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Shhhh...Don't talk about the A-10


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F-15C, Tops in Blue, all bands but the HAF Band, and 96.9% of anciliary "training". I'll be expecting change with that by the way. The A-10 is dirt cheap compared to other areas where the AF hemorrhages cash.

Ha, okay, you win.

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As much as we all hate Tops in Blue, it really is a drop in the bucket compared with anything of strategic importance.

The AF is doing a poor job at clearly articulating what the 2020 threat picture looks like. Boys... it's scary. The JSF may be an ugly prom date, but it's the only one we have for delivering meaningful amounts of interdiction capability in a contested environment.

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As much as we all hate Tops in Blue, it really is a drop in the bucket compared with anything of strategic importance.

The AF is doing a poor job at clearly articulating what the 2020 threat picture looks like. Boys... it's scary. The JSF may be an ugly prom date, but it's the only one we have for delivering meaningful amounts of interdiction capability in a contested environment.

True - it is just annoying that they will keep prestige projects while continuing to kill the A-10.

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As much as we all hate Tops in Blue, it really is a drop in the bucket compared with anything of strategic importance.

The AF is doing a poor job at clearly articulating what the 2020 threat picture looks like. Boys... it's scary. The JSF may be an ugly prom date, but it's the only one we have for delivering meaningful amounts of interdiction capability in a contested environment.

The problem with the 2020 threat picture is that any sort of a "contested" environment is going to be a numbers game, at least to some degree. The F-35 may (at least on paper) be more technologically advanced than the peer/near peer adversaries we may face, but when it's out numbered 10-1, that advantage evaporates entirely. The logical fallacy that is thrown around about the F-35 (and the F-22 before it) is that one F-35 is worth some multiple of a legacy aircraft it is replacing. Even when that statement is taken at face value the other side of the equation can't be ignored-- the attrition of one F-35 is the equivalent of the loss of that multiple of legacy aircraft.

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The problem with the 2020 threat picture is that any sort of a "contested" environment is going to be a numbers game, at least to some degree. The F-35 may (at least on paper) be more technologically advanced than the peer/near peer adversaries we may face, but when it's out numbered 10-1, that advantage evaporates entirely. The logical fallacy that is thrown around about the F-35 (and the F-22 before it) is that one F-35 is worth some multiple of a legacy aircraft it is replacing. Even when that statement is taken at face value the other side of the equation can't be ignored-- the attrition of one F-35 is the equivalent of the loss of that multiple of legacy aircraft.

lol "force multiplier"... what a farce.

all i will do is point to the 2008 (yes 2008) RAND report that tore our entire way of thinking apart by pointing out exactly what Napoleon said, its a numbers game.

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I know the 2020 (or current) contested threat picture is ugly, but for the low conflicts we keep engaging in, the A-10 is pretty cost effective.

Against a peer adversary, the A-10 stopped being a Day-1 weapon around the time that it was rolling off of the assembly line. We were simply going to accept higher attrition in the Fulda Gap as part of the plan. By the 90's, the Hawg wasn't even a Week-1 weapon. Going into 2020, the Hawg simply won't be in the fight until ground troops cross the line. But there's the rub--we don't roll ground troops under contested airspace. So yes, the A-10 will sit in the chocks until the air is permissible--and it's going to continue to need cover while it does it's job.

But the capabilities simply do not translate to those platforms which are being counted on to bring down the air threat, and provide cover moving forward. The F-35 simply won't do under the weather, low vis, escort, rescort, knife-fight close proximity...and the list goes on.

To be blunt, the A-10 and it's core TTPs just aren't that far removed from an A-1D over VN. But then again, linear battlefield infantry tactics (at least looking down from the air) haven't either. Leaders have become accustomed to pred feeds and the whispers of the military industrial complex saying "but with this new technology just around the corner, EVERYTHING will be different". My bet is that even in a German Formula 1 team garage, amongst the computers and precision calipers and multimeters, there's still a claw hammer in a drawer somewhere.

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I hear the IG report on the ACC/CV "treason" remarks is complete.

Any bets on what happens to him?

I'll bet he gets moved out of the job and into some Pentagon staff job until retirement.

