Close Air Support

[Sprkt69]

5 hours ago, Lawman said:

You aren't the only means for fires out there. TTPs and mission criteria on the ground can and do evolve.

Nobody is saying you can completely take the fighters or rotary wing CAS out of the Coin fight, but doing something like this takes the pain and suffering out of those communities of participating in that 99% of the time where they legitimately don't need to be there.

If you can get away with 3-4 Hawgs or Viper where we used to need whole squadrons because the stacks are much more self sufficient it'll still be bigger savings than trying to add what is essentially a less effective (TOS/speed/armament/etc) lower cost airplane where you still have 3-4+ aircraft where you could get away with 1-2 almost all of the time.

And I get it the Hawg guys keep leveraging that card of "what about if" with weather eyc, but to get down that low you are well into the RW envelope anyway. And if we can get out of wasting time in stacks that don't need is we can be more places when called.

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Never said or claimed aviation is the only means of fires. Some of the guided artillery works great, but is limited to just attempting to achieve desired weapons effects. I will say arty can and should be involved in any fight with the proper deconfliction. 

Even 8 LAARs would be far cheaper to operate than a 2 ship if Vipers. So what you gain is economy, and the ability to operate in multiple locations simultaneously while being able to absorb losing an aircraft to maintenance, damage, etc. with minimal impact to the overall mission.

Unless you are going with some dedicated variant of an AC-130, a dash 8 with relatively expensive hellfires compared to laser guided rockets or cannon, is still significantly more expensive in fuel, arms, maintenance and aircrew especially if one goes down for any reason,  My point of the ability to maneuver is that sometimes you have to square the corner in order to take a shot that has to be on a certain axis in a timely manner when you do not have the minutes for a dash 8 or some kind of MC-12 variant to get around the wheel. 

[SurelySerious]

My point of the ability to maneuver is that sometimes you have to square the corner in order to take a shot that has to be on a certain axis in a timely manner when you do not have the minutes for a dash 8 or some kind of MC-12 variant to get around the wheel. 

Plenty of weapons with off-axis capability that allow employment from the wheel.

[Toro]

On 8/9/2016 at 7:14 PM, Lawman said:

Ah crap yeah that's to close to home and too late to edit...

Mods?

Not over the line, but getting close...

[Clark Griswold]

On August 10, 2016 at 8:00 AM, BFM this said:

No arguments here. My beloved MAJCOM is the reason we're going through the third iteration of "fixing" the RPA business model, but I'd put my next paycheck on a table in Vegas that, yes, the RPA community will still look like a Vietnamese Under Armor sweatshop when the issue gets raised again in 6-9 years.

Yup - no vendetta against ACC but if you want to fix some major headaches in the AF I would take away 3 core functions from ACC, pass two of them, Global Integrated ISR and Personnel Recovery, other commands.  Respectively, a resurrection of Air Intelligence Command for Global Integrated ISR (and Cyberspace Superiority) and pass Personnel Recovery to AFSOC.  Command and Control is still there under them but in my opinion could wind up in AFGSC, with a new C2 platform (ideally AWACS, JSTARS and a new Looking Glass type of mission platform based on B737).  

ACC is just tasked with things that are better suited elsewhere.

On August 10, 2016 at 8:19 AM, Lawman said:

But alas I'm not running the donkey show, I just mop the floors around here.

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2

The problem with the CAS / Divestment of the A-10 shit show of late is that it is a preoccupation with systems and not a strategic approach on how to accomplish a mission set in a changing military realm, I advocate ad nausea for some airplanes, but I realize that in the big picture, it needs to be a team of systems, tactics and flexible capabilities approach to accomplish a strategy.  

Vague, but we would do better (IMO) to say CAS-ISR-Light Strike are all missions intertwined strongly now and happen in various environments at different levels of threat, demand for fires, persistence and organic capabilities for the supported unit or customer.  A family of systems will be fielded to accomplish all of these with each emphasizing a particular capability while retaining others to be flexible and capable in all environments but specialized for a particular one. 

