF dudes is not hard, at all.  You have got to be an average aircraft commander at best to succeed in most operational missions currently. Don’t tell me there isn’t time back home during the workday to get a little smarter on near peer threats or attempt to be more tactically oriented.  Maybe less Christmas party/CGOC planning and more time in the vault might help. 

Circling back to the MAF JFR/GRF construct passingtime69 aludes to: it was option B to invade Iraq in 2003, it was almost used in Haiti with 130s/17s enroute with 82nd troopers on board until they were recalled. Unlikely? Probably, but not out of the realm of possibility if we decide to kick the doors down of a country. 

 

  • Like 4
Link to comment
Share on other sites



And then the fighter guys turnaround and complain about not being supported in things like ACE, or that mobility lacks a tactical mindset.

I’d love all the KC-135s to have working lights and crews not be afraid to turn them on over the desert.

You are at much higher risk doing lights out ops from your receivers than any ground threat.

And if you ever get the chance to brush up on HVA killers...do it. You’ll see that in today’s world. There is very little you can do other than stay waaaaaay away.

Push tankers away 100 miles, you just lost 200 miles of fighter range.




Sent from my iPhone using Baseops Network mobile app
  • Like 3
  • Upvote 1
Link to comment
Share on other sites

Observations

  • Airlift and AR are absolutely critical to a peer fight. We will lose without them. The key to a war win is 1.) a clear executable strategy and 2.) logistics. Understand that as mobility force and live it.
  • If fighter AR doesn’t get prioritized by TACC, that doesn’t mean it’s not important. In fact, TACC’s priorities are often 540° off what they should be. These are people that famously use KC-10s to haul an NCO’s household goods across the Pacific, or use C-17s to strat airlift Gatorade to the Deid. Use knowledge and judgement to determine what’s important, then continuously press your leaders and MAJCOM to move in that direction.
  • No amount of RWR, Link 16, chaff, or flares will help heavies survive against big threats any different than you do now. Those’ll maybe save the 6-9% of the crews that couldn’t mission plan for defensive considerations or didn’t understand what was happening on the radio. Survival starts with understanding and planning.
  • Airlift brings weapons into a FOB so the fighters and bombers can continue to rearm and fight. Then they return and repeat until someone loses. If you find yourselves with a pallet of JASSM in the back of your mobility aircraft, do not launch them. Land and give them to someone who knows how to use them. Then go do that again. Don’t waste time on learning how to shoot something, you’ll always be worse at that. Focus on your core competencies.
  • C-17 combat airdrop is something I’d love to learn a lot more about. I think they’d be dropping paratroopers eventually, but not with RF SAMs or fighters still around. That seems like an ALR too far. Manpads maybe. The last 2 large scale paratrooper airdrops were Just Cause and OIF into an airfield already held by friendlies. None in Desert Storm, which I think is a significant indicator of the risk involved for ingressing heavy airlift during a shooting war.
  • Upvote 2
Link to comment
Share on other sites

10 hours ago, dream big said:

To other posters talking about the current ops tempo, I got it - but I’m tired of that being an excuse.  What we do in CENTCOM and other commandant commands as MAF dudes is not hard, at all.  You have got to be an average aircraft commander at best to succeed in most operational missions currently. Don’t tell me there isn’t time back home during the workday to get a little smarter on near peer threats or attempt to be more tactically oriented.  Maybe less Christmas party/CGOC planning and more time in the vault might help.

There isn't time back home during the workday to get a little smarter. What gets measured gets managed; OPRs, Christmas parties, bullshit taskers, rejected vouchers, and "insert nonsensical tasks," that's what your boss is going to hassle you about. Not how tactically minded/proficient you are.

Now, if you're saying that "leaders" at the SQ/GP/WG should ensure everyone has time to get better at flying-centric duties, I couldn't agree more. However, at this point, the onus is on the managers, not the squadron line flyer.

  • Upvote 1
Link to comment
Share on other sites

Link to comment
Share on other sites

I think palletized munitions is one of the coolest things out there to help out in A2/AD fights. Just look at JASSM capacity on the bomber/Strike fleet and how you can multiply that many times with mobility assets. Not sure why anyone that actually gives a crap about AirPower would scoff that idea.

  • Upvote 1
Link to comment
Share on other sites

5 minutes ago, Danger41 said:

I think palletized munitions is one of the coolest things out there to help out in A2/AD fights. Just look at JASSM capacity on the bomber/Strike fleet and how you can multiply that many times with mobility assets. Not sure why anyone that actually gives a crap about AirPower would scoff that idea.