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I hear the IG report on the ACC/CV "treason" remarks is complete.

Any bets on what happens to him?

I'll bet he gets moved out of the job and into some Pentagon staff job until retirement.

I bet it's like The Fatigues (Seinfeld), promote him so we don't have to fire him.

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Against a peer adversary, the A-10 stopped being a Day-1 weapon around the time that it was rolling off of the assembly line. We were simply going to accept higher attrition in the Fulda Gap as part of the plan. By the 90's, the Hawg wasn't even a Week-1 weapon. Going into 2020, the Hawg simply won't be in the fight until ground troops cross the line. But there's the rub--we don't roll ground troops under contested airspace. So yes, the A-10 will sit in the chocks until the air is permissible--and it's going to continue to need cover while it does it's job.

But the capabilities simply do not translate to those platforms which are being counted on to bring down the air threat, and provide cover moving forward. The F-35 simply won't do under the weather, low vis, escort, rescort, knife-fight close proximity...and the list goes on.

To be blunt, the A-10 and it's core TTPs just aren't that far removed from an A-1D over VN. But then again, linear battlefield infantry tactics (at least looking down from the air) haven't either. Leaders have become accustomed to pred feeds and the whispers of the military industrial complex saying "but with this new technology just around the corner, EVERYTHING will be different". My bet is that even in a German Formula 1 team garage, amongst the computers and precision calipers and multimeters, there's still a claw hammer in a drawer somewhere.

That's the thing, the tactics and the way the game works have changed.

In the fight like Afganistan low CDE and precision while building the "pillars of targeting" are the name of the game. Outside the 3-10 mission or immediate TIC against US troops (and only US troops) dropping ordnance just doesn't equate to all the pros the Hawg has that other platforms don't (low level, low speed, massed gun fire etc). In many ways that 30mm much like the 105 on a Spectre or he higher CDE 500lbs bombs just generates too many unknowns to a Battle space owner whose entire world revolves around preventing CDE over killing bad guys. Right now the push in Army Aviation is getting laser guided rockets up and running because even the little 14 lbs warhead on the Hellfire is seen as overkill to a lot of commanders which is ridiculous.

In many ways yes the Hawg is more economical to the situation than say an F-35 or a Strike Eagle but really every tool we have over there is overkill right now. For the mass of aircraft we deploy we only truly need a fraction of them for that once and a while situation (chauk valley in 13 for example) but 95% of the time some long legged loitering Reaper or some turboprop with a couple Hellfires/APKWS or the occasional 500lbs bomb would meet the GFC requirements. More importantly it would stop us from putting mileage on all these thoroughbred race horse fighters that we've turned into mules.

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In the fight like Afganistan low CDE and precision while building the "pillars of targeting" are the name of the game.

I thought that we were talking about tomorrow's fight, not yesterday's. But sure, I'm game.

Outside the 3-10 mission or immediate TIC against US troops (and only US troops) dropping ordnance just doesn't equate to all the pros the Hawg has that other platforms don't (low level, low speed, massed gun fire etc).

Have you been on the ground and supported by the range of platforms you discuss? Otherwise it sounds like a talking point.

In many ways that 30mm much like the 105 on a Spectre or he higher CDE 500lbs bombs just generates too many unknowns to a Battle space owner whose entire world revolves around preventing CDE over killing bad guys. Right now the push in Army Aviation is getting laser guided rockets up and running because even the little 14 lbs warhead on the Hellfire is seen as overkill to a lot of commanders which is ridiculous. [...] Hellfires/APKWS or the occasional 500lbs bomb would meet the GFC requirements.

The Laser RX were tested on the A-10 years ago. I thought it was a fantastic idea, but I was not a decision maker at that level, and bigger brains passed on the idea. Meh...

Other than that, having employed three out of the four fielded weapons that you describe, I'm not sure where you're getting your CDE data, unless the brochure says Raytheon on the front.

In many ways yes the Hawg is more economical to the situation than say an F-35 or a Strike Eagle but really every tool we have over there is overkill right now. For the mass of aircraft we deploy we only truly need a fraction of them for that once and a while situation (chauk valley in 13 for example) but 95% of the time some long legged loitering Reaper or some turboprop with a couple Hellfires/APKWS or the occasional 500lbs bomb would meet the GFC requirements. More importantly it would stop us from putting mileage on all these thoroughbred race horse fighters that we've turned into mules.