Edited August 12, 2016 by Clark Griswold
minor

[Hacker]

10 hours ago, Clark Griswold said:

a preoccupation with systems and not a strategic approach on how to accomplish a mission set

I think it depends on who you are speaking to.

Back 10+ years ago, CSAF Johnny Jumper was crapping on all of the space geeks who were fapping about space-based-radar, saying "we are an effects-based service, not a platform-based service."

[ViperStud]

A preoccupation with systems?  Am I the only one that thinks the A-10 fiasco was about a strategic decision, after decades and hundreds of billions spent, to divest the CAS mission and force the army to bite the bullet on spinning up their own CAS?  I don't believe Welsh or any of his cronies ever thought shelving the A-10 would free up funding for the Failure-35 singlehandedly; they knew that getting out of CAS almost completely would free up the time and money to recapitalize and re-focus on Air Superiority and AI.

Edited August 13, 2016 by ViperStud

[Clark Griswold]

15 hours ago, Hacker said:

I think it depends on who you are speaking to.

Back 10+ years ago, CSAF Johnny Jumper was crapping on all of the space geeks who were fapping about space-based-radar, saying "we are an effects-based service, not a platform-based service."

Valid - just my interpretation of recent events.

8 hours ago, ViperStud said:

A preoccupation with systems?  Am I the only one that thinks the A-10 fiasco was about a strategic decision, after decades and hundreds of billions spent, to divest the CAS mission and force the army to bite the bullet on spinning up their own CAS?  I don't believe Welsh or any of his cronies ever thought shelving the A-10 would free up funding for the Failure-35 singlehandedly; they knew that getting out of CAS almost completely would free up the time and money to recapitalize and re-focus on Air Superiority and AI.

Respectfully disagree.  

I don't think the AF is trying to or did try to set the stage for the Army to make a case for getting the fixed wing CAS mission, the AF would and rightly so see that as a threat to its independent existence.  Like the C-27J, once the Army gets a major fixed wing platform, there is room now to make an argument for more Army fixed wing, something the AF will never let happen, I don't fault them for that.  The Army would never let us get our own SAM systems as that would undercut their Air Defense Artillery mission so we can't allow poaching on our ranch.  We just need to acknowledge that a certain portion of our portfolio is dedicated to supporting the ground commander, formally in doctrine and resource/plan from there.

Welsh, et al, could have managed the A-10 vs. F-35 argument by proposing an alternative solution rather than full divestment, send almost the entire CAS mission to the ARC, except for the FTU.  This would disperse the iron, getting more Congressmen, Senators and Governors interested in keeping the mission (dedicated CAS and its platform).  Argue for an "on-demand" model and put more of that baseline in the ARC's appropriation while also shifting more of the operational cost to the Force Requester when it is called on for combat ops.

[Clark Griswold]

Good article, worth the read.  

http://warontherocks.com/2016/08/oa-x-more-than-just-light-attack/

From the article and his math seems reasonable:

These platforms can consolidate the current CAS eco-system, which is tried and true, but extremely tired and growingly geriatric. A pair of F-15Es or F-16s performing air support is supported by a KC-10, receives intelligence or targeting information from an ISR asset (i.e. MQ-1/9, MC-12, or U-28), and controlled by a Joint Terminal Air Controller (JTAC). This construct is simply inefficient and expensive. What’s more it only exists as a result of continually adapting conventional assets instead of investing in an enduring solution. Adaption in the beginning of the conflict with current resources is tolerable a stop-gap, but 16 years later, this expensive stop-gap formula remains.

The total cost to operate a single CAS orbit as described above is astonishing: over $64,000 per hour or $1,000 per minute per combat air patrol.* The F-35 will only increase the bottom line, as it actually brings less, not more, capability to the type of air support used the past 15 years — and it will cost exponentially more to operate than the aircraft it is replacing. The F-35 will not have the following for several years (or longer): the small diameter bomb, IR marker, video down-link, and EO/IR sensor fidelity that equals currently deployed fighters. Accepting the published $42,200 cost per flying hour, a formation of two F-35s will grow this price-point by 68 percent, to $107,800 per hour. By comparison, OA-X is projected to operate for under $4,000 per hour, including personnel costs — a 96 percent reduction in operating cost to support a generational war against violent extremism.