Yep, and it requires little-to-no additional training for airdrop qualified crews.

I can see very little reason not to have this as a hip-pocket cape.

 

  • Haha 2
Link to comment
Share on other sites

10 minutes ago, Danger41 said:

I think palletized munitions is one of the coolest things out there to help out in A2/AD fights. Just look at JASSM capacity on the bomber/Strike fleet and how you can multiply that many times with mobility assets. Not sure why anyone that actually gives a crap about AirPower would scoff that idea.

I agree, but mainly because of the reasons in this thread...(is it scoffed at!)

Edited by Tonka
words are hard
Link to comment
Share on other sites



it was almost used in Haiti with 130s/17s enroute with 82nd troopers on board until they were recalled. Unlikely? Probably, but not out of the realm of possibility if we decide to kick the doors down of a country. 
 


Dating myself, but those were C-141s. Buddha came online a year or two afterwards...


Sent from my iPad using Baseops Network mobile app
Link to comment
Share on other sites

I mean, at one point in history someone asked "what if we put a bunch of miniguns on a cargo plane?"

Yeah let’s be honest but the C-130 is the turboprop timeline version of the same shit we did with the 707.

It wasn’t that there was a perfection of that airframe to do a role, it was that there were literally so many of them nobody cared that somebody wanted to take one and try something with it.

And now because like the 707 series it’s literally doing “all the jobs” nobody is going to replace the damn thing because as an aircraft developer you are trying to replace more a family of systems off one airframe, not just an airframe.

Sent from my iPad using Tapatalk
Link to comment
Share on other sites

55 minutes ago, Lawman said:


Yeah let’s be honest but the C-130 is the turboprop timeline version of the same shit we did with the 707.

It wasn’t that there was a perfection of that airframe to do a role, it was that there were literally so many of them nobody cared that somebody wanted to take one and try something with it.


Sent from my iPad using Tapatalk

BS the C-130 is perfect in every way

  • Like 1
  • Haha 2
Link to comment
Share on other sites

13 hours ago, Majestik Møøse said:

Airlift and AR are absolutely critical to a peer fight. We will lose without them.

Concur with that but so do our enemies so they will and are planning for ways to deny us them in the way we plan to use them now so we probably need to plan to do them differently to make it harder for them to destroy that critical support and primary mission capability.  

Looking at us now (the AF specifically), we are primarily OT&E'd to deliver the range of Air Mobility missions thru large and manned platforms, making the targeting problem relatively simple for the enemy to plan to eliminate it, maybe not execute it but plan to and threaten that force thereby affecting our planning and training to use that force.  Changing what we have and how we intend to bring those missions to the fight(s) will make the adversary's targeting and denial strategies / tactics more difficult and or more costly, ideally bolstering our deterrence against aggression or if a fight starts a more survivable force for him to contend with.

If we are serious about delivering Air Mobility into contested environments with growth in capes our two likely and capable opponents have now and likely in the future we need to increase the number of mobility platforms to complicate the targeting problem, introduce and field unmanned mobility platforms for some of the high risk and conversely for some of the low risk routine/repetitive missions, develop multi-mission capable manned Air Mobility platforms similar in some ways to tactical platforms now if we want the capability to deliver Air Mobility into some contested environments and for the mass movements of people and cargo into relatively safe MOBs as a contingency happens we probably should rely on CRAF, contractors and military versions of civilian air freighters for maximum efficiency & reliability.

That's a big change from how we do things now but if we don't realize that our enemies pay attention too, they have watched how we do business for the last 25+ years and will never allow us the advantages our last few enemies we actually fought could not threaten, we will regret it.

Link to comment
Share on other sites

4 hours ago, Clark Griswold said:

Concur with that but so do our enemies so they will and are planning for ways to deny us them in the way we plan to use them now so we probably need to plan to do them differently to make it harder for them to destroy that critical support and primary mission capability.  

Looking at us now (the AF specifically), we are primarily OT&E'd to deliver the range of Air Mobility missions thru large and manned platforms, making the targeting problem relatively simple for the enemy to plan to eliminate it, maybe not execute it but plan to and threaten that force thereby affecting our planning and training to use that force.  Changing what we have and how we intend to bring those missions to the fight(s) will make the adversary's targeting and denial strategies / tactics more difficult and or more costly, ideally bolstering our deterrence against aggression or if a fight starts a more survivable force for him to contend with.