Real simple: Army is EVENT driven. Air Force is TIME driven. That's one of the enduring puzzles of CAS. Right capability at the right time. Not gonna change. Sorry man, it's still not flying artillery, and the F-35 won't be, either. Yes, you can bridge the gap some with a long loiter platform like the Reaper, but that ignores the current debate: survivability, which the Reaper is much more vulnerable, hands down.

So that leaves your final point, wear and tear. Once the ground CC departs, the AF is going to do it's level best to have assets in place at the right TIME to catch the Army's EVENTS. If you think it's expensive to have A-10's loitering overhead, wait till you get the bill for a stack of F-35's.

Just to be clear, I think any rational A-10 advocate would say that we need the F-22 and F-35, and whatever is next down the pike. I hate it when the debate takes an "us vs. them" detour, because it distracts from the honest truths. Unfortunately, if you're counting on those airframes to provide quality integrated CLOSE Air Support, I think we're going to relearn some past lessons. The same lessons that gave us what are, in essence, upgraded capabilities from the A-1D. The only replacement should be upgraded capabilities from the A-10, not substitute pinch hitters from other communities, delivering watered down metric based sham results.

This guy is doing a better job of framing the debate than I can. And he's Army.

(Wait...I'm Air Force...that means...)11082246_954955917870893_876311383335788

Edited by BFM this
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I think you missed my point on precision. Yes you sling low CDE weapons, and caveat from a BSO decision making point of view impressions on CDE have more to do with the decision process than reality, like when they took away our Hellfires because unguided rockets had smaller warheads (no kidding).... But you don't do it any kind of significantly better than a dozen platforms also slinging those weapons. Twenty years ago, when pods and FLIR hadn't matured to where it is today, yeah eye ball to eye ball get the Hawgs in here. But with the stuff on line today and stuff like Hellfire/APKWS/DAGR/Etc... It just makes so many aircraft capable of taking over the fight we keep saying the A-10 makes more sense than the F-35 in. And yes the Hawg per flight hour is cheaper than a 35 but that's not the point. Neither one of these aircraft should be sucking money up to what amounts to airborne QRF/fires, it's overkill. Think about what qualifies as "troops in contact" right now. We don't need Hawgs (or my 40 mil Apache for that matter) to respond to 6 MRAPs taking sporadic small arms fire that happened 30 minutes ago. Yes your postured for the Infantry Bn making contact with a hostile Tank Company and needed armor smash right now but that isn't going to happen in these brushfire fights one side keeps using as proof we need to keep the Hawg around because of "efficiency."

When you eliminate that huge chunk of the A-10 making more sense argument you are left with the 10 years from now peer/near peer fight. Combine that with we have money/personnel for one or the other not both and the Hawg starts making less and less sense. And we are back to the yes you can get low slow and under the weather but F-35 can do XYZ/high threat/etc that you can't. I think part of the problem is this fight has become F-35 vs A-10 not A-10 vs the rest of the inventory. And both sides are ignoring anything that hurts their argument. For every story of Hawgs getting in somewhere somebody couldn't you can point to stuff like that Buff in Iraq stopping an armored column as CAS with modern sensor fused weapons from the stratosphere or dudes on donkeys calling in bombs of a B1 because that's what they had available.

In a lot of ways you guys are having the same fight we are having in the Army with divesting the Scouts and using UAVs and more expensive gunships to fill share the meat of that role. Are there situations where we will miss the 58 for its low cost efficiency and lower MX requirements, yes. Would we rather see a new scout vs no scout, yeah but there isn't any money for that. But to just fly general support recon like is happening right now the shadow is actually very good. And when it comes time to hit people we have it in gunships.

Edited by Lawman
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http://www.c-span.org/video/?324888-1/hearing-defense-department-fiscal-year-2016-budget

1:54:00 - 1:58:30, listen to Rep Gallego's question and CSAF Welsh's response. He's getting tired of this question, and he's certainly nailed down a good response. Whether you believe his reasoning or not, he appears to have real conviction in what he's saying. It's a good clip. I love that Rep Gallego forgot the name of the CSAF.