If the now-operational F-35A deployed to the Middle East and flew a typical 8-hour Operation Inherent Resolve (OIR) sortie, it would cost nearly $800,000 per mission as described, not including ordnance expenditures. For every 20 forecasted OIR F-35 missions flown, the Air Force could buy an OA-X platform (assuming $15 million for either the A-29 or AT-6). As another comparison, suspending a single day of current OIR operations ($11.9 million/day) would almost buy an OA-X platform.

Not to use hyperbole but I'll just use hyperbole, this decision not the aircraft itself, but the decision to buy or not, an appropriately capable and cost effective solution to this mission may represent an almost existential moment for the AF.  

Can the institution act when confronted with a shift in the operational environment to a new form, outlook, paradigm, etc... when that is contrary to the direction that the institution has been traveling for the past 35+ years?  Can it act in a way on what it needs to do rather than what it wants to do?

[matmacwc]

Am I the only one that thinks the Scorpion is a POS?  I'd rather have an AT-6.

[Clark Griswold]

8 hours ago, Kiloalpha said:

I'll go ahead and add in another variable to your equation. Can Congress set aside the necessary capital, both monetary and political to make such an existential change? Fingers can stand on the pulpit of the CSAF and scream till the cows come home, but Congress holds their own agenda (see repeated attempts to keep the A-10). You start throwing in A-29's or Scorpions into the mix that could cause them to lose jobs in their districts because the F-35 is made in what... 30 states? That dog won't hunt. One can hope that things will change though.

As for War on the Rocks, awesome website. They have a number of articles on the Turkey "coup" that I tend to disagree with, but sure make for interesting reading.

True.  The domestic production / Congressional District problem can be solved with any of the on the table options out there now (AT-6B in KS, A-29 built under license in FL and Scorpion in TX) but the larger problem of the cultural change / acceptance in Congress & the Defense Establishment to needing a lower cost Joint Force for fighting 10+ year COIN / Stabilization / Nation Building is going to be the steep hill to climb.  The US has only been comfortable with large scale conventional warfare, unconventional or irregular has never been completely accepted, either derided as morally questionable or unwindable, neither absolutely true or false.

The historical precedent is not good as to what we did to our fleets of smaller jets / props that provided CAS / Observation & ISR / Light Strike at a much lower cost in Vietnam and to some extent the legacy piston powered fleet that served well in Korea.  

Like it or not, the Arc of Instability is going to keep producing problems that we can either ignore and hope don't produce trans-national problems (unlikely) or we (the Western nations, International Community, etc...) can intervene to keep the shit to shoe level at least.  We should just not spend ourselves into oblivion doing it.  

Edited August 18, 2016 by Clark Griswold
minor

[ClearedHot]

9 hours ago, matmacwc said:

Am I the only one that thinks the Scorpion is a POS?  I'd rather have an AT-6.

Curious why you would pick the AT-6....not hating on the AT-6, in fact I've flown it and did an assessment, lots of good, some bad, tremendous potential.

I have not flown the Scorpion, Yet...but I would note some advantages just looking at it compared to the AT-6 and A-29, two engines, wing placement, speed.

 

[nsplayr]

9 hours ago, matmacwc said:

Am I the only one that thinks the Scorpion is a POS?

What makes you say that?

[tac airlifter]

10 hours ago, matmacwc said:

Am I the only one that thinks the Scorpion is a POS?  I'd rather have an AT-6.

Why?  And why AT-6 over A-29?  

One thing that isn't often discussed when talking about COTS light strike aircraft is acoustic signature, but it's a huge player in (current) SCAR.  I don't know how the scorpion stacks up.

[Hacker]

Isn't this the kind of opinion we scoff when we hear it from non-flyer fanboy "journalists" like Tyler Rogoway?  Thinking one aircraft is awesome or crappy based on....pictures of it?  No direct experience with it?