If we are serious about delivering Air Mobility into contested environments with growth in capes our two likely and capable opponents have now and likely in the future we need to increase the number of mobility platforms to complicate the targeting problem, introduce and field unmanned mobility platforms for some of the high risk and conversely for some of the low risk routine/repetitive missions, develop multi-mission capable manned Air Mobility platforms similar in some ways to tactical platforms now if we want the capability to deliver Air Mobility into some contested environments and for the mass movements of people and cargo into relatively safe MOBs as a contingency happens we probably should rely on CRAF, contractors and military versions of civilian air freighters for maximum efficiency & reliability.

That's a big change from how we do things now but if we don't realize that our enemies pay attention too, they have watched how we do business for the last 25+ years and will never allow us the advantages our last few enemies we actually fought could not threaten, we will regret it.

Taking this one step further, if I’m those bad guys I know there are two things that MAF force can’t operate without - TRANSCOM and The 618th AOC. So to gain advantage in the outset, I’d be turning every cyber ninja bad guy warrior I can toward shutting them down. 

The centralized and efficient processes that developed to support COIN conflicts are akin to those that made the Berlin Airlift hum along. Shooting wars are messy, inefficient, and chaotic. When the next high end fight kicks off, the current processes, organizations, and leadership will all need to be ushered offstage so the innovators, do-ers and combat leaders can get back in the mix. We’ve been in purgatory long enough… Especially in the MAF.

Chuck

  • Like 1
  • Upvote 2
Link to comment
Share on other sites

35 minutes ago, Chuck17 said:

 When the next high end fight kicks off, the current processes, organizations, and leadership will all need to be ushered offstage so the innovators, do-ers and combat leaders can get back in the mix. We’ve been in purgatory long enough… Especially in the MAF.

Chuck

Spot on for AFSOC as well.  But you’re asking an impossibly difficult organizational task: for its leadership to realize they can’t lead in a new environment.  And what is the mechanism to ID new leaders whose thought processes are compatible with the new environment?  There isn’t one.

When the next high end fight kicks off (which I think is not soon), we’re going to follow the pattern we’ve always followed: get our ass kicked a little bit, then pivot dramatically by firing existing leadership.  That will be our only chance to win…. Assuming those new military leaders are matched by political leaders who also demand victory and enable it.  
 

Our entire approach to war will need to look very different than the last 20 years.

  • Upvote 2
Link to comment
Share on other sites



Taking this one step further, if I’m those bad guys I know there are two things that MAF force can’t operate without - TRANSCOM and The 618th AOC. So to gain advantage in the outset, I’d be turning every cyber ninja bad guy warrior I can toward shutting them down. 
The centralized and efficient processes that developed to support COIN conflicts are akin to those that made the Berlin Airlift hum along. Shooting wars are messy, inefficient, and chaotic. When the next high end fight kicks off, the current processes, organizations, and leadership will all need to be ushered offstage so the innovators, do-ers and combat leaders can get back in the mix. We’ve been in purgatory long enough… Especially in the MAF.
Chuck


This problem isn't just a MAF problem, or a TACC problem. Put in more general terms: Attacking an AOC or a COCOM headquarters severely impacts our ability to execute C2 of our forces. This is also a problem for the CAF, and the joint force at large.

That's nothing new-headquarters/C2 have been a critical node that affects fighting capability throughout history. What's changed is that it used to be harder to attack headquarters/C2 because those functions tended to be further to the rear of a battlefield and harder to reach, limited only by their ability to communicate with the front lines. Airpower made it easier to reach out and attack a headquarters, but advancements in IADS make it easier to deter air attacks. And now, cyber attacks remove most of the safety that physical distance from the front line brought.

It's easy to say scrap the system and get the combat minded people in the seat to make decisions. But for MAF, you still have to prioritize movements because airlift is limited, and losing the AOC removes efficiencies and effectively decreases available airlift capacity. A fighting force can only move as fast as it's logistical tail.