2:53:45 - 2:58:30, Rep McSally argues against the A-10 cut decision. As said by JQP, she both deftly and angrily pushes the SECAF and CSAF into a corner. Meh, she sure is angry but I doubt any of her comments will have lasting effect.

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This guy is doing a better job of framing the debate than I can. And he's Army.

I think that's an article by Tony Carr, an Air Force guy if I'm not mistaken. Unless I'm misinterpreting the first paragraph. No real point one way or another, just thought I'd mention it.

I just hope whatever they do, the F-35 program is used as the standard of how not to run acquisitions. Of course, the F-35 program was supposed to be the program that used the F-22 program as an example of how not to run acquisitions...

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I think that's an article by Tony Carr, an Air Force guy if I'm not mistaken. Unless I'm misinterpreting the first paragraph. No real point one way or another, just thought I'd mention it.

I just hope whatever they do, the F-35 program is used as the standard of how not to run acquisitions. Of course, the F-35 program was supposed to be the program that used the F-22 program as an example of how not to run acquisitions...

You mistake the F35 acquisitions program as anything other than a jobs program for lots of congressional districts.

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http://www.c-span.org/video/?324888-1/hearing-defense-department-fiscal-year-2016-budget

1:54:00 - 1:58:30, listen to Rep Gallego's question and CSAF Welsh's response. He's getting tired of this question, and he's certainly nailed down a good response. Whether you believe his reasoning or not, he appears to have real conviction in what he's saying. It's a good clip. I love that Rep Gallego forgot the name of the CSAF.

2:53:45 - 2:58:30, Rep McSally argues against the A-10 cut decision. As said by JQP, she both deftly and angrily pushes the SECAF and CSAF into a corner. Meh, she sure is angry but I doubt any of her comments will have lasting effect.

Probably but good to put them on the spot.

I take them at their word (sort of) when they say sequestration is why they have to divest the A-10 (and KC-10) but I have to wonder why not just propose an alternative plan with a price tag and see if Congress bites? What other job does the CSAF aspire to that keeps him from going big and just seeing if Congress bites?

Propose the LAAR or an inexpensive (in airplane terms) platform to fill CAS once the threat is suppressed and you also have a good COIN platform. Let's face it, the old order of the post WWII post colonial world is going to continue to breakdown, we will not be engaged in occupation / rebuilding Iraq style operations but in smaller scale operations of COIN / Capacity Building; having something inexpensive and not too technically challenging or too expensive to operate for our allies and can perform CAS efficiently is a win-win.

His (CSAF) job is to lead us to a better place not make the trip downward more pleasant thru smooth talking points.

Edit: grammar

Edited by Clark Griswold
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So what does he push to divest that offers the same amount of savings as the A-10/KC-10? I'm not a fan of either going away, but if we have to divest something, what else? And yeah, I know there's bullshit waste like Tops in Blue and new flat screens - but unfortunately none of those will create the same savings. It has to be something "big"...I don't know the answer, and because of that I'm not going to throw spears at the guy. I will however throw burning spears towards Congress - this is their giant shit pie and now they're making him clean it up.

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So what does he push to divest that offers the same amount of savings as the A-10/KC-10? I'm not a fan of either going away, but if we have to divest something, what else?

I understand the need to save money...but you don't do it by cutting one of the most used aircraft in the most used missions when the aircraft is hands down the best at what it does.

A year ago our esteemed USAF leadership told us we'd be done with the low intensity conflicts in 6 mos.

Now it appears we are nowhere near being done with them, but I'm supposed to believe The need for CAS in China 20 years from now is such a priority that we need to divest the A-10 now to meet that threat.

And then leadership comes out on record with false stats and politics to support their argument.....f-ing looking like morons.

How about we reign in the F-35 4bn over budget per year first.

Then we phase out jets that the F-35 is designed to replace when it's ready. F-16, etc.

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I might get crucified for this but...

Cut the B-1, KC-10 and F-15. No need for a non-nuclear bomber, the KC-135 and soon KC-46 will cover AR and the F-16 and F-22 will cover A-A.

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