[ClearedHot]

7 hours ago, Hacker said:

Isn't this the kind of opinion we scoff when we hear it from non-flyer fanboy "journalists" like Tyler Rogoway?  Thinking one aircraft is awesome or crappy based on....pictures of it?  No direct experience with it?

I disagree somewhat, perhaps based on my experience in the AT-6 and the shortcomings I noted.  You don't have to be an expert flying the Scorpion to notice the benefit of an extra engine, the speed, or the placement of a a wing that does not block downward visibility.  That being said, there could be other faults that I don't know out of ignorance...regardless still worthy of a basic discussion.

[nsplayr]

I have personal experience with the Scorpion jet's systems and work with three individuals who have flown it, including my boss (retired AFSOC pilot).  Their assessment is that it is definitely not a piece of shit, and I would tend to agree based on the capes it will bring once operational.  Hopefully will get to fly it myself sometime in the future.

Obviously every platform has pluses and minuses, and the Scorpion isn't some silver bullet by any means.  Then again neither are any of the aircraft we've discussed here nor is anything in our current fleet.

Still curious though what would prompt that "POS" conclusion, even just based on seeing it on paper and youtube videos.

[matmacwc]

Random thoughts:

1.) Its thrust to weight is infers it will be a pig in space.

2.) Two cockpits?

3.) Just a weather radar?

4.) No air refueling.

5.)  No gun?

6.) No threat warning.

IF I t thought about it longer I could come up with more, I just mentioned the AT-6 because we have most of the parts in the supply chain already.  Some of the issues above could be addressed but not at 20mil a copy.  And the Martin Baker seat from the T-38 is a pain in the butt, literally.  

[ClearedHot]

2 hours ago, matmacwc said:

Random thoughts:

1.) Its thrust to weight is infers it will be a pig in space.

2.) Two cockpits?

3.) Just a weather radar?

4.) No air refueling.

5.)  No gun?

6.) No threat warning.

IF I t thought about it longer I could come up with more, I just mentioned the AT-6 because we have most of the parts in the supply chain already.  Some of the issues above could be addressed but not at 20mil a copy.  And the Martin Baker seat from the T-38 is a pain in the butt, literally.  

1.  Not designed for high aspect BFM,,,and while not meant to be a replacement for the A-10 it is faster.

2.  I actually agree with two cockpits, as noted not just a replacement for the A-10 and FMS considerations come to mind that make two cockpits a necessity.

3.  Sort of...again not meant for air to air but other sensors (GMTI and a few other toys), will greatly add to SA for CAS.

4.  Design work in progress to ad air refueling.

5.  True, but then neither does the AT-6 you prefer...pods are a solution for both but strongly prefer an internal gun.

6.  Not true...threat warning piece an easy add and being worked, ECM is the bigger show-stopper in my opinion, but that too is being looked at.

[Clark Griswold]

2 hours ago, matmacwc said:

Random thoughts:

1.) Its thrust to weight is infers it will be a pig in space.

2.) Two cockpits?

3.) Just a weather radar?

4.) No air refueling.

5.)  No gun?

6.) No threat warning.

IF I t thought about it longer I could come up with more, I just mentioned the AT-6 because we have most of the parts in the supply chain already.  Some of the issues above could be addressed but not at 20mil a copy.  And the Martin Baker seat from the T-38 is a pain in the butt, literally.  

Valid critiques but the aircraft is not in it's operational configuration (or one that will be offered to a launch customer) and those might be too much to keep the price right and they might be too much or not needed for the mission.  To address your points and my meager two bits to the debate:

1 - probably not a big deal as the majority of its operational employment will be at 1G and as the probability of rolling in on a target with high G turnout after delivering unguided ordinance low, a better thrust to weight is not needed, would be nice but not necessary.

2 - Two cockpits are a plus for this mission, the missions are long, often boring but then become busy as hell and a good crew to manage the stack, radios and  inevitable chaos (while not tripping over each other is a plus).  Running longer missions (likely to be 6 hours) with a crew will likely be a plus.

3 - WX radar only is probably ok but I could see a radar like the Raytheon RACR being installed as an option for an anti-RPA role or to give it some self-defense against a fighter if you gave it a AMRAAM or two on a wing station.  In truth the Thales iMaster radar in one of the available sensor turret mounts is the real mission radar and has already been used in demonstrations for organic cross queuing.

4 - AR, nice but not necessary probably as many customers would have no tanker aircraft to refuel it anyway.  Could be added like the simple fixed AR probe the OA-37 had but probably overkill for the intention of the platform, appropriately capable and value priced in acquisition and operational cost with low risk proven systems.

5 - Gun, nice but for the light strike mission, probably not necessary and may put the aircraft into the WEZ of a system down low better dealt with X NM and X thousands of feet away after being acquired and dealt with via Hellfire rather than getting up close and personal.

6 - Threat warning to be added in operational configuration.

As you said about price and the features I mentioned may take it above 20 mil a copy, likely if you really start to add capes like the AA capable radar, so an AT-6 or A-29 might be a better fit considering what resources our AF and other price sensitive Allies might be willing to spend on a LAAR.  

A modernized IA-58 would also be a contender, just my humble opinion also.

 

 

[di1630]

Scorpion has No gun?!?!......still almost effective as the 20mm noise cannon with limited ricochet ability in A/G missions.

[Wing Sweep]

Prior ALOs or those in the know...

Has there ever been any thought to embedding USAF OA-X type aircraft into ASOS units? TACPs as enlisted aircrew?

[Clark Griswold]

Another concept CAS / COIN / LAAR aircraft that seems viable but have not heard anything about it for number of years, the ATK OV-1D... has anyone here seen it or knows if ATK got any takers for this plane?

http://www.defensetech.org/2010/10/28/old-school-coin-planes-keep-coming-back/

 

 

[Lawman]

Another concept CAS / COIN / LAAR aircraft that seems viable but have not heard anything about it for number of years, the ATK OV-1D... has anyone here seen it or knows if ATK got any takers for this plane?

http://www.defensetech.org/2010/10/28/old-school-coin-planes-keep-coming-back/

 

 

I know armed Mohawks in Vietnam were basically the "let congress sort it out" reason for the Key West fights that ended armed Army fixed wing for the next 3 decades.

It's a great plane from talking to old guys that worked with it. Stupidly simple and using the same engines as the Huey when they were literally everywhere so parts were easy. I could see it being an easy plane for a lot of our partner nations to keep and feed but they haven't been used in nearly 30 years so they aren't like the Bronco or others that enjoyed a life after the US military.

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[MD]

23 minutes ago, Lawman said:

I know armed Mohawks in Vietnam were basically the "let congress sort it out" reason for the Key West fights that ended armed Army fixed wing for the next 3 decades.

It's a great plane from talking to old guys that worked with it. Stupidly simple and using the same engines as the Huey when they were literally everywhere so parts were easy. I could see it being an easy plane for a lot of our partner nations to keep and feed but they haven't been used in nearly 30 years so they aren't like the Bronco or others that enjoyed a life after the US military.

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All the ones at Humphreys ended up on the Pilsung Range in Korea.

Very limited post-Army use indeed, although the old Customs air branch in TUS had a number of them from the late '70s to the late '80s.

[Clark Griswold]

35 minutes ago, Lawman said:

I know armed Mohawks in Vietnam were basically the "let congress sort it out" reason for the Key West fights that ended armed Army fixed wing for the next 3 decades.

It's a great plane from talking to old guys that worked with it. Stupidly simple and using the same engines as the Huey when they were literally everywhere so parts were easy. I could see it being an easy plane for a lot of our partner nations to keep and feed but they haven't been used in nearly 30 years so they aren't like the Bronco or others that enjoyed a life after the US military.

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Copy that and good details - I have heard it was well thought of and I found one of the sub-contractors mentioned in the article referenced, looks like they have 2 D models for hire.

http://www.mohawk-tech.com/mohawktech.htm

There was a proposed tandem cockpit version offered to the USMC for their LARA (Light Attack Reconnaissance Aircraft) competition they had in the 60's

The OV-10 was selected and the rest is history but not a bad prop job concept.