How does a line squadron decide what needs to be moved and when (unless it gets chopped to support a specific commander)? What takes priority, a M1 Abrams tank, food and water, a MICAP engine for a fighter, or evacuation of a patient in critical condition?
Link to comment
Share on other sites

Taking this one step further, if I’m those bad guys I know there are two things that MAF force can’t operate without - TRANSCOM and The 618th AOC. So to gain advantage in the outset, I’d be turning every cyber ninja bad guy warrior I can toward shutting them down. 
The centralized and efficient processes that developed to support COIN conflicts are akin to those that made the Berlin Airlift hum along. Shooting wars are messy, inefficient, and chaotic. When the next high end fight kicks off, the current processes, organizations, and leadership will all need to be ushered offstage so the innovators, do-ers and combat leaders can get back in the mix. We’ve been in purgatory long enough… Especially in the MAF.
Chuck

True
We’re in a business / operations model likely to not work in the cyber environment we’re seeing develop now with also the threat of long range non nuclear (fingers crossed) ballistic and cruise missile capes
Also to your point of the leadership being selected for process efficiency optimization skills vs strategic & operational military judgement I concur
25+ years of steady state operations in CENTCOM have put us into a cultural rut that is not easy to escape


Sent from my iPhone using Tapatalk
  • Upvote 1
Link to comment
Share on other sites

On 6/10/2021 at 5:35 PM, FlyingWolf said:

Yep, and it requires little-to-no additional training for airdrop qualified crews.

I can see very little reason not to have this as a hip-pocket cape.

 

I truly hope you have both at least ACAD level C-17 AD experience as well as at least FLUG level JASSM employment experience before blasting out a statement like that… 

Link to comment
Share on other sites

On 6/11/2021 at 7:00 AM, jazzdude said:

How does a line squadron decide what needs to be moved and when (unless it gets chopped to support a specific commander)? What takes priority, a M1 Abrams tank, food and water, a MICAP engine for a fighter, or evacuation of a patient in critical condition?

This is the problem set, but the sad part is that it already happens on occasion these days in the C-130 world.  I watched a single Det run by a detco, a sup, a duty load, and an arms troop run airlift for four months at a time supporting multiple users at multiple bases without so much as a single complaint.  Heck, I think their MX section was all of 20 people total.  All they needed was reliable periodic comms with the users.  No-one hears about it because they got the job done.  But C-17s are involved so clearly it's not really happening or worthy of acknowledging.

Granted that's on a small scale, but ACE, distributed ops, or whatever else you want to call it can work great if we identify the mission, the users, and let the tactical leaders on the line sort out the best way to meet user requirements.  The most important step is making sure TACC/AMD provides support (not C2) and is not involved in daily operations.  The second is localizing the operation and providing a clear scope, and objectives.

  • Like 1
Link to comment
Share on other sites

23 hours ago, FourFans130 said:

The most important step is making sure TACC/AMD provides support (not C2) and is not involved in daily operations.  The second is localizing the operation and providing a clear scope, and objectives.

Would that lead to or how would you prevent hoarding?

Link to comment
Share on other sites

On 6/10/2021 at 4:35 PM, FlyingWolf said:

Yep, and it requires little-to-no additional training for airdrop qualified crews.

I can see very little reason not to have this as a hip-pocket cape.

 

You gonna plan those shots, too?  Because if you’ve ever done any JASSM planning for a contested environment you should know how much of a bullshit statement that is. 

  • Upvote 1
Link to comment
Share on other sites

14 hours ago, 08Dawg said:

You gonna plan those shots, too?  Because if you’ve ever done any JASSM planning for a contested environment you should know how much of a bullshit statement that is. 

My assumption is they’d have zero play in the planning/weapons loading part, just in the “throw that shit out that back at this point/time” part.

  • Like 1
Link to comment
Share on other sites

3 hours ago, brabus said:

My assumption is they’d have zero play in the planning/weapons loading part, just in the “throw that shit out that back at this point/time” part.

It's a good thing JASSM shooters don't have to worry about LARs, timing, shot containers, spacing between shots, retargeting in flight...just push the pickle button and the weapon does the rest.

🙄

  • Haha 1
Link to comment
Share on other sites

I’m well aware of how JASSM works and is employed. Are you implying AMC guys can’t hit a release point on time at a specified altitude and heading?

I support outside the container thinking - this is worth pursuing. 

Edited by brabus
  • Like 1
  • Thanks 1
Link to comment
Share on other sites

As with everything else, the calculus is based on “is this worth the money and time we’re spending on it?” In this case, it’s costing $25m, which is of course being paid directly to LM. Are there bigger problems that could be solved with this money? I bet any PEM would say absolutely.

  • Upvote 1
Link to comment
Share on other sites

Create an account or sign in to comment

You need to be a member in order to leave a comment

Create an account

Sign up for a new account in our community. It's easy!

Register a new account

Sign in

Already have an account? Sign in here.

Sign In Now
×
×
  • Create